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THE HISTORY OF COLONIZATION



THE
HISTORY OF COLONIZATION

From the Earliest Times to the Present Day

BY
HENRY C. MORRIS

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I

New York
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TO
MELVILLE W. FULLER
Chief Justice of the United States
AS A SLIGHT TESTIMONIAL OF ESTEEM

PREFACE

THE present work is in a certain measure the satisfaction of a personal need. Upon the occupation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands by American troops, the problem arose whether the United States was to become a colonial power. With the swiftly passing events of the conflict with Spain and the consequences inevitably following in its wake, the horizon of national influence and authority suddenly widened. "The results of war are invariably far beyond the anticipations of its promoters" is a time-worn adage, the truth of which has once again been proven; for this recent triumph of the Republic has opened, or will in due course open, a series of questions, new to this people and fraught with grave import. All great nations have passed through similar experiences; many have solved their doubts, others are still engaged in the task. Statesmen of every age have been more or less occupied in formulating doctrines and rules of administration, trade, and conduct in, with, and toward the possessions of their respective countries. The main topic, whether colonies are advantageous and hence desirable, has been frequently debated. Wherever the policy of territorial expansion has been adopted, every current phase of management and treatment has necessarily received attention and solution. History in other aspects yields bountiful instruction to the student of social phenomena; why should it not in the sphere of colonization contribute to the evolution of better methods and more enlightened theories?

Francis Parkman, in his preface to "The Old Régime in Canada," quotes from De Tocqueville: "The physiognomy of a government can best be judged in its colonies, for there its characteristic traits usually appear larger and more distinct.

When I wish to judge of the spirit and the faults of the administration of Louis XIV, I must go to Canada. Its deformity is there seen as through a microscope." It is the fact, that in the dependency national weakness or strength is most apparent, which gives additional zest to this study; because of it, the subject gains its highest interest; for in the disposition of the problems incidental to distant realms the ultimate destiny of a people may well be said to be presaged. The establishment of new germs of social, civil, and political organization in unexplored regions, and their subsequent growth in importance and influence, must ever be reckoned as most potent in results. How much the more significant this record becomes when the effects of these communities upon the citizens and the institutions of the parent state are considered.

Such thoughts, due to a natural interest in the affairs of the day, aroused in the author a desire for detailed knowledge. At that time he was residing in a land where the issue of the utility and propriety of colonial endeavor has been for several years agitating the public mind; so that the opportunity to hear arguments *pro* and *con* upon fundamental principles was not lacking. As his examination extended, he found, of course, that a considerable number of volumes relative to colonization had been published. European scholars have not neglected this theme, while in the United States distinguished writers have elaborately described the early period of American development. More careful investigation, however, shows that of these treatises almost all are devoted to certain special phases, epochs, or fields of research, are written from the standpoint of some one nation, or are too technical to be available and interesting to the majority of readers. The main object of this book may therefore be stated to be succinctly to supply information of a department of human activity, the progress of which, by reason of its peculiar complexity, it is difficult to trace within a few pages.

In pursuance of this purpose, the writer, while strictly adhering to his own method of presenting the subject, has not

hesitated to be generally guided by those whose eminence is a guarantee of their accuracy. The notes, while in many instances supplementing the text, are primarily designed as a means of acknowledging to whom the inspiration is due. In connection with the Bibliography they will also serve, it is believed, as an index to the best and most accessible literature treating the various aspects of colonization. To make any more explicit reference to specific works or sources of information in this place would be to draw an unwarranted and invidious distinction. Many, it might well be said all, the various details of the subject have been repeatedly discussed. Wherever possible the principal authorities in each instance have been cited, and to them the credit should be attributed.

Although every effort has been made to verify details of facts and figures, it is scarcely conceivable in a book of this nature that mistakes should not exist; while it is hoped that not any material errors or inconsistencies have been inadvertently overlooked, the author craves indulgence for such as may appear.

HENRY C. MORRIS.

CHICAGO,
October 1, 1900.

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THE HISTORY OF COLONIZATION

INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL research is always instructive. The study of the record of colonization is more especially attractive because, for the most part, it treats of newly discovered regions, of distant and unexplored portions of the earth; describes the meeting of civilized races with the savage and uncultured tribes native to the soil; and recalls the heroism of those, who, at the command of country, have abandoned homes and friends, to seek, across the broad expanse of waters, military, commercial, or political supremacy for their fatherland, or, as in so many instances has happened, fleeing the tyranny of church or king, have wandered afar to find freedom of thought, speech, and worship. This investigation is useful, in that it discloses the motives which have actuated states or individuals in their primary steps of establishing or forming settlements in remote localities; in that it leads to the consideration of the various circumstances which have subsequently contributed to the growth of powerful dependencies or to the evolution of independent bodies politic, thus revealing the causes or springs of action which have tended to create international friendships or animosities; and finally, in that it explains the sources of language, of customs, of trade relations, and of laws. Such discussion is necessary to a community which is debating the advisability of entering upon a colonial policy, that it may be informed of the experience of other peoples in this sphere of development; that it may not be neglectful of the duties and obligations imposed by such enterprises nor ignorant of the risks and profits involved; so much the more is it inevitable for the citizens of the parent state, after the assumption of such a connection with foreign lands, to review this branch of history that they may be warned by the errors and strength-

ened by the successes of the colonizing powers of the past and the present; to the end that they may be the more capable of granting an honest, enlightened, equitable, and Christian form of rule to those whom the stroke of destiny may have placed in their charge. Nor should the nations of the Western Hemisphere forget their own common origin, to be universally traced through the colonial phase of government. A comparison of their situation at this stage of their respective careers with that of other former and subsequent colonies should, in itself, be profoundly interesting.

To endeavor briefly to give an adequate conception of the theoretical ideal colony will therefore be the first task of the present treatise. The order then followed will be to define the subject, to classify colonial possessions into their various groups, to determine the requirements and conditions of colonial activity, to delineate the multiple characteristics requisite for the metropolis and for the colony, as essential to the welfare of the one as to the prosperity of the other. After the accomplishment of these preliminary aims, the facts of history will be elucidated with the design to show how the various principles of colonial policy have been developed. The object will be to state these details impartially and without bias, fairly and without prejudice, so as to enable the reasoning reader to formulate in any instance his own independent judgment; the effort will be strenuously made to supply concisely the data from which conclusions may be deduced, in order that he may be able to determine the best methods as well as the effects of colonization, not only upon the lands thus peopled and governed, but also upon the nation undertaking such an important labor.

In pursuance of this plan, the following particulars will in each case be mentioned:—

- Causes of colonial origin;
- Objects of colonization;
- Requisite conditions in parent state and colony;
- Methods of colonization;
- Systems of government applied to the colony;

- Period and course of development of colonial life ;
- Cost of colonization to mother country ;
- Advantages derived and disadvantages accruing from a colonial policy ;
- Causes leading to the severance of colonial ties, and the establishment of independent states ;
- Finally, in some measure, the relations existing between the former parent state and the liberated colony, after the latter's freedom has been attained.

The discussion of these various questions will effectually comprehend the field of colonial action. The lessons deduced from practical experience will indicate how far and to what extent the theoretical doctrines of model colonization have in reality been recognized and applied; what have been the exceptions, and how the force of facts has sometimes outweighed the apparent probability of theory. In this study it will be necessary to examine the circumstances relating to the origin and the earlier development of numerous influential states which have sprung from colonial establishments.

Some nations, more than others, have manifested the spirit for colonization; but genius and ability in the solution of the problems, incident to such a policy, have distinguished few peoples; still those less fortunate yield instruction by exemplifying the many embarrassments and errors possible to arise in their treatment. It is well, therefore, to include within consideration not only the more successful, but even likewise the less prosperous colonizing powers of the past. The states renowned for their colonial empires are: in antiquity, Phœnicia, Carthage, Greece, and Rome; in the Middle Ages, Pisa, Florence, Genoa, and Venice; in modern times, Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, and England. As more available and more useful to students of this topic, the greater attention will be paid to those countries of the existing era, which have retained their possessions.

After the outlines of the creation and maintenance of colonial life, past and present, shall thus have been sketched, some vital questions naturally arise. What is really the prime

motive for the establishment of colonies—the extension of trade or the diffusion of civilization? Are colonies useful to the parent state? If so, in what sense and to what degree? Do the advantages or disadvantages of such a system preponderate? On these problems the views of statesmen have always been at variance. It is not the purpose of this work to advocate either cause. When the experiences of mankind shall have been recalled and considered, all—even though disagreeing in opinion—will be able to judge and reason independently.

One of the difficulties encountered in the study of colonization is the orderly arrangement of the matter presented in some sequence of time or locality. History, as a rule, treats of one people or one country; events are limited to some one region, and follow each other in a fixed chronological order. This narrative is different in that reference must frequently be made to many of the contemporaneous races, other than the principal nation; while numerous events, removed in space but simultaneous in time, cannot be treated consecutively. A grave problem is therefore presented, how to attain a clear conception of the era when the actions described were transpiring: only one method will obviate confusion,—the recollection that many occurrences, narrated of various peoples, are more or less coincident with each other; that there is a constant forward and retrograde motion; that fragmentary portions of the annals of many states are in fact being read; after the one is perused from the beginning to the end, another must then likewise be traced from its source. Nevertheless, it is hoped, the reader of these chapters will realize that there has gradually been a steady improvement in the administration of dependencies.

Another delicate task is to discriminate the historical facts which properly relate respectively to navigation, trade, and colonization. Throughout the ages the three topics have been more or less blended. In antiquity the origin of commerce was contemporaneous with the birth of the science of seafaring, while colonial activity was so associated with trade as to render the history of the one almost the chronicle of the other; in mediæval times the development of the Italian republics in

maritime skill, in mercantile enterprise, and in colonial effort was parallel; while, finally, in the modern era, national pre-eminence in distant lands has always depended upon sea power, and has sprung from the desire for wider trade relations. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the art of navigation exercised in a regularly increasing ratio its influence; in recent years this element, by reason of its approximate perfection, seems to have become fixed; but the effect of commercial and trade motives upon colonial policies is still daily more and more intense. If, therefore, in this treatise — especially in the earlier chapters — undue attention should appear to have been given to these allied subjects, let it be remembered that colonization found in both its origin and has been closely connected with them during its entire career.

PRELIMINARY CHAPTER

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

THE Latin "colonia," whence the word "colony," primarily means a possession in land, a landed estate, a farm; secondarily, an abode or dwelling; and in the third place, a colony or settlement.¹ The allied word "colonus"² describes a husbandman, or tiller of the soil, a farmer, one who cultivates another's land, a colonist, and finally an inhabitant of a colonial town. Hence it may be stated that a colony conveys the idea of a landed possession, wherein agriculture is the chief occupation of the inhabitants; a colonist, in the true meaning of the term, is essentially an agriculturist.

Modern authorities generally define the word "colony" in almost identical language. Johnson's Dictionary reads, "A body of people drawn from the mother country to inhabit some distant place." "The country planted; a plantation."

Webster says: 1st, "A company or body of people, transplanted from their mother country to a remote province or country to cultivate and inhabit it, and remaining subject to the jurisdiction of the parent state." 2d, "The country planted or colonized; plantation; also the body of inhabitants in a territory colonized, including the descendants of the first planters."

Worcester gives the definition: 1st, "An establishment or settlement formed in a foreign country by a body of men

¹ In so far as words are concerned it may be said that the Greek "apoikia" corresponds more nearly to the modern word "colony" than does the Latin "colonia"; cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 438.

² A later meaning is serf or villein, an unfree tenant; the Roman "colonus" was a direct predecessor of the mediæval serf; for full description cf. Du Cange, "Glossarium Mediæ et Infimæ Latinæ" (Nivot, 1883), II, 414, *sub* "colonus."

emigrating from their mother country." 2d, "The country planted or colonized."

The Century Dictionary describes a colony as: 1st, "A company or body of people who migrate from their native country or home to a new province, country, or district, to cultivate and inhabit it, but remain subject to or intimately connected with the parent state; also the descendants of such settlers so long as the connection with the mother country is retained." 2d, "The country or district planted or colonized."

McCulloch, in his Dictionary of Commerce, lays down the rule, "Colonies are establishments founded in foreign countries by individuals who either voluntarily emigrate from or are forcibly sent abroad by their mother country."

Littre's French Dictionary defines colony as: "An establishment founded by a nation in a foreign country—Possession of an European nation in another part of the world—Assemblage of individuals who have left one country to inhabit another. The place whither they have gone—People of one same country inhabiting a foreign locality."

The Dictionary of the French Academy reads: "Colony is properly applied to the assemblage of men who have left one country in order to go to inhabit another and, by extension, to the population which forms and is perpetuated in the place of their settlement; also to the place or country inhabited by a colony."

Brockhaus' German Conversation Dictionary states: "A colony in general is a settlement in a foreign land or among a foreign people. The settlement must be enduring and must spring from a large number of the subjects of the same nation, who preserve their native customs and language, and thereby, generally in connection with an independent organization, establish a distinct society in the midst of a foreign people. In this sense, the maintenance of political dependency on the metropolis is not necessarily involved. In the narrower definition of the word, however, only such settlements as preserve their connection with the mother country are denominated colonies."

It is thus evident that the essential characteristic of a colony is the common nationality of its original settlers;¹ these latter must recognize one flag, must have emigrated in some considerable numbers from the same fatherland, and must have been strong enough to transport with themselves their language, customs, and laws, transplanting them to the foreign soil. Any dependency, the inhabitants of which do not, at least in part, correspond to these requirements, is not properly a colony, but merely a possession; such is, for example, an island owned by an European power, but entirely, or almost entirely, peopled by the aborigines, no matter of what degree their civilization.² In treating the subject at hand, this distinction should always be borne in mind. Sometimes such fine shades of variance exist as to render it extremely difficult in any particular case to determine the real status. Many colonies have grown out of possessions. The importance of this discrimination will subsequently be more apparent; to it may be attributed differences in conditions and especially in legislation by the parent state, which otherwise would be unaccountable.³

Colonies are classified, according to their method of origin and acquisition, into four leading groups :⁴ 1, those created

¹ This characteristic was not true of those ancient colonies which had not any governmental connection with the mother country.

² Inasmuch as the word "colony" is constantly changing its meaning, the most satisfactory definition for any particular country is that specific enumeration of its "colonies" which may be found in the decisions of its courts. An interesting case is mentioned by Lucas in his Introduction to Lewis' "Government of Dependencies." "A nation can colonize in two ways. It can settle a land either mainly with its own race or mainly, if not entirely, with some other foreign race, and this second method of colonization is apt to be left out of sight by writers on colonial subjects." Introduction by Lucas, xxiv. For example, the Jewish captivity, the African slave trade, the Chinese emigration.

³ Most modern writers seem to favor a broad use of the word "colony." Thus Ireland says, "A colony is in fact to be considered a territory situated at some distance from the sovereign state, but subject to the sovereign authority." Introduction, 3. It is hard to-day to distinguish a colony from a dependency, *ibid.*

⁴ For discussion of various kinds of colonies, cf. Heeren, 23; Rosscher and Jannasch, 2 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 747 et seq.; Lewis, xviii and 115; Seeley, 64; Merivale, 260 et seq. Leroy-Beaulieu classifies modern colonies into three

or acquired by military force; 2, those engaged in agricultural pursuits, where farming is the main occupation of the inhabitants;¹ 3, those employed in commerce or trade,² consisting chiefly of a few merchants, sent out from the parent state to carry on the barter and exchange of commodities with the natives of the region in which they reside;³ and 4, those in which the plantation system prevails, devoted to the cultivation of such products of the soil as cannot for climatic reasons be grown in the home country.⁴ As illustrations of these various classes, the Roman establishments may be cited, in antiquity, as colonies by conquest; in modern times the Spanish possessions in Central and South America belonged to the same type.⁵ Among agricultural colonies the United States — while a British dependency — and Australia may be reckoned. The principal commercial colonies are those under the administration of trading companies, such as formerly the Dutch and English domains in East India and in that vicinity; of plantation colonies those in the West Indies and in the torrid zones of Africa are the most important to be noted.

Nor should a fifth order be entirely forgotten; reference is made to penal stations, to such as those whither England

principal classes, commercial, agricultural, and tropical. The last variety is perhaps best designated in English as "plantation colonies." Heeren distributes colonies as "agricultural, plantation, mining, and trading"; Merivale says that colonies may be divided into two groups, first, "those in countries possessing no peculiar advantages for the production by agriculture or mining labor of articles of value in the foreign market; . . . secondly, those in which the industry of the settlers has been principally turned to the raising of staple articles of produce for foreign markets."

¹ For the preferable location of such colonies, cf. R and J. 19; colonial establishments engaged in cattle breeding form a special division of this class, *ibid.* 23.

² The fisheries are a subdivision, *ibid.* 18.

³ Roscher and Jannasch consider that almost all colonies begin as commercial stations or trading posts, but likewise just previously remark that merely commercial outposts never develop into independent nations, "Colonies and Colonial Policy," 16.

⁴ A clear distinction must be drawn between agricultural and plantation colonies. The latter might now be better termed "cultivation colonies," R. and J. 26, 27; in fact they are frequently known as "tropical colonies." How would it do to call them "promotion colonies"?

⁵ Movements tending to national expansion as the result of migration partake of this character, and still they must be distinguished, R. and J. 3.

used to deport her criminals and to which France still to-day sends certain of her offenders.¹ This category is, however, of very slight account; for naturally, as time passes and new generations are born, they merge into one or the other of those previously described.² Earlier writers also recognized mining colonies as a variety, but recent authorities are disposed to omit this distinction, as settlements exclusively for that purpose can scarcely be said ever to have existed.³

In reality, another simpler, but much broader, classification of colonial origin may be made by dividing colonies into those voluntarily and those involuntarily founded by the metropolis;⁴ or rather those intentionally established by the government and those unconsciously created by the people.⁵ Among those organized under official direction all distant military strongholds must be included; likewise commercial stations, at least in their inception; plantation and penal settlements are also comprised in this same group. Agricultural communities and a certain portion of trading establishments alone are due to individual initiative, without any material assistance from the mother country, and frequently, as history shows, without her coöperation.⁶ As belonging to the class of colonies directly inaugurated by the state, those of Rome and

¹ Cf. R. and J. 39 et seq., who include the piratical establishments of former times as a subdivision of this class.

² For penal colonies, cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), xviii, li; Dilke, 519 et seq.

³ For the instability of mining colonies, cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 442 et seq.; Roscher and Jannasch mention still another variety to which they apply the word "Kulturberufungskolonien"; an equivalent term in English might be "civilizing colonies," their object being to propagate and foster in the localities where they are established the ideals of a higher degree of civilization. Such were the German settlements in Russia, Poland, and Hungary. "Colonies and Colonial Policy," 30.

⁴ "The history of colonization is not simply that of the migrations of men across the world. It is also that of war and of the exploitation of races and of nations one by the other," (tr.) De Lanessan, 17.

⁵ The Greek words "cleruchos" and "apoikia" express the distinction; the Romans had "colonias ex secessionem conditas" and "colonias ex consilio publico," Servius ad Virg. *Æneid*, I, 12; R. and J. 44.

⁶ Among the causes for this variety of colonization are religious persecution or distress and want at home, cf. De Lanessan, 41-43.

of Spain may be mentioned; to the number indirectly erected or aided by its authority, those of Holland and England in and around the Indian Ocean; while to the division constituted by personal effort, those of Greece and the North American and the Australian territories, past and present, of Great Britain may be assigned. Among all the different kinds of dependencies, military outposts are the least productive, the least happy, and the least enduring; they are the most exposed to the risk of abandonment or of war: agricultural colonies, on the other hand, are the most profitable, satisfactory, and permanent. The former are strong in the beginning, weak in the end; the latter are at first weak, but in the course of their development grow stronger and stronger.¹ Trading stations, by reason of their commercial element, occupy an intermediate position. A military establishment, as a rule, is merely a possession, and as such its retention depends for the most part upon the will of the government; it is also expensive; necessitates a large outlay of money for the maintenance of a sufficient armed force to retain it, as well as to keep the native inhabitants in order and submission; and usually yields little actual profit to the nation by which it is owned, unless it be by the speedy and headlong exhaustion of its resources; on the other hand, it often involves the parent state in appalling expense and ultimate ruin. An agricultural colony, on the contrary, occasions little cash outlay; returns in general large profits; and, so long as it remains loyal, helps to strengthen the power on which it depends; even after acquiring liberty it usually remains friendly and on trading terms with its former metropolis. These characteristics are well established by the evidence of history. Frequently, however, a settlement, military in its origin, has been gradually transformed into an agricultural community, and thus better conditions have been secured.² Throughout all ages, these varieties of colonies are recognized; some people have favored one class, others another; while a

¹ For advantages derived from a policy of non-interference with the colonies, cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), iv.

² For the transformations which may occur, cf. R. and J. 29.

few, especially in more modern times, have had possessions of each sort; in every case the experience resulting from the trial of their different forms has been very similar.

The object of establishments created by the state is manifest; not any nation has ever entered upon a colonial policy without the hope thereby to strengthen its power, to add to its riches, to assure its stability, to increase its influence, and to augment the prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants. Whatever may have been the temporary occasion, such have universally been the motives of action. A warlike empire founds colonies to protect threatened points of its territory, to widen its national domain, to give employment to its military forces, or to weaken a rival; a trading community seeks them in order to open new channels of commerce, or to protect those already won for itself but now threatened by an ambitious competitor; a people devoted to religion establishes them in heathen lands, with the professed object of converting the natives to its belief; a country deficient in natural resources, but strong in industry, locates them in more bountiful regions in order to procure the daily necessities which it lacks. The propagation of civilization has also played an important rôle in colonial development.¹ However various the causes for colonization under official authority, the results have been almost always identical.

Postponing for future discussion the effects of such organized enterprise, some consideration should first be given to the reasons which have actuated individuals to abandon home and friends, to travel afar, to settle in new localities among savage or half-civilized tribes, and thus, by their personal efforts, to create so many colonies; for it is universally true that marked characteristics have always distinguished every such settlement. The determination of those voluntary exiles of former days to journey as far as possible from their native hearths may be ascribed to their desire to flee material hard-

¹ For a statement of the principal moral motives for colonization, cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, 841-847. Civilization is the result of colonization more often than its cause, De Sismondi, "Pol. Econ.," II, 102 et seq.

ships, to escape moral or intellectual persecution,¹ or to gain for themselves some expected advantage. As the centuries have passed, however, the distance between the dependencies and the mother country has, by the increasing facilities of travel, been more and more curtailed, until, now that practically the entire surface of the globe is known, a natural limitation is placed upon this feature of colonial existence; for, as the means of communication develop, the feeling of remoteness from the metropolis is disappearing, and the colonists are being steadily drawn closer and closer in touch with their national centres of life.²

In the earliest era the principal cause for migration was the gradual expansion of races; as certain localities became more and more densely peopled, some shepherds, tending their flocks, were necessarily forced to wander farther and farther in search of sufficient pasture land; many of them, combining together for mutual society and protection, often removed to unexplored regions and there established themselves. Such were the first colonies.³ Subsequently, as towns were founded and nations developed, the human race in certain districts increased more rapidly than elsewhere. Men did not see the means of gaining a livelihood in their old habitations, while afar off they heard of untilled fields and unworked mines.⁴ Thither they betook themselves; hence sprang commerce; for, when they reached their new abodes, they discovered there products unknown at home; these they sent back and received in return other familiar manufactures. Here is seen, for the

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 10, note 6.

² For discussion of this point, cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), xl et seq.

³ Some of the Greek colonies thus originated both in Italy and in Asia Minor. The earliest movements of the Assyrians were also probably due to such causes; cf. Z. A. Ragozin, "Earliest Peoples," 98-102.

⁴ This was one of the motives set forth by Sir George Peckham for colonization in America; cf. Richard Hakluyt, "Voyages, Navigations, and Discoveries" (London, 1599), III, 167-181. It is important, however, to distinguish between emigration and colonization; although in a sense the advance posts of the moving nations may be considered colonies, yet they soon become the rear-guard of the advancing host, and have not the separate existence which seems to be necessary in a colony proper. For elaborate discussion of this question, cf. De Lanesan, 1, 2; for migrations, *ibid.* 2-16.

first time, the spirit of profit actuating the foundation of foreign settlements. While this disposition has in some measure prevailed throughout the ages, it cannot be said to have had marked influence upon colonial enterprises—so far at least as regards those due to individual effort—until the period of modern activity. The greatest momentum has been given to colonization; in antiquity, by the density of population and by the bitterness of civil strife in the capital cities of those days; in the Middle Ages and even later by the spirit of religious enthusiasm and commercial ambition,¹ and in more recent times by sectarian, political, and racial oppression.² The desire for adventure, as a separate motive, has always played a secondary rôle, although perhaps the strongest in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. The incentive of direct personal advantage to be won beyond the seas has never been more important, take it throughout all the world, than at present.³ Since the end of the seventeenth century, religious, moral, and intellectual reasons have had less and less effect. As a matter of fact, the higher the degree of organization which society attains the less possible the creation of colonies by independent endeavor becomes; they are to-day almost as much of the past as those formerly instituted by decree of the state. Quite as impossible would it now be for a nation to transfer at command a large number of its inhabitants in civil life to a distant locality as it is improbable that such citizens would voluntarily found a settlement in an uncivilized region, without official intervention.⁴ In this epoch of civilization, neither the government can inaugurate and maintain without the will of the people, nor the latter create and develop a colony without the protection of their country. This mutual dependence undoubtedly results in better organ-

¹ R. and J. 40.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 2; on the question of the benefit of the early colonies to Greece, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 32; for an extended discussion of the causes of colonization, cf. R. and J. 32 et seq.

³ For rise of commercial interest in colonies, cf. Seeley, 117 et seq.

⁴ For the necessity of official participation at the present day, cf. R. and J. 48 et seq.

ized, more happy, prosperous, and profitable establishments, in which the colonists are more peaceable, law-abiding, and loyal than those of previous ages.¹

To render any effort or system in colonization successful, certain well-defined conditions must exist, not only in the land to be colonized, but likewise in the parent state.² If on either hand these requirements are lacking, the attempt to maintain tranquil, harmonious, and satisfactory relations between the metropolis and its dependencies must prove futile. In the first instance, the connection implies power on the one side and weakness on the other; it necessarily involves superiority and inferiority. This principle not only applies to the form of government and the code of civil conduct, but also equally as well to individuals. The colonizing nation must be strong, possess a well-developed social organization, and be inhabited by men of intellect and education.³ The region to be brought under control must, on the contrary, be without a recognized method of rule, or with an administration very imperfectly constituted; its society must be more or less crude and uncultured, while its people must, as a race, be untrained in the higher type of civilization and inexperienced in manufactures, commerce, and statecraft.⁴ Just as soon as the colonists approach a degree of culture similar to that of the mother country, the association between the two becomes irksome and difficult to sustain, unless, indeed, the latter practically renounce all participation and intervention in colonial affairs.⁵

While power, then, is a prime necessity in the parent state,

¹ For a very thorough discussion of the problems arising in such cases, cf. "Problems of Greater Britain," by Sir Charles W. Dilke (London, 1890), Pt. VI, "Colonial Problems."

² R. and J. 51.

³ *Ibid.* 5.

⁴ "It is much easier to impress a new nationality on natives who have never learned to adopt any Western civilization than to erect a new standard of existence among a people who have been absorbing an European nationality for centuries." — IRELAND, 219.

⁵ On the necessary conditions for successful colonization, cf. De Lanessan, 33-41.

not the less is density of population.¹ There must be excessive competition in some lines of occupation and trade; a surplus of labor and a want of work; hence a certain degree of discontent, a desire for new fields of exertion, a feeling that there is not any further chance at home; the belief must prevail that the avenues of advancement are there closed before many individuals will be found ready to go to the ends of the earth to gain their livelihood.² In this condition of the public mind, opportunities to emigrate are eagerly sought; the impulse from within is felt and the peopling of distant possessions becomes a comparatively easy task. It is not merely the temptation of possible riches and future prosperity which attracts; it is rather dire necessity, which urges the masses to seek relief afar, but still under the flag, laws, and protection of their fatherland.³ For this reason the colonial designs of densely inhabited countries are always easily and quickly executed.⁴ Thus England, with a small area, a compact and industrious population, has the most numerous and most prosperous dependencies. The gain of the latter is to the direct advantage of the former; the one needs men, the other has more than it can employ.⁵ A man without work, without resources, without prospects, becomes in a brief time, by circumstances, a malcontent, an individual who may — especially if multiplied a thousand fold — be a most serious menace to

¹ A comprehensive table giving the increase in population of the various European countries for many years past may be found in Ricaud, 11.

² This statement applies to political as well as to social discontent, which are often merged, cf. R. and J. 36 et seq.

³ The effect is sometimes to send the people to other lands, notably to the United States. The yearly immigration to this country during the past century has exceeded all the vast migrations of antiquity; cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), xxvi et seq.

⁴ R. and J. 19, 32; for the effects of emigration on the parent state, cf. Merivale, 137-166; Leroy-Beaulieu, 671-696.

⁵ For mutual advantages and disadvantages resulting to the mother country and to the colony, cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), xlv and Ch. VI-IX; Ricaud, Ch. III; also Seeley, "Expansion of England," Lect. VI and VII, Course I; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 465-508; Hurlburt, "Britain and her Colonies," 60-128; for a view decidedly adverse to colonization, cf. J. B. Say, 202 et seq.; Benjamin Franklin was also an opponent in theory as well as in practice of the colonial régime.

his government; in a colony he finds labor, satisfaction, and contentment, is encouraged to better thoughts, is given renewed aspirations, and almost inevitably makes a model citizen.¹ To this class of persons Australia, for example, mostly owes its earlier unparalleled development; many, who in old England would have been agitators and revolutionists, on breathing fresh air and seeing green fields, consecrated themselves to the upbuilding of their adopted land.² A thinly populated metropolis does not, as a rule, contain sufficient of these characters, who, as the consequence of critical exigencies in trade and industry, are impelled elsewhere to seek employment for their energies. The conditions do not exist; hence the resulting emigration cannot be obtained; and without frequent arrivals from the protecting state, the new community is destined to stagnation. The difference between British and French establishments exemplifies this fact. The Englishman is born a wanderer; the Frenchman is prone to remain at home. The populating of British colonies has been easy and their evolution rapid; the growth of French settlements has been extremely slow, and their situation generally precarious.

The essential of power on the part of the mother country likewise implies the element of wealth.³ That a poor nation cannot afford the luxury of colonies is almost an economic maxim. Vast expense is requisite for the maintenance of an army and navy, and without adequate military and sea forces any possessions would be of brief duration. Money is also necessary to the utilization of colonial resources; to the clearance of forests, to the tillage of fields, to the operation of mines, to the improvement of harbors, rivers, and watercourses, to the construction of railways, to the creation of manufactures, to the marketing of products, to the proper inauguration of government, to the education of the people, and to the development of all the varied material and intellectual forces within the colony.⁴ Not riches alone suffice to support a colonial

¹ R. and J. 38.

² *Ibid.* 33.

³ *Ibid.* 17.

⁴ For the effects of the exportation of capital on the parent state, cf. Merivale, 167-186; Leroy-Beaulieu, 697-711.

policy; something more is demanded, there must be an excess of capital. Money must be plentiful and cheap, investments difficult, interest low; all or many of the conditions must exist which would cause financiers to welcome with pleasure new opportunities for ample returns.¹ The stress of affairs should be even more pressing; for colonial risks involve exceptional danger, and even the higher rates of profit always prevailing will not attract capitalists unless the home market be such as to preclude safe, steady, and at least slightly remunerative transactions; only then can the colonies secure the funds necessary to their progress.²

The situation of trade must also be similar. Warehouses must be overstocked; there must be overproduction; the demands of domestic consumption and of buyers in independent foreign lands must be less than the supplies of national industry. Manufacturers and merchants must feel the need of new openings for their goods and wares, while they must find in the colonies an outlet for them.³ Farming, on the other hand, in the dominant state should be insufficiently developed to satisfy the daily wants of its people. Colonists are naturally tillers of the soil, and an agricultural community cannot, as a rule, guarantee them the necessary sales. The metropolis must at least lack in some measure the products which they cultivate; for this reason colonies are found to be peculiarly advantageous to industrial nations.⁴

Having thus discussed the material requirements essential for a country engaged in colonial enterprises, it is now proper briefly to consider two other necessary attributes. A race without the military and naval spirit is ill fitted for these tasks.⁵

¹ R. and J. 35.

² For the financial aspect of the colonial question, cf. Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), *lxi et seq.*; also Dilke, Pt. VIII.

³ "Foreign colonies are therefore a necessity for industrial and commercial nations. They offer the metropolis the best and easiest outlet for the surplus of its products" (tr.).—RICAUD, Ch. III; Leroy-Beaulieu, 712-736; Ireland, "Tropical Colonization," 84-127.

⁴ For the two schools of opinion concerning colonial policy in England, cf. Seeley, Lect. VIII, Course II.

⁵ Cf. Seeley, Lect. VI, "Commerce and War," and p. 724.

The possession of colonies involves the control and protection of distant lands; it implies the maintenance of order within their boundaries, as well as the subjugation of the native, barbarous, or semi-civilized tribes; it means the management of many half-explored regions; and, above all, it requires their defence against the world.¹ Where a people would not meet one enemy on its own borders or shores, it will encounter many foes in the vicinity of its dependencies; still great armaments might not be demanded were simply their protection in view. Would that all the struggles inaugurated in or for them had been confined to their soil! But hostilities, once begun, will spread; many of the international conflicts of history have been of such origin.² A contest thus commenced often serves as the excuse for an attack on the parent state. A colony is, as some one has very truly said, a tinder box, which only requires a stray spark to ignite the conflagration of war. The inhabitants of the mother country must therefore always be ready, at command, to render service in behalf of her wards, or as frequently happens, to protect their own land against the foreign aggressor to whom some territorial dispute offers the desired pretext. On the other hand, well-situated possessions may thwart blows aimed at the metropolis. Witness the Greek colonies, which for centuries served as effective barriers to the attempted invasions of the Asiatic hordes directed against their central governments.³ With the more complex interdependence of races the probability of discord, by reason of distant dominions, has in modern ages greatly increased.⁴ The

¹ R. and J. 17; Merivale, 584-591. Such conflicts are not, however, necessarily due to any fault of the colonists. Speaking of the English possessions, Hurlburt says: "Nor has any policy or folly of the colonies ever involved the mother country in hostilities. . . . No colonists believe that England will go to war on a purely colonial question," "Britain and her Colonies," 58-59; they must rely on their own militia and volunteers for defence, *ibid.*, also 89 et seq., 127-128, 200 et seq.

² A most familiar example, in so far at least as France and England are concerned, is the Seven Years' War. In ancient times an illustration would be the Peloponnesian War.

³ Eventually, however, these same colonies occasioned the great war between Greece and Persia; to confirm the statement that colonies tend to prevent war, cf. Hurlburt, 200 et seq.

⁴ As to the probability of war because of colonial possessions, cf. Lewis

military and seafaring disposition is therefore more and more essential. Such are briefly the requisites indispensable to any nation to enable it successfully to pursue a colonial policy; without these resources and characteristics—or the most of them—those undertaking colonization have already failed; others which do not heed the voice of experience are destined to a similar result.

After this study of the qualifications demanded of the dominant power, it is equally important to examine the conditions necessary on the part of the colony. Authorities agree that in colonial affairs the maxim, "All men are created equal," does not hold true. Peaceably to tolerate the foreign rule exercised over them, the natives of the land to be colonized must be inferior in capacity. Leroy-Beaulieu has classified the races of the world into four categories: The Western civilization, "our own"; the Eastern, "comprising the Chinese and Japanese nations—different but compact, coherent, stable, destined by their history and present character to self-government"; another, including peoples "quite advanced in many respects, but entirely, or almost entirely, stationary, or who have not yet succeeded in establishing united, pacific, and progressive nations," frequently troubled in the regular course of their administration. "British India before the conquest, Java, and Cochin-China are examples of this class"; "finally, a very large portion of the inhabitants of the Asiatic and African continents, addicted to murderous customs, ignorant of regular labor as well as of the arts and sciences, and thinly scattered over immense regions of wilderness."¹ As that author says, only men of the first type are fitted to become colonizers, while they must found their colonies among those who belong more especially to the fourth group; even the races of the third order are frequently not sufficiently docile or submissive to permit colonial enterprises in their midst. To yield to the parent state the rightly expected profits and to reap

(Intro. by Lucas), xlvii; Dilke, Pt. VIII; Seeley, Lect. VII, Course II, entitled "Internal and External Dangers."

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 841 et seq.

from it full reciprocal advantages, not only the aborigines, but even the colonists themselves, must be willing to bear many burdens; above all the former should be amenable to discipline, to regular forms of government, to reformed methods of life, and to reasonable primary instruction in the ordinary rural occupations and trades.¹ If these conditions do not exist, a long period of turbulence is unavoidable; the natives must then be exterminated or reduced to such numbers as to be readily controlled, and in this process, so contrary to civilization, but for its sake, the mother country must inevitably expend much treasure and blood.

The soil of the colony must be new; it must be fallow to the ploughshare; forests should exist and rivers be plentiful; fish and game should be unlimited; in short, the first settlers must there find all the prime necessities of existence. Hardships there will be, but to steady, energetic efforts the fields must respond, producing abundantly. Climate also is a great consideration; salubrious latitudes, free from fever and pestilence, are the most easily colonized.² Land must be cheap and readily obtainable, so that human endeavors be not handicapped.³ At the same time, while the establishment must be capable of growing sufficient food for the support of its own inhabitants, it must likewise furnish considerable quantities of such articles to be shipped to the home country, there to be exchanged for the luxuries of life. A community necessarily cannot in the first few years of its existence have many or varied manufactures; it must buy many goods and wares; and naturally its people will turn for them to the protecting nation.

The same rule applies to capital. The colony within itself

¹ For treatment of natives, cf. De Lanessan, Ch. IV and V, also 24-26, 43-46; Dilke, Pt. VI, who shows the necessity of docility on their part; also Ch. IV and V, entitled "Labor Problems in the Tropics."

² It is noteworthy that colonists seek the same or warmer climates as a rule, De Lanessan, 31-33; for requirements in the matter of soil, etc., *ibid.* 33-41, 43-46.

³ For the importance of plenty of good land, cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 444 et seq.; Merivale, 381-486; Leroy-Beaulieu, 754-771; De Sismondi, "Pol. Econ.," II, 112-114.

must lack financial resources. The metropolis rightly expects to find there opportunity for investment and legitimate speculation. The prosperity and general good feeling of both depend upon this reciprocal exchange of products and money, in excess within the one, deficient in the other. The supply and demand in the state and in the dependency must, in a measure, be correlative. They must to a great extent be capable of providing for their mutual needs, material, moral, and intellectual; hence intercourse, trade, and commerce should be free and untrammelled. On this basis alone a permanent connection can be assured. Throughout history, therefore, the colony the most distant from the mother country and the most unlike in climatic and agricultural conditions has always proved the most successful, prosperous, and remunerative. Competition between the two is thus at a minimum, and the markets of each are the more open to the other.¹

Another important element, from a national standpoint, in the choice of a region for colonization, — whenever such an occasion presents itself to a people, — is its strategic value. Military and naval considerations may outweigh other deficiencies; they must then, however, be so evident, and the part of national territory to be defended must be so exposed, as not to permit any serious doubt of the advantages to be gained.

Reference must finally be made to a further problem necessary of solution as quickly as the dominant power has assumed control, and before it can anticipate any confidential relationship with the individuals lately brought under its authority. Political economists lay down the rule that the language and laws of state and colony must be uniform. This question is of special import when the land to be colonized is already inhabited by a race somewhat above the level of barbarism. It means, then, that much greater energies must be put forth to supplant the existing statutes, dialects, and customs by new ideas of justice, a different tongue, and reformed manners, than

¹ For this aspect of colonization, cf. R. and J. 7 et seq.; for discussion of trade and colonization, Leroy-Beaulieu, 712-736; R. and J. 417-469; for the progress of wealth in colonies, Merivale, 564-584; Leroy-Beaulieu, 784-800,

would be required to train minds undrilled in any school. To teach from the foundation upward is much simpler than to eradicate false notions, prejudices, and beliefs previously acquired.¹ Whatever be the degree of intellectual advancement in the dependency, its native citizens must be taught to respect the institutions of their protectors.

But what now of the colonists? The true colonist is here contemplated; he who, as a pioneer, goes forth from the land of his birth to seek a home under strange skies. What class of society furnishes the most desirable settlers?² What are the qualifications of emigrants best adapted to colonial life? They must in the first instance be imbued with the traits of their own nation; they must be truly patriotic, above selfishness and below socialism; sturdiness of character and firmness of conviction are their two chief needs. As in the case of our own origin, when men were ready to sacrifice friends, families, and estates to brave the harsh New England winters and the burning summer suns of the South, so those seeking abodes beyond the sea must always be willing to bear hardship. The medium grade of society is the most suitable element for new communities.³ On the one hand not inured to ease, nor on the other weighed down by destitution, the middle-class citizen is the most easily transformed into the model colonist. He knows how to exercise to a reasonable degree both his brains and his hands. It is a false impression that one of the factors thus typified — labor or education — alone can assure prosperity. To direct the course of distant enterprises intelligence is required, while every one must be eager to join in manual exertion.⁴ The experience of nations has shown that establishments organized by, or for the most part composed of, wealthy men or the scions of nobility have with difficulty,

¹ *Supra*, p. 15, note 4. For a discussion of the treatment of native races, cf. Merivale, 486-663; Leroy-Beaulieu, 818-823.

² R. and J. 6 et seq.; 18; J. B. Say, "Pol. Econ.," 400 et seq.

³ R. and J. 35.

⁴ The labor problem has always been one of the most important colonial questions; for its discussion, cf. Merivale, 253, 381; Leroy-Beaulieu, 771-784; Ireland, 128-216.

if at all, survived their founders' indifference to the value of toil; on the contrary, settlements created by poverty-stricken persons have seldom ever cohered long enough to amass the riches essential to the development of their internal resources. A due sufficiency or moderate standard of fortune is ordinarily first requisite to carry the emigrant to his adopted home, and upon his arrival there strongly conduces to the probability of his industry, thrift, and permanence. These three characteristics should distinguish the settler in his new life. He must be active, not only for the sake of himself, but for the benefit of the colony.¹ Idleness brings success neither to the individual nor to the community. Thrift is the necessary complement of activity; afar from his fatherland and friends, the colonist must accumulate for his old age and for the support of his family. Permanence is the inevitable result of activity and thrift; nor is it less than either of them a condition of colonial prosperity. Without these intrinsic qualifications on the part of their founders, outposts will never grow into towns; public improvements will never be constructed, roads opened, harbors deepened, railways built, not to mention any of the other durable, material, social, and intellectual institutions and forces which are to be generated in a nascent colony.² Even-minded, honest, sturdy, and persevering pioneers are needed for these tasks, men unshrinking before hardship, undaunted before toil; such were our own forefathers; and such as they — the glorious type of successful colonists — alone can inaugurate new nations and create for the world enduring empires.³

¹ Merivale, 73 et seq., 336 et seq.

² For society and the local institutions of colonies, cf. Merivale, 591-622.

³ The qualities necessary for success abroad are much the same as those required at home. Lucas says, "Strong healthy nations like healthy human beings must grow. They can grow in two ways — either by simply enlarging their limits at home or by taking possession of distant and less civilized parts of the world," Lewis (Intro. by Lucas), x; cf. also J. B. Say, 401. For the evil influences of adventurers and convicts on new colonies, De Sismondi, II, 117-120. Lucas has also shown that a new feeling toward colonization is arising throughout the civilized world. Seeley emphasizes this change; while Ireland points out that the modern conception of a colony does not date back more than about fifteen years.

After the establishment of the colony, many important problems are at once presented for the decision of the citizens of the parent state.¹ The military, economic, moral, social, and political questions connected with colonial administration are multiple;² it is not the purpose here to detail them, for only one general topic may be mentioned; attention can alone be briefly directed to the consideration of the chief attributes requisite for permanent rule. Patience in awaiting results and justice in the treatment of the people, whether natives or emigrants, are the two principal characteristics required of the mother country. The greater number of colonial failures have been due to haste and imprudence. Time is the sole medium of knowledge. A colony is not born nor developed in a day; before a fair estimate can be made of its value a considerable period must elapse. Bacon has said that at least thirty years must pass before judgment can be given. Special reasons often contribute to render a settlement temporarily prosperous, under the influence of excitement, pride, and false stimulation, which cannot be long maintained. A colony may, just like a mining town, transiently succeed, and then subsequently wither and fade. Frequently those which at first seemed to have the least anticipation of growth have, by reason of forbearance and just administration on the part of the dominant power, yielded, in the long run, the best returns and attained the highest degree of fortune.³ Nor can one people draw a conclusion from the results obtained by others. Some races,

¹ The most comprehensive work on these questions is "Problems of Greater Britain," by Sir Charles W. Dilke (London, 1890).

² For a discussion of some of them, cf. Roscher and Jannasch, "Colonies and Colonial Policy," 56 et seq., where the price of land, interest rates, wages, political, social, agricultural, and other questions are briefly discussed; also *ibid.* 70 et seq., 93 et seq., 116 et seq.

³ As illustrative of these facts the early history of the Spanish colonies in South America may be cited as showing how such settlements may temporarily flourish by reason of some peculiar and ephemeral influence; on the other hand Canada may be recalled as a colony which at first appeared to have very poor prospects, but which subsequently, after the inauguration of a more liberal form of administration, exceeded all original anticipations. For some of the causes which contribute to permanent colonial prosperity, cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 444 et seq.

it is admitted, are the better adapted for colonizing work.¹ A community without prospects, unsuccessful or mediocre in the hands of one state, may flourish under the control of another. Moderation is not less an element of equity than of good government. A country headlong to secure quick profits from its possessions is inevitably led to forget their real lasting interests. Laws are made for the day without regard to the future. Colonial wealth is ruthlessly extracted, stolen, and wasted; the natives are exterminated; the rights of the colonists themselves are violated.² Governors and subordinates are selected, judged by their fitness speedily to fill the coffers of the nation; but it is forgotten or overlooked that, while collecting the taxes so hated by the colonists, they are for themselves amassing private riches, until it becomes a common byword that justice is not to be found in their provinces. The management of colonies offers a tremendous temptation to unscrupulous adventurers, to men who, heedless of the dependency's claims and of their own country's ultimate prosperity, seek only personal aggrandizement, for there it is so much easier than at home to accomplish such ends.³

Unfortunately, but too truly, throughout history the record of colonization has been often marred not less by the oppression of the weak than by the profligacy of the powerful. Only such nations, indeed, as have reasonably well controlled the action and conduct of their officials have had successful careers in their enterprises. The organization and maintenance of a colonial government exempt from corruption and sufficiently free to please the colonists, as well as strong enough to secure adequate returns to the parent state, form, therefore,

¹ An example in point would be the colonial record of New York, which under Dutch rule only stagnated, but which, as soon as transferred to the English Crown, began to prosper; Canada also would again be a good illustration, the two periods of its history respectively under France and England strongly attesting the statement made in the text.

² It must never be forgotten, "It is exceedingly rare that a colony furnishes a net profit to the mother country; in infancy it cannot, in maturity it will not." — LEROY-BEAULIEU, 737; 737-746.

³ The administration of the colonies of Spain and of those of England on the American continent is illustrative of this contrast.

most difficult problems.¹ The elaboration and perpetuation of a proper administration require of the citizens of the metropolis the possession of great knowledge, the exercise of profound sagacity, the frequent sacrifice of apparent self-interest to the probabilities of the future, and the wisdom to realize that such conservative action—although seemingly without immediate results—may contain the germs of subsequent welfare and really be not the less in the interest of the country than of the colony.

From this brief statement of the various requisites and conditions, essential to model colonization, few conclusions of experience can be drawn. Had all these theories been practised in reference to the colonial establishments of the past and present, oppression, discontent, rebellion, and revolution would never have ensued. How far and in what respects the facts of history vary from the doctrines of philosophy will be demonstrated in the course of the succeeding chapters.

¹ To the subject of administration almost all writers on political economy and colonial policy—such as Dilke, Seeley, Leroy-Beaulieu, Merivale, and Ireland—devote considerable attention. A more or less full discussion will be readily found; for these reasons specific references here seem hardly necessary or useful. Lewis, "The Government of Dependencies," is a standard work.

PART I
ANTIQUITY

CHAPTER I

EARLIEST COLONIZATION

EXCHANGE and barter seem to have constituted the oldest phases of mercantile activity. One man found advantage in turning over his surplus products to his neighbor, taking in return some needed article which the latter could not, by reason of his plentiful supply, consume. Both parties soon realized the mutual benefits arising from such action, and interchange of wares became the common rule. A short time after these first separate transactions, the primitive outlines of general traffic may be recognized. As the centres of population grew more numerous and more crowded, villages, towns, cities, and nations came into existence. The habits of the individual developed into the customs of the community. Trade was born.¹

The prehistoric peoples naturally had very little nautical skill, and hence ventured seldom, if ever, upon large bodies of water. The most ancient races of mankind probably resided in the interior, and did not possess any knowledge of the oceans; to them the rivers were indeed almost insuperable barriers; consequently the transportation of commodities was then restricted to land routes, while even such highways as existed were comparatively short and unimportant. Business was certainly not much more than local until the origin of navigation; the subsequent extension of both has been more

¹ Genesis xxvii. 25; for an account of the beginnings of trade, cf. De Goguet, "The Origin of Laws, Arts and Sciences," I, 277; for some details of early Egyptian traffic, its methods, incidents, and difficulties, cf. Maspero, I ("The Dawn of Civilization"), 323; several instances of the exchange of wares are found in the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey." India seems to have been the earliest seat of trade; in remote ages it was apparently the source of supplies—especially products of industry—for the more western regions.

or less parallel. The inception of seafaring is in fact obscured in the myths of antiquity; but from the time of the inauguration of this means of locomotion, it inevitably exercised a potent influence; its ease, rapidity, and advantages were soon apparent. Improvements in the construction and management of boats were slowly made, but nevertheless the tide of humanity rapidly turned toward the sea. Maritime states increased in power, and acquaintance with that element was recognized as indispensable for national prosperity.¹

Modern authorities show the early Egyptians to have been both hardy and adventurous.² In the time of the Fifth Dynasty³ they were familiar with the deep; they knew of the lands beyond, and had some intercourse with those living on the farther coasts. Their ships were commodious and adapted to lengthy voyages.⁴ They themselves were not unversed in foreign commerce; even the lumber of which their vessels were constructed was imported from the shores of Asia Minor; for Egypt then, as now, was deficient in forests.⁵ Amber and bronze seem also to have come from over the waters. The caravan trade with the races of the East was equally flourishing. To the south the Egyptians were extending their domain, gradually imposing their nominal sov-

¹ For brief account of early navigation, cf. Lenthéric, "La Grèce et l'Orient en Provence," 67-92; De Goguet, I, 277, 302.

² For Egyptian history consult the works of Professor Maspero, "The Dawn of Civilization," "The Struggle of the Nations," and "The Passing of the Empires"; also the "History of Egypt" by W. M. Flinders Petrie, and Von Ranke, "Universal History."

³ Maspero approximates the period of this dynasty between 3990-3804 B.C., I, 389 (note); Petrie says 3721-3503 B.C., "History of Egypt," I, 68.

⁴ For an illustration of an early Egyptian vessel, cf. Mas. I, 195, 393; Petrie, II, 12. After describing the construction of an Egyptian ship, Maspero says: "Its complement consisted of some fifty men, oarsmen, sailors, pilots, and passengers. Such were the vessels for cruising or pleasure. The merchant ships resembled them, but they were of heavier build, of greater tonnage, and had a higher freeboard. They had no hold; the merchandise had to remain piled up on deck, leaving only just enough room for the working of the vessel. They nevertheless succeeded in making lengthy voyages and in transporting troops into the enemies' country, from the mouths of the Nile to the south coast of Syria."—MASPERO, I, 392.

⁵ Pliny, XVI, 76, 35; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 75; in prehistoric times forests existed; Petrie, I, 4.

ereignty upon the tribes which dwelt in those regions. Traders appear to have made journeys to Pûânîf and to have brought thence stores of precious wares.¹ Papi I of the Sixth Dynasty² opened and operated the mines of that locality.³ Under him and his immediate successors conquest was persistently pursued, so that the Egyptian frontier was pushed farther and farther up the Nile.⁴ Then a dark age intervened; from the Sixth to the Twelfth Dynasty the course of events is shrouded in mystery.⁵

When the veil lifts, the Egyptians have just overthrown the supremacy which the Heracleopolitans had usurped over them.⁶ With the Twelfth Dynasty traffic again resumes its pristine activity.⁷ Great prosperity prevailed during this period, comprising about two centuries.⁸ Commercial relations were re-

¹ Mas. I, 390-398. "Having traced the dynastic race so far, we can more readily value the strong resemblance between them and the people of Pun, a country at the south end of the Red Sea. The Egyptians called Pun 'the land of the Gods'; and they do not appear to have made war on the Punite race, but only to have had a peaceful intercourse of embassies and commerce. The name of the Puni people appears to be connected with the Pœni or Phœnicians, who in later times founded the Punic colony of Carthage. The Philistines, who are probably a branch of this race, are also on the monuments very similar to the Egyptians and Punite type." — PETRIE, I, 12-13.

² Sixth Dynasty, 3503-3335 B.C., Petrie, I, 86.

³ Mas. I, 421; Petrie, I, 89-96.

⁴ Mas. I, 416-440; Petrie, I, 86-107, 106; expedition of Una overland, about 3350 B.C., to secure stone for building operations, when it became necessary to build a boat for part of the return journey, Petrie, I, 94 et seq.; another expedition to Pûânîf, *ibid.* I, 100.

⁵ Mas. I, 440-442; Petrie, I, 108-144; the events of this period are gradually being unravelled.

⁶ Mas. I, 117 et seq.

⁷ Petrie, in mentioning an Egyptian expedition to Pûânîf, which occurred about 2800 B.C. (Eleventh Dynasty), cites a contemporaneous inscription: "On reaching the coast, vessels were built to transport the men;" apparently along the shore at the south end of the Red Sea, "History of Egypt," I, 141.

⁸ "It lasted 213 years, 1 month, and 27 days, and its history can be ascertained with greater certainty and completeness than that of any other dynasty which ruled over Egypt." — MASPERO, I, 468. About 2778 to 2565 B.C., Petrie, I, 145; comparing this dynasty with the Fifth, the latter author says, "It is singular how parallel the two cycles of development run one with another; but such seems to be the course of government in its growth and fall in all ages; and growth, prosperity, foreign wars, glory, and decay succeed each other as the seasons of the great year of human organization," "History of Egypt," I, 199.

newed with the East and the South; quantities of merchandise were purchased abroad, while wealth and civilization increased. The gold mines on the Sinaitic peninsula were once more worked; regular colonies were possibly established, and every few years an expedition was sent thither to bring back the highly prized metal. Nubia was conquered by Usertesen I; the yellow ore was found also to exist there;¹ a military force went out annually to collect from the natives whatever they had extracted since the preceding visit. Pūanīt was still the objective point of numerous trading adventures, both by land and by sea. While foreign traffic was thus fostered, the domestic needs of the country were not forgotten; palatial structures were erected, canals were built, works of irrigation undertaken, and agriculture generally promoted.² The fertility of the Egyptian soil is proverbial; the crops were always sufficient to supply ordinary demands.³ Notwithstanding all the hostile and mercantile energy which was directed to distant regions, there seems very little probability of any real colonial endeavor during this era.

Again Egypt is hidden in obscurity; for nearly one thousand years⁴ the continuity of the historical narrative, as reconstructed by modern scholarship, is broken.⁵ Only after the expulsion of the Shepherd Kings⁶ the perspective becomes

¹ "This was the Nubian gold, which was brought into Egypt by nomad tribes, and which the Egyptians themselves, from the time of the Twelfth Dynasty onward, went to seek in the land which produced it. They made no attempt to establish permanent colonies for working the mines as at Sinai, but a detachment of troops was despatched nearly every year to the spot to receive the amount of precious metal collected since their previous visit." — MASPERO, I, 481.

² Usertesen III (about 2650 B.C.) reconstructed a great canal and made a warlike expedition on it, Petrie, I, 179; 145-199; Amenemhat III (2622-2578 B.C.) reclaimed considerable land from overflow and regulated the course of the Nile. "Colonies of soldiers and their families were settled on the newly reclaimed land; towns and temples sprang up as the lake (Mœris) receded. . . ." *Ibid.* I, 192; Mas. I, 469-528.

³ For description of fertility of Egypt, cf. Mas. I, 64 et seq.; De Goguet, II, 89.

⁴ From 2565 to 1587 B.C., Petrie, I, 252.

⁵ More and more details of this epoch are coming to light, Mas. I, 528-537; Petrie, I, 200-247; II, 1-24.

⁶ For the period of the Hyksos (about 2098-1587 B.C.), cf. Mas. II, 50-89; Petrie, I, 233-240; II, 16-24.

clearer. Thutmosis I, of the Eighteenth Dynasty, certainly invaded Syria, although his authority over the greater part of his dominions was seemingly not very firmly fixed.¹ Hatshepsut or Maatkara, his daughter, maintained the glorious reputation of her father, rearing many imposing monuments, constructing interior waterways, and reopening the mines of Sinai.² Her most celebrated action was the despatch of a fleet of five vessels to the land of Pūanft, of which voyage evidence is afforded by a sculptural record. The ships brought back a valuable cargo and vastly added to the renown of the queen.³ Thutmosis III⁴ more thoroughly perfected the task of conquest and subjection which his predecessors had begun.⁵ Egyptian supremacy, although generally recognized, was not burdensome. Territories were not annexed, but tribute was exacted.⁶ Hostages were retained by the Pharaohs as pledges for obedience, and vassal princes were invested with and relieved of their functions at discretion. Taxation was the measure of loyalty, devastation of country and loss of power were the penalties for insubordination.⁷ During this epoch commerce, notwithstanding the multiple risks and dangers, was revived, extended, and, it may well be said, primitively organized. Custom-houses existed, foreign agents are to be noted, and some official regulations were enforced.⁸ The monarchs immediately succeeding to the throne were not especially distinguished, while their reigns were brief; for, within a few years after the zenith of its splendor,⁹ the Eighteenth

¹ Mas. II, 209-235; Petrie, II, 57-71.

² Mas. II, 236-254; Petrie, II, 73-96; her reign lasted approximately 1516-1481 B.C.

³ Mas. II, 245-252; Petrie, II, 82 et seq.; Von Ranke, I, 11 et seq.; this expedition to the "Ladders of Incense" was primarily to obtain a peculiar aromatic gum for religious worship, Mas. I, 245-246; it reminds us somewhat of the later search for spices.

⁴ Maspero says he reigned 1550-1490 B.C.; Petrie fixes it 1503-1449 B.C.

⁵ Mas. II, 254-289; Petrie, II, 97-152.

⁶ For some account of the tribute exacted, cf. Petrie, II, 109-123.

⁷ Mas. II, 271-282.

⁸ *Ibid.* 282-288.

⁹ For some description of civilization in Egypt under Thutmosis III, cf. Petrie, II, 145-152; also 179-180.

Dynasty¹ was overthrown; the decadence of Egypt had silently begun.²

Under the Nineteenth Dynasty, campaign followed campaign, magnificent edifices were erected, and wealth was, as previously, drawn from the gold mines; but the peoples of Asia Minor were growing and developing, so that it was to be only a comparatively short interval before they would overwhelm Egypt.³ A period of affluence was now, however, experienced. Trade flourished; ships plied in incredible numbers on the north to and from Phœnicia, while, to the south, the intercourse with Pūanīt was active.⁴ Rameses II, the most renowned member of this dynasty, has recently been identified with the Sesostris of the Greeks.⁵ To him Herodotus credited a naval expedition across the Red Sea and an invasion of Syria.⁶ Whatever may be the facts, it is certain that he had a long and glorious career. Soon after his decease the reaction was manifest. Egyptian history is thenceforth for the third time enveloped in oblivion.⁷

Rameses III, a descendant of the old Theban line, was destined to rescue his country from alien oppression, to resuscitate its army and fleet, to send out colonists, and to renew the prosperity of commerce.⁸ All these efforts were nevertheless unavailing; for his successors quickly dwindled into insignificance. With the end of the Twenty-first Dynasty the supremacy of the Egyptians seems to have once more entered into eclipse, but that imperceptible, silently working influence of customs and habits was still strongly to act upon those

¹ Duration of the Eighteenth Dynasty, 1587-1328 B.C. (?), Petrie, II, 29.

² Mas. II, 289-338.

³ Cf. Petrie, chapter entitled, "Decline of Egypt in Syria," II, 259-321.

⁴ Mas. II, 407-408.

⁵ *Ibid.* 426-427.

⁶ Herodotus, II, 102; Diodorus, I, 64.

⁷ Mas. II, 340-450, 440.

⁸ "He strengthened the garrison of Sinal, and encouraged the working of the ancient mines in that region. He sent a colony of quarrymen and of smelters to the land of Attika (Gebel-Ataka) in order to work the fields of silver which were alleged to exist there. He launched a fleet on the Red Sea and sent it to the country of fragrant spices."—MASPERO, II, 474.

races which had been subject to their rule.¹ Involved in constant domestic and foreign struggles, few of the subsequent monarchs, prior to the Assyrian conquest, are remarkable. Bocchoris, who died about 720 B.C., although still famed for his wisdom, has lost much of the halo of glory with which early historians formerly invested him.² About 693 B.C. Taharqua, of Ethiopia, invaded and subdued the land. A great builder and a tenacious fighter, he finally fell in 670 B.C. before the victorious hosts of Esarhaddon. Egypt, thenceforth divided and administered as dependent provinces, received Assyrian governors and paid tribute to the conqueror. Confusion prevailed among the numerous petty states along the Nile.³

The period of thralldom was, however, to be brief; after some ten years, marked by many ineffectual rebellions, the country again found in Psammeticus I a deliverer. His reign (659-611 B.C.) is distinguished by the reannexation of Thebes, the revival of nationality, the reconstruction of public works, the reorganization of government, and the first settlement of the Greeks upon the shores of Africa.⁴ Necho II, who next succeeded to the throne, was not as illustrious as his father; carrying war into Syria, he there met defeat at the hands of Nebuchadrezzar. Still, in history his fame may be more enduring, for to his spirit of enterprise the earliest voyage around the Cape of Good Hope (604 B.C.) is probably attributable. He not only rehabilitated the Egyptian army and navy, but seems also to have been the promoter of some hardy mariners who, the first, braved the tempestuous waters of the Southern Ocean.⁵ Under Apries (589-569 B.C.) the Egyptians sent a fleet against the Phœnician coasts,⁶ routed their rivals on the sea, sacked Sidon, and captured several neigh-

¹ Mas. II, 453-566.

² For a plate of King Bocchoris, like Solomon, giving judgment between two women, rival claimants for a child, cf. Mas. III, 233-246.

³ *Ibid.* 360-386, 295, 371 et seq., 385 et seq.

⁴ *Ibid.* 425, 488-506, 512.

⁵ To him is also credited the construction of a canal connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, Grote, III, 148, based on Herodotus, II, 153, and IV, 42; Mas. III, 512, 532, 533.

⁶ Diod. Sic. I, 68; Herodotus, II, 161.

boring cities.¹ This triumph encouraged the victors to turn their arms against the Greek colony of Cyrene, which since its foundation by Battus had rapidly risen to opulence. Tempted by cupidity of the possible spoil, they determined to destroy this establishment; but the issue was disastrous. Apries suffered a repulse,² a revolution followed, and Egypt under Amasis was again on the verge of ruin,³ for the East was filled with awe. Cyrus had overthrown the empire of Media; and Cambyses, his successor, in 525 B.C. accomplished the downfall of the kingdom of the Pharaohs.⁴

Egypt was henceforth a Persian satrapy, yielding homage and paying tribute to its new lord. With the exception of a few brief insurrections, — of varying intensity and success, — this land for two hundred years continued to be ruled by foreign princes. After the short period of connection with Greece under Alexander the Great,⁵ and upon the rise of the Ptolemies (323 B.C.) the nation regained not only independence but prestige.⁶ Until the death of Cleopatra (30 B.C.), when it became a Roman province, Egypt was once more at the height of power. The Ptolemies overran Cyprus, allied themselves with Rhodes, and had close relations with Greece; to which results the Greek element in the population decidedly contributed. The Black Sea was opened to Egyptian ships and the trade with India was prosecuted with vigor. A canal joining the Mediterranean and the Red Sea was also built; while Alexandria became not only a political and intellectual but likewise a mercantile centre.⁷

Whether or not Egypt owned distant possessions cannot be definitely determined. Probably, in the real sense of the word, not any colony — unless possibly the Sinaitic mining estab-

¹ Mas. III, 550.

² *Ibid.* 554 et seq.

³ *Ibid.* 556, 557.

⁴ *Ibid.* 657-668.

⁵ *Ibid.* 811, 812; cf. also "A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty," by J. P. Mahaffy, which forms the fourth volume of Professor Petrie's "History of Egypt," 1-24.

⁶ Mas. III, 769 et seq.

⁷ Von Ranke, 466; for the entire Ptolemaic period, cf. Vol. V of Petrie's "History," by J. P. Mahaffy.

lishments and Cyprus¹—can ever be said to have existed. Nevertheless the evidence of the long-enduring maritime activity of the Egyptians, which in recent years has been revealed by the labors of archæologists, strongly tends to support the supposition that they must have employed all the customary means to increase and protect their trade. They have been shown to have rivalled, if not to have anticipated, the Phœnicians on the domain of the sea; they trafficked and bartered with strange peoples. Who can say that they did not avail themselves of all the paraphernalia of a commercial nation? Why may they not have had settlements of merchants—perhaps even garrisons of soldiers—in those shadowy lands to and from which their ships plied for precious ores and fragrant perfumes in the earliest days of antiquity? With due regard to the revolutionary edicts of modern research, it may not be hazardous to presume that some relics, more firmly testifying to a remote colonial system, may yet be discovered. The most remarkable feature of ancient Egyptian history, in view of the extensive territories conquered by the kings, is the apparent indifference of the latter to the retention of the regions thus acquired; seldom endeavoring to impose their permanent control upon other than those districts which immediately adjoined their own former dominions, they limited themselves to the neighborhood of the Red Sea; nor do they appear to have desired to govern those scattered colonists who may have gone to Greece and to more distant places. While some of the first settlers of the Hellenic peninsula, as attested by their worship, arts, sciences, and nomenclature, may have wandered from Egypt,² they never recognized this country as connected with them in commerce or government.

¹ Niebuhr seems inclined to agree with Herodotus that the Colchians were an Egyptian colony, and states his reasons at length, "Ancient History," I, 61; Von Schlegel, 219, 221 et seq.; Von Ranke, 466.

² Ancient historians chronicle at a very early date the departure—probably legendary—of some few adventurers for Greece; whether exiles, merchants, or fortune-seekers it is not easy to decide, Herodotus, II, 154; Holm, I, Ch. IX; E. Meyer, 194, 234, 260 et seq., based on Herodotus; for the presumable influence of Egypt on Greece, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 68-80; to this series of tales belongs that of Danaus and Cecrops.

Escape from religious persecution or political tyranny, rather than any intentional effort of the state, seems to have been the cause of their migration. Traces of such reasons for self-exile are not entirely lacking, for civil strife was frequent. Whatever the motive and the importance of these movements, it is practically certain that, with the exception of slight advantages in trade, Egypt never exercised any authority over them or derived any benefit, influence, or strength from those of its subjects who perhaps located on the farther shores of the Mediterranean.

While, in grouping together the succession of events in Egypt, the chronological order as to other peoples has necessarily been anticipated, still it is only thus possible consecutively to review the enterprises of this nation. Reverting once more to earlier times, attention must now be directed to the eastward, where the race which first regularly practised colonization was in due course to arise; but, prior to entering upon the discussion of the system adopted by the Phœnicians, it is preferable to glance at the scattered fragments of information concerning this activity disclosed by modern investigators in the records and monuments of the other great empires of the ancient world which were parallel to, even if they did not in part precede, the line of the Egyptian dynasties.

The history of Chaldea, could it be reproduced, would open to the student a narrative the length of which has not yet been measured.¹ Legends of mythical character float darkly around the creation of the human race, the earliest men, the deluge, and the repopulation of the land. According to the Scriptures, Nimrod, "the mighty hunter,"—now identified with the hero Gilgames of Uruk,—is said to have come in the primitive ages—and it may be by sea—to establish a kingdom in lower Mesopotamia.² Subsequently, within the historic era, the Chaldeans slowly developed in nautical skill. Their voyages seem originally to have been limited to the Euphrates and the Tigris; at last, although their boats were very crude in design, as well as in spite of the danger from shipwreck and

¹ Mas. I, 572 et seq., 592 et seq.

² *Ibid.* 574, 590.

capture by hostile tribes, they ventured to sail out on the Persian Gulf.¹ The traders of Uru were the leaders among those hardy adventurers through whose efforts traffic was gradually extended from point to point along the adjacent shores. Chaldea thus received the fine woods, the stones, and the marbles used in the construction of its temples, not less than the perfumes and the gems piously employed in its adoration of the gods.

Babylon, in the days of the first Chaldean empire, was already renowned for its size and splendor; a city which, although at a later date overwhelmed by its Assyrian conquerors,² was destined, two thousand years subsequently, to renewed glory.³

The early epoch of Assyrian supremacy is coincident with the decadence of Egypt after the reign of Rameses III. This country, racked with internal dissensions, was losing its hold on the races to the east of the Red Sea. The preëminence of Babylon was likewise waning. Out of the tumultuous upheavals of rebellious subjects a new state was to come forth.⁴ Tiglath-pileser, who flourished about 1150 B.C., was the first of the Assyrian monarchs whose deeds assume historic reality. The struggle between Chaldea and Assyria was long doubtful; and at intervals both were, by the exhaustion of their vitality, buried in equal oblivion; but ultimately the issue for the latter was to be triumphant.⁵ Soon after the close of the eighth century B.C., Assur-nazir-pal emerges out of the gloom as the founder of the second and more substantial period of national greatness.⁶

Thenceforward his people continued almost uninterruptedly during two hundred years to enlarge the circumference of their influence;⁷ with the conquest of Egypt by Esarhaddon,

¹ Rawlinson, II, 219.

² For fall of Babylon before Sennacherib, cf. Mas. III, 307-309.

³ Mas. I, 590-591, 603; II, 19-27; III, 783.

⁴ *Ibid.* II, 569, 621.

⁵ *Ibid.* II, 642-671.

⁶ *Ibid.* III, 13-51; "In a small town near one of the sources of the Tigris Assur-nazir-pal founded a colony, on which he imposed his name," *ibid.* 15.

⁷ Sargon and Sennacherib were the most distinguished of Esarhaddon's predecessors.

they attained the pinnacle of their power.¹ Under this sovereign and immediately after the accession of his successor, Assur-bani-pal, the empire comprised immense dominions (670–660 B.C.).² Besides its possessions throughout Western Asia, its sway then also reached over Egypt and included Cyprus as a dependency;³ still its constitution was inherently weak, as evidenced by its sudden and unprecedented collapse. At the moment when outward glory was apparently the greatest, Phraortes, the vassal prince of Media, himself the conqueror of the Persians, attacked his feudal lord and lost his life in the fruitless endeavor; but his son, Cyaxares, taking up the task, invaded Assyria, and after overwhelming all opposition humbled Nineveh in the dust (*circa* 608 B.C.). Nabopolassar, who was the local ruler of Babylon, also rebelled. Thus Assyria fell; from its ashes the two mighty realms of Media and Babylonia—the latter more properly known as the second Chaldean empire—arose; Egypt was at that time again free.⁴

The tie of the subject states to the central government of Assyria was always loose and ill defined; usually organized into provinces, each was placed under a governor and garrison; whenever the fortune of arms again extended Assyrian authority in any direction, the newly acquired territory was either subordinated to some neighboring administration or, if sufficiently important, granted separate autonomy.⁵ Moreover subjugated districts were thus attached to almost every province. The sword was the sole claim to supremacy; but, as the frequent periods of decadence testify, even the control thus exercised was ephemeral and limited. The chief effects of the loss of liberty upon the defeated nations consisted in the obligation to do homage, to pay tribute, and to render military service,—in brief, to assist their masters in hostile

¹ Mas. III, 15–322.

² *Ibid.* 323–442, 461–464; more especially for conquest of Egypt, *ibid.* 295, 371, 385, 397, 401.

³ Von Ranke, 65 et seq.; Raw. I, 501; Mas. I, 614–617, 650 et seq.; III, 259–260.

⁴ Mas. III, 454–486.

⁵ *Ibid.* III, 42–43, 193–198, 201–204, 373, 375.

operations against other foes.¹ While the degree of dependency at certain epochs and in different regions more or less varied, it may generally be said that, so long as the lords of secondary rank fulfilled these duties, they remained otherwise practically undisturbed; but in the event of non-compliance, or in the contingency of rebellion, they suffered severe punishment.

From the time of their earliest empire, the Assyrians had the habit of deporting vanquished races from their homes and settling them in remote localities.² At first the custom was, like that afterward adopted by Rome, to bring them within the boundaries of Assyria proper and send forth citizens to replace them in the annexed districts. For a period this system of colonization worked admirably and served to diffuse nationality not less than to consolidate the empire; but subsequently, when the frontiers of Assyria were being advanced with prodigious rapidity, it was found that continuance of the former method of scattering the native people would involve their dispersion over too large an area, their consequent weakness, and the anomaly of introducing into the body politic of the ruling community a factor equally as dangerous by reason of its variety as because of its enmity. Tiglath-pileser III followed the plan of removing the residents of one conquered province to the soil of another and then substituting in their stead those taken from the latter region; thus "he

¹ Von Ranke, 75; Raw. I, 501, 505; for description of the nature of such tribute, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 98 et seq. "The Assyrians ravaged their country, held their chiefs to ransom, razed their strongholds, or, when they did not demolish them, garrisoned them with their own troops, who held sway over the country. The revenues gleaned from these conquests would swell the treasury at Nineveh; the native soldiers would be incorporated into the Assyrian army, and when the smaller tribes had all in turn been subdued, their conqueror would at length find himself confronted with one of the great states from which he had been separated by these buffer communities; then it was that the men and money he had appropriated in his conquests would embolden him to provoke or to accept battle with some tolerable certainty of success."—MASPERO, III, 13.

² Von Ranke, III, 31; Raw. I, 503; Mas. III, 639-642; this system of deportation and forced colonization was likewise practised by the Incas of Peru; for an account of their *mitimas*, cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 330. Is this method of deportation not the origin of penal colonization?

transplanted the Arameans of the Mesopotamian deserts and the Kaldæ to the slopes of Mount Amanus or the banks of the Orontes, the Patinians and Hamathæans to Ulluba, the inhabitants of Damascus to Kir or to the borders of Elam, and the Israelites to some place in Assyria."¹ Opinions widely differ as to the effects of this system. All agree that it eradicated sedition and weakened the spirit of local patriotism; some claim that, while the dominant state designed the policy of forced colonization as a means of self-protection, the employment of these methods estranged the affections of the deported peoples, and exposed the metropolis to the risk of their defection in case of foreign invasion.² Others incline to the view that this general diffusion and mingling of vassal nations — many of which were hostile to each other — tended to promote their mutual antipathies and to cause them to regard the Assyrians as their common protectors, thus consolidating and strengthening the empire.³ Whatever be the true theory, it is certain that the sovereign power by its garrisons, governors, and alien colonists never impressed upon the greater part of its acquisitions either language, customs, or laws.

The history of the Medes, prior to the reign of that Phraortes who first challenged the supremacy of Assyria, is still involved in the obscurity of legend.⁴ The conflict with the Scythians, — summoned in terror by Assur-bani-pal to the support of his tottering empire, — is the birth-struggle of Media.⁵ After the expulsion of these uncouth invaders⁶ and the destruction of Nineveh by Cyaxares (606 B.C.)⁷ the Medes, continuing their conquests, rapidly increased in prestige until they finally erected the most important state in that portion

¹ Mas. III, 200; also 186, 199.

² Raw. I, 503 et seq.

³ Mas. III, 200, 201.

⁴ *Ibid.* III, 243, 327, 446-454; Raw. II, 82.

⁵ Raw. I, 493 et seq.; II, 89 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 148 et seq.; the statements of the latter authority in regard to the Scythians are based on Herodotus, I, 103-105. *Query*: Did not these people from the fact of their invasion and residence in a hostile land practise the elementary principles of colonization?

⁶ The text follows Maspero (III, 473-481).

⁷ *Ibid.* III, 484-486, 521-529.

of Asia;¹ their independence was, however, to be of brief duration; for about 550 B.C. the capital city of Ecbatana fell before Cyrus, and thenceforth Persia assumes the leading rôle in the dual hierarchy.²

Their form of control for the conquered districts resembled that of Assyria at the pinnacle of its fortunes; a regular system of dependency was built up. The nearest regions alone were subject to the central government, while the latter intrusted the administration of the more remote provinces to those situated between them and the metropolis. Hence a permanent source of weakness; since Media was less recognized as suzerain by its outlying possessions than their own immediate masters, to whom they were directly responsible for their revenues. Military strength was here again the only effective force of cohesion.³

Chaldea, the ancient, was one of the two principal states which arose from the ruins of Assyrian greatness;⁴ but the length of its second period of glory was scarcely longer than that of its ally and contemporary — Media. In 538 B.C. Cyrus triumphantly entered Babylon; and again in 519 B.C., after an interval of rebellion, Darius recaptured the place.⁵ Notwithstanding the fact of its subjection, first to one and then to another master during many cycles, Babylon is destined always to remain prominent among the cities of antiquity. Some idea of the volume of traffic transacted by the early Chaldeans has already been given;⁶ throughout the ages they were farmers, traders, and sailors;⁷ twenty centuries after they had first navigated the Persian Gulf they pushed their victorious arms to the banks of the Nile. Known by their enemies as the "Hammer of the Whole Earth,"⁸ they seem frequently to have deserved this appellation.

¹ For history of Media, cf. "Media, Babylon, and Persia" (in the "Story of the Nations" series), by Z. A. Ragozin; also Von Ranke, 89 et seq.; Raw. (Third Monarchy); Raw. II, 92 et seq. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 36, 91.

² Mas. III, 600.

³ Raw. II, 116 et seq.

⁴ Mas. III, 496.

⁵ *Ibid.* III, 634-637, 678-682.

⁶ *Supra*, 40-41.

⁷ Raw. II, 166, 218 et seq.

⁸ Jeremiah I. 23; Raw. I, 166.

Agriculture¹ and commerce were their two leading pursuits; the production of grain was enormous, while the cultivation of the date was carried to the highest degree;² industry—especially the making of carpets and the weaving of textiles³—also occupied a large proportion of their energies. Scriptural authorities call Babylonia “a land of traffic,” Babylon “a city of merchants,” and attribute the prosperity of its inhabitants to “their ships.”⁴ The vast quantity of their imports and exports attest their commercial activity. The open ocean was probably not a barrier to their ambition;⁵ so that after their subjugation by the Persians they may very naturally have aided in supplying the demand of their conquerors for seamen. According to the testimony of Strabo, the Chaldeans possessed the port of Gerrha, one of the first real colonies mentioned in history.⁶ This town is said to have been situated on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf, and to have been a centre of transportation between Babylon and the South, while considerable of the more northern trade passed through it.

Chaldea, as a government, whenever preëminent, was practically the duplicate of its rivals.⁷ The plan of subordination of the more remote to the nearer provinces was likewise followed; native princes were retained on the thrones of van-

¹ “The Chaldeans carried agriculture to a high degree of perfection, and succeeded in obtaining from the soil everything it could be made to yield.”—MASPERO, I, 770; 761-770.

² Raw. II, 220.

³ Mas. I, 752-759. “Their linen, woollen, and cotton fabrics and their richly ornamental carpets were celebrated throughout the Eastern regions. Their cotton was brought in part from the Persian Gulf. The flocks of sheep tended by the Arabian nomads supplied the wool.”—GROTE, III, 118.

⁴ Ezekiel xvii. 4; Isaiah xliii. 14.

⁵ Raw. II, 219.

⁶ “Nebuchadnezzar also constructed the seaport Teredon at the mouth of the Euphrates, and excavated a ship canal four hundred miles in length, which joined it with Babylon.”—GROTE, III, 119, based on Strabo, XIII, 617; Raw. II, 219.

⁷ “The tie which bound together the petty states of which Uru was composed was the slightest; the sovereign could barely claim as his own more than the capital and the district surrounding it; the other cities recognized his authority, paid him tribute, did homage to him in religious matters and doubtless rendered him military service also, but each one of them nevertheless maintained its particular constitution and obeyed its hereditary lords.”—MASPERO, I, 618.

quished kingdoms; similar tribute and service were exacted. To a still greater extent this system of oppression was enforced. Hardly any effort was made to ameliorate the position of the subjugated nations; while immense treasures, drawn from them, were employed within the central state in the construction of works of public utility and luxury, the development of the metropolis was almost exclusively the aim of its rulers. Other regions were left to their own mutilated and weakened resources, and not anything was done to improve the condition of their agriculture, commerce, or industry. This short-sighted policy was the chief cause of national weakness when peril threatened.¹

The Chaldeans, more than other Asiatic races, if not alone among them, had the genius to sketch the principal outlines of civilization.² From them the Greeks drew deep inspiration in architecture, sculpture, science, philosophy, and mathematics. Although their influence in this respect may be somewhat exaggerated, they certainly rendered invaluable benefits to mankind, and assured humanity of moral, intellectual, and social qualifications broader than it ever could have obtained from other Oriental sources.³

Of the ancient Persians little in this connection need be said. Notwithstanding the importance of their navy,⁴ equipped and manned by sailors drawn from subject states, they held traffic and commerce in contempt. Shops were excluded from the thoroughfares of their cities and the transactions of buying and selling were relegated to obscure quarters. Trade, believed to require falsehood, was regarded as contrary to the spirit of religion.⁵ Persia, therefore, although subsequently powerful, never developed either its own internal riches or those of its dependencies; its dominion was maintained entirely by the sword.⁶

In their organization, all the countries heretofore mentioned

¹ Raw. II, 245 et seq., 258.

² Mas. I, 703-784.

³ Raw. II, 257.

⁴ *Ibid.* 333 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.* 361; in later times, however, these prejudices seem to have disappeared, Duncker, "Gesch. des Alterthums," II. 664.

⁶ Cf. generally: Raw. II, also Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 135, 136; the government of Persia was subsequently very much improved by Darius Hys-

displayed the same characteristic.¹ Military strength was the prime attribute of government. Their various possessions—for such they were more strictly than colonies, so far as records indicate—were secured by force of arms, and not any, or scarcely any, by peaceful and voluntary emigration. Desire for glory and the necessity of conquest on the one hand, or submission to a foreign victor on the other, appear to have been the mainsprings of activity. In the condition of civilization during that era the subjugation of extensive regions and great multitudes to some stronger aggressor obtaining the mastery over them, seems to have been a natural result. Any considerable period of peace was an anomaly; the struggle for preëminence was unending. Of the five great empires,—Egypt, Chaldea, Assyria, Media, and Persia,—one and then another again and again attained the leadership; with every upheaval the former ruling power relapsed into the rank of a province. There was not any fixed or permanent order of society. The alternation of supremacy and dependency was such as to involve almost complete disruption when revolution came.

Let it not be forgotten that the annals of the races respectively dwelling in Egypt and in Western Asia, as just briefly outlined, practically relate to the same epoch. Attention is now to be directed to that people which, although for a long time politically connected with one or the other of the realms the history of which has been reviewed, was the first among nations destined to bequeath to posterity the memory of a vast system of colonization; wherein it set an example universally followed by all important states of ancient and modern times. The story of Phœnicia, the acknowledged forerunner in historic colonial enterprise, rightfully claims special consideration.

taspes, who organized or perfected the satrapal form of administration in the place of the crude methods of Assyria and Babylon. A good description is to be found in Grote, III, 447-453; also Oman, "History of Greece," 136; Mas. III, 686-687; for the slight traces left by Persia after its fall, cf. Mas. III, 813.

¹ Compare with these conquests and methods of rule those of the Peruvians before the arrival of the Spaniards in the New World; Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 325 et seq.

CHAPTER II

PHœNICIAN COLONIZATION

THE chronology of the Phœnicians is parallel to that of the Egyptian dynasties and of the Assyrian empires. From the day when their colonial régime is recognized by history, a well-defined and consecutive narrative of colonization may be traced; the characteristic features of that relationship between a dominant state and its weaker dependencies are to be distinguished, and the natural development of policies from age to age, as modified, improved, and ameliorated, is evident. They are thus the earliest ancestors in the genealogy of colonizing nations.

Bounded on the one side by Mount Carmel, on the other by the river Eleutheros, Phœnicia, during the period of its ordinary prosperity, embraced a strip of land about two hundred miles long, and from three to fourteen miles in width, with an area approximating two thousand square miles; a few islands in the adjacent waters completed its territory.¹ To the southward snow-clad Hermon and to the eastward the long receding and gradually rising plateau of modern Syria seemed to threaten the people with expulsion into the Mediterranean. The entire region is noted for its wonderful physical diversity. Up on the steep barren mountain sides and in the higher uncultivated valleys the only individuals to be met are shepherds with their flocks of black goats; down along the narrow belt of seaboard, intersected here and there with lofty ridges, palms and figs are cultivated; while on the lower ranges of the terraced hills, fruitful vineyards, topped

¹ Rollin, "Ancient History," II, 369; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 76 et seq.; Cantu, "Universal History," I, 440.

with mulberry and cedar trees, are seen. The tablelands are cold, deserted, even desolate: but to breathe their air is life-giving; the other districts are fertile, but damp, hot, and insalubrious.¹

In the midst of this variety and combination the forefathers of the Phœnicians located. While on the more immediate coast their descendants at the time of their subsequent affluence dwelt, the original people seem to have come from the rugged country of the South; perchance attracted thither, as Frederick von Schlegel suggests, by the brighter constellations of the northern firmament, or urged forward by some instinctive impulse rather than by any deeply rooted desire for commercial advantage.² With some reasonable degree of assurance they are supposed, in the first instance, to have resided in the neighborhood of the Persian Gulf and to have migrated thence by easy stages.³ The date of their earliest establishments in Phœnicia is sometimes fixed in the year 2800 B.C. Although great doubt has been expressed whether they should be reckoned among the Semite or Hamite races, recent opinion is in favor of the former view. One fact is certain: they are mentioned in the Old Testament as inhabiting the land of Canaan; throughout their career they were also frequently associated with the Hebrews.⁴

Whatever may be the details of their primitive history, several tribes were, in remote antiquity, domiciled in the vicinity of the Mediterranean, some on the slopes and others along the shore. Of those now in question, the Sidonians, whose name means "fishermen," had their abode at the foot of the Lebanon; they possibly were the most ancient settlers in that locality. Farther to the north, the Giblytes, or "mountain dwellers," were found; next to them the Arvadites—

¹ Duncker, I, 136 et seq.; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 169.

² Von Schlegel, "Philosophy of History," 80.

³ "One fact . . . appears to be certain in the midst of many hypotheses, and that is that the Phœnicians had their origin in the regions bordering on the Persian Gulf."—MASPERO, "Struggle of the Nations," 64. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 76; Duncker, "Geschichte des Alterthums," I, 139; Cantu, I, 438; Ragozin, 102; Von Ranke, 65.

⁴ Von Ranke, 60.

otherwise Zahi — occupied a very limited tract.¹ All these communities were situated in a well-watered section, not only rich in woods and meadows, but luxuriant in palms, wines, fodder, and grain.² The Greeks knew them collectively as Phœnicians — a word which means the “red skins,” or “eastern people,” not “inhabitants of the palm land,” as was once believed.³

Still other races lived in the hills in the direction of the Dead Sea.⁴ During the sixteenth century before Christ Thutmosis of Egypt made an expedition against Syria.⁵ Many of the smaller nations, forced to flee before the army of invasion, were then displaced; set in motion by this incursion, they, in turn overrunning the lower districts, obliged those dwelling there to seek relief elsewhere. The migration of these tribes does not seem to have been warlike, but rather friendly, in its character; they were simply avoiding the Egyptian foe and seeking to find protection among their more powerful neighbors, the Philistines and the Phœnicians. The effect — whether peaceful or hostile — could have only one result. Phœnicia, although highly productive of all the necessaries of life and many of its luxuries, was already crowded; this increase in numbers — as unexpected as it was unnatural — augmented therefore the demand for food supplies beyond its resources. Alleviation by a reduction of inhabitants was the only solution.⁶

¹ Maspero, “Struggle of the Nations,” 169 et seq., for an account of these tribes and their principal towns; also Strabo, XVI, ii, 13.

² “The Phœnicians naturally took to agriculture, and carried it to such a high state of perfection as to make it an actual science. Among no other people was the art of irrigation so successfully practised, and from such a narrow strip of territory as belonged to them no other cultivators could have gathered such abundant harvests of wheat and barley, and such supplies of grapes, olives, and other fruits.” — MASPERO, “Struggle of the Nations,” 188.

³ Duncker, I, 139 et seq.

⁴ Duncker, I, 140; the Egyptians called all the tribes whom they met Kāfiti or Kefāitū, which term was originally used only “for the people of the sea-coast, more especially of the regions occupied later by the Phœnicians,” Maspero, “Struggle of the Nations,” 120. For some description of the variety of these petty communities, cf. *ibid.* 147 et seq.

⁵ Maspero, “Struggle of the Nations,” 126; *supra*, p. 35.

⁶ Duncker, I, 141; Rawlinson, in his “History of Phœnicia,” 88-90, speaks of the overcrowding as being the natural result of the increase of the population rather than due to the influx of other kindred peoples.

At this early date, Sidon,¹ said to have been founded by and named after the eldest son of Canaan, was the metropolis. Tyre, somewhat later in origin, but ancient at the time of the Egyptian invasion,² lay a little farther to the southward. Opposite to this latter city, on a rocky island, the famous temple of the protecting god, Melkarth, was built. Other important towns were Berytus—now Beirut—and Byblos belonging to the Giblites, and Arvad to the Arvadites; Arka, Simyra, Marathus, Sarepta, Dor, and Joppa should also not be forgotten.³ Many of these places enjoyed considerable trade and carried on commerce with foreign nations; but until this epoch they had not extensively, if at all, entered upon their policy of colonization. Now they realized the necessity of transporting the surplus population to some remote region; and at the same time they proposed, while thus relieving themselves at home, to render these settlements, from a commercial standpoint, serviceable. Versed, as they were, in nautical science,⁴ they did not hesitate to seek for such establishments some land beyond the sea. Thus the Sidonians deported many of their compatriots to Cyprus and there erected the cities of Citium and Amathus, while numbers also went to Crete.⁵

¹ "The First-born of Canaan," Genesis x. 15; a name meaning a fishing-place.

² Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 183; the foundation of both these cities is obscured in legendary myths; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 78; Von Ranke, 60.

³ Duncker, I, 140; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 188 et seq.; Cantu, I, 440.

⁴ "The epoch, which was marked by their first venture on the Mediterranean, and the motives which led to it were alike unknown to them. The gods had taught them navigation and from the beginning of things they had taken to the sea as fishermen, or as explorers in the search of new lands. . . . It was the nature of the country itself which contributed more than anything else to make them mariners."—MASPERO, "Struggle of the Nations," 191 et seq., and "Dawn of Civilization," 392.

⁵ Duncker, I, 142: "The first colony of which the Phœnicians made themselves masters was that island of Cyprus, whose low lurid outline they could see on fine summer evenings in the glow of the western sky." Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations, 199: "It is not easy to determine the race to which the first inhabitants of the island (Cyprus) belonged if we do not see in them a branch of the Kefâiti, who frequented the Asiatic shores of the Mediterranean from a very remote period." *Ibid.* 201.

Besides being skilled mariners, the Phœnicians were an industrious people, renowned both in legend and history for their various manufactures; they especially promoted the useful arts.¹ Commerce, in the more extended meaning of the word, was probably due to their inventive genius.² Favorable winds make the voyage to Cyprus and Rhodes easy; thence Egypt is not far, and from the African shores the current runs toward Asia.³ The early conformation of the Phœnician seaboard, endowed with numerous harbors, was also a condition strongly favoring the development of navigation.⁴ It must be remembered that the tides, setting throughout the ages in this direction, have filled up many formerly excellent havens and naturally changed the coastline from that of antiquity. Lumber for ship-building was likewise plentiful in the interior hills and on the neighboring mountains.⁵ The inhabitants were not slow to avail themselves of these advantages. Hence there are traditions that they sailed in the time of Abraham to Greece, and even, perhaps, to other more distant regions. Of the nature and extent of their trade at this period and of their methods not any record exists. These myths are only mentioned as tending to prove the high antiquity of their acquaintance with the sea.⁶

With their knowledge and manifold facilities, it is not difficult to appreciate how the Phœnicians quickly embraced the opportunity to extend their influence, as soon as a short experience had taught them the beneficial consequences of such activity. The impulse, once felt, brought rapid results. They had the good fortune to find the ocean, at least comparatively, free; so that they seldom, if ever, had any enemies and probably not any competition on that element.⁷ They wandered, therefore, whithersoever the winds and currents

¹ Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 193.

² Cantu, I, 446 et seq.; Gaston Boissier, "L'Afrique Romaine," 37 et seq.

³ Von Ranke, I, 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 80.

⁶ *Ibid.*; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 192, 194.

⁷ For the little known concerning Egyptian commerce, cf. *supra*, Ch. I; also Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 232, 407, 582.

carried them. Wherever they went, they founded permanent colonies for trade with the natives and as places of refuge for their ships.¹ They not only located in Cyprus and Crete, but also migrated farther northward to Rhodes, Thera, Melos, and Cythera; thus gradually approaching Greece, and obtaining for themselves a complete line of commercial stations together with safe and convenient harbors. If the story of Herodotus be true, they even reached the island of Thasos, near the Thracian coast.² Not only here, but even more successfully on the adjacent mainland, gold was sought. Cyprus, with its copper ore, was especially important to them; for, with their skill in metal working, they speedily made great profit out of its possession.³ Settlements, all paying their tribute to Sidon, soon multiplied.⁴

Naturally devoted to industry, the Phœnicians were not slow in drawing from the countries brought under their control such raw materials as they deemed useful in their manufactures. They also perceived that the agricultural deficiencies of their own overcrowded land could be supplied by the products of these regions. They traded their dyes, clothing, and weapons for grain and cattle.⁵ Phœnicia, thus partially provided with food from abroad, it was seen, could sustain with ease its surplus of residents, and was enabled, as a result of the demands of the uncultured tribes, to give a

¹ Rollin, II, 367; *post*, p. 60-61; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 194; R. and J. 10; the Phœnician trading establishments are, in fact, to be compared to the more modern so-called "factories," *ibid.* 13.

² Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 202 et seq.; Duncker, I, 142; for influence of the Phœnicians upon Greece, cf. Holm, "History of Greece," I, Ch. IX; the legends of Cadmus, of the founding of Thebes in Bœotia, and those of Minos and of Europa in Crete, seem to indicate connection in very early times between Phœnicia and Greece.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 78; Duncker, I, 142; Herodotus, VI, 47; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 199.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 76; Cantu, I, 458 et seq. "The Phœnicians were also accustomed to send caravans into regions which they could not reach in their caracks and to establish trading stations at the fords of rivers or in the passes over mountain ranges. We know of the existence of such emporia at Laish, near the source of the Jordan, at Thapsacus and at Nisibis, and they must have served the purpose of a series of posts on the highways of the world." — MASPERO, "Struggle of the Nations," 193.

⁵ Duncker, I, 143.

wider range to its own activities. Not merely the difficulty of supporting its increased population was overcome, but it was now possible to give all regular and profitable employment. The merchandise brought back by Phœnician ships was not merely destined for home consumption. Situated almost alone on the coast of a densely inhabited district, with immense empires to the eastward and southward, these people were soon destined to become the intermediaries of traffic between the East and the West,¹ between the old world of Asia and Africa and the new world of the Mediterranean, just being opened through their endeavors. Egypt, Babylon, and Judea became the chief purchasers of the articles received from their newly acquired domains. Thus Phœnicia not only found means to satisfy its own needs, but at the same time developed into the market-place of all races.²

The political influence of the Phœnicians then became important; but their power, although extensive, might have been greater, for they were not a conquering nation. In their treatment of the aborigines, so far as recorded, they rarely fought them, but rather sought with gifts and promises to maintain friendly relations, thence their reputation for wisdom and prudence.³ They never, in the true sense of the word, turned their eyes to conquest. Trade, not territorial aggrandizement, was their aim;⁴ and consequently their possessions were left practically independent in their connection with the parent state. Such was their policy from earliest antiquity.

About 1300 B.C. another tremendous impetus was given to colonial enterprise by the migration of the Hebrews, who, then coming over the Jordan,⁵ pushed the neighboring tribes into this overcrowded land. The exodus from Phœnicia again took a westerly direction. Efforts were made, not only to find habitable regions, but likewise to locate settlements at points

¹ Von Ranke, I, 60; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 80; Cantu, I, 457 et seq.; Gaston Boissier, "L'Afrique Romaine," 53 et seq.

² For excellent description of Phœnician trade, cf. Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 188-206, 407, 582.

³ Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 195.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 80.

⁵ Duncker, I, 144.

most favorable to commerce and to the sale or exchange of Phœnician products,¹ for these people had already learned the lesson of seeking trade. Hence on the more distant coasts of the Mediterranean they determined to build ports and provide harbors, even though it were necessary for their maintenance to protect them with the sword.² Westward they steered their ships through unknown seas and discovered Sicily. Motya on one of the western peninsulas, and Rus Melkarth—subsequently the Greek Heraclea—on the south, together with Solocis and Machanath—the site of the modern Palermo—on the north, became their principal establishments. Malta was also occupied by them; ruins of temples to the patron goddess, Astarte, still exist there. All these places were under the rule of the inhabitants of Sidon. Tyrian colonists landed on Sardinia, where their headquarters were Caralis, the present Cagliari; other islands of the Mediterranean were equally visited by them. Nor was the African mainland overlooked. Not only Hippo, but also Utica (1100 B.C.), and Carthage³, at a somewhat later date (880–826 B.C.), were founded by Phœnician emigrants. Leptis and Hadrumentum were likewise respectively settled by Sidonians and Tyrians.⁴

Once entered upon the domain of the sea, these hardy mariners knew not any bounds to their ambition. Ever and ever westward and still farther westward they sailed, until they arrived at the Pillars of Hercules. The gods dwelt beyond; as they believed, the ends of the world and of the infinite met there. Without the consent of the deities they dare not proceed. Disembarking therefore on the coast of Africa, they,

¹ Cantu, I, 462.

² This advance of the Phœnicians into the western Mediterranean was largely attributable to the loss of their establishments in the *Ægean Sea*, and the consequent decline of their trade in that region, due to piratical expeditions, which were multiplying; cf. Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 585; "Passing of the Empires," 281.

³ Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 280; Carthage is reckoned as an agricultural colony; Rosscher and Jannasch, 21.

⁴ For some account of the Phœnicians in, on, and around the Gulf of Lyons, cf. Charles Lenthéric, "Les Villes Mortes du Golfe de Lyon," 89 et seq.; also Duncker, I, 144 et seq.; Cantu, I, 461; Von Ranke, I, 60; Gaston Bois-sier, 40; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 586.

under the shadow of Mount Calpe, offered up sacrifice; but in vain, for the divinities were unpropitious. Whether the ocean was too rough or these ancient sailors were too timid, it is said, that two successive expeditions returned to Phœnicia without having passed the Rock of Gibraltar. A third and more successful fleet penetrated the Atlantic, and, keeping close along the Spanish shores, reached the mouth of the Guadalquivir. Here the Phœnicians located, about 1100 B.C., the outpost of Gadeira or Gades, the forerunner of the city of Cadiz.¹ In this region, it is recorded, they discovered many rabbits² and much silver. From the first circumstance they named the country Spain, the word in their language meaning "full of rabbits"; while by the second fact they were strongly influenced to make this settlement more than usually important. All statements agree that, in that age, silver abounded in Spain. Nor did this metal alone constitute its sole mineral wealth; copper, iron, and lead were plentiful. Gold also existed. Of the vast quantities of silver, supposed by tradition to have been found there at that era, the Greek poets give a glowing account; "rivers of the liquid metal, mountains of the solidified ore; forests and meadows covered with silver; silver, silver, silver everywhere in the land beyond the Pillars of Hercules," is their universal testimony. The prudent Strabo corroborates the plenty of natural, mineral, and metallurgical resources;³ fish and agricultural products were also abundant.⁴

A new epoch then opened for the Phœnicians. In the vicinity of the Lebanon, and in some of their early outposts, they had already practised mining, and were consequently somewhat accustomed to the extraction of metals from the soil; but never previously had such opportunities been presented to their genius and their industry as in the Iberian

¹ More exactly Tartessus, slightly to the southwest of Cadiz; Diodorus, V, 345; Von Ranke, I, 60; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 77, 79; Duncker, I, 145; Cantu, I, 458; E. Meyer, I, 338 et seq.; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 740; "Passing of the Empires," 281.

² Strabo, III, 213, 214, 256; also Pliny, VIII, 43, 83; and Varro, "De Re Rustica," III, Ch. XIII; the Hebrew word for "rabbit" is said to be very similar to that of the Phœnicians.

³ Strabo, III, 224.

⁴ Duncker, I, 145 et seq.

Peninsula. At first they simply traded, like the Spaniards subsequently in Peru, giving the poor, untutored savages mere tawdry trifles in exchange for vast riches. When, however, the aborigines observed the anxiety to obtain this wealth, they hoarded their store; or perhaps, indeed, after a time, it had become exhausted. Then the Phœnicians pushed inland, overran the southern districts, and laid the foundations of many future cities. They located mines, seized possession of them and worked them, or forced the natives to labor in search of the precious ores. A silver current flowed across the seas and poured upon the shores of Phœnicia. Returning ships carried valuable cargoes to Tyre and Sidon. As a witness to the prosperity of Gadeira, Strabo must again be cited; he says that "although situated at the end of the world, on a small island, this city had, through the industry of its inhabitants, become so great in wealth and population that it was only second to Rome; and that the largest trading vessels came thence and went thither."¹

Legendary stories, with some features of possibility, transmitted to later ages, state how the Phœnicians, sailing north from Cadiz, cruised along the Portuguese and French coasts, in the tenth century B.C.; crossed to the Scilly Islands, landed among the Britons, and explored the English Channel.² The account of their voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, at a slightly subsequent date, is probably more authentic.³ While of little importance in their hazy details, these myths certainly prove that the Phœnicians, at that time, far surpassed, in geographical knowledge, the Greeks, their competitors in the field of colonization.⁴

¹ Duncker, I, 147 et seq.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 79; Duncker, I, 148; Cantu, I, 458 et seq.

³ As elsewhere (*supra*, p. 37) stated, a Phœnician fleet by direction of Nekos, Pharaoh Necho (circa 600 B.C.) of Egypt, probably made the voyage around Africa; Grote, III, 148; Herodotus, II, 158; IV, 42; Cantu, I, 458; Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 532 et seq. Fiske clearly sets forth the beliefs of the ancients concerning the circumnavigation of Africa, and gives a full discussion of this alleged voyage of the Phœnicians, "Discovery of America," I, 267.

⁴ "The colonization (of the Phœnicians) was not so continuous as the Greek nor so extensive in one direction, but on the whole it was wider and it

It has already been told how the Phœnicians, in the first period of their colonial policy, developed their trade with the nations to the eastward and thus secured for their Asiatic neighbors, as well as for themselves, food and raiment. When new colonial riches were brought home, and especially after the discovery of the silver mines of Spain, their intercourse with the Orient augmented enormously. Ships going to the western shores of the Mediterranean were loaded, not only with their products, but also with goods brought from Judea, Babylonia, and beyond, to be sold to the peoples dwelling nearer the Pillars of Hercules. The return cargoes consisted of silver, gold, precious stones, and fine woods; many of which articles not merely stayed in Phœnicia, but were sent farther inland to Babylon, Nineveh, and other centres, to pay for the exports previously made. Thus, as merchant, banker, and agent, Phœnicia enriched itself, and contributed vastly to the prosperity of the ancient world; its cities were the metropolises of trade. To the eastward, caravans of merchandise, from Baalbec, Emesa, Thapsacus, Tadmor, Damascus, and Babylon, directed their march toward Tyre and Sidon; to the westward, from Utica, Gadeira, and other numerous Mediterranean ports, treasure vessels shaped thither their course.¹

Notwithstanding their vast traffic in foreign wares, the Phœnicians did not forget to foster their own industries. The reputed inventors of glass, the undisputed makers of purple,² the developers of rare dyes, the unsurpassed weavers of wool and skilful workers in metals: they stood in their day unchallenged, in the foremost ranks of industrial peoples.³ Their towns became known not less as great centres of manu-

was far bolder and more adventurous. . . . The commercial motive was predominant with them, and gave them courage."—RAWLINSON, "History of Phœnicia," 129.

¹ Duncker, I, 149 et seq., 172 et seq.; Cantu, I, 441; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 187 et seq.

² Maspero describes the process of purple making, "Struggle of the Nations," 203.

³ For description of Phœnician skill and renown in workmanship, cf. Gaston Boissier, 37 et seq.; also Cantu, I, 442; Duncker, I, 150 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 80.

facture than as excellent harbors and seaports. Of the riches of Tyre, and of its magnificence, the prophet Ezekiel, writing three hundred years later, gives in his twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth chapters a brilliant, but well-merited, description.¹

At the beginning of the tenth century before Christ, such was the reputation of the Phœnicians; they had then opened almost every portion of the Mediterranean to their ships, and wherever they had gone had established prosperous and permanent settlements.² The inhabitants of Tyre likewise knew, or surmised, the utility of the Red Sea as a route to the East. Not content alone with the commerce of the West and the overland caravan traffic, they determined to seek for themselves the sources of wealth hidden beyond the unsailed ocean of the Orient. King Solomon, whose building operations they had aided with workmen, fine woods, and precious stones, granted them permission to build vessels at Eziongeber, port of the city of Elath.³ The fleet there constructed made a three years' voyage in the Indian Ocean, returning with an immense shipment of jewels, ivory, metals, gold, monkeys, and peacocks. The country of Ophir had been discovered, and the trade, once begun, was regularly maintained.⁴ Under King Hiram, Tyre thus attained the height of its power.⁵ Shortly thereafter, some Tyrian political refugees went to settle in the vicinity of Utica, and there laid the foundations of mighty Carthage.⁶

The Phœnician establishments throughout the Mediterranean were not only important as commercial stations, but even the more as outposts of Eastern civilization, diffusing among the aborigines of the West the culture and education of the

¹ Ezekiel xxvii-xxviii; Isaiah xxiii, 8; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 81; Duncker, I, 153 et seq.; Quintus Curtius, Bk. IV, Ch. IV, 159; Strabo, XVI, 1057.

² Rawlinson, "History of Phœnicia," 105; for location of the colonies, *ibid.* Ch. V.

³ Von Ranke, I, 61; Duncker, I, 156.

⁴ Duncker, I, 157; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 741.

⁵ For account of Tyre at that time, Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 742.

⁶ Gaston Boissier, 41; Duncker, I, 157 et seq.; Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 280; *supra*, p. 56; *post*, p. 69 et seq.

most enlightened nations of that age;¹ while their own knowledge of the world and conception of the universe were in turn vastly developed. As the first colonizing people, the Phœnicians conferred unreckoned and incalculable benefits upon future generations.² In extending their commerce to the uttermost ends of the earth, they unconsciously bore with their ships a cargo immeasurably more precious than that of merchandise and silver. They transported the elementary rudiments of learning to the untutored tribes of the West, and thence they received not less valuable information of the breadth of the seas and of the uncounted millions of mankind who were not bounded or confined by any false or imaginary circle of limitation between the gods and men.

Before their vision the Pillars of Hercules fell. Would that they had had the bravery boldly to proclaim to their contemporaries the fulness of their discoveries! Progress in the sciences of astronomy and geography might have been advanced by two thousand years. But trade was their prime motive, and their avarice resulted in the desire to keep other races in ignorance and to retain alone for themselves the advantages which they had gained. Not less crafty than skilful in their actions and conduct, they adopted, as part of their colonial system, an exclusive policy. The mercantile transactions of the colonies were for Phœnicia and not for any other. Crude as the method in those days was, the end was similar to that held in view by many more modern states. A monopoly was sought.³ Captains, pilots, and sailors were instructed not to communicate to foreign merchantmen the course followed by their ships. When pursued or tracked by any competitor, they did their utmost to throw him off their wake; for this purpose any stratagem or trick was permissible.⁴ Thus during many

¹ "The settlements of the Phœnicians always assumed the character of colonies, and however remote they might be from the fatherland, the colonists never lost the manners and customs of their native country." — MASPERO, "Struggle of the Nations," 194; *supra*, pp. 54-55.

² Cantu, I, 460 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 79 et seq.; Duncker, I, 172; Cantu, I, 459.

⁴ Strabo, III, 175, 265; Herodotus, III, 102 et seq.; Duncker, I, 174.

centuries, they sought wealth in regions, the direction and extent of which were unknown to their neighbors; and sold these latter's products to the barbarians, whose very existence was to them mythical and whose habitations were as remote and even more unfixed in their minds than the abodes of the divinities. By these means the Phœnicians amassed riches and concentrated the carrying trade of that age in their own hands.¹

What now can be said of the government of the people who experienced this wonderful and until then unexampled development? The details transmitted to posterity are few and scattered; very little information of the political or administrative system of Phœnicia is still extant.² At the epoch of the earliest invasion of the hill tribes into the coast districts, the country was, according to the most reliable accounts, divided into more than thirty petty kingdoms, each with its own walled capital and separate royal family. In many instances the newcomers seem to have overthrown the established authorities and to have usurped their power; but eventually, after prolonged strife, the old-time sovereigns regained the ascendancy. The division into several independent states continued uninterruptedly, save, as will be seen, when slightly modified at a later date.³ Similar to the experience of the Italian republics of mediæval times, one or the other of the Phœnician cities in turn acquired the preponderance. In the earlier days Sidon was the metropolis and thence the first colonies went forth; to it the Greek settlements especially traced their origin. The greater Tyre itself owed its foundation to some emigrants, who, wandering, had sought a home on the island opposite the ancient Tyrus.⁴ The new community prospered beyond measure, annexed the city on the mainland, assumed its name, and became the famous Tyre of story. By reason of its natural advantages, situation, and industry, soon surpassing Sidon in wealth and importance, it became the political and commercial centre of the world.⁵

¹ Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 206.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 77 et seq.; Duncker, I, 159 et seq.

³ Duncker, I, 160 et seq.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 78.

⁵ Duncker, I, 153, 172 et seq.; Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 279-283.

Among the towns of Phœnicia not any other equalled or rivalled it; almost, if not all, the colonies of the West, those in Spain, Africa, the islands of the farther Mediterranean, and beyond, were due to the initiative of its citizens.

The form of government in the independent cities of Phœnicia was always a limited monarchy.¹ Sidon, Tyre, Aradus, Byblos, and Berytus had their own royal families, in which the power was hereditary. The kings were highly honored and displayed much magnificence. Their wealth was undoubtedly great — especially upon the development of colonial possessions — and they enjoyed all possible luxury. During the history of the country, the succession remained after the first upheaval, and notwithstanding the numerous subsequent foreign invasions, in the ancient houses of old Phœnician stock; but despotism was never known. Well-defined limits were set to the authority of the princes, and there was a council of elders to advise and a system of magistrates to judge.² Above all, account had to be taken of the disposition of the populace. A race, conglomerate in its origin, as bold as courageous, containing a very large proportion of artisans and a still greater number of seafaring men, is not easily governed by a tyrant or by an aristocracy. Throughout Phœnicia it

¹ The degree of independence varied among the different cities and from time to time. The Arvadites were the bravest against a foreign invader. "Conquered again and again, on account of the smallness of their numbers, they were never discouraged by their reverses, and Phœnicia owed all its military history for a long period to their prowess. The Tyrians were of a more accommodating nature. . . . Their foreign policy was reduced to a simple arithmetical question, which they discussed in the light of their industrial or commercial interests. As soon as they had learned from a short experience that a certain Pharaoh had at his disposal armies, against which they could offer no serious opposition, they at once surrendered to him, and thought only of obtaining the greatest profit from the vassalage to which they were condemned. The obligation to pay tribute did not appear to them so much in the light of a burthen, or a sacrifice, as a means of purchasing the right to go to and fro freely in Egypt, or in the countries subject to its influence. The commerce acquired by these privileges recouped them more than a hundredfold for all their overlord demanded from them." The other cities acted likewise and very similarly to whomsoever might have the supremacy over them — be it Chælia, Egypt, or Assyria. Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 190 et seq.; "Passing of the Empires," 279 et seq.

² Duncker, I, 159 et seq.; Cantu, I, 440.

would seem that the people must have had popular leaders, and that these representatives must, speaking in their name, have had considerable influence upon political, commercial, and economic policies.¹ Although the different communities were, indeed, entirely independent of each other, still — very much like the Hanse towns of the Middle Ages — they had a union to protect themselves against hostile foes and also to execute their more important undertakings. Entering upon great enterprises and meditating vast conquests, the Tyrians, the Sidonians, and the Aradians realized the profit to be drawn from co-operation. Just when, it is not known, but certainly at an early date, Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus joined in sending delegates to a national assembly; as the place of its meeting, the city of Tripolis was founded and built.² To this congress each of the allies seems to have sent one hundred representatives; their special duty was to develop Phœnician trade and commerce; undoubtedly, in this connection, they had much to say about colonial affairs. Such a system of rule inevitably favored freedom of thought, speech, and action; and to this independence Phœnicia owed its glorious career.

The social evil of human bondage, nevertheless, existed; and, as possessions increased, innumerable throngs of slaves were drawn thence to do service in the parent state.³ This traffic is a blot on the record book of all the nations of antiquity. Slavery, however, plays a rôle, not only in ancient times, but even throughout colonial annals; with or without it, many problems present distinctly varying aspects. As until recently this form of servitude has almost everywhere prevailed, so, it may be said, the colonization of the past is thereby differentiated from that of the future. This cruel factor of former ages, although now not any longer existent, must, nevertheless, be considered as an element, which has been eliminated.

Of the administration of the Phœnician dependencies still less is known than of the government of the parent cities.

¹ Duncker, I, 159 et seq.

² Duncker, I, 160 et seq.; Cantu, I, 440.

³ Duncker, I, 150; Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 169.

The tie between them appears to have been principally maintained by reason of common origin, their participation in mutual benefits derived from commerce, and their recognition of the same divinities.¹ The Phœnicians were apparently content with very little direct control in colonial affairs. Although probably they collected certain taxes and amassed wealth from their colonies, they do not seem to have extended their political rule over them. Each establishment was in this respect free. A senate of elders and two governors, elected for life from its members, exercised the supreme local power.²

The very reasons for the prosperity of Phœnicia were likewise the causes of its decay. Its sailors opened the first far-reaching sea routes; its merchants first introduced many hitherto unknown products to the civilized nations of that day; its colonists first occupied untilled and distant regions; its priests first taught religion, science, and civilization to the rude races of the West. While this people drew immense resources from lands previously enveloped in darkness, it diffused not less light upon them. Through centuries unmolested or scarcely annoyed by enemies, the sole conqueror of a new element, — the sea, — Phœnicia forgot that, with its vast expansion in area and wealth, defensive organization must keep pace. While it restricted its energies to the narrow strip of Asiatic coast, and as long as rivals did not appear on the domain of water, Phœnicia was able to wield its own unchallenged sovereignty; but as the colonies grew and expanded, many of them in turn sent forth settlements and, becoming centres of trade, subsequently attained importance. Other highways were traced on the map of the world; vessels sought other harbors. The time of emancipation was approaching, or had come, when an invasion of the Babylonians, in 587 B.C., shattered the Phœnician government.³ Old Tyre was besieged

¹ For the common worship of Melkarth, cf. Diodorus, IV, 17 et seq.; for the participation of the colonists in the religious festivals of the parent cities, cf. Duncker, I, 171.

² Duncker, I, 161; Cantu, I, 462.

³ For the fall of the Tyrian kingdom before Sennacherib, cf. Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 285 et seq.

and totally destroyed by Nebuchadrezzar, in 574 B.C.;¹ New Tyre fell before Alexander the Great, in 332 B.C.²

The Phœnicians were never dazzled by the glory of conquest. Except Cyprus, all their possessions were acquired by peaceful methods. To their ultimate misfortune, they were not addicted to the maintenance of armed forces, nor even to military instruction. Their entire attention was devoted to commercial development.³ The fact, however, must be emphasized, that the field which they entered was practically new. In founding a colony, they had not to reckon with avaricious or envious rivals; many of their establishments were virtually unlimited in extent. Questions of uncertain boundary lines, delimitation of territory, and buffer states never arose. In the trackless deep they rested where they would. So long as Sidon and Tyre were the nearest or the most accessible marts of traffic and the most convenient ports, the colonists remained faithful; but when other more neighboring cities and more profitable markets arose around the Mediterranean, they naturally absorbed the trade and interests of those Phœnician dependencies, which, by their situation, were then cut off from the realm of their forefathers. Sidon and Tyre could not do more than protest. Without sufficient military and naval armaments, they gradually withered, like a too luxuriantly flowering plant. Their work had been done; the seed had fallen in many places.

The greatest bequest of the Phœnicians to posterity was their broad diffusion of the elements of civilization.⁴ Their method was not the less remarkable. They stand the first — in antiquity perhaps the only race — who by peaceful means attained world-wide supremacy; for, not only by sea, but like-

¹ Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 542-549, 601; Von Ranke, I, 87; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 81; Cantu, I, 441; for relations between Babylonia and Phœnicia after this conquest, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 110; between Persia and Phœnicia, *ibid.* II, 322 et seq. and Lect. 71. The political history of Phœnicia and its cities, after the period of decadence began is not here of interest.

² Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 811-812; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 384 et seq. ³ Cantu, I, 462.

⁴ Maspero, "Struggle of the Nations," 187 et seq.

wise on land, they were the acknowledged sovereign people of their times. Even to-day in daily life, their activity, their skill, their inventive genius, and their commercial instinct are memorable; and not the least of the lessons which they taught is the theory of colonization.

CHAPTER III

CARTHAGINIAN COLONIZATION

THE occasional traveller who visits the antiquated city of Tunis is usually attracted thither by its proximity to the ruins of old Carthage. The Goletta, the port of Tunis, must indeed be near the site of the ancient rival of Rome. Disappointment, however, is the fate of him who dreams that he may be impressed by any remnant of past grandeur. Some few scattered piles of stone, one or two broken columns, a museum containing many fragmentary inscriptions, the excavation of cisterns and the outline of an aqueduct, are the only relics of Punic or Roman Carthage which remain.¹ Even more memorials are to be found in the collections of European capitals, whither they have been transported by ardent and avaricious explorers. What recollections, nevertheless, this barren scene of destruction inspires! Carthage, the home of renowned generals and admirals, the victor over many nations, the mother of numerous cities, and once the metropolis of the world, lies crumbled in the dust.² Great in her legacies to future generations, these very gifts are for the most part undetermined, vague, unrecorded, and unappreciated; such knowledge as exists concerning the extent of her dominions and the glorious career of her arms is indeed chiefly due to the scattered notices found in the literature of her most powerful foe and eventual conqueror. All that *was* Carthaginian still extant is little more than meaningless. Suppress the record of the Punic wars, which ended in her annihilation, and short would be the historic narrative of her political career;

¹ Gaston Boissier, 48 et seq.

² For power and splendor of Carthage, *ibid.* 47 et seq.

yet the era of her prosperity embraced a period of six hundred years. What of her commerce, of her laws, of her learning, of her arts, of her customs? The answer is similar. Enveloped in the myths of time, all traces of the social, industrial, and economic life of this city seem to have disappeared, together with her palaces and temples, under the sacrilegious hand of the ruthless destroyer; even racial descendants to perpetuate language and religion were denied. The testimony of the brave deeds and the crushing disasters of the former mistress of the Mediterranean must be read in the annals of enemies.¹ These writers, in spite of their animosity, chronicle the struggles, the growth, the development, the rise, the long continued successes of an energetic and heroic people, until, in the circumscribed circle of that age, they met in mortal conflict their only rivals, destined for so long to be their antagonists and ultimately their annihilators. Due allowance made for the jealousy, envy, unintentional ignorance, or deeply rooted prejudices of these men of hostile race, foreign language, and different worship, the true bearing of the events, observed and noted only as necessary to the elucidation of their own national history, can be but faintly estimated. Legend and poetry also, while doing something to preserve the names of individuals and places, have been busy in confounding Carthaginian chronology.²

The details of the origin³ of the metropolis, as in the case of many other cities boasting of high antiquity, are absolutely lost. Authorities uniformly maintain that Dido, or Elisa, arrived there some time between 880 and 826 B.C. Whether or not long prior to that date a settlement existed in the immediate vicinity, not any man can positively say; although some claim that as far back as 1500 B.C. a village or collection of houses was on this site. In any event, Carthage did

¹ Gaston Boissier, 56.

² The most complete work on Carthage of recent date is "*Geschichte der Karthager*," by Otto Meltzer.

³ Maspero, "*Passing of the Empires*," 280; Niebuhr, "*Ancient History*," III, 158 et seq., 160; Gaston Boissier, 41; Cantu, II, 512. The foundation of Carthage was due to political discontent at Tyre, Rosscher and Jannasch. 36.

not attain celebrity until after the advent of Dido on these shores. Virgil, in his exercise of the poetic license, vividly describes how Æneas found the new city building, paid court to Dido, suffered complications with Tarbas, a neighboring monarch, and subsequently fled.¹ While, by assuming Æneas and Dido to be contemporaries, a romantic tale is woven, the anachronism is from the historic standpoint not less unpardonable. Æneas, if a reality, lived at least three centuries before the era of the queen. The accepted account of the flight of Dido, or Elisa, from Tyre is, however, probably not entirely devoid of truth. This woman, a daughter of the royal house, by reason of her marriage with Sichæus, a wealthy prince, had been unfortunate. Pygmalion, her brother, at that time king of Tyre, encompassed the assassination of her husband, intending to seize his great riches; but Elisa, by subterfuge, managed to elude the traps set for her, and, accompanied by a band of trusty followers, set sail on Tyrian ships, carrying away in Pygmalion's own vessels the treasures which he so much coveted. She first touched at Cyprus, there embarking, according to the story, eighty maidens as wives for the members of the crew. Thence she continued westward, undoubtedly influenced by knowledge of the existence of previous Phœnician settlements on the African coast, for Utica and Tunes had already been founded.² A landing was effected in their vicinity, and, on condition of paying a fixed tribute to the natives,³ the refugees were permitted there to establish their permanent residence. How Dido bought of the aborigines a tract of the soil only as large as might be encompassed by a bull's hide, and then claimed the right to cut the skin into narrow strips;⁴ how she built the city, how she worshipped the gods, and how, after rejecting Tarbas, she committed suicide, are well-known legends; whether they be true or only the product of imagination, little matters.

¹ For brief criticism of the character of Dido and Æneas, cf. Gaston Boissier, 56 et seq.; for founding of Carthage, cf. Meltzer, I, Ch. III.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 159 et seq.

³ *Ibid.* III, 161; Gaston Boissier, 41.

⁴ Gaston Boissier, 41.

The salient fact is the record of this community in the ninth century before the Christian era.

Carthage was most favorably situated.¹ In those days, the peninsula, on which the city stood, was connected with the mainland only by a long narrow isthmus, while the seaward extremity widened, on either side, almost symmetrically into two outspread elongated wings. The ceaseless action of wind and tide has since then connected both these natural jetties with the respectively opposite shore; leaving behind the strips of land, thus formed, two small shallow lakes; vast quantities of sand have also piled up against the ancient sea front; to estimate the real condition of this harbor twenty-seven hundred years ago would, therefore, be difficult.² All records confirm, nevertheless, its wonderful advantages. The Phœnician settlers, traders by instinct, sailors by necessity, anchoring in this haven, were not slow to appreciate the local surroundings of their new abode. Other events, beyond their most sanguine hopes, were also tending to favor their plans and crown with success their descendants. "The star of empire moves westward" was an axiom perhaps unknown to them, but absolutely as correct then as now. The great monarchies of Western Asia had well-nigh closed the most important period of their national careers; Phœnicia was at the height of its power; Greece was not yet great, and Rome had not risen;³ the Phœnician colonies in Spain and on the islands of the Mediterranean were developing; the science of navigation was daily growing in importance. Carthage, let it be recalled, was a Phœnician dependency, not only established by Tyrians, but acknowledging allegiance to Tyre; whether by the death of the parties to the domestic tragedy of Dido or by reason of the impossibility of punishment, the mother city never persisted in the chastisement of the self-constituted exiles. On the contrary, at Carthage, midway in the Mediterranean, the centre of many stations on the African coast,

¹ Rollin, II, 368; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," 159 et seq.; Gaston Boissier, 45 et seq.

² Gaston Boissier, 46 et seq. ³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 159.

as well as within easy reach of immense native markets, the Phœnicians found a safe, convenient harbor and a new, regular trade. Consequently the relations between the parent state of Tyre and her Phœnician neighbors on the one hand, and this vigorous colony on the other, must have been very intimate and profitable.¹

The city and port soon became prominent. Other settlements, possibly prior in origin, were absorbed and some adjacent territory was annexed;² but, like Phœnicia, Carthage never very extensively increased her realm on the African mainland. In the days of greatest prosperity, her own immediate area was little more than the present French regency of Tunis, the boundaries being, indeed, almost the same. Dominion, power, and riches lay beyond the seas. Under the Phœnician system of colonization, Carthage was practically independent to develop her own designs and amass her own riches. For a time the colonists, by religious offerings and gifts to propitiate good feeling, recognized the obligations of descent; but they soon acquired sufficient strength even to substitute themselves in place of their predecessors as protectors and patrons of many outposts scattered still farther to the westward.³ The waning power of the elder state and the dangers which were then encompassing it at home likewise contributed to this result.⁴ Historically, Carthage may therefore be justly considered as the successor of Phœnicia in the empire of colonization. While active in almost the same field, while frequently continuing the work begun by the parent cities, and while, for many similar reasons and aims pursuing a colonial policy, her methods were nevertheless essentially different.⁵

Carthage, as a body politic, was in the first instance more

¹ Rollin, II, 368; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 126; for the friendly relations between Tyre and Carthage, cf. Polybius, "Exc. de Legatt," 114; Herodotus, III, 17 et seq.; Diodorus, XVII, 41.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 161.

³ Ernest Babelon, 18.

⁴ The same author attributes the rapid growth, and the greatness of Carthage, to the Babylonian conquest of Tyre; "Carthage," 18.

⁵ Gaston Boissier, 41; the Phœnician colonies were *apoikiai*, the Carthaginian *clerouchoi*.

unified than Phœnicia.¹ The earliest immigrants, whoever they were and whenever they came hither, too weak to resist the aborigines, exercised, according to trustworthy accounts, great skill and astuteness in maintaining friendly relations with them.² Subsequently other villages sprang up in proximity to the principal city, and the gradual intermarriage of the colonists with the natives created the race known as Liby-Phœnicians. In this manner the first Carthaginian colonies originated, and thus the subjugation of the surrounding tribes was for the most part peaceably accomplished.³ The other Phœnician establishments on the African coast, originally the equal allies of Carthage, likewise soon acknowledged her supremacy.⁴ The people seem early to have extended their colonial efforts beyond the sea. In the myths of uncertainty the exact time when they first began to migrate to distant lands cannot now be specified, nor can the motives which then actuated them be accurately determined. Circumstantial evidence would, however, indicate that the rapid growth of the metropolis, its restricted area, the deeply rooted trading instinct of the inhabitants, the favorable occasion to supplant, or rather succeed, the cities of Phœnicia in commercial relations with the West, the facility of their situation as a point of departure for all Mediterranean ports, were inducements, if not really the causes, which decided the Carthaginians to embark their fortunes upon the deep. Their colonies were certainly the result of a well-defined endeavor, and not nearly as accidental in origin as those of their Phœnician ancestors. Very early, indeed, they appear to have realized the possibilities of the future for their nation, and to have appreciated the significance and value of distant possessions in the achievement of their destiny. From the most remote period they seem to have fixed upon colonization as the best method

¹ Von Ranke, 470.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 161; Gaston Boissier, 41.

³ Cantu, II, 512.

⁴ Gaston Boissier, 42; Cantu, II, 513; for the decline of the west Phœnician colonies and the building of the Carthaginian empire, cf. Meltzer, I, Ch. IV.

to restrict their numbers, to eliminate the vagabond, restless elements of the population, and to supply themselves the wealth necessary for other enterprises.¹ Located as their capital was,² they were obliged to go afar to seek natural riches; in this search they did not forget nor overlook the errors of the Tyrians and of the Sidonians, but rather profited by their eventually unfortunate experiences. They resolved that their dependencies should be for them not only a fountain of wealth, but the source of power; with this object in view their policy was modelled upon broad lines. The colonies established formed not mere trading stations or forts, but rather permanent settlements; reinforcements were being constantly sent out to the support of the first emigrants, so that in time many of these outposts became large and important towns. With the tribute paid by them and the indirect gains arising from their trade, the mother city not only enriched herself, beautified the municipality, developed her industries, fostered the arts,³ and maintained an immense merchant marine, but likewise in a regular manner extended her dominion, conquered outlying territory, defended her possessions, and even waged protracted wars with rival nations. Carthage was at the same time merchant and fighter, sailor and soldier. She first promulgated the doctrine of conquest in connection with a colonial system.⁴

¹ Cantu, II, 513.

² The soil was not barren from the standpoint of agriculture, but by reason of the limited area of Carthage the crops were small and insufficient. Gaston Boissier states, "The land has not yet ceased to be fertile and smiling. Beule says, 'It is the richness of the African soil united to the poetry of Greek and Sicilian nature.' In the midst of fields of barley and grain little villages and beautiful country houses, taking shelter under the foliage of fig and olive trees, form green isles." — "L'Afrique Romaine," 48. Polybius says the neighborhood of Carthage "was covered with gardens and trees, with irrigating canals, country houses shaded with olive trees and vineyards, with fields of green verdure."

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 156 et seq.; Cantu, II, 513.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 157, speaking of the Carthaginians, says, "Their weakness consisted in their not being a warlike nation." *Contra*, the greater number of the Carthaginian forces were mercenaries, attracted into the service of this city by the high pay and the rich spoils awarded them; Cantu, II, 519.

Colonies were seldom planted where they could not be retained; hence islands, as more easy of defence, rather than the mainland, were preferred for occupation. Sardinia and the Balearic Isles were, after the early inland acquisitions of the Carthaginians on the African continent, the first objective points of their enterprise; while Malta, and possibly Corsica, soon fell under their control.¹

The long struggle for the subjugation of Sicily began at a very early date.² This island, situated so close to the metropolis and the ownership of which, would, in a measure, assure the control of the narrow intervening seas, was naturally very attractive; more fortunate would it have been, had it proved less costly to the treasury and less productive of evil to the state. In these expeditions, the enemies were chiefly the Greek colonists of Syracuse, Agrigentum, and other neighboring cities of like origin.³ Gelon,⁴ Theron, Dionysius, the elder, and the younger, Timoleon, and Agathocles were the skilful and crafty generals with whom the Carthaginians had to contest foot by foot their advances and to whom they, on several occasions, made abject surrender. For most of the successes here, as elsewhere, the great military leader Mago,⁵ his two sons and six grandsons, were responsible.⁶ Trained in the profession of arms, the first named commander drilled the Carthaginian army to a high degree of excellence, and tried it on many fields of battle. His sons, Hasdrubal and Hamilcar,

¹ Cantu, II, 514; R. and J. 10 et seq.

² For a concise account of this conflict, cf. Von Ranke, 471 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 163. "The value of the western point of Sicily was not likely to escape them (the Carthaginians). From the beginning of the sixth century onward we find them supporting the native or Phœnician inhabitants in their contests with the Greeks."—E. ABBOTT, "History of Greece," II, 433 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 163 et seq. *Post Ch. IV.*

⁴ Holm, II, 79 et seq.

⁵ Meltzer, I, 193, attributes to Mago the founding of the military system and the extension of the Carthaginian state into an empire. Mago is said to have concluded commercial treaties with the Etruscans, the Latins, and the Greeks of Sicily and Italy. The first treaty with Rome (509 B.C.) is his work. Cf. Polybius, quoted by Babelon, 20 et seq.; also Meltzer, I, 168 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 161; for brief account of the Sicilian wars, cf. Cantu, II, 44 et seq.

⁶ Cantu, II, 513.

subdued Sardinia,¹ while their six sons maintained or even surpassed in military achievements the reputations of their fathers. But let it not be imagined that the arms of this people were always crowned with victory; for, from the earliest epoch, when, as allies of the Persians against the Greeks, they invaded Sicily, their fortunes were varied and at times disastrous. Some of the reverses suffered by them are indeed memorable. Of all the foes whom they met in these wars Agathocles was the most formidable; after having been once defeated,² he suddenly shifted the scene of action by landing a considerable army on Carthaginian soil.³ He won some minor triumphs and with prompt action might have taken Carthage herself (309 B.C.); his delay, however, enabled the citizens to rally to her defence, and, after a heroic struggle, the invader was repulsed. Eventually a treaty was signed, according to which the Syracusans entirely withdrew from Africa, and the Carthaginians desisted from any attempt at further conquest in Sicily.⁴ From 480 B.C. to 264 B.C. Carthage was involved in almost continual hostilities to assert her rights in that island; still, in spite of this prolonged conflict and the vast expenditure of money and men, not more than one-third of it was ever under her rule.⁵

Taking advantage of civil dissensions in Syracuse, the Carthaginians, in 239 B.C., after capturing many of its possessions, invested the city itself. The Romans and Pyrrhus — whom the Tarentines⁶ had called to their assistance — were then at war, when the Syracusans enlisted the latter's support; on the other hand a treaty of offence and defence existed between the former and the Carthaginians.⁷ The Greeks appeared in Italy and the Carthaginians sent a fleet to aid the Romans; which

¹ Ernest Babelon, 20, accredits the first conquest of Sardinia to Mago; his sons were merely finishing his work.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 205.

³ *Ibid.* III, 97; Von Ranke, 478 et seq.; for brief account of the war with Agathocles, cf. Holm, III; also Ernest Babelon, 26 et seq.; for extended account, Meltzer, I, 360 et seq.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 149 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.* II, 163 et seq., Lect. 93, III, 97.

⁶ *Ibid.* III, 213.

⁷ *Ibid.* III, 223.

succor was however declined. The king of Epirus then successfully invaded Sicily, and, not satisfied with depriving Carthage of her colonies, meditated an attack on the African coast, a design which he did not execute. Meanwhile the Carthaginians, in an endeavor to extricate themselves from their Sicilian perplexities, entered into an agreement detrimental to the welfare of their allies. The Romans, envious of their rivals, and now angered by the evident attempt to injure their own interests, eagerly seized this pretext for discord. Thus the first Punic War sprang from the Sicilian imbroglio. The hatred of Rome was incurred, which was in time destined to end Carthaginian supremacy.¹

It is unnecessary further to trace political events in Sicily. What has been related suffices to show the difficulty with which Carthage maintained even a foothold in a neighboring island; how many men and how much wealth she there sacrificed, and how finally all was lost without any permanent, decided, or material advantage ever being attained. The story forms one of the saddest pages of colonial conquest. Ultimately national poverty, caused by the excessive drain on the treasury, prevented the regular and prompt payment of the troops, of whom the greater number were always hired mercenaries; incipient mutiny, the revolt of some of the Sicilian states, added to complications with Rome, precipitated their loss as well as that of Sardinia. The two great struggles, in which Carthage, during her career, participated, were with the Greek colonies of Sicily and with the Roman Empire. Had she withdrawn from the former enterprises, or, on the other hand, achieved a speedy triumph, her wars with Rome would probably have been at least postponed. As it happened, these prolonged hostilities, with their doubtful and changeable issues, eventually involved her neighbors on the mainland to the north, or rather afforded them an excuse to intervene. It is therefore not only as an attempt to conquer colonial possessions and

¹ *Ibid.* III, 224 et seq.; for account of the Punic wars, cf. Cantu, II, Ch. VII, IX; also Babelon, 30 et seq.; for an excellent longer account of the first Punic War, cf. Meltzer, II, 252 et seq.

retain them by armed force, but even the more as an illustration of the risk of foreign entanglements in such undertakings, that the Carthaginian experiences in Sicily are instructive.

While engaged in such ventures on this island, these people were not idle elsewhere. From the time of their earliest maritime expeditions, the land of Spain, by reason of its mineral resources, had always strongly attracted them;¹ here they also appear to have inherited the domains of Phœnicia; thus Gadeira became one of their principal ports. Many mines, already opened, likewise fell into their hands and afterward furnished them the sinews of war in their long contest for supremacy. In these regions, however, little peculiar to the colonization of the Carthaginians is to be noted. They merely succeeded to and maintained the work of their predecessors. Besides their establishments in Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, the Greek colony of Cyrenaica on the shores of Africa also yielded to their victorious arms; within a brief interval they had emigrants scattered westward along the coast to the straits of Gibraltar.²

The epoch of Carthaginian glory extended from 550 to 268 B.C. During this period Hanno went out to found a chain of colonies on the Atlantic seaboard of Africa. Of his record of this journey there is an inexact copy, subsequently made by some Greek, showing that sixty vessels took part, carrying thirty thousand individuals, who were distributed into six different settlements. Hanno sailed as far southward as Senegambia, and returned crowned with such success that his exploits were deemed worthy of a monument. Himilco, about the same era, made a voyage as far northwardly as Great Britain, leaving a few outposts on present Portuguese, Spanish, and French territory. The Carthaginians then ruled over three hundred cities in Africa, over two thousand miles of coast, washed by the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, over most of the islands in the former sea, and over many extensive districts in Spain.³

¹ Cantu, II, 515.

² R. and J. 10.

³ Cantu, II, 513 et seq.; Rollin, II, 368; Heeren, "Ideen," II, 511 et seq.; Pliny, "H. N." II, 67.

After their expulsion from Sicily, these people applied themselves, with renewed energy, to the further development of their Spanish possessions. They turned their eyes thither with the hopes both of recompensing themselves for the losses elsewhere sustained and of finding the treasure wherewith to resist their Roman rivals; and so well did they succeed that their empire there at one time almost equalled their dominion in Africa. Among many enterprises the building of Carthagera, about 217 B.C., by Hamilcar, on the site of the present city of the same name, was the most remarkable.¹

But very soon constant hostilities with the Romans occupied the principal attention of the Carthaginians, and the age of their constructive work may be said to have passed. For some time they courageously struggled to maintain their ascendancy; but, little by little, these wars sapped away their vitality; until, at last, Scipio repeated with greater effect the experiment of Agathocles. Invading Africa, he broke down the gates of Carthage, reputed inviolable, and humbled her inhabitants under the yoke; thus, in 146 B.C., this mart of commerce fell, after a decadence which was probably the most rapid in history.

The monopoly of commerce had been the ambition of Carthage.² For a long time her power nearly approached this limit. Her trading vessels plied in every sea, and her sailors visited all ports; her caravans penetrated the most barren deserts of Africa. Wine and oil came from Majorca, Minorca, and Iviça; flax, from Gozzo. Greece furnished fine stones and gold; Malta, cotton; the Lipari Islands, bitumen; Elba, iron; and Corsica, honey and slaves; while from the interior of the Dark Continent negroes and salt were obtained.³ All these and many other things were received only to be redistributed, in a great measure, to tributary nations. Carthage was the chief warehouse and emporium of trade. For many centuries this position was natural and voluntary, not depending on

¹ For the work of the family of Barcidæ in Spain, together with the events leading to the second Punic War, cf. Meltzer, II, 392 et seq.

² Cantu, II, 517.

³ *Ibid.* II, 518.

any act of law, but merely due to geographical situation and superior facilities. Her ships — for there were not then any others — came and went, without thinking of rival markets; so long, all was well! But finally other races developed, cities were founded, and states grew; new fleets came into being. In the Mediterranean, Carthaginians met boats manned by crews of other nationalities. They found them at home and they encountered them in colonial waters; then the people voted arbitrary laws, by which, with a few exceptions, they prohibited the entrance of foreign craft into the harbor of the metropolis or into the ports of the colonies; it was even forbidden to their own vessels to carry colonial goods elsewhere than to the capital. A large navy to protect trade, to maintain free communication with their possessions, and to enforce these regulations of the sea was a necessary consequence.¹ As early as the year 509 B.C., when the first treaty with Rome was made, there was a special provision that the latter's seamen should not sail to the south beyond a certain promontory, lest they should be tempted to the conquest of those districts; the Romans, too, were then strictly excluded from all dependent territories.² Any nation, desirous of buying their products, must purchase them in Carthage, which probably levied an export duty on wares sold to foreigners. Certain portions of Sicily alone were exempt from these taxes, it being a matter of prudence to favor their inhabitants and thus remove any occasion for sympathy with Rome, which might spring from undue oppression and proximity to Italy.

Such was the extent and system of Carthaginian commerce.³ The policy of the government in providing careers of adventure and vast opportunity drew into the channels of enterprise all those characters who, by nature or circumstances, might have been a menace to the state. The disposition and social condi-

¹ Cantu, II, 519.

² Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 160. For an English version of this treaty, and of the one which followed it, cf. McCullagh, "Industrial History of Free Nations," I, 333 et seq.; for its history, *ibid.* 130.

³ It must not be forgotten that Carthage also had a considerable overland trade in Africa, cf. Cantu, II, 518.

tion of the individuals sent forth from the capital city did not apparently offer any guarantee of a happy issue. Those who left the metropolis were almost exclusively the destitute, urged by want at home and attracted by the hope of enriching themselves through the prevalent trade monopoly. Betterment of position and fortune was their sole motive. Frequently, too, those who emigrated belonged to the vagabond or criminal classes, whose removal for reasons of public safety was favored or forced. Nevertheless, in spite of these unpropitious omens, the results achieved were decidedly favorable. The adventurers sometimes found relief in sea-roving or in fighting the battles of their people against a foreign enemy; again, those who were so inclined settled in some peaceful colony, and there in undeveloped regions, by their own energy, availed themselves of the means to accumulate riches or to attain to a certain degree of power.

In marked contrast with the discontent of the subjugated tribes, the one characteristic of the colonists who had migrated from the parent state was their strong allegiance. The religious worship of Melkarth¹ served to bind them firmly to it, while their common commercial interests rendered any rebellion or disobedience not less fatal to the colony than injurious to the nation. In the condition of the world at the time of Carthage's greatest prosperity, colonial possessions were necessary to her, as the sources of her food supplies and revenue, while the supremacy of the metropolis was essential to the dependencies, as affording them a market-place for their products, and a patron, from whom they could in time of need rightfully demand protection. Thus both worked to further the welfare and increase the wealth of the race. Had the colonies not existed, had the commerce incident thereto not been fostered and cherished, this city, with a small national domain, would at an early day have been an easy object of attack from without, and a ready prey to insurrection from within. Had her ambition been limited to rational bounds and had she been content to develop her authority in

¹ Cantu, II, 520.

territories properly belonging to her by nature and descent, without coveting wider realms, her dominion might have endured much longer, and have had a vastly greater ultimate influence on posterity. Failure in the attempt to realize vain dreams of conquest shattered her entire fabric.

The form of government at Carthage varied from a moderate monarchy to a hereditary aristocracy.¹ In the beginning the first type seems to have prevailed, and under this rule most fortunate results were attained. In subsequent times, two high governors, known as *suffetes*, formed the executive; they were, however, responsible to a representative assemblage. Of this latter, one hundred members were chosen as a consultative body to prevent any usurpation of authority. So long as the chief magistrates and this council were in accord, the people had little voice, but in case of disagreement the popular will decided between them. As a matter of fact, wealth was the necessary stepping-stone to power and political preferment.² The cumulation of functions in the hands of a few persons was the custom. The governors were usually also the generals, and in the later history of the city such as Hanno and Bomilcar undertook to set themselves up as dictators. The position of *suffete* or even member of the council necessitated enormous expenditures, and, as these offices seem to have been unremunerated by the state, only rich citizens could aspire to them.

The dependencies of Carthage were politically distributed into two classes: the first division comprised those possessions near the metropolis, on the mainland, heavily taxed and directly tributary to it; the second category included the more remote establishments, likewise subject to the mother city, but partaking more than the others of a mercantile character. Un-

¹ Aristotle records that in antiquity the constitution of Carthage was held in high esteem; he directs special attention to the fact that sedition and tyranny were there unknown during a period approximating five hundred years; Aristotle, "De Republica," Bk. II, Ch. XI; for brief description of the constitution and administration of Carthage, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 162 et seq.; Shuckburgh, "History of Rome," 228-231; Cantu, II, 521.

² Cantu, II, 523.

like the Greek colonies, those of Carthage never were free; all were under military commanders, and, as Polybius records, the Carthaginians admired and honored the officials who were the sternest and collected the largest tribute; in this respect the African conquests especially suffered; and, for this reason, they were frequently in rebellion. Carthage maintained her supremacy for the most part by the sword; wherever she ruled, she made her acquisitions by force of arms; she was, it is true, the commercial power of her time; but side by side with her trading vessels, frequently in advance of them, her war galleys and her mercenary legions went.¹

In the military and naval system of this city grave defects existed. Her ships were generally, if not always, manned by slaves; while the greater proportion of her armies consisted of hirelings. Thus patriotic spirit or national pride was lacking to urge either soldiers or sailors to acts of valor. Her vassals fought boldly so long as they were well fed, well paid, and well treated; but any temporary embarrassment or discomfort led to mutiny, and the offer of better wages from a richer enemy precipitated desertion. While the treasury was full, and the contest was against poverty-stricken peoples, victory and glory were hers. A bountiful inheritance from the parent state, Phœnicia, the profitable development of earlier possessions, and a relatively clear field for activity, at the outset, favored the accumulation of wealth and consequent rise to fame. But political decay, profligacy, and corruption did their work; not even commerce could save Carthage.

Insatiable desire for the extension of their boundaries, encounters with foes as tenacious as themselves, and the wasteful expenditure of money in wars waged abroad by generals ambitious to secure renown at home, conflicts which so often ended disastrously for the republic, creating not only poverty but even dissension in the state, — combined to exhaust the Carthaginians not less physically than financially. Undue oppression and unjust taxation caused discontent in the colonies; they grew restless under the burden; democracy in

¹ Rollin, II, 368.

the capital city asserted itself, and civil strife was threatened; money ran short, mercenaries could not any longer be hired, and the gilded youths of Carthage were, by the excesses of generations, too effeminate successfully to fight their own battles. When a formidable rival appeared, new in the lists, endowed with greater resources and seconded by the fresh vigor of its own citizens, the collapse of Punic prestige was as speedy as hopeless. The victorious nation rejoiced in the opportunity to be severe to those who had never been otherwise than stern toward their enemies. Deprived of her realms, her fleet destroyed, Carthage was for some time dependent on the favor of Rome; but, writhing under the yoke of the oppressor, she girded herself for one more mighty combat and, like a wounded giantess, rose again; the world trembled; but, wasted by previous fatigues, the dying struggle, although heroic in courage, was brief in duration.¹ When finally this empire fell, the national light was so burnt out that scarcely a trace of institutions, laws, language, polity, or people survived. In commerce and in the science of colonization intelligent beyond her contemporaries and many of her successors, Carthage perished, a victim of ambition.² The first rule of conduct, as prescribed by her founders, was correct:

“Attempt not to acquire that which may not be retained.”

¹ For brief account of the fall of Carthage, cf. Gaston Boissier, 70 et seq.

² “Ambition was the ruin of the Carthaginians.”—ROLLIN, II, 368.

CHAPTER IV

GREEK COLONIZATION

SOME one has said that when Greece was at the height of power, the Mediterranean was a Greek lake with a girdle of Greek colonies around it.¹ The statement is scarcely exaggerated; for Greece not only controlled almost all the islands within this sea, but its representatives were likewise established to the eastward along the coasts of Asia Minor, on the Ægean and Black seas, and thence westward on European soil, from the regions of present Russia to the territory of modern Spain. On the Adriatic, in southern Italy, in Sicily, at the mouths of the Rhone, and beyond the Pyrenees settlements had sprung up; while nearer Africa was not forgotten; for here and there along the shores of this vast continent a few colonists had scattered.²

The Greeks themselves formed a race rather than a nation, a group of states rather than a unified political community.³ Their home dominions, including the mainland, the Peloponnesus, and several of the principal islands off the eastern and western coasts, approximated in area only twenty-five thousand square miles. Here, practically throughout the period of antiquity, resided numerous clans of varying importance, originally hostile to each other, constantly rivals for the leadership, occasionally linked together in times of peace by a very fragile chain of common interests, and seldom thoroughly in accord except in the face of some general enemy. The process of con-

¹ Cicero says the lands of the Mediterranean "wore a Greek fringe," "*De Republica*," II, Bk. IV.

² For an excellent brief description of the Greek colonies, cf. Wachsmuth, "*Historical Antiquities of the Greeks*," I, 70, who cites numerous sources. For list of these establishments, cf. Cantu, II, 109 note.

³ For description of the tribes of Greece, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 34 et seq.

solidation was destined to be accomplished only under the hammer of disaster, wielded throughout centuries. Many petty political organizations meant independence, and freedom fostered the growth of originality.¹ The Greek is for all time the type of free action and unrestricted thought; not any other people has ever been equal in the development of character.² The later day confederation was only a *modus vivendi*; it existed because of exterior circumstances, not by reason of voluntary choice;³ so that, notwithstanding the glorious position attained by united Greece at that epoch, the partial surrender of individuality, state and personal, was the first step toward decadence.

Migrations, passing over this soil in prehistoric cycles, left well-defined traces.⁴ The tide of humanity here ebbed and flowed with its consequent invasions, conflicts, expulsions, and confiscations of territory. From the north tribes out of Thrace⁵ and Illyria precipitated themselves upon this land; while, afterwards, on its southern coasts mariners from Egypt and Phœnicia appeared.⁶ Vague as these legends, enclouded in the mist of ages, are, there seems little doubt of the possibility of their truth.⁷ A similar upheaval among those dwelling along the Caspian Sea occasioned their general removal; some of them, skirting the shore line or pushing from island to island across the Ægean, finally reached the mainland of the peninsula. The Pelasgians, thus slowly

¹ For some idea of the variety of Greek life and character, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 105 et seq.

² Von Schlegel, "Philosophy of History," 228; McCullagh, "Industrial History of Free Nations," I, 15 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 231 et seq.

⁴ The argument from the primitive and fundamental character of the migration from the north as compared with that from the east, is well presented by Meyer, "Geschichte des Alterthums," II, sec. 36 et seq.

⁵ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 141, also Lect. 16, 23; Thirlwall, "History of Greece," I, 32-62; Cantu, II, 26.

⁶ "Widely dissimilar as were the Greek tribes and nations in their original seats and settlements, their occupations and modes of living, their manners and political institutions, they differed not less in the primitive elements of their civilization. . . . The Greeks were of very various extraction." — VON SCHLEGEL, 233; Thirlwall, I, 62-78.

⁷ "The life of the Greeks is mirrored in their legends." — HOLM, I, Ch. X; Von Schlegel, 229, 239; Thirlwall, I, 78-122.

approaching, overran about 1870 B.C. the country, in course of time established several kingdoms, and were in turn defeated, subjugated, and merged with other conquerors.¹ The Hellenes followed them in chronological order.² The mythological story is that the son of Deucalion, Hellenes by name, was their chief; he had three sons, Dorus, Æolus, and Xuthus. The last, driven from his ancestral home by his brothers, located in the vicinity of Athens, where by Creusa he had two sons, Ionus and Achæus. The brothers, Dorus and Æolus, and their nephews, Ionus and Achæus, became the founders of the four races known by their respective names. Such personification typifies the common origin of the Hellenes from one stock.³

The characteristics of the early inhabitants were modified by the stragglers, — exiles or refugees, — who came thither from the south.⁴ These latter, however few and whatever their nationality, not only served to reawaken and reënforce in the populace the longing for adventure, but likewise brought with them a knowledge of distant states and familiarity with seaman-ship. Originally the residents of Greece, uncouth in their manners and belief,⁵ were deficient, if not utterly lacking, in maritime science; enlightened through association with Phœnician and Egyptian emigrants⁶ they seem first to have attained a faint appreciation of its utility. Legend recounts their gradual development thenceforth in the field of ship-building and water travel.⁷ As soon as the attention of a people so situ-

¹ Meyer and other recent German historians of Greece hold that the Pelasgians, as primitive and widely scattered Greek settlers, belong to the domain of legend.

² For this legendary period, cf. Grote, I, Ch. IV–XV; Holm, "History of Greece," I, Ch. IV–VII; also Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 196–212.

³ Von Schlegel, 234; Thirlwall, I, 87 et seq.

⁴ Herodotus, V, 94; Holm, I, Ch. IX; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 210; Thirlwall, I, 62–78.

⁵ Thucydides, I, 2, 3; Strabo, III, 238; Ovid, "Metam." I, 121; Pliny, VII, 57, 413; "Schol. Pindar ad Pyth." IV, 107, 219.

⁶ Von Schlegel, 235; Æschylus, "Prometheus Vincito," 466.

⁷ Diodorus, IV, 185; "Iliad," I, 16; Thucydides, I, 8. On this subject generally, cf. McCullagh, I, 10, 17 et seq.; De Goguet, "Origin of the Laws, Arts, and Sciences," II, 306 et seq.; Cantu, II, Ch. XXVII.

ated was once directed to the advantages of such means of communication, it is not surprising that it should have rapidly adopted and improved this method of intercourse. In a mountainous region with deep indentations of the beach, a relatively long extent of coast, with numerous islands near the shore and innumerable isles scattered throughout the neighboring deep, navigation soon became not only as useful as necessary, but even attractive. Natural barriers, almost insurmountable, on land and an innate wish to exchange their surplus of products for articles of service and luxury, stimulated by a disposition for piracy and supplemented by the realization of the facility of flight, often needed to escape some stronger foe, incited the Greeks to train themselves in this pursuit to such a point, that at last they became the greatest sailors of their era, and their domain was in fact the sea.¹ Without emphasizing the use made of boats and other craft in their expeditions and fratricidal quarrels of earlier date, it is only essential to recall the degree of perfection already achieved by them in nautical skill at the time of the siege of Troy. The story of the "Iliad" and the subsequent adventures of Ulysses, as related by Homer in the "Odyssey,"² testify to the proficiency and hardness of Greek mariners of that age. While it is difficult to establish the historic basis and identity of the many fabled colonies, reputed to have been founded by Agamemnon, Jason, Menestheus, Ulysses, and other heroes, still the fact remains that migrations from Greece occurred.³ The Trojan War with its attendant excitement and resulting spirit of conquest, coupled with the practical experience then acquired, undoubtedly inspired the Greeks with the

¹ Von Schlegel, 229 et seq.; Duncker, III, 1 et seq.; McCullagh, I, 22; Thirlwall, I, 1-31; Wachsmuth, I, Ch. I, and p. 104.

² For thorough discussion of the Homeric poems and of various views on them, including the "Prolegomena" of Wolf, cf. Grote, II, Ch. XXI.

³ By 1500 B.C. there was a unified Greek civilization extending around the Ægean from the Peloponnesus to Cyprus. The relations between the various centres were mediated by sea, cf. Meyer, II, sec. 97 et seq., and the latest discussion by Hogarth in "Authority and Archæology," 220 et seq.; cf. also Duncker, III, 1-218; Thirlwall, II, 81; Rosscher and Janasch, 42.

desire for more extensive power.¹ They began to appreciate the benefits to be gained from wider relations with other portions of the world — still strange to them — and first comprehended in some measure the importance of control of the sea.² These legendary tales, therefore, at least mark the birth of their ideas of dominion, the dawn of their aspirations;³ but their ignorance of geography manifests nevertheless the crudity of their knowledge.⁴

The colonial system pursued by the Greeks — if an activity, wherein order and design were lacking may be so characterized — is, because of its variety and multiplicity in origin and effect, exceedingly interesting; the consideration of its methods, aims, and results is recognized to be the more necessary, if it be borne in mind that they close the story of ancient colonization; for, when their supremacy ceased to predominate, the efforts of antiquity in this field of enterprise, properly described, came to an end. Henceforth until after the decline of the Roman Empire — in spite of the latter's foreign possessions — not any real colonies are to be reckoned.

History fixes the earliest record of Greek colonization about 1124 B.C. A general movement of races was just taking place;⁵ the Æolians had invaded Bœotia and the Dorians in turn overran the Peloponnesus.⁶ The former, pushed toward the sea by the Pelasgians, went to settle in Asia Minor on the shores of Mysia. Numbers of the Dorians next were forced to seek there new homes in the southernmost section. The

¹ For the mythical character of the Trojan War, cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 195; for conditions of navigation at that time, Thirlwall, I, 218 et seq.

² For the great influence of the sea on the Hellenic people, cf. Grote, II, 152 et seq., who cites Cicero, "De Republica," II, 2-4.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 140.

⁴ For some account of Homer's geographical knowledge, cf. Thirlwall, I, 209 et seq.; also Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 113; Herodotus, II, 23; IV, 8, 36, 42, 45; VIII, 132.

⁵ Cantu I, 546 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 221-235; Wachsmuth, I, 70; Thirlwall, I, 249-290; II, 81-112; Holm, I, 139.

⁶ For these movements of the Æolians and the Bœotians, cf. Grote, II, 217 et seq.; for that of the Dorians, *ibid.* Ch. IV and V.

Achæans, hard pressed by those who remained and were moving toward the Peloponnesus, drove the Ionians, then living in the north of this region, before them; these latter, reinforced by multitudes of poverty-stricken individuals of all tribes, likewise turned their eyes and steps across the Ægean, where they found an asylum in the territory between the colonists of Æolian and Dorian stock.¹ It is especially noticeable that this Greek emigration—the first of which trustworthy details exist—was eastwardly.² The memories of the Trojan War and the information derived from that expedition seem to have suggested the course which these mariners followed; but the mainspring of the exodus was the enormous momentum which the foreign aggressors, coming from the north and west, imparted to the weak and divided clans dwelling along the eastern coasts of Greece. This district, with its limited resources and small area, was overcrowded. Relief was not there to be had. Beyond the Ægean and even within its expanse of blue waters, vast fields of rich grain and orchards of bountiful fruit were beckoning on new settlers to come and help in their cultivation. It is, therefore, not astonishing to see horde after horde leave the mother country to scatter themselves along the opposite shores or on the nearer isles.

Those islands, with which Greece is, so to speak, surrounded, afforded great advantages to the wanderers; abounding in good harbors and fertile in their soil, they offered safe and pleasant havens of rest, whether for temporary suspension of the voyage or for permanent abodes. Melos, Pharos, Lemnos, Delos, Crete, and Cyprus were only a few of the places serving as refuge for these early emigrants and marking the progressive stages of their journeyings; they themselves were to be peopled, to be civilized, and in turn to lend their own peculiar glory to the race. To these lands of the

¹ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 249; Holm, I, 135-155; Duncker, III, 234-257.

² Meyer is of the opinion that colonization had already begun in the Mycenaean age through the impulses of commerce and conquest, "Geschichte des Alterthums," II, sec. 141.

sea, lying as stepping-stones across the waters, due consideration must be attributed as one of the facilities for Greek colonization.¹

About the opening of the eleventh century² before Christ, then, the Æolians, — or perhaps better the Achæans, — whose descendants claimed Agamemnon as an ancestor, sailed from Aulis and disembarked on the northern portion of the coast of Asia Minor.³ Starting from the same port as the Trojan expedition, they took practically its route. The island of Lesbos was their first resting-spot; here they built six cities, of which Mitylene was the principal; Tenedos and Hecatonnesi were also visited by them.⁴ Upon reaching the Asiatic continent, they spread out, from the Hellespont to the river Hermus, over a region to which they gave the name of Æolide. From the best authenticated accounts, it would seem that the Æolians, or Achæans, for more than a century, continued to draw new recruits from Greece. The number of their towns was twelve, of which Cyme was the capital; Smyrna, which subsequently fell into the hands of the Ionians, was also one of their settlements.⁵

The Ionian emigration, occurring almost a century later, was destined to have the most important influence.⁶ Codrus, king of Athens, was, according to legend, killed in a struggle with the Carians, and his two sons disputed the succession. Medon won in the arbitration of the oracle; whereupon his brother Neleus withdrew to the farther shores of the Ægean, being followed by countless multitudes from the various provinces of Greece. The pressure of foreign invasion, seconded by the pangs of famine, undoubtedly formed the real occasion of this general irruption from the fatherland. These people passed by

¹ Grote, II, Ch. XII.

² As to this date, cf. Holm, I, 147 et seq. and note; Duncker, III, 246 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 81; Cantu, II, 111 et seq.

³ For a critique on the tradition of the Æolic Movement, cf. Meyer, II, sec. 150 et seq.

⁴ Thirlwall, II, 82.

⁵ Grote, II, 209; III, Ch. XIV; Von Ranke, I, 129 et seq.; Holm, I, 121 et seq.

⁶ Meyer, II, sec. 135; Grote, III, Ch. XIII; also, II, Ch. X and XI; Duncker, III, 237 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 83 et seq.; Cantu, II, 112 et seq.

the Cyclades, and inaugurated the shrine of Delos—ultimately to become the common place of worship of all the Greeks. They finally located next to the Æolians; on the north the Hermus, on the south the Meander, served as their usual boundaries, although at times they prevailed farther to the southward. Including practically the entire district between Halicarnassus and the Gulf of Smyrna, their possessions enjoyed the advantage of a comparatively long seaboard, which then abounded in sinuosities, fine bays, and well-protected harbors; many of these latter have, in modern times, filled up, so that the outline is now essentially different. Notwithstanding the varied origin of the settlers, their numerous dialects, and the mixture of races, they all became known as Ionians, were in the end amalgamated, and conferred the name Ionia upon the land which they occupied. With some of the natives who resided there they seem to have united; or rather, perhaps, they absorbed them. The hostile tribes were exterminated.¹

For the present purpose it is not necessary to recount at length the fanciful tales of the early history of the cities of Ionia; their founders furnish abundant material to the student of legend and story; but here a few words must suffice.² Sometimes the new arrivals appear to have simply entered towns already existing, massacred or subjugated the inhabitants, and taken possession. Miletus affords an instance in point; here the men were slaughtered by the invaders and the women became the wives of their conquerors.³ Elsewhere establishments were peopled from the beginning with Greeks. Eventually there were twelve settlements, many of which, because of their importance, attained celebrity.⁴ Among them Miletus, Samos, Chios, Ephesus, Lebedos, Colophon, and

¹ Holm, I, 142; Grote, III, Ch. XIII et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 84.

² For some account of them, Thirlwall, II, 84 et seq.

³ Von Ranke, I, 130.

⁴ Strabo, XIII, 872; Duncker, III, 239 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 281; also, Lect. 32; R. and J. 52; Cantu, II, 112; for a more detailed statement of the government, commerce, and culture of these cities, cf. Duncker, IV, 92-149; more especially for their manner of life, *ibid.* 143 et seq.

Clazomenæ may be cited, some on the mainland, others on the neighboring islands. Ephesus and Miletus¹ were famous as seaports and centres of commerce. The most prosperous epoch of the last-named city may be placed between 700 B.C. and 500 B.C., when in traffic and affluence it rivalled Tyre and Carthage. Four different harbors received its merchant fleet and the one hundred men-of-war which it is said to have been able to fit out. It, in turn, had founded three hundred colonial or trading stations on the Black Sea — of which subsequent mention will be made — and drew thence great quantities of grain, fish, skins, and slaves.² Intercourse with the interior was also flourishing; caravans from Miletus followed the old Persian routes into the more remote quarters of Asia, taking thither the merchandise of the West to be exchanged for the precious wares of the Orient. Such was one of the Ionian cities; many of the others were not much less noted.³ At a later date Ephesus developed in power and, after the fall of Miletus and Phocæa, assumed the preëminence; the temple of Diana lent it its chief renown.⁴ The Ionians boasted of several other thriving towns, among which need be recalled only Samos,⁵ Chios,⁶ and Smyrna. The first, on the island of the same name, displayed remarkable activity in navigation, discovery, and colonization. To Crete, to Egypt, to Sicily, and to Spain its ships ploughed their way. Pythagoras may have been born there, and Homer, tradition recounts, there died. Chios also attained distinction for the vigorous resistance made by sea at the time of its conquest by the Persians. Both Samos and Chios once aspired to the leadership of the Ionians. Smyrna — originally belonging to the Æolians — was destined to become the principal city of the East and to play a dis-

¹ Herodotus, V, 28; Duncker, III, 242 et seq.

² Von Ranke, I, 130; Holm, I, 143; Cantu, II, 113 et seq.

³ For the wealth and refinement of the Ionian cities, cf. Thirlwall, II, 110 et seq.; Holm, I, 143 et seq.

⁴ Cantu, II, 115.

⁵ For brief description of Samos, cf. Cantu, II, 115. The earliest deep-sea voyage undertaken by the Greeks is attributed to a merchant of this city, Herodotus, IV, 152.

⁶ For description of Chios, cf. Cantu, II, 116.

tinguished rôle in early Christianity.¹ Of all the ancient Greek centres on the Asiatic coast, it is the sole modern survivor.

The Dorian eruption took place about the same era as the Ionian upheaval;² it was possibly not only due to the impetus given by the myriads of Pelasgians in the rear, but likewise accentuated by the fortunate results already achieved by the Æolians and Ionians in Asia. The Dorians seem to have very gradually approached those distant shores. First they went to Crete under the guidance of Althæmenes, and thence to Rhodes; on both, settlements were made. Halicarnassus and Cnidus on the mainland of Asia Minor were soon afterward founded, and the island of Cos was occupied by other migrating bands of the same tribe.³ The sphere of their enterprise was thus the southwestern district of the Asiatic peninsula and the adjacent islands. Altogether their establishments numbered six. Of the three races their colonies, although the fewest, were the foremost in energy. In Doris, Cnidus was the metropolis of terra firma. The celebrated statue of Venus Eupolemus, due to the chisel of Praxiteles and in the sanctuary of that goddess, was here the object of great admiration. Halicarnassus, the rival of this city, was indeed eventually excluded from the union. Rhodes, built after the time of Xerxes, and which in time planted many colonies, is memorable for the Colossus and for its laws of commerce.⁴ The Romans subsequently not only adopted the Rhodian legislation, but frequented its schools of philosophy, oratory, and fine arts.

These three colonial systems constituted practically three bodies politic, in so far as they were in fact organized; for both association and centralization in government were repugnant to the Greeks. Each community preferred to form a

¹ Thirlwall, II, 88.

² Meyer, II, sec. 177 et seq.; Grote, II, 211 et seq.; Von Ranke, I, 130 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 88 et seq.; Holm, I, 145 et seq.

³ Strabo, XIV, 965; Cantu, II, 116; Duncker, III, 251 et seq.

⁴ For laws of Rhodes, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," 98 et seq. For its trade and commerce, cf. McCullagh, I, 327 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 89; Duncker, III, 253 et seq.; Cantu, II, 116 et seq.; Cicero, "Pro Lege Manil." V, 18, 19; Strabo, XIV, 964.

separate state and to be a law unto itself.¹ The settlers in remote regions realized, however, in the end, that mutual alliance was necessary to maintain their position. Taking, then, the respective races as bases of consolidation, the colonies in each section undertook to unite, thus creating three political federations. Twelve cities were included in the Æolian league; the same number in the Ionian confederation; while only six and finally five were comprised in the Dorian coalition.² At the best these unions were, especially in early times, very imperfect; for each municipality had an administration which in its own matters was generally independent. The leagues, which only eventually developed into means of opposing more formidable foreign foes, when the necessity arose, were originally designed chiefly to afford opportunity for joint religious festivals and to inaugurate a common shrine of worship. The Ionians, because of their situation and other external circumstances, are recorded to have had the strongest organization; still, the motive of piety was the uppermost. In the beginning their towns, with one exception, were governed by descendants of Codrus. Androclus of Ephesus is said at first to have exercised, by right of age, authority over all the members of the confederacy; but Miletus, by reason of its rapid growth, soon outstripped its neighbors, and certainly did not then tolerate outside interference in its own affairs; for a long period it held the supremacy, until its fall, when Ephesus regained the ascendancy. As a fact, a regular organism of laws, of courts, and of finances did not exist. The alliance of the Dorian people was much weaker than that of the Ionians, as the easy expulsion of Halicarnassus therefrom indicates. They had, however, a public meeting-place on the Triopian promontory near the temple of Apollo. The Æolians were the least firmly bound together; for it cannot be positively affirmed that they even met periodically. Panionium

¹ For brief outline of the institutions and life of the Asiatic Greeks, cf. Duncker, III, 257 et seq.

² Von Ranke, I, 129 et seq. For some account of this league. cf. Wachsmuth, I, 167 et seq.

near Mount Mycale seems to have been the locality of occasional assemblage. The centre of political activity in *Æolus* was at *Cyme*, where it may be that its general assembly convened. *Mytilene* on *Lesbos* — the largest island in the eastern *Ægean* — was the principal trading mart, and was not less renowned for effeminate manners than for commerce.¹

Considered together, the *Æolians*, the *Ionians*, and the *Dorians* Grecianized the entire western coast of *Asia Minor* and all the islands lying to the north of *Crete* between the country of their origin and the land of their adoption. But, notwithstanding their apparently common interests and their proximity to each other, the three groups of colonies never seemingly manifested any tendency or effort toward union or concerted action until the menace of Persian conquest hung over them. The same reasons worked to hold them apart as operated on the Greek states of Europe to a like end. Athens was the parent of the *Ionians*; *Thebes* and *Argos* or *Sparta* — partially at least — stood sponsors respectively for the *Æolians* and the *Dorians*.²

As may be imagined, the ties binding the colonists to the fatherland were slight; originally, for the most part, the settlers were by stress of circumstances voluntary exiles. Throughout the history of Greece, the cities founded by them were regarded as allies on an equality rather than as possessions. There was not indeed any political dependency; for these colonies, as they are called, exercised not only all the domestic functions of government, but likewise reserved the right to declare and wage war, a privilege which they frequently seized, not only against the *Asiatics*, but even against each other. At first, for a brief time, monarchies, they later were usually organized as nominal republics;³ and every community had probably a republican form of rule. The authority in the leagues appears to have been actually vested in the hands of an oligarchy or aristocracy, while the chief magistrates of the different towns, although perhaps chosen by popular vote,

¹ For description of the three leagues, Thirlwall, II, 100 et seq.

² Von Ranke, I, 131 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 101.

³ Thirlwall, II, 104.

were undoubtedly selected for life, and generally belonged to the same family. Notwithstanding their political liberty, the colonists retained their ancient worship, language, and manners, the former remaining unchanged, the two latter being possibly somewhat modified by contact with the peoples among whom they had settled. Thus the links which bound them most strongly among themselves and to the parent states were those of religion and commerce. Numerous common shrines arose on the islands of the Ægean, and this sea became at last a lake, covered with craft plying to and fro in either direction. The Black Sea likewise was explored and opened to Greek enterprise, while ship-building and navigation experienced many improvements. Nor were these colonies more important for their trade than for their intellectual activities. Such men as the philosophers Beas and Thales, Anaximander, Euclid, Archelaus, and Xenophon, were of Asiatic birth.¹ Freedom from restraint and complete independence of action enabled these settlements, as organizations, and their citizens, as individuals, to overcome all other disadvantages and to attain a high degree of commercial, political, and intellectual development. But, unfortunately, intercolonial quarrels were frequent, and within their own limits civil discords were often rife. Miletus, for example, had a series of internal revolutions lasting the lifetime of two generations; in spite of which it was during this period that the city rose to its highest prosperity.²

Still, notwithstanding the disunited condition and local dissensions of these establishments, they were, by reason of their own power, safe from outside aggression so long as not any strongly constituted neighbor of another race existed in the vicinity;³ thus they continued to prosper in an increasing measure until the time of Cyrus, the Persian, who first in 547 B.C. threatened them.⁴ The Æolians and Ionians then united for mutual defence, but the Dorians, believing themselves capable

¹ Von Ranke, I, 280-342; Cantu, II, 112.

² Holm, I, 269 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 104.

⁴ For the Ionic revolt, cf. Grote, III, Ch. XXXV.

³ Holm, I, 319-338.

of repelling the invader, refused to join the alliance; Cyrus sent his general, Harpagus, against them and finally subjugated them all.¹ The colonists, in several instances, rather than submit to foreign dominion, abandoned their homes and took refuge on islands in the Ægean Sea;² those who remained were often forced to serve in military operations against their own compatriots.³ After the defeat of Xerxes they again were freed by the efforts of their brethren (479 to 469 B.C.) but in 387 B.C. their cities were once more restored to the Persian empire.

About the era of the foundation of the three groups of colonies already mentioned, the Greeks had also overrun another slightly more remote portion of Asia Minor. To the southward of the Dorian regions, just east of Rhodes, a small but attractive semicircular peninsula projects into the sea; a well-watered district, it abounds in fertile valleys and wooded mountain sides. Although the exact date of its first colonization is not known, this land seems very early to have aroused attention.⁴ Settlers scattered not only over Lycia, but farther inland through Pamphylia and Pisidia. Xanthus, famous for its heroic resistance against sieges, was the principal city. Other notable places were Selge and Sagalassus, Aspendus and Sida. But the Greeks do not seem to have been sufficiently numerous to obtain complete mastery over the natives. By their bravery — a notable characteristic of the Lycians — the aborigines appear to have avoided subjugation, and on the contrary to have absorbed the immigrants into their midst; that they were greatly modified by contact with the Greeks, the remains of their edifices discovered in modern times fully attest; thus, while not accepting the language or supremacy of those who came among them, they did receive in a marked degree the effects of their culture.

In government the Lycians perhaps first exemplified the

¹ Thirlwall, II, 169 et seq.

² *Ibid.* 170 et seq.

³ For the condition of these colonies after their conquest by Cyrus, cf. Holm, I, 333.

⁴ The latest and best discussion is to be found in the "Geschichte der Lykien," by Treuber (1887).

advantages of a centralized power combined with the individual independence of its members. Their twenty-three cities were represented according to their population in a federal congress, and taxes were paid to a common fund in a ratio proportionate to representation. There was a central executive, a supreme court, a general treasury, and an assembly with jurisdiction over peace, war, and other national affairs; a fleet of considerable importance also existed.¹ Lycia, under Cyrus, became a Persian province; was subsequently conquered by Alexander, fell under the control of the Ptolemies, was annexed to the Syrian empire, and at last, 190 B.C., was vanquished by the Romans. Somewhat later the yoke was thrown off and the nation reconstituted; its twenty-three towns then organized a league for common defence; but finally, after a period of freedom alternating with subjection to Rome and another brief era of liberty, this entire region was permanently incorporated in the Roman province of Pamphylia.

Cyprus, luxuriant in wheat, wine, figs, honey, and other products, was by reason of its fertile soil very inviting.² The earliest settlers were probably Phœnicians; whether the fact be true or not, it is certain that the Greeks, upon arriving there, found colonists of that race before them.³ The Greek establishments apparently date from about the same epoch as the foundation of the colonies on the mainland of Asia Minor; but the Cypriotes themselves, disposed to boast of higher antiquity, deduced their descent from Trojan heroes who, after that expedition, were reputed to have wandered thither.⁴ Greeks soon preponderated, especially throughout the central valleys and in the city of Salamis, where their influence was the greatest; but, whether because of admixture with the aboriginal inhabitants or as the result of climatic conditions and the natural richness of the land, they in time became sluggish, indolent, and inert. Consequently the

¹ For brief account of the Lycian federation, cf. Thirlwall, II, 103.

² Thirlwall, II, 89; Cantu, II, 107.

³ Holm, I, 146 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 257.

⁴ Thirlwall, II, 89.

Cypriotes were generally subjugated to foreign rule. Already, in the eighth century before Christ, Assyria had acquired the mastery; subsequently Egypt and then Persia gained the supremacy. Alexander the Great succeeded in restoring the island to Greece for a brief period; after his death, it remained in the hands of the Ptolemies until the era of its conquest by Rome. Under the early Greeks, Cyprus was divided into nine states; of these Salamis and Citium were the most important; their capitals, known by the same names, possessed fine harbors. The towns of Paphos and Amathus were celebrated for their temples of Venus; and the latter was especially valuable because of its proximity to the copper mines.¹

Besides the regions, already described, under Greek control, there was among the eastern islands of the Ægean only one which, on account of its size, may be thought to merit separate mention. As a matter of fact, however, Crete, which belonged to the sphere of Dorian activity, does not offer any features of special interest.² Its chief cities, Cnosus and Gortyna, might be cited.³ Among the Cretans, noted for their licentiousness and degeneracy, civilization soon disappeared; royalty was abolished and in its stead corrupt republics followed, world renowned for the depraved character, moral, social, and intellectual, of their people.⁴

These five systems of colonization — Æolian, Ionian, Dorian, Lycian, and Cypriote — comprised all the Greek settlements made in the eastern Mediterranean, and were indeed the only colonies belonging to the first period of migration.⁵ The epoch within which this movement occurred cannot be precisely

¹ The literature relative to Cyprus has been greatly enlarged in consequence of the recent excavations; besides Cesnola's remarkable though somewhat unscientific researches, excellent material is found in Ohnefalsch and Richter, "Cyprus, the Bible and Homer"; cf. also Meyer, II, sec. 142 et seq.

² Von Ranke, I, 181; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 251; for lack of industry in Crete, cf. McCullagh, I, 207.

³ For brief account of the constitution of the cities of Crete, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 137.

⁴ Duncker, III, 254.

⁵ A general view of this first period of Greek colonization will be found in Busolt, "Griechische Geschichte," I, sec. 8.

fixed. Any accuracy in the statement of dates is impossible, for the best authorities do not agree within a century. The most which can be said is, that a reasonable conjecture, supported by such evidence as is obtainable, would establish the time of the earliest expulsion of the Greek races from the Hellenic peninsula about 1000 B.C.¹

The consequences of these expeditions in Greece were evidently not less momentous than the results in the Ægean and on the coast of Asia Minor. The land was relieved of its surplus population, the boundaries of states were readjusted on a more permanent basis, and tranquillity was assured. The changes thus effected materially altered or at least modified the national character. For two or three hundred years peace reigned. There was repose; the existing situation not being favorable to forced exile, emigration slackened and indeed ceased. When, in the eighth century before the Christian era, conditions similar to those previously prevailing again arose, the desire to find relief beyond the seas once more was manifest; but this time the tide of humanity—with a single exception, which shall at once be mentioned—turned westward to the more unexplored fields of Italy and Sicily.²

Eubœa,³—now Negropont,—the first point of departure in the second period of Greek colonization,⁴ lies just east of Greece, from which it is separated by a narrow strait; in fact at the place where the opposite shores come nearest together, the intervening distance is not more than two hundred feet. This chasm has in most ages been bridged; so that, artificially at least, the district has been connected with the mainland. The island—about one hundred miles in length, and varying from six to twenty-six miles in breadth, with an area of fifteen

¹ "The state of Greece in 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, and 1400, B.C. . . . cannot be described to the reader from anything like decent evidence."—GROTE (Introduction), vii. He begins authentic Greek history with the first Olympiad; cf. also, Holm, I, 135, 148, and note 22 at end of Ch. XII.

² A good general description of the colonization of the eighth century with references to pertinent literature will be found in Busolt, "Griechische Geschichte," I, secs. 9, 10, and Meyer, II, sec. 284 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 250.

⁴ Holm, I, 274.

hundred square miles — is mountainous and well-wooded, but with few streams; notwithstanding which the valleys are fertile and rich in agricultural products. While the east coast is rocky and frequently precipitous, the west has several good harbors. Eubœa constitutes, as it were, a natural bulwark of defence, rendering the approach of hostile fleets difficult and affording a safe refuge for Greek ships; its earliest inhabitants, reputed to have come from Phœnicia, are rarely noted in history prior to the eighth century before Christ.

Chalcis and Eretria, the two principal towns, were then important centres of life, for a long period rivals, until after a severe struggle the supremacy of the former was assured.¹ Subsequently it fell under the domination of Athens, with and against which it repeatedly fought. Eretria perished in 490 B.C. at the hands of Persian invaders. Megara and Corinth were likewise at that epoch the wealthiest and the most aristocratic of Greek communities. These four cities, from which so many emigrants were to go forth, — at that time each governed by an aristocracy, — were favorably disposed to the exodus of the poorer classes, not so much for these latter's benefit as to secure themselves from the danger of revolution and the evils of discontent.

The Chalcidians, in their search for new homes, turning northward, established themselves on the southern peninsula of Macedonia.² This region, partially separated from terra firma by an inlet, and linked to it only by a thin strip of land, — thus forming almost an island, — took the name of the settlers and became known as Chalcidice. Its winding, deeply indented seaboard, with long promontories and protected bays, bore great resemblance to the Greek coast. Hence the Greeks — especially the inhabitants of Chalcis — were attracted thither in large numbers. Of the two chief cities, Potidea, nearly surrounded by water, was founded by Corinth about 600 B.C., and Olynthus by the Thracians a

¹ Holm, I, 271 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 280.

² Holm, I, 279.

little subsequently. In 370 B.C. this latter organized a league of the neighboring towns to oppose Philip II of Macedonia, and the war waged by him upon this alliance occasioned the Olynthiac orations of Demosthenes, when he exhorted the Athenians to send aid to Chalcidice; but his efforts came too late; for before the Athenian forces had arrived Philip had achieved its conquest.¹ Both Potidea and Olynthus were in their day of prosperity noted for trade and commerce.

Attention must now be directed to the Greek empire which was growing up in the West.² In remote antiquity it would seem that the Pelasgians went to locate in Hesperia, as Italy was then called. According to the narrative, one expedition of these people, under Ctenotrus, setting out from Arcadia, reached the central portion of the peninsula. They had a king, Italus, whose name in turn was adopted not only by his own subjects, but also by the surrounding tribes. Another party of emigrants, whose home had been in Thessaly, settled at the mouth of the Po and built the town of Spina; thence numerous colonists departed to found other cities. This race seems to have eventually overrun all Italy, everywhere asserting itself; Croton became the capital. Based upon these beliefs as to that which may have occurred in pre-historic cycles, — although the greater number of details is lost, — many fantastic myths originated. This primitive intercourse between Italy and Greece, ascribed to the voyages made by the heroes of the Trojan War, was probably subsequent to that event; Cumæ and Metapontum undertook nevertheless to trace back their descent to that age.³ If these stories have any value, the settlements of the Greeks in southern Italy might perhaps be considered prior in chronological order to their colonization of Sicily; for the former always claimed in legend a preëxistence of several centuries; but historically their earliest emigration into Sicily

¹ Thirlwall, V, 307 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, Lect. 68.

² For the Western colonial establishments of the Greeks, cf. Grote, III, Ch. XXII.

³ Holm, I, 289 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 90.

preceded their entrance into Magna Græcia by about fifty years.¹

Leaving undetermined the precise time of the origin of Cumæ,² said to have been founded in the eleventh century before Christ, and of Metapontum,³ boasting to date from 900 B.C., it is true that nearly eight hundred years before the Christian era these places—both afterward celebrated—received reënforcements of Greek colonists.⁴ The first owed its foundation to wanderers from Æolian Cumæ, Chalcis, and Eretria; the latter was generally called Achæan. Cumæ was a prosperous commercial mart, ruling over considerable territory and planting various colonies, among which were Naples and Zancle, otherwise known as Messina.⁵ Slight ruins of Cumæ still exist, while Metapontum has utterly disappeared. The other settlements in Italy were made about the end of the eighth century B.C. Croton, Sybaris, Tarentum, Locri, and Rhegium commenced their chronicles with this epoch. Several other cities likewise subsequently sprang from them. Of the Greek races, the Achæans held the supremacy in Magna Græcia.⁶

The fact of the proximity of Greece to the eastern extremity of Italy readily explains the course which the emigrants followed.⁷ From all accounts the earlier peoples of these regions were mountain dwellers; vast expanses of plain and seacoast were uncultivated, untilled, and uninhabited.⁸ These conditions, combined with a pleasant climate and the fertility of the soil, undoubtedly were highly conducive to immigration.⁹ The Greeks were active in commerce, and at this time had in a measure developed the science of navigation. They saw in Italy the chance not only to escape tyranny and poverty

¹ Holm, I, 284 et seq. For the rapid development of the Greeks in Italy and Sicily, cf. Grote, III, 173 et seq.

² Cantu, II, 393.

³ *Ibid.* II, 394.

⁴ Holm, I, 282 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 283 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 90.

⁶ For details of Greek colonization in Magna Græcia, cf. Lenormant, "La Grande Grèce," I.

⁷ Holm, I, 283.

⁸ Cantu, II, 388.

⁹ The Greek colonization both in Magna Græcia and in Sicily was agricultural in character, R. and J. 21.

at home, but even more the opportunity to enrich themselves and to extend their power;¹ once the current set in this direction, it flowed steadily thither until, by the number and importance of their colonies in southern Italy, this entire district assumed the name of *Magna Græcia* (Great Greece). Having landed on the Gulf of Tarentum, these enterprising mariners skirted the shore line as far north as the Bay of Naples,² and overran the island of Sicily. The origin of most of these establishments is obscure for want of historic records. Corinth, Megara, and Chalcis were the chief points of departure. Both the two first mentioned had harbors on the western side of the Isthmus of Corinth, while Chalcis was then the leading commercial metropolis of Greece. The position of Megara is attested by its many dependencies.

Sybaris, possibly the most ancient Greek community in southern Italy, being founded a little before 700 B.C., attributed its beginning to Achæans and Troizenians.³ Its authority extended over four neighboring tribes and twenty-five cities. The inhabitants, renowned for their wealth, luxury, and enjoyment of ease, multiplied so rapidly that within two centuries they are said to have been able to put three hundred thousand fighting men in the field. This army, however large, was defeated by that of Croton in 510 B.C., when Sybaris was literally drowned; for the conquerors turned the course of the river Crathis so that its overflow destroyed the town.⁴

Croton was likewise settled by the Achæans in 710 B.C.⁵ The extent of its trade, the strict morality of its citizens, and its superior government soon rendered it prosperous and influential. The school of Pythagoras was situated here, and hence his disciples, Charondas and Zaleucus, disseminated their teachings.⁶ The subjugation of the Sybarites marked the

¹ The first Greek adventurers in the West were probably pirates, Grote, III, 163.

² For list of colonies in *Magna Græcia*, cf. Cantu, II, 387; Holm, I, 359-375.

³ Holm, I, 289; Cantu, II, 389.

⁴ Holm, I, 365 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 180 et seq.

⁵ Cantu, II, 389 et seq.

⁶ Holm, I, 366 et seq.; Cantu, II, 390 et seq.

height of the power of Croton. Its people were not long afterward repulsed by the Locrians, and from that time their decline began.¹

Tarentum, the most easterly of the important Greek settlements in Italy, also dated from 710 B.C.² Possessing a fine harbor and situated in the midst of a fertile region, this city was once the most prominent and flourishing of Magna Græcia, not less because of its merchant marine and ships of war than on account of its population, industries, and high degree of civilization.³ Although subsequently corrupted by wealth and degenerated in morals, it remained independent until 272 B.C., the date of its conquest by Rome.⁴ Tarentum was one of the last places in Italy to abandon the Greek language. Some few ruins are still to be seen on its site.

Thurium was built in 443 B.C. on the spot where Sybaris had stood.⁵ The survivors of the latter were first aided in their enterprise by colonists—among whom Herodotus and Lysias—from all parts of Greece; but the newcomers soon expelled the Sybarites, superseded them by more recruits, and raised the colony to a position of considerable rank.⁶ Thurium fell into the hands of the Romans in 296 B.C.

Poseidonia (city of Neptune), or Pæstum,⁷ so called, a little south of Cumæ, famous for its beautiful roses and the prevalence of malaria, founded by Greeks from Sybaris in the sixth century before Christ, was destroyed by the Saracens in 1000 A.D.; extensive remains recall its former splendor.

Rhegium, the only other Greek town of note in this vicinity to be mentioned, situated almost at the southern extremity of

¹ Holm, I, 365 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 180 et seq.

² Holm, I, 290; Cantu, II 388.

³ Among its citizens is reckoned Archytas, the celebrated mathematician. For account of the constitution of Tarentum, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 123.

⁴ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, Lect. 91; Cantu, II, 502 et seq.; Holm, II, 251 et seq.

⁵ Holm, II, 251 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 184 et seq.; Cantu, II, 393.

⁶ For political constitution of Thurium, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 123 et seq. It was one of the Athenian cleruchies, cf. *post* 119, 120, and notes.

⁷ Holm, I, 291; Cantu, II, 394.

the mainland, directly opposite the Sicilian coast, was established, possibly as early as 743 B.C., by Chalcidians. About 668 B.C. it received further immigrants of the Dorian race, by reason of its fine harbor and large fleet soon became powerful, and exercised sovereignty over the inhabitants of the entire neighborhood. Finally, in the fifth century before the Christian era, this city, becoming embroiled with Syracuse, was conquered by the first Dionysius; after which disaster its greatness never returned.¹ The Greek tongue was here spoken until a very late day.

¹ Nearly all the colonies around the Gulf of Tarentum, in their turn, located settlements farther to the northward on the western coast of Italy. Some have been described, others were merely of secondary importance.² A few words respecting the political constitutions of these dependencies may now not be amiss. Generally the colonists of early days adopted in their new home a form of government similar to that of the state from which they migrated; but subsequently, in many of those communities where aristocracies had prevailed, revolutions occurred, so that oligarchies or democracies became almost universal. Class distinction, nevertheless, was everywhere strong; the inhabitants of the cities ruled the country people as serfs, and later arrivals were considered inferior to those families which had participated in the foundation of the municipality.³

The first settlers of Sicily are supposed to have been refugees from Troy, as presumptive evidence of their Asiatic origin exists.⁴ The Phoenicians undoubtedly came hither at a remote date.⁵ The Greeks and the Carthaginians soon followed, the former preceding the latter by at least two centuries.⁶ Within fifty years after the inception of the earliest Greek town—

¹ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 185; Cantu, II, 393.

² For description of other Greek colonies in this region, cf. Holm, I, 290 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 181 et seq.; for the later political situation in Magna Græcia, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 489, 550.

⁴ Holm, I, 284 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 252, II, Lect. 50.

⁵ Grote, III, 97; Holm, I, 291 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 91 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 96.

⁶ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 96.

Naxos — numerous flourishing colonies, such as Syracuse, Catania, Megara, Hybla, Gela, and Agrigentum, arose;¹ while the location and development of the Greeks at other points continued unmolested throughout three centuries, until the invasion of the Carthaginians.² These two races, as is known, were here destined to wage a prolonged strife for supremacy; from 400 B.C. to 250 B.C. the struggle for the mastery persisted; and, ultimately, out of this conflict Roman hostility to Carthage sprang. At the end of the first Punic War Rome took possession of the western half of the island, and during the second contest of the same name seized all Sicily. It is only necessary here to relate the story of Greek power in that vicinity so far as it is independent of Carthaginian complications.³

Chalcis was the first to send emigrants thither. About 735 B.C.,⁴ from twenty-five to fifty years before the historic colonization of the Italian peninsula, Naxos on the east coast was settled by Chalcidians, seconded by some colonists from Megara; it grew rapidly and within a short time had in turn established offshoots,⁵ but eventually in 403 B.C. was razed by the tyrant Dionysius.

Syracuse, the greatest Greek city outside of Greece, if not of the entire Greek world, owed its origin, about 734 B.C., to Dorians from Corinth.⁶ When these emigrants landed on the Sicilian shores, they probably found there a small Phœnician outpost, surrounded by the ancient inhabitants, the Siceli; of them the newcomers made slaves, setting themselves up as the nobility and rulers.⁷ The Greeks became the land-owners and, assuming the chief political authority, established

¹ Holm, I, 285 et seq.

² For description of Greek colonization in Sicily, cf. Freeman, "History of Sicily," I; Holm, "Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum," I.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 93 et seq., *supra*, pp. 75-77.

⁴ Grote, III, 163 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 91.

⁵ Holm, I, 285 et seq.

⁶ For the foundation of Syracuse, cf. Grote, III, 176; Holm, I, 286, 288; Thirlwall, II, 92; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 98 et seq. For explanation of the motives for the foundation of Syracuse, cf. R. and J. 37.

⁷ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 95, 101.

among themselves a nominal republic. Those who subsequently arrived and engaged in trade and commerce formed an intermediate class; but, as Syracuse increased in wealth derived from their occupations, they became even more influential than the so-called "Gamori" or proprietors; so that in 485 B.C. these latter were driven out of the city and the period of the tyrants began.¹

Gelon of Gela,² attracted by the internal dissensions, lent aid to the refugees and, in consideration of the sovereign power, led them back. He also transferred the people of several smaller towns to Syracuse and offered many inducements to other Greeks. To secure wealthy men as citizens was his special object, in the execution of which he went so far as to sell, or exile, multitudes of the poor. "One hundred rich men are more easily governed than one poverty-stricken individual," was his maxim. Under his rule Syracuse attained a more important position than any other Greek state. He organized an efficient army and navy for the defence of the Greeks against the allied forces of Persia and Carthage, and with his fleet won a signal victory over the vessels of the African metropolis. In peace, not less than in war, he was distinguished. His court was splendid and he was the patron of Epicharmes, Æschylus, Pindar, and Simonides.

The brother of Gelon — Hieron — who followed him, extended his influence over Magna Græcia, and maintained the traditional policy of his predecessor.³ Thrasybulus, who upon Hieron's death had been designated as regent during the minority of the rightful heir, was soon expelled by the citizens; the republic was restored, and amassed greater and greater riches. Slaves were innumerable; for, alas! in Sicily human bondage existed, and the number of serfs was the standard of wealth. Developing in foreign prestige, Syracuse was torn

¹ For some account of the tyranny at Syracuse, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 407 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 101 et seq.

² Holm, II, 79 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 103 et seq. For brief history of Syracuse subsequent to this time, cf. Cantu, II, Ch. XXVII, 394 et seq.

³ Holm, II, 83 et seq.

with civil discord; one after another its principal men were banished, out of fear that they might usurp the supreme control.¹ The Siceli also inaugurated, in 451 B.C., a strong league for the purpose of evicting the Greeks; but the Syracusans routed them and later, capturing Agrigentum, obtained the mastery throughout Greek Sicily.² Troubles were not yet, however, ended, for some of the minor states persuaded Athens to declare war.³ First Alcibiades, and subsequently Nicias, was placed in command of the blockading squadron. After a protracted siege and the timely arrival of succor from Sparta, the enemy was defeated, and its fleet sunk, while among the prisoners were Nicias and Demosthenes.⁴ Syracuse then perhaps reached the pinnacle of its fame (412 B.C.).

The next two centuries certainly measured the most glorious epoch,⁵ when the long struggle with the Carthaginians for the leadership in Sicily was being waged. The principal domestic event was the rise of Dionysius,⁶ who, of humble station in his youth, accomplished by intrigue the overthrow of the republic and assumed the dictatorship. His tyranny lasted thirty-eight years. At first unfortunate in war against the Carthaginians, he finally made with them a compromise, by which the possessions of both parties were respected and peace reestablished.⁷ Then, after the suppression of rebellion at home, he aspired to stretch his sway over Magna Græcia.⁸ In these efforts he was only partially successful, although he seems to have planted some colonies on the shores of the

¹ For the constitution of Syracuse about this time, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 118 et seq.

² Holm, II, Ch. XXV.

³ Von Ranke, I, 248 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 66, 109, 117. For political conditions of this war, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 175 et seq. For the period immediately following it, *ibid.* 283 et seq.

⁴ For good account of the Sicilian enterprise, cf. Holm, II, 466-481; Von Ranke, I, 269; Thirlwall, III, Ch. XXII et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," Lect. 52 and 53.

⁵ Thucydides, VI and VII; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 106 et seq.

⁶ Holm, II, 521; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, Lect. 94. For the political aspect of Syracuse under the Dionysii, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 407 et seq.

⁷ Von Ranke, I, 472 et seq.; Holm, II, 516-525; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 176 et seq.

⁸ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 179.

Adriatic;¹ still undaunted, and turning his attention to the affairs of Greece, he delegated his brother to represent him at the Olympic games, but there met defeat. In the festival of Bacchus Dionysius won a prize; he unfortunately died soon afterward at a banquet given in honor of this victory (368 B.C.). Among the renowned men of his court Plato was for a time the chief; but ultimately a quarrel arose and the philosopher was sold into slavery. Damon and Phintias, whose story of friendship is well known, were likewise of his age, but reckoned among his enemies.²

Dionysius II, son of the preceding, and following his father in the dictatorship, was quickly deposed;³ after ten years passed in exile, while revolutions were rapidly succeeding one another in Syracuse, he eventually regained the ascendancy. His reign, however, lasted only five or six years. On his return many people abandoned the city, going to found Ancona; while others were continually planning to deprive him of his authority, with the additional object of breaking down the increasing predominance of Carthage in the island. Aid was sought of Corinth, and Timoleon⁴ was chosen to assist in the task. This skilful general, and not the less great man, vanquished Ictas, — who in the meantime had driven out Dionysius, — banished him to Greece, annihilated the Carthaginian forces, liberated all the citizens of Sicily, and restored the republic.⁵ The Greek settlements were then organized into a league, of which Syracuse became the leading member. Timoleon, one of the grand characters of antiquity, was never corrupted by wealth nor dazzled by power. Under his direction the laws were revised, and many reforms instituted; but upon his death chaos again prevailed both at home and abroad.

¹ Among others probably Ancona can trace its antiquity back to that epoch; cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, Lect. 95.

² *Ibid.* III, 189 et seq.

³ *Ibid.* III, 191 and Lect. 96.

⁴ Von Ranke, I, 475; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 197 et seq.

⁵ For the political affairs of Sicily after the fall of the Dionysii, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 484 et seq.

Agathocles,¹ a man of the people, usurped in 317 B.C. the absolute command. His rule was warlike, for, as elsewhere related,² he invaded both the territory of Carthage and the soil of Italy. After his decease, in 278 B.C., seditions and misfortunes intervened.³ Then Hieron II became an ally of Rome, and from 241 to 215 B.C. Syracuse enjoyed extraordinary good fortune; but, subsequently espousing the cause of Carthage, was in 212 B.C. captured and partially destroyed by the Romans, Archimedes, its defender, perishing in the conflict. After this event the government remained in the hands of the conquerors.

The prosperity of Syracuse was not less due to the fertility of the region surrounding it than to its central position in the Mediterranean and its wonderful harbor. Thus trade and commerce grew to vast proportions, and in the political world the city assumed a most important rôle; the population is variously estimated to have been at one time from 500,000 to 1,200,000 souls, while its area was nearly as extensive as that of present Paris.⁴ A few ruins may still be visited by the curious archæologist. Within the first century of its existence this metropolis had likewise become the parent state of many settlements, among which Acræ, Camenæ, and Camarina may be mentioned.

The neighboring Greek colonies, as compared with Syracuse, scarcely require notice. Agrigentum, its early competitor, which, however, soon fell under its dominion, was situated about midway on the southwest coast.⁵ It owed its origin to emigrants from Gela in 582 B.C. Pindar called it the most beautiful abode of mortals. Its wealth was once immense and its buildings magnificent. The number of its citizens is said to have approximated 200,000, although some authors put as high as 300,000.⁶ By reason of proximity to Carthage,

¹ Von Ranke, I, 475 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 203 et seq. and Lect. 97.

² *Supra*, p. 76.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 215 et seq.

⁴ *Ibid.* II, 101; R. and J. 53.

⁵ Cantu, II, 408.

⁶ For brief account of constitution of Agrigentum, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 122; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 100.

and owing to its affluence, it naturally suffered much from invasions. The period of greatest opulence was from 470 to 406 B.C.; the trade with Africa was then enormous. In the last-named year Agrigentum was taken by the Carthaginians and sacked; afterward rebuilt, it became head of the league against Syracuse and was entered by the latter's army in 306 B.C. In the Punic wars it sided with Carthage, and in 262 B.C. opened its gates to the Romans. Numerous remains testify to its power and extent. Leontini,¹ famous for its public edifices and its scenery; Catana, submerged by Etna; Hybla, remarkable for its honey; Camarina, infested by the malaria; Eryx, renowned for the temple of Venus; Himera, with its hot baths; and Enna, annually celebrating the fêtes of Ceres, — were other places of secondary importance.²

The Greek dependencies in Sicily rapidly developed because of the natural advantages of their location.³ In the days of Rome the island was known as the granary of the Empire, and is reputed to have previously been even more fertile. Its great products were cereals, — chiefly wheat and barley, — fruits, wines, and metals.⁴ In this era, when so little attention is given to the cultivation of the soil, it still produces large quantities of grain, oranges, lemons, and sulphur. Its architectural ruins of to-day are not less noted than its wealth of preceding ages. Over its territory the civilizations of Phœnicia, Carthage, Greece, and Rome passed, and in its antiquities traces of all these varying influences are perceived.

To the west Sicily did not mark the farthest outpost of Greek enterprise. About 600 B.C. some Phocæans, having visited several of the minor islands in the Mediterranean, disembarked on the mainland to the north and laid the

¹ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 107.

² Thirlwall, II, 93; Cantu, II, 408 et seq.

³ Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 98 et seq.

⁴ Herodotus, VII, 158; Thucydides, VI, 20; Xenophon, "Œcon." 20 and 27; Polybius, V, 88, XXVIII, 2; Demosth. "adv. Dionysiod," 1285; Cicero, "Verr." III, 18.

foundations of Massilia,—the modern Marseilles,—which, owing to its fine harbor, soon became an important trading point.¹ The colonists, as the result of their bravery, commercial instinct, and skill in seafaring, soon gained renown. They extended their sway to the site of the present city of Genoa on the east and, crossing the Pyrenees to the west, planted scattered settlements in the south of Spain.² Pythias of Marseilles made a voyage of discovery, coasting around the Iberian peninsula, and, sailing northward beyond Britain, reached the land of "Thule," the identification of which has puzzled so many geographers. The Massilians, as might be expected from their energetic spirit, came in conflict with the Carthaginians,³ routed them in a sea engagement, and always maintained their independence until their district became a Roman province; when, indeed, they still preserved their own constitution and local administration. Later they espoused the cause of Pompey against Cæsar, were captured by the latter's troops, and suffered severely (49 B.C.). Not only was Marseilles for several centuries one of the leading marts of the world, but in subsequent times it also is famous for its schools of philosophy and literature, which attracted students from Rome herself. The government was an aristocracy; affairs were in the hands of an assembly of six hundred, from which a committee of fifteen was charged with their actual management, while three of this body formed the executive.

About the same date as the Greeks first went to Sicily, perhaps when en route, some Corinthians wandered to Corcyra, whither the Eretrians had apparently preceded them.⁴

¹ Holm, I, 292 et seq.; Duncker, III, 498 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 108; Cantu, II, 114. For an extensive description of Marseilles and the coast around the Gulf of Lyons in the time of the Greeks, cf. Lenthéric, "La Grèce et l'Orient en Provence," 154 et seq., 331 et seq.

² For Phocæans and Rhodians at Tartessus, and elsewhere in Spain, cf. Thirlwall, II, 107 et seq.; also Duncker, III, 497 et seq.; Cantu, II, 114.

³ Holm, I, 293, based on Thucydides; Duncker, III, 501; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 164. The Massilians had also come in conflict in earlier times with the traders of Phœnicia, Grote, III, 161.

⁴ Holm, I, 287; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 270.

This island, situated in the eastern part of the Adriatic Sea, midway in its length, of great fertility and possessing two good havens, rapidly grew in prominence, and soon established on the adjacent isles and opposite shores numerous colonies, among which may be mentioned Epidamnus, Apollonia, Leucas, and Anactorium. Within a century Corcyra had developed into a formidable rival of Corinth, and in 604 B.C. open hostilities occurred. The Corcyreans then met the Corinthians in the first naval battle recorded by history, and administered to the mother city a crushing defeat;¹ subsequently they were the primary occasion of the Peloponnesian War.² After various experiences,³ Corcyra fell into the hands of Rome in 229 B.C. Under its modern name of Corfu, it is the chief of the Ionian group.⁴

On the northern coast of Africa, half-way between the mouth of the Nile and the site of Carthage, a stumpy-shaped promontory juts out. This region, now a part of Tripolis, was in olden days called Cyrenaica, then as now renowned for its delightful climate and luxuriant soil. Mountain streams and cool breezes render its tablelands most agreeable. These natural conditions early aroused Greek attention. A colony from the island of Thera, under the leadership of Battus, migrated thither and in 630 B.C. built Cyrene.⁵ Other emigrants from the Peloponnesus followed, founding Barca, Apollonia, and Hesperia. The house of Battus reigned about two hundred years, when Barca became semi-independent. Persia afterward conquered this district, which was eventually an-

¹ This battle "took place, according to Thucydides, about two hundred and sixty years before the end of the Peloponnesian War," Holm, I, 287; McCullagh, I, 72; Thirlwall, III, 96 et seq.

² Holm, Ch. XXI; Thirlwall, III, Ch. XX et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," II, 37, 233; for the result on Corcyra, Niebuhr, II, 66 et seq.; for the economic causes and effects of this war, cf. McCullagh, I, Ch. V.

³ For the political situation in Corcyra, cf. Wachsmuth, II, 116, 278, 392.

⁴ For other Greek colonies in the Adriatic, cf. Thirlwall, II, 107 et seq.

⁵ *Supra*, pp. 37-38, Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 551-556. For an account how Psammetichus I (659-611 B.C.) employed Greek mercenaries, and how merchants from Miletus founded an establishment in the delta of the Nile, cf. *ibid.* 495-500; for the foundation of Cyrene, cf. also Holm, I, 294; Thirlwall, II, 94 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 209 et seq.; Cantu, II, 117 et seq.

nexed to Egypt in the time of the Ptolemies. Under the Greeks, prosperity was attained;¹ but the later colonists united with the aborigines and, adopting many of their customs, relapsed into semi-barbarism.

The circle of Greek influence around the Mediterranean was then complete; nor must it be forgotten that while Corinth,² Megara,³ and Phocæa⁴ were colonizing the West and the South, Miletus was sending settlers both to Egypt and to the Black Sea. Naucratis, at the mouth of the Nile, instituted about 550 B.C., became an important metropolis; from it Greek culture spread throughout the vicinity.⁵ But the special sphere of activity for the Milesians was in the Black Sea, which, although so different from the *Ægean*, proved nevertheless, like it, a wonderful field for the Greeks. Miletus, seconded by other Ionian cities, located some eighty towns on its coasts and drew much wealth from her trade with them.⁶ The principal were Cyzicus, Sinope, Abydos, Tomi, Olbia, Apollonia, Odessus, and Panticapæum.⁷ These districts served to furnish Greece with a large share of its cereals and food supplies; and most of these communities, dating from about the sixth century before the Christian era, played a part in history. Megara also took a prominent rôle in the work of colonization toward the east; to its inhabitants the foundation of Byzantium (658 B.C.)—the modern Constantinople—and Chalcedon, nearly opposite (685 B.C.), must be credited.⁸ As early as

¹ Cyrene is reckoned as one of the few plantation colonies in antiquity; R. and J. 29.

² For the colonies of Corinth, cf. Grote, III, Ch. XXIII.

³ Holm, I, 281 et seq.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 278 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 277 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 108 et seq.; Duncker, III, 495 et seq.; Maspero, "Passing of the Empires," 495-500, 645-651, 789-793; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 73.

⁶ Pliny, "Hist. Nat." V, 29; Holm, I, 274; Thirlwall, II, 105 et seq.; Duncker, III, 490 et seq.

⁷ Most of these cities were at first mere trading-posts established for traffic with the natives.

⁸ Holm, I, 281 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 93; Cantu, II, 117. Another important Greek colony of the Euxine was Heraclea, one of the earliest of such settlements; cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 113 and Lect. 88. For its constitution, Wachsmuth, II, 137.

500 B.C. the girdle of settlements around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea was unbroken. Everywhere the Greeks were present, constantly advancing their nationality and permanently developing their civilization; they were, in fact, far more potent outside of Greece than within its borders.¹

Some account of the social, political, and commercial characteristics of this great colonizing race must now be given. The continual political feuds of the people, the numerous domestic revolutions and internal dissensions, the excessive population of their small territories, their independent spirit, love of freedom, and devotion to commerce, combined with a longing for adventure, power, and fortune,—these various causes and motives united more or less to stimulate the exodus from the Hellenic peninsula.² Almost all emigration occurred with the consent and often with the coöperation of the mother state. The prime objects in view were to dispose of the surplus of inhabitants and to inflict exile on intractable agitators.³ The aristocracies especially aimed to force out the poorer classes, who willingly agreed to migrate, knowing that they themselves would become the aristocrats in their new abodes. These circumstances constituted the chief reasons which occasioned multitudes to scatter around the *Ægean*, the western Mediterranean, and the Black Sea.⁴ Wherever the Greek went, he never forgot his country;⁵ he was often, indeed, a better citizen when abroad than in his native metropolis; for it is a remarkable fact that sometimes the greatest revolutionists, upon going to distant parts of the world, become most loyal. Rarely was a colony hostile to the interests of the parent city, although frequently its founders had, while at home, been active in promoting

¹ For the later day "Hellenization" of the East under Alexander and his successors, cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," III, 298 et seq.

² Von Ranke, I, 129; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 253.

³ Holm, I, 263; Thirlwall, II, 97.

⁴ Holm, I, 286. "With the Greeks the motive was generally political, and a safe home was sought where social and commercial life might have free scope for quiet development."—RAWLINSON, "History of Phœnicia," 129.

⁵ Holm, I, 272; Wachsmuth, I, 146.

discord.¹ Above all, the Greek was a patriot; for, while not bound by any political tie,—except in the case of the Athenian cleruchies,—the colonists uniformly manifested a deep solicitude for Greece itself, as their participation in the Olympic games and other fêtes testifies.²

The colonies were generally of peaceful origin. In the first instance, the band of emigrants was usually small in number and poor in means. They sought as a rule some spot unoccupied by the Phœnicians or Carthaginians, and there located; at other times they received a hospitable reception in the outposts of these very nationalities, those of other stock regarding them as homeless and poverty-stricken individuals;³ in which event their neighbors were doomed to disappointment; for they, by their natural abilities, soon obtained the upper hand. Again, they went among the barbarians, purchased the right to a little land, and then by barter and traffic laid the foundations of future cities.⁴ The adaptability of the Greek to his situation was one of his principal traits. His conquests were nearly always peaceful and without military force; only in the later period of development did war play an important rôle. Alas, too often, however, the colony was rent by civil commotion. At first, perhaps, relying for protection on the metropolis, it frequently outgrew it, and assumed complete independence.⁵ Not any struggle on the part of a Greek state to retain a possession is recorded in history; on the contrary, they lent one another aid against the common enemy, but seldom, if ever, did they come in collision with each other.⁶ The dependencies gave new birth, in remote regions, to the religion, manners, language, and philosophy of the fatherland. For those of the East, Delos was the centre of life; for those of

¹ Holm, I, 272.

² *Ibid.* I, 273.

³ *Ibid.* I, 273; Thirlwall, II, 99; Wachsmuth, I, 103.

⁴ For the relations between the Greeks and the barbarians, Wachsmuth, I, 208 et seq.

⁵ Holm, I, 273.

⁶ For a description of the relations between the mother cities and the colonies, cf. Beloch, "Griechische Geschichte," I, 172.

the West, Corinth. Miletus, Megara,¹ Chalcis, and Phocæa were also the founders of many settlements.² Athens on the other hand, notwithstanding the number of individuals who left the city in early days, abstained from any organized effort at colonization³ until after the creation of the Athenian League (479 B.C.).⁴

Then, as Holm says: "The Athenians strengthened their influence and supremacy in the allied districts . . . by planting colonies in the Roman sense of the word — *cleruchies*, not *apoikiai*, as the ordinary Greek colonies were called. The latter are independent towns, while the Athenian and Roman colonies are settlements of Athenian and Roman citizens in foreign countries, settlements of people who always remained in the closest dependence on the mother city, of which they did not cease to be citizens. They were to Athens what Mesenia was to Sparta, except that geographically they were not so close to the parent city, being planted in distant spots, with the intention, not only of providing subsistence for their own citizens, but also like the Roman colonies, of controlling an empire. Like the latter some of them were settled in connected districts as complete communities, and some only upon land which had to be made over by communities which continued to exist there,⁵ in which case the emigrant Athenians formed a state within the state of the already existing republic, somewhat after the fashion of the Germans in the Roman Empire at the time of the migration of peoples. In the former case the cleruchy had its special constitution like Athens herself with archons, council, ecclesia, and strategi. Some of their legal cases had to be decided at Athens. The same pro-

¹ For some account of the industry of Megara, cf. McCullagh, I, 236.

² Von Ranke, I, 129 et seq.; Niebuhr, "Ancient History," I, 256.

³ In the usual Greek sense "Athens always avoided colonization"; Holm, I, 273.

⁴ For the Athenian League, *ibid.* II, 211-220.

⁵ Citizens obtaining allotments of divided lands in a conquered or subject state were called *cleruchoi*; Boeckh, II, 168-180; III, Ch. XVIII; Grote, II, Ch. XLVII; Thirlwall, III, 56; Curtius, "History of Greece," III, Ch. XXXVII. Similarly the Roman colonists; cf. Polybius, II, 21, III, 40, IV, 81; Appian, "Bellorum Civilium," I, 7; Dionysius, "Ancient Rome," II, 16.

cedure had already been adopted by the Athenians at the beginning of the sixth century, when they occupied Salamis. But then they were in the immediate neighborhood of the metropolis, and Salamis may be considered as a continuation of Attica.¹ The cleruchies which concern us more closely in the history of the fifth century came into being after the unsuccessful attempt at Eion in Thrace (about 475 B.C.). . . . We may reasonably assume that the system of Athenian cleruchies influenced the Romans, whose colonies certainly date from a later period than the occupation of Salamis by Athens."² Grote, among other details, notes, "These men were Athenian citizens who still remained citizens of Athens even in their foreign domicile, and whose property formed part of the taxable schedule of Athens." They certainly constituted an exception, both in the method of their foundation and in the nature of their dependency, to the usual colonial establishments of the Greeks.

The principal bond between the mother state and the colonies was perhaps religion.³ The people literally carried their worship with them; for, before departure, they took a light from the sacred fire of the tutelary deity, and this they transported to ignite the flame in some other remote temple to be erected by their hands;⁴ if perchance extinguished en route, some one was delegated to return for the special purpose of rekindling it. The Greeks paid homage to nature, and invoked its manifestations under various phases and forms.

¹ For the two periods of the system of cleruchies or "lot-holders," cf. Grote, IV, 521; VIII, 282 et seq.

² Holm, II, 220-222; for list of some of these colonies, Thirlwall, III, 57 et seq.; Holm, II, 221; according to the latter author, Duncker reckons the number of Athenians settled abroad in cleruchies at fifteen thousand, *ibid.* For their influence in the western Mediterranean, *ibid.* II, 250-257; for their maritime power, cf. McCullagh, I, 152 et seq., 160 et seq.

³ Holm discusses the bonds of union among the Greeks, and cites Herodotus as saying the things common to the Greeks were "blood relationship, or common descent, common religion, and language, and lastly, similar manners and customs," "History of Greece," I, Ch. XIX; also *ibid.* I, 272; for the elements of Greek disunion, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 147 et seq.; for those of union, *ibid.* 154 et seq.; cf. also Von Schlegel, 253; Cantu, I, 550.

⁴ Thucydides, I, 24; Thirlwall, II, 9°.

Forests, air, sun, stars, and ocean, as well as the attributes of the human race, such as beauty, strength, courage, and wisdom, were revered.¹ No matter where they sailed, how far from home they migrated, whether they settled on hilltop, mountain side, or in the valley, on seashore, or in the plain, everywhere they perceived these same phenomena, suggestive of their gods, to remind them of their moral allegiance to their common country. All their familiar ceremonies were reinstituted in the new settlement, while the greatest ambition of the colonist was to be chosen to participate in the national festivals.² Embassies and gifts were frequently sent home on these occasions. Thus from every civilized part of the globe the Greeks congregated at the shrines of Delos, Ephesus, and Cyprus for the adoration of their divinities.³ The temple became their parliament house.

The public games likewise aroused a strong feeling of union.⁴ Not only did neighboring communities there contend with each other, but competitors for prizes came from afar. During their continuance, war was suspended and enemies at arms met as rivals in athletic sports. Cities were often reconciled and alliances sealed. Amusement was not the sole factor, but literature and music won recognition; for then it was that some of the world's famous tragedies and comedies, in verse and prose, gained for the authors their first laurels. Here wise men and sages, philosophers and wits, historians and story writers, vied with each other in friendly contest. Athlete, artist, poet, and priest fraternized; citizens, colonists, patrons, and paupers, joining in admiration, were drawn into closer sympathy. The statesman also was there for pleasure, but seldom for diplomacy. Thus not any political federation developed from these assemblies. They were national without a nation.

The Greeks, wherever wandering, preserved their own lan-

¹ Von Schlegel, 240 et seq.

² Holm, I, 272.

³ For the influence of the Delphic oracle upon colonization, cf. Holm, I, 231 et seq. and note 9 to Ch. XIX; Duncker, III, 543.

⁴ Isocrates, "Paneg." 49; Holm, I, 235; Von Schlegel, 233; Thirlwall, I, 390 et seq.; Wachsmuth, I, 159 et seq.

guage and laws.¹ This does not mean that all their settlements enacted similar legislation, but merely that they acknowledged the same fundamental principles. The medium of common speech afforded decided advantages to the widely scattered colonists; it enabled them to read the same literature and to study the same philosophy; the great number of renowned men, born, educated, and residing in the various dependencies, who became distinguished in letters, morals, history, science, and art, bears witness to this community of thought.²

The individual Greek cities enjoyed absolute political freedom with complete control over their local and foreign affairs.³ Even when entering an alliance created among themselves in certain localities, they never yielded the doctrine of home rule, and were loath to surrender to any central executive the direction of their exterior policy.⁴ The colonies, like the older states, displayed every shading in the framework of their organization. Each municipality had its own constitution, modelled by its citizens to suit their exigencies; democracies, republics, aristocracies, monarchies, tyrannies existed; in some places the government passed through several of these transitions.⁵ Nearly all the internal seditions were, at least ostensibly, to maintain and enforce duly guaranteed privileges, but unfortunately they often resulted in their overthrow. A new uprising was then deemed necessary that the people might recover their ancient rights. Syracuse presents a striking example of the ever changing spirit. Generally the establishments, founded the more directly with the coöperation of the metropolis, began as monarchies; those planted

¹ Wachsmuth, I, 103; Cantu, I, 552-553; II, 110.

² For the high degree of culture in the colonies, cf. Von Ranke, Ch. VIII; Holm, I, Ch. XXIV and XXV; II, 163 et seq.; Ch. XX and XXVI; Von Schlegel, 246; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 445. For more details at length, and especially for the Asiatic Greeks, cf. Duncker, IV, 102 et seq.; R. and J. 69.

³ Holm, I, Ch. XX and XXI; McCullagh, I, 141 et seq.; Thirlwall, II, 97.

⁴ For some account of the mutual relations existing among the Greek states, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 197 et seq.

⁵ Von Schlegel, 230 et seq.; McCullagh, I, 23 et seq. On the constitution of the Greek state, cf. Wachsmuth, I, 120.

by refugees or exiles were first republics;¹ but almost universally revolutions of the populace or usurpation of power by the elected magistrates again and again overturned the recognized authorities.² In many cases there was constant ebb and flow; liberty and repression, despotism and order, were repeatedly in conflict for the supremacy. Such is the Greek story of political reforms and social reformers. Whether by reason of these circumstances or in spite of them, there was usually a steady advancement in prosperity. Civil dissensions rarely seem to have constituted an obstacle to regular development.³

The leagues were outgrowths of necessity; dread of conquest was the motive for their foundation. Wherever the federation was the strongest, the fear of invasion was the greatest. Incidentally they afforded means for the increase of trade, and offered larger and safer fields of exchange and barter to their members. But the elevation of some one city to a preponderating influence over the others was contrary to the Greek disposition, and could with difficulty be endured by these equally independent bodies politic; hence the weakness of the unions, their inefficiency, their frequent forcible or insensible dissolution, and their inability to defend themselves when outside foes finally overwhelmed them.

Separated from the fatherland by vast distances and dangerous seas, the Greek colonists were cast upon their own resources. Their innate sense of self-respect and resolute will incited them to the fullest degree of their capacity and strength.⁴ Energetic, thrifty, and skilful, they created and fostered, by their toil and industry, prosperous and flourishing communities, which thus rapidly attained the rank of respectable states and important marts of traffic. Commerce was the main factor in their growth.⁵ In every region of the

¹ Cantu, II, 110 et seq.

² Thirlwall, II, 99.

³ Holm, I, Ch. XX and XXI.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 272; McCullagh, I, 21.

⁵ For the commercial policy of the states of Greece, cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 542 et seq. He says, nevertheless, that "in several of the ancient states of Greece foreign trade was prohibited altogether," and again that "at Athens," for example, "all such trades were occupied by the slaves of the

then known world they bartered and traded with the natives, thus not only enriching themselves, but likewise indirectly augmenting the wealth and consequent power of the parent cities. The needs of mercantile intercourse were a mighty stimulus to navigation and discovery; under this potent incentive, these people opened an expanse of lands previously unexplored, their ships plied in every sea, and the name of Greece became famous in all portions of the earth. Through the opportunities prevailing in the dependencies, the poor were made rich and the ignorant became learned; for the fact is noticeable that, when Greek colonization was at its height, the intellect of man was most cultured.¹ Oratory, poetry, history, philosophy, and art then attained their zenith. Athens, Corinth, Samos, Miletus, Phocæa, and Corcyra were renowned not less for trade than for learning. Records exist proving that products from every clime reached Athens, and that many of them were there manufactured and subsequently reexported.²

The colonists who by choice, by privation, or by force, sought distant homes were, for the most part, poor and of the lower orders of society; but the existence of these conditions, not unexampled in later times, instead of a hindrance proved a blessing. Poverty and want were the mainsprings of assiduity and effort, which inspired them in the achievement of their wonderful destiny. As Von Ranke so ably portrays them: "This active and vigorous population, whose elements were as infinite in their variety as they were copious in number, followed in every situation an impulse of its own. To attempt to pursue these varieties in all their bearings would lead us too far into the explanation of local circumstances. But Greek

rich, who exercised them for the benefits of their masters. . . ." So that "it was almost impossible for a poor freeman to find a market for his work." In support of the text, cf. McCullagh, I, 12, 23; also parts of Ch. III; more especially, *ibid.* I, Ch. II, entitled, "How Industry and Freedom together grew Strong in Greece," an excellent account of the development of commerce, and likewise containing much relating to Greek colonization. If Athens were liberal, Sparta was conservative in her institutions and policy. Cf. also Cantu, II, 110.

¹ Thirlwall, II, 110-156.

² For trade and policy of Athens, cf. McCullagh, I, 93 et seq., 253 et seq., and Ch. VII.

life, in general, displays certain characteristics which can never cease to be significant. The Hellenes followed no common political aim; they cannot be compared with the great powers of which we have had occasion to speak; their provinces and towns were of insignificant extent. But the manner in which these men, with no extraneous impulse or example, lived together and ordered their public affairs deserves the most attentive consideration. Independent and self-centred, they created, in a constant struggle of citizen with citizen, and state with state, the groundwork of those forms of government which have been established in the world at large."¹

Let it also be remembered that while the Greeks were developing philosophy and art, they were likewise, through their colonies, disseminating over the remote regions of the barbarian world the life-giving, refining influences of their institutions. Without the enduring effects of these widely scattered establishments, mankind in every sense would have enjoyed a deferred and only half-formed civilization.² Their colonial policy must, therefore, be recognized as a most efficient force in human progress.³

¹ Von Ranke, "Ancient History," I, 132.

² Cunningham emphasizes the difference in this respect between Greek and Phœnician colonization: the Greek colonies "were new centres of civilizing influences," "Western Civilization" ("Ancient Times"), 72.

³ Von Ranke, I, 129.

CHAPTER V

ROMAN COLONIZATION

THE characteristic of Greek civilization was diversity, of Roman power unity. Variety in the one, uniformity in the other, was the rule; independence of the individual in Greece, subjection of personality in Rome.¹ This difference may be traced in every department of enterprise, in every branch of their respective activity; and the contrast is not anywhere more manifest than in their methods of colonization. The very words employed to designate such a settlement as is now commonly termed "colony" were in signification materially distinct. *Ἀποικία*, the Greek, implies a separation, a moving out of, a dwelling afar off; the Latin *colonia*, on the other hand, means, as is known, a "plantation," a possession in land. In the Greek expression there is not any implication of real property; the colonist is not necessarily a tiller of the soil; the idea is simply that he inhabits a distant region. The Latin decidedly stamps him by the occupation of an estate, and the question of remoteness is not involved. The definitions, in themselves, contain a forcible suggestion of the dissimilarity between the Roman and Greek systems.²

Rome had the advantage of being able to profit by the experience of her two great forerunners, Carthage and Greece. The former lost her acquisitions by detaching them too much

¹ Von Schlegel, "Philosophy of History," 250.

² Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 438, *supra* 6. It may well be said that the Greek "*apoikia*" comes nearer in meaning to the modern word "colony" than does the Latin "*colonia*," from which it is derived. The distinction between the Greek and the Roman establishments must be clearly borne in mind. It is evidenced by the fact that the latter are frequently called *cleruchies*; cf. Polybius, II, 21; III, 40; IV, 81; Appian, "*Bellorum Civilium*," I, 7; Dionysius, "*Ant. Rom.*" II, 16.

from herself, and not sufficiently blending their common interests; thus Carthage never achieved nationality. Greece, on the contrary, spread out her resources in too generous a manner and, failing in centralization, likewise perished. These opposite policies effected similar results. Rome retained her conquests through many centuries by never forgetting to bind securely every section of the empire to the life-giving heart of it, the vital centre, the metropolis. Avoiding the extremes of her precursors, the plan was adopted of drawing the outlying communities to her, rather than going to them. One typical example of the ends attained lies in the domain of literature and art. The Greek sculptors, artists, architects, orators, historians, poets, and philosophers, were scattered throughout the extensive territories of the Greek race; probably the majority of its learned men were natives and residents of the dependencies. Among the Romans this distinguished circle is found alone in the city of Rome. All flocked thither, while the greater proportion were born within or under the shadow of her walls.¹

On the other hand, Rome suffered the drawback that, of the districts then available, her predecessors had preëmpted those considered desirable. The world of that age was, for the most part, composed of states and dominions grouped around the Mediterranean. Little was known of the interior, especially toward the west, at the time when the Republic was established and during the few centuries immediately succeeding that event. The region of the Mediterranean had been apparently large enough for the ambitions of Carthage and of Greece; not much friction had arisen between them; even in Sicily, where the danger was most imminent, an agreement for division was finally made, while elsewhere there seemed to be simply a mutual understanding to avoid each other. Rome, growing stronger and stronger, but not yet able successfully to oppose her older competitors, perceived little, if any, room for development. When therefore, like other nascent empires,

¹ For striking contrast between Greek and Roman colonies, cf. Sir George C. Lewis, "Government of Dependencies," 115 et seq.

she first undertook to subdue her weaker enemies, her energies were necessarily directed against the more peculiarly Italian tribes residing in the peninsula. Thus the preëxistent occupation of the most favorable coasts by other races to a great degree explains the tendency manifested from the earliest ages. As the Greeks, surrounded by water and dwelling along the shores of a country having many inlets and bays, were from the beginning sovereigns of the sea, so Rome built inland and, with her rivals in possession of the principal islands and ports, at once became a land power.

When this state was entering upon its enterprises for conquest, it was, although feeble, a unit.¹ There was a material difference between Rome at the commencement of her history and Greece at a similar stage of its career. The latter was broken into numerous communities of more or less dissimilar ancestry, each with its petty ruler, and dispersed over a region cut up by mountain barriers and intervening streams; the former was smaller, but one city with one king. Exterior conditions and the characteristics of Roman administration fully account for the method, the system, the aim, and the results of her early colonization. This people always seem to have had the good judgment not to attempt to subjugate more territory than they could reasonably hope to retain. Thus their acquisitions were made near home, in the same locality, and in a gradual but progressive manner.² Rome thoroughly amalgamated with herself the conquered districts before endeavoring to extend her rule over other tribes beyond.

The first era of colonial activity may be divided into two periods, quite distinct in character; the one embraces the colonies within Italy;³ the other, those outside of the peninsula.

¹ "The Roman State from its origin and according to its first constitution was nothing else than a well-organized school of war, a permanent establishment for conquest." — VON SCHLEGEL, 254.

² For this reason some authorities refuse to admit that Rome had "colonies" in the modern sense, at least until the time of the Empire.

³ On the colonization of this period, Person, "Essai sur l'Administration des Provinces Romaines sous la République" (1878), Ch. III, and Beloch, "Der Italische Bund" (1880), may be consulted.

The earlier group belongs mostly to the time of the Republic, only a few of the establishments dating back to the epoch of the kings; the later policy was inaugurated and pursued under the emperors. Historians are generally agreed that the system of Roman colonization played only a secondary rôle in the affairs of the nation; still, it most efficiently served to bind the dependencies together, or, more properly speaking, to Romanize them and to transmit to posterity the civilization of that age which otherwise would never have been so widely disseminated. For these reasons it would seem that the efforts of the Romans in this respect are entitled to more credit than is usually attributed to them; they at least merit an impartial investigation.

As already premised, in this department, like in all others, the state was the moving power. Not anything was left to mere chance or to individual caprice. Rome was the master of her citizens. Few of the rich ever wished to retire from the city. There they enjoyed life, good fortune, and politics, and there they preferred to remain, believing it to be the most attractive place for residence.¹ Perhaps the lower classes would have liked to have been able to withdraw, in order elsewhere to found other freer communities with the chance of improving their position, but the government depended upon the populace for military purposes, and hence forbade the poor to leave without permission; possibly even they would not have departed so willingly, had they had the opportunity; for such men looked forward to the contingency of attaining renown in the wars, which were nearly always on hand. It was thus esteemed by every grade of society a hardship and a sacrifice to be obliged to abandon the capital. The inauguration of a colonial policy was therefore not an enterprise easy of accomplishment; for the important factor of spontaneous emigration was here scarcely to be taken into account. Such a situation would in most

¹ Many of them had their "country houses" outside Rome, but even later in the case of the "latifundia," the owner usually stayed near Rome and managed his slave farm through agents.

cases have rendered colonization futile and impossible, but in this instance it was only a means to a more perfected and more highly organized system; so that, under the prevailing disposition of involuntary individual action, Rome, in the exercise of supreme control over her people, not only was enabled to select those whom she pleased for colonists, and to fix at will the location of their abodes, but likewise could furnish the leaders and a code of laws, at the same time taking good heed that the community should discharge some useful end in the larger development of the state, and should never be tempted to disloyalty or rivalry with the metropolis.¹

From the period of the earliest conquests the senate promulgated the doctrine of confiscation of the lands of defeated foes. These estates were then distributed among Romans, preferably among the poor, upon condition that they would remove thither and till the fields bestowed upon them.² The emigrants, while thus by the bounty of their government becoming landed proprietors, lost their rights as citizens. These establishments served for Rome a double purpose. The city itself was relieved of the embarrassment and the care of numbers of its needy inhabitants, while its new acquisitions were furnished a nucleus of faithful, loyal Romans who implanted the seed of their laws, customs, and language among the foreigners around them. In the event of war they formed a trusty band of defenders, while in time of peace they supplied Rome with her necessary agricultural products and paid taxes into her treasury.³ These colonies, of the epoch of the kings and of the Republic, were not composed of old soldiers, as at a later date, but consisted

¹ The Roman doctrine of the relation of a colony to the state, as contrasted with the Greek idea, is very interesting in view of modern discussion by such men as Seeley, Froude, Lucas, Chamberlain, and others. The most advanced theory seems to be that a colony is a part of the state, *i.e.* a British colony is just as much a part of "Greater Britain" as Illinois is a part of the United States.

² Rosscher and Jannasch, VIII. "Wheresoever the Roman conquers, he inhabits. The natives of Italy, allured by pleasure, or by interest, hastened to enjoy the advantages of victory." — GIBBON, "Roman Empire," I, 260.

³ Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 438, 446.

for the most part of civilians drawn from the lower orders of life. Sometimes the vanquished natives were also admitted to membership. To replace the drafts made on the population of the metropolis, the subjugated people, or at least some of them—generally their principal men—were transported to the capital and there given homes.¹ By this procedure enemies were often deprived of their chief counsellors, and these latter themselves were frequently inspired with the desire to adopt Rome as a foster city. This skilfully executed system of colonization and amalgamation, going hand in hand, in due course successfully Romanized the greater portion of Italy.² The victories by the sword were thus most ably seconded by the policy of absorption applied to the conquered tribes.³

A *senatus consultum* (decree of the senate) or a law of the people was required to authorize the creation of a colony.⁴ The territory was accurately described, as well as provision made how the land should be allotted, how many colonists there should be, how much ground should be assigned to each individual, and, finally, how the community should be governed, it being even indicated how many persons should constitute the administration. After the necessary legal sanction had been granted, the citizens elected the members of the commission to whom the formation of the settlement was to be intrusted; their number varied,⁵ according to its importance, from three to twenty. The most eminent men at times competed for positions on such boards, esteeming not less highly the honor than the attendant power, which often lasted several years.⁶ Numerous officers, architects, artisans, mechanics, laborers, and servants were next chosen to accompany the official representatives to the previously selected site.

¹ Dion. Hal. VII, 439; Cicero, "Agrar." II, Ch. XXVII.

² For the salutary effect of Italian colonies on the social state of Rome, cf. Mommsen, "History of Rome," I, 391 et seq.

³ The last colonization within Italy proper occurred at the end of the sixth century A.U.C.; Mommsen, III, 312 et seq.

⁴ Livy, XXXIV, 53; XXXV, 40.

⁵ *Ibid.* IV, 2; VIII, 16.

⁶ Cicero, "ad Attic." II, 6; Quintilian, XII, 1; Dion. Cass. XXXVIII.

When all was ready the colonists were drawn up in military fashion, and the entire troop, with the commissioners at its head, marched forth to the sound of martial music.¹ Upon arrival at the determined destination, the outlines of the proposed city were traced by a plough, the whole company following the furrow thus made. Sacrifices then being offered to the gods, the work of construction began.² The limits of the adjacent region were also fixed in a similar manner. The ceremony of defining the boundaries was, however, only practised upon the organization of new municipalities. Whenever the Romans occupied a captured place, they simply entered the town, took possession, and apportioned its public property among themselves as directed by the decree voted for the occasion.

The colonial dependencies of Rome were divided into three groups, known respectively as Roman,³—or maritime,—Latin, and Italic.⁴ Residents of the Roman or maritime colonies,⁵ so called, seem to have preserved all their legal rights and obligations, as instituted for citizens of Rome. These communities, mostly situated on the coast, were required to furnish men for the legions. In the Latin colonies⁶ the inhabitants enjoyed merely the liberties of Latium, thus being deprived in part of the prerogatives accorded by the laws of the metropolis.⁷ The recruits, also, whom they supplied, only served in the auxiliary forces. Persons could not be obliged to go to them; but the greater share of land assigned to such emigrants constituted a strong attraction to the poor.⁸ The Italic colonies appear to have had fewer privileges than either of the

¹ Plutarch, "in Gracch." 839 et seq.

² Dion. Hal. II, 75; Varro, "de L. Lat." IV; Cicero, "Phil." II, 40, 42; Livy, V, 48.

³ Livy, XXXIX, 55.

⁴ The other system of division is technically more exact, i.e. into municipia, coloniae, praefecturae, civitates, foederatae, etc.; for discussion under these heads, cf. Becker and Marquardt, III, 7-37; 51-53.

⁵ Mommsen, I, 42 and 48; B. and M. III, 34.

⁶ Mommsen, I, 135 et seq., 439; B. and M. III, 31 et seq.

⁷ Cicero, "pro Caelina," 33.

⁸ Concerning the rights of the Latin colonies authorities are divided; cf. Marquardt and Mispoulet.

two preceding classes. They were rarely founded, and then only, apparently, under the emperors and outside of Italy.¹ Very little is known of them. Another division of these possessions was into plebeian and military;² the former were those in which the people belonged to the indigent and poverty-stricken orders; the latter, as their name indicates, were created for the reward of old soldiers, and to afford them a retreat and residence.³ Sylla, turning over to his adherents the estates confiscated from the partisans of Marius, was probably the first regularly to inaugurate such settlements;⁴ although a century previously, at the end of the second Punic war, the senate had already prescribed a distribution of the soil among the veterans.⁵ Julius Cæsar imitated the example of Sylla in later times.⁶ But prior to undertaking any account of the second period of colonization, brief mention must be made of some enterprises under the earlier system.

Legend credits Romulus with the establishment of several towns, but Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, is the first of any subsequent importance settled by the Romans. This city is reputed to have been commenced in the days of Ancus Martius, and undoubtedly owed its origin to the necessity felt for a seaport.⁷ Three other places seem to have rightly attributed their foundation to the kings, and they were followed by numerous others, organized before the second Punic war, so that more than forty colonies of Rome might then be counted in Latium, Campania, and other regions. Among them were Signia and Circeii, both erected by King Tarquin; Norba, the walls of which still stand; Antium, the earliest of the Roman or maritime group; Satricum, Cales, Fregellæ, Saticula, Nequinum,

¹ Pliny, III, 3, 21.

² Velleius Paterculus, I, 14, 15.

³ For quite a concise description of Roman military colonies, cf. Niebuhr, "Roman History," II, 386 et seq.; Livy "Epit." LXXXIV; Sallust, "Catil." 11.

⁴ For Sylla's colonies, cf. Mommsen, III, 541 et seq.; B. and M. III, 329, 330.

⁵ Livy, XXXI, 4, 49.

⁶ For Cæsar's colonies, cf. Mommsen, V, 131, also V, 98, 422 et seq.

⁷ For settlement of Ostia, Livy, I, 3; B. and M. III, 18, citing Madvig, 265; Mommsen, II, 2.

Venusia, Pæstum, Brundisium, Vibo, Valentia, Cremona, and Placentia.¹ From 218 to 201 B.C., the Romans were so busily engaged with the Carthaginians as not to have had any opportunity for further development. Immediately after the close of hostilities they again resumed their work of colonization. Some thirty-five additional communities were created before the rise of the Empire; among them are included Croton (reestablished), Thurium likewise, Bononia (Bologna), Potentia, Parma, Pisa, Lucca, Mutina (Modena), Aquæ-Sextiæ (Aix-les-Bains), Tarentum, Carthage, on the site of the ancient city, and Narbo Marcius (the modern Narbonne). The full achievement of the regeneration of Carthage was, however, left to the Cæsars. Meanwhile Rome had occupied a few of the minor islands of the Mediterranean, planting towns in the Balearic Isles and in Corsica; but Sicily had never received a Roman colony.²

Two facts are noticeable in the later activity of the Republic: the tendency to send out larger bodies of people, and to locate them at a greater distance from the capital; the boundaries of Italy were even occasionally overstepped. Of many of the cities of this age, not only the name, but also the municipal existence, has endured to the present. The so-called Roman or maritime colonies — which were not always on the coast³ — counted at the end of the Republic thirty-five, while the Latin colonies were at that time also of equal number. Not any of the latter were subsequently founded, on account of the difficulty of securing recruits willing to renounce their privileges and rights as Romans. Hence practically all settlements thereafter made obtained for their inhabitants the concession of full citizenship.

The disposition of the senate toward colonization was

¹ Livy (XXVII, 9, 10) says that at the time of the second Punic war there were thirty Roman colonies in Italy, but he probably underestimated the number. For complete list up to about this time, cf. B. and M. III, 18; also Cantu, III, 24 (note) et seq.

² Livy mentions almost all the places colonized by the Romans in this early period; cf. also Tacitus, and R. and J. 9.

³ For inland "maritime" colonies, cf. Mommsen, "History of Rome," III, 26 et seq.

decidedly modified about 130 B.C., which date may be said to mark the close of the first era. The custom had been to exempt from certain taxes and burdens the tracts allotted emigrants, while those remaining public property yielded to the state a fixed and considerable income. The inauguration of so many colonies in the past had gradually restricted the extent of these domains. After the defeat of the Carthaginians, Rome perceived herself with vastly increased possessions, and enormous debts and expenditures. It was therefore resolved that the entire national territory, both actual, and that which might be acquired for some time to come, would be needed to replenish by its revenues the exhausted treasury of the state and to furnish the supplies necessary to defend the conquered regions.¹ It was also then desirable to retain all citizens at home, thus rendering the metropolis more populous, and harboring its strength; for Rome was beginning to fear the growing power of some of its own dependencies as possible rivals.² Hence it was determined not to distribute any more lands, nor to create any further settlements.

The second era commences with the emperors, and its effects fall outside of Italy.³ Julius Cæsar himself reënforced the inert colony already instituted by Caius Gracchus on the site of Carthage,⁴ by sending thither twenty thousand persons;⁵ but the enterprises of his successors were mostly to partake of the military character.⁶ The triumvirate, for want of any other means to reward the old warriors who had helped to overthrow the Republic, deprived many of the citizens of Italy of their estates and divided them among the veterans. Augustus alone located numbers of such establishments in all portions of his dominions.⁷ Entire legions, officers and privates, were frequently settled in the districts which they had

¹ Cicero, "ad Attic." II, 16.

² Velleius, I, 15.

³ On the imperial colonies, cf. Halgan, "L'Administration des Provinces Senatoriales sous l'Empire Romain" (1898), Liv. II, Ch. II.

⁴ Velleius, I, 24.

⁵ Suetonius, "in Jul." 20.

⁶ Pliny, III, 5; Seneca, "ad Helviam," 8; Niebuhr, "Roman History," III, 76, 105.

⁷ Especially those in the East; cf. Mittel, "Reichsrecht und Volkrecht in den Ostlichen Provinzen des Römischen Kaiserreichs" (1891).

conquered.¹ In other instances, the colonists were taken indifferently from various organizations.² This latter plan, however, was not popular; for army men in those days, even more than now, were clannish, and liked to maintain associations with their comrades in arms. During the prosperity of the Empire, this system of colonization was uninterruptedly pursued.³

After twenty years of fatigues the Roman warrior found prepared for him a haven of repose and relief from hardship. The lands of the locality where the legion had perchance so many years been stationed were allotted among its members. The veterans laid down their arms and took up the plough, they marked out the site for the city, and designed the forum, the senate house, and the temples. They drew around themselves a commercial and an industrial class; merchants, bankers, manufacturers, followed them. They erected another Rome in miniature, exercised the rights of citizenship, chose a delegate to the imperial capital to care for the interests of the new community, frequently married native women of the neighborhood, and had posterity to whom they transmitted the Roman blood, language, customs, and laws, as well as their own respect for the metropolis.⁴ The colonists, while thus constituting a civil municipality, served also as frontier garrisons; for in the event of stubborn war they were subject to recall under the eagles. More than all else they formed a nucleus of Roman life in their respective regions.⁵ Here were the places of worship, the theatres, the schools, the halls of

¹ Tacitus, "Annals," XII, 32; XIII, 31; XIV, 31 et varii. "A nation of Romans was gradually formed in the provinces by the double expedient of introducing colonists and of admitting the most faithful and deserving of the provincials to the freedom of Rome." — GIBBON, I, 259.

² Tacitus, "Annals," XIV, 27.

³ "It is in the agricultural towns of Africa, in the homes of the vine-dressers on the Moselle, in the flourishing townships of the Lycian mountains, and on the margin of the Syrian desert, that the work of the imperial period is to be found." — MOMMSEN, "Provinces," Introduction 5.

⁴ "Carteia (on the Bay of Gibraltar), the first transmarine urban community of Latin tongue and Italian constitution, was founded in 583 A.U.C. from the multitude of camp children of Roman soldiers and Spanish slaves." It was made a Latin colony; MommSEN, "History of Rome," III, 214, 215.

⁵ For a description of the military colonies under the emperors, cf. B. and M. III, 335-341; Gibbon, I, 260; also Champagny, "Les Césars," II, 65.

justice; here were also the objective points of many of the great roads constructed by Roman skill; here they ended, met, or crossed, and each such junction was a strategic citadel. The importance of these well-built, enduring highways in national development must never be forgotten.¹

The Roman colonies carried civilization afar inland into the mountain fastnesses and along the mighty river courses of Northern Europe. Like the tentacles of some tenacious vine, they never released from their grasp the spot where once they struck root. Rome, even in her splendor, needed them; they were her bases of supply; thence along the routes leading to the capital rolled the grain, the meat, the wine, the fruit, the vegetables, necessary to the maintenance of her inhabitants; and not the less from them were procured her luxuries, as well as her mineral and metallic riches.² The dependencies were the producers, while Rome was the consumer; for in all the centuries of her existence this city was never an industrial centre. Rome, not a commercial nation in the broader sense of buying and selling for other peoples, limited her trade by her own demands; but nevertheless, on account of her multifarious wants and her vast wealth, considerable traffic must have occurred, of which her numerous outposts were the natural channels.

The most remarkable characteristic of Roman colonization, so centralized in its methods, was the result achieved in the diffusion of nationality.³ At the present day, the sojourner on the European continent everywhere perceives the manifest and enduring memorials of this activity. Masterpieces in architecture, sculpture, road building, and many other monuments of industry and skill, testify to its intensity and strength. At Cologne, at Nîmes,⁴ at Lyons, at Narbonne,⁵ at

¹ For description of the Aurelian Way, and the cities and fortresses along it, cf. Lenthéric, "La Provence Maritime," 29 et seq.; an interesting old book on Roman roads is "L'Histoire des Grands Chemins de l'Empire Romain," by Nicolas Bergier (Paris, 1622).

² *Supra*, p. 133 notes.

³ "Les Césars," II, 72.

⁴ For Roman remains in South France, cf. Lenthéric, "La Provence Maritime."

⁵ For the antiquities of Narbonne, cf. Lenthéric, "Les Villes Mortes du Golfe de Lyon."

Merida, at Bologna, at Toulouse, at Cordova, at far-away Corinth, and — not to mention other places on the mainland — even at London, and across the Mediterranean in Africa, the traveller finds cities sprung from Roman settlements.¹ Not less do governments, languages, literatures, philosophies, arts, and sciences show the impress of Roman thought and influence. The culture of Rome was through her colonial establishments bequeathed in some degree to all European nations west of the Russian frontier.²

From these widely scattered fountains, supplied from the one source, modern civilization has bountifully drawn. The capital city planted these pickets on the borders of her realm. The colonists transported thither the germs of national life, so that, many centuries after the imperial authority fell, their descendants still served to perpetuate its traditions and to consummate by those silent, but unerring, laws of association the conquest of barbarism. These little Romes, in the image of the metropolis, accomplished for the welfare of humanity far more than their common conquering parent; but Rome founded or reestablished them all, and by that fact the credit is due her. The consequences are now known, but how much less important and valuable would the victories of Rome have been to posterity had not her troops been followed by, or rather transformed into, the permanent occupants of the lands which they won! The greater achievements of Rome were not by the sword, but by the plough. Her soldiers were far more for the empire and for the race as property owners than as successful invaders. To the later as to the earlier colonization effected by her, Rome applied a well-defined plan of organization. By these means she vastly increased her own durability and the perpetuity of her institutions. The spontaneity of the Greeks was entirely lacking, but because of this difference the system of the one or the other should not be condemned. The results

¹ Tacitus mentions several of these establishments.

² As to methods of Romanizing a country, cf. Mommsen, "History of Rome," III, 79 et seq.

attained by Rome bear testimony not less to the ability of her citizens as colonists, than to the wisdom of her rulers as colonizers. By their combined efforts they performed a stupendous work destined to excite the admiration of future generations.

PART II
THE MIDDLE AGES

CHAPTER I

FIRST MEDIEVAL COLONIZATION — AMALFI — PISA

UPON the disintegration of the Empire of the West, Italy, as is well known, was rent into numerous small states; several were by their subsequent commercial and political activity to attain importance; through them the best of the Roman heritage was transmitted to posterity; they were the caldrons in which Roman and barbarian were fused. The history of the Italian republics of the Middle Ages, in certain respects, recalls the similar experiences of the Greek cities, during ancient days, in their struggle for preëminence. Politics were apparently the sole occupation of the inhabitants; in many of them, between the civil dissensions within and the foreign conflicts without, there seemed little time or thought for anything else. Nevertheless, some of these communities did make notable records in other fields of effort.¹ Their development in art, literature, and science cannot be here discussed; these successes are of interest indirectly only as incidental to their colonial empires; but their commerce, as more closely related to the present topic, is a proper subject of consideration. Florence, Genoa, and Venice are the principal cities to which attention must be directed. A few words will fully suffice for their predecessors — erstwhile rivals — Amalfi and Pisa.

The colonization of this epoch, it should be at once stated, is in its main features essentially different from any other. In the first instance, municipalities originally without tributary

¹ Cf. Hodgkin, "Italy and Her Invaders," III and IV; Sheppard, "The Fall of Rome," Lect. 3-11; Dahn, "Urgeschichte der Germanischen und Romanischen Völker," I and II; Simonde de Sismondi, "Histoire de la Chute de l'Empire Romain," II, 232; and V. Duruy, "Histoire du Moyen Age," 219, 274.

territories were its promoters; trade was its sole object; the wars waged and the conquests effected were believed to be its necessary accompaniment; they were simply auxiliary. The emigrants, leaving the metropolis, were absolutely limited to the number required to conduct the business in the locality whither they were bound; the establishments created were thus, in the majority of cases, scattered outposts, and exclusively consisted of merchants residing in a distant town. The political or social influence exerted by the colonists in the region of their abode was minimum and temporary. The existence of these dependencies was entirely for the advantage of the parent state, which, while compelled by events to defend them incessantly against inveterate foes, expected to draw from them a profit far greater than would be merely commensurate with the cost of their maintenance.

The earliest place in the Italian peninsula to become famous for commerce combined with foreign possessions was the picturesquely situated Amalfi.¹ Probably a Roman colony of the time of the emperors, it was, in the ninth century,² the fifth city in the kingdom of Naples³ enjoying locally a republican form of government. Just before 1100 its population approximated 50,000 inhabitants, besides its 500,000 subjects dwelling in the neighboring districts. Its navy was accorded the highest rank in Europe; not only had its ships repulsed the Turks, but they had also brought home from the Holy Land a considerable band of Norman crusaders. The Amalfitans had likewise developed a new system of laws to replace the former Rhodian code⁴ and their commercial

¹ Hallam, "Middle Ages," III, 310 et seq.; de Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 158, 162 et seq.; Cantu, V, 556; also Robida, "Les Vieilles Villes d'Italie," Ch. XIV; Gibbon, "Roman Empire," V, 645 and 663, who cites "de Republica Amalphitana" in Henry Breneman's "Historia Pandectarum."

² It was during this century that a league between Naples, Amalfi, and Sorrento forced the Moslems from Gaeta. This contact with the East opened the way for the revival of the power and the riches of the Greek cities of southern Italy; Hunt, "History of Italy," 13-14.

³ The Norman conquest of southern Italy temporarily destroyed this greatness.

⁴ The island of Rhodes was in antiquity one of the greatest and most prosperous maritime and commercial communities. Its metropolis of the same

representatives had founded numerous colonial stations throughout the East. Constantinople, Alexandria,¹ Tunis, Bagdad, Cyprus, and Jerusalem had granted Amalfi trading privileges;² in every one of these centres its citizens were living, protecting and fostering its interests. After a lengthy period of strenuous warfare against the Sicilians, Amalfi finally capitulated in 1131 to Roger II.³ Four years later, while its own fleet was absent aiding the conqueror in his attack upon Naples, the Pisans, then becoming formidable on the sea, strongly invested it; surprised, however, by the unexpected return of the Amalfitans, they escaped only with severe loss. Twelve years subsequently they again came back, and without the least struggle enforced complete submission. Thus the prestige of Amalfi perished.⁴ In the twelfth century part of the coast lands were washed away, and in 1348 an extraordinary storm consummated the material destruction of the maritime works and a large portion of the walls. This previously important city is at present a mere village.⁵

Pisa was, in chronological order, the next state notable for colonial establishments;⁶ standing now in her antiquated and deserted streets, it is scarcely conceivable that in this same once densely crowded and wealthy metropolis the rulers of many peoples dwelt. That Pisa, six miles inland, on a comparatively small stream, should ever have been a naval

name was the market-place of many nations, and numerous mercantile laws and customs were due to the initiative of its citizens; cf. Niebuhr, "Ancient History," Lect. 87; also *supra*, p. 94.

¹ Alexandria in the tenth century was frequented by Amalfitans, Venetians, and Genoese.

² In the eleventh century Amalfi had a factory in Constantinople. She also had a foothold in Antioch, and tried to settle in Jerusalem. Her Egyptian trade was most successful, Heyd, "Histoire du Commerce," I, 114 et seq. For Amalfi in the East, cf. Prutz, "Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge," 382-383.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 190 et seq.

⁴ Cantu, VI, 304.

⁵ For the condition of Italy in the twelfth century, cf. Huillard Breholles, "Mem. sur la Situation de l'Italie au XII^{ème} Siècle" (Mem. de l'Académie des Inscriptions, XXVII, 2^{ème} partie, 1873).

⁶ For brief history of Pisa, cf. Hallam, I, 424 et seq.; also III, 309, 311; De Sismondi "Italian Republics" contains full history in its various chapters; cf. likewise Villani, "Cronica."

power seems the extreme of inconsistency. A review of her annals well illustrates the ease with which false beliefs may be inculcated by deceptive appearances. The Roman colony on this site dated from 180 B.C.; but all traces of whatever early prominence may have been attained are lost. Not until about 1000 A.D. did the place assume any special part in history;¹ at that time quite populous, it enjoyed a monopoly of commerce on the Arno and in adjacent waters; the Arabs being then in control of Sardinia, the native Christians were taking refuge within its gates. Urged by these exiles to action, Pisa, uniting with Genoa and some private individuals of Spain, invaded and subjugated both Sardinia and Sicily, the former island being divided among the victors (1050).² This city is also less noted for having vanquished its neighbor, Lucca,³ in the first war waged during the Middle Ages between Italian republics (1033). The Pisans participated in several crusading enterprises and planted colonies at Jean d'Arc, Constantinople, Tyre, Antioch, and in Syria.⁴ Corsica, Elba, and the Balearic Isles⁵ also fell under their dominion. For nearly two centuries their merchant marine and naval forces were only rivalled in the western Mediterranean by those of the rising Genoese. From her foreign possessions Pisa attracted inhabitants of every race and clime, who came thither to sell their wares and to buy their supplies of manufactured articles. A strong and steady current of wealth flowed over the seas into the hands of her citizens. Some of her nobles did not shrink from fitting out, even on

¹ In the tenth century Pisa waged a war with the Mussulmans of Sicily, Spain, and Africa; Amari, "Storia dei Mussulmani in Sicilia," III, 1 et seq.

² Cantu, V, 556; VI, 304; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 224, 231.

³ Lucca was a centre of the wool manufacture as early as the ninth century. In the thirteenth century Aldebrand and Lucas of Lucca had large merchant houses in London; Cunningham, "History of English Commerce and Industry," 185; Rot. Hund, I, 405.

⁴ At the epoch of the crusades Pisa had establishments at Antioch, Tyre, Constantinople, on the Black Sea, and at Tunis; Noel, "Histoire du Commerce du Monde," I, 191-196; Cantu, VI, 720; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 231, 234; III, 62.

⁵ Villani incorrectly puts the date 1118; they were in fact captured 1113-1115, cf. Villari, "History of Florence," I, 103-106.

their own personal account, vast commercial expeditions to distant lands. Her supremacy extended along the coast from La Spezia to Civita Vecchia. The famous group of world-renowned edifices within her walls but feebly attests the riches and power of the past.

This prosperity was not, however, long unchallenged; for, to the northward there was a new aspirant destined to become her conqueror—a city which in the future was to surpass her on the domain of the deep. About 1119 the first collision between Pisa and Genoa occurred.¹ Thenceforward a stubborn, irregular, intermittent, but frequently vigorous contest, lasting two hundred years, was maintained.² A quarrel concerning the procedure of a Pisan judge, charged with mistreating some Genoese settlers in Corsica, was the final occasion—eagerly sought by both parties—again to vent their ancient hatred on each other. After great preparations had been made on either side, and several battles fought without result, Pisa in 1284 sent against Genoa a fleet of seventy-two galleys, which was met off the island of Meloria by fifty-eight Genoese vessels. A general engagement ensued, in which the Pisans were utterly routed; they lost sixteen thousand men, eleven thousand of whom were taken prisoners; and their twenty-nine surviving galleys were captured.³ Hence the proverb arose, “To see Pisa you must go to Genoa.” This fatal day sounded the death knell of the city; Sardinia and the other colonies were in a few years abandoned, and with them all maritime trade vanished. After its disastrous defeat the navy was extinct, while to the interior numerous old-time enemies quickly seized the favorable opportunity for their own profit.⁴ Eventually, betrayed in 1406 by

¹ De Sismondi, “Italian Republics,” I, 240.

² For Pisa in the East and her strife with Genoa there, cf. Prutz, “Kulturgeschichte,” 378–379.

³ Cantu, VI, 720–721; De Sismondi, “Italian Republics,” III, 63, 69, and authorities quoted by him; Vincens, “Genoa,” I, 204; Hallam, I, 425; G. Villani, Bk. VII, Ch. XCII; Duruy, 482.

⁴ By the treaty of 1299, between Pisa and Genoa, Pisa ceded a part of Sardinia, also the territory of Bonifacio in Corsica, and agreed not to have ships of war for fifteen years. The Guelph enemies of Pisa threw themselves upon her after this disaster. In their trouble, the Pisans elected as their captain for ten

her own rulers to the arrogant Florentines, Pisa then ceased to exist as an independent community.¹

years Ugolini de la Gherardesca, who made peace by ceding a part of their territory; Lavisse and Rambaud, "*Histoire Générale*," III, 514.

¹ Many Pisans in 1406 went into voluntary exile and with them went the glory of their city, Hunt, 93; ninety years later Charles VIII freed her from her rulers, but she was again subsequently conquered; cf., generally, Hallam, I, 426; De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," VI, 90, 100; M. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. CIL.

CHAPTER II

FLORENTINE COLONIZATION

WHEN Pisa had one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, Florence, likewise situated inland and on the same river, Arno, about fifty miles higher up in the mountains, had already developed into a still greater metropolis;¹ and even prior to the final overthrow of the Pisans by the Genoese, in 1284, was aspiring to the leadership of central Italy.² Tracing its origin³ back to the Roman colony, established on the site about 60 B.C., this place did not attract any attention before the opening of the eleventh century;⁴ but one hundred years later was indeed the most important state of the region. Then came the period of civil dissensions between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines,⁵ followed by the Whites and the Blacks.⁶ Nevertheless, the city constantly increased in authority until, in 1406, it finally obtained possession of its much coveted neighbor, Pisa;⁷ its glory and influence were thenceforth steadily augmented till the death

¹For History of Florence, cf. De Sismondi, "Italian Republics"; Villani, "Cronica," and Guicciardini, "Istoria"; especially for early times, G. Villani, Bk. I, Ch. LXXXVIII et seq.

²De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 63 et seq.; G. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. LX and LXIII, also Ch. XCIII and XCIV.

³For origin of Florence, cf. Villari, I, 65-67; Mommsen assigns its foundation to the colony established in the time of Sulla.

⁴As to Florentine dependence on the Countess Matilda, in the eleventh century, cf. Villari, I, 83-91, 94.

⁵The first official mention of Florentine Guelphs is made in 1246. The annals first use Guelph in 1239 and Ghibelline in 1242, Villari, I, 178-232.

⁶For origin of Blacks (Nera) and Whites (Bianca) cf. Machiavelli, Bk. II, Ch. IV.

⁷Hallam, I, 404 et seq.; De Sismondi, VI, 100; M. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. CII; Machiavelli, Bk. II, Ch. IV; *supra* pp. 147-148 and notes.

of Lorenzo de' Medici, in 1492 — almost coincident with the discovery of the New World. Florence was then without any rival in Italy other than Venice, which was entering on its decline. The people were wealthy, powerful, and united, not only renowned for their political constitution and their cultivation of the arts, but also for their commercial and trade supremacy. For the rôle taken by them in local history during the Middle Ages they certainly deserve more praise than any of their competitors. While both Genoa and Venice exhausted their strength and their policies in enterprises beyond the sea, this republic, by reason of its location, kept aflame the zeal of the Italians for liberty.¹ Frequently associated with Venice,² Florence accomplished a work on land very similar to that which her ally effected on the deep. By their efforts, separate and combined, commerce and trade were revived, and through these agencies riches were amassed for their citizens.

In the days of Florentine prosperity the mercantile classes of the community were divided into those engaged in the greater and the lesser arts;³ of the former there were seven guilds, the principal being those of the wool, cloth,⁴ and silk workers; of the latter there were twenty-one unions, and still many of the artisans were unorganized. All these associations had some part in the government.⁵ The industry which was in

¹ Florence was identified with the Guelph cause. The first shock between Guelphs and Ghibellines was October 4, 1260, in the battle of Montapetti, in which Florence alone lost twenty-five hundred men. Dante was a Ghibelline, Oscar Browning, "Guelphs and Ghibellines, Essays," 17; cf. also De Sismondi, IV, Ch. XXXII and XXXV; VI, Ch. LVII.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VI, 362 et seq.; G. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. XLIX and L.

³ Only the greater guilds had risen to political importance in 1260; for an excellent account of Florentine commercial interests, cf. Villari, I, Ch. VI; also his article in *Politecnico* of Milan, June-July, 1867; for the government of the Calimala guild, cf. Villari, I, 233-239; and for the statutes of the guild, cf. Gindiel, "Storia dei Municipi Italiani" (appendix); and Fillippi, "Il Più antico Statuto dell'Arte di Calimala."

⁴ The cloth of Florence was celebrated as early as the twelfth century, Lavisso and Rambaud, II, 133.

⁵ Hallam, I, 404; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," III, 89 et seq.; G. Villani, Bk. VII, Ch. XVI; Duruy, 482.

time to raise the city to importance and wealth seems from the earliest ages to have been centred here. Large quantities of raw wool and woollen fabrics were long imported from England and Flanders.¹ The crude material was cleaned, washed, combed, and curled, then woven and dyed. Special skill was shown in the process of coloring. In 1338, 80,000 pieces of cloth of great value were manufactured. Prior to 1340 this trade employed 30,000 individuals in 200 establishments.² While these goods were the chief staple, the admirably brocaded silks, unexcelled by any in the world, must not be forgotten; for velvets and products of the goldsmith's skill Florence was also famous.³ In every market her textiles competed with Asiatic commodities, so that even in the East they found a ready and immense sale.

Foreign articles passing through the hands of the workmen of this city likewise acquired an increased valuation. Not only did the Florentines themselves, by their own ships, dispose of a due share of their merchandise, but a considerable amount was sold to the Venetians and distributed throughout the Orient by means of their numerous colonies. Not the East alone, but the West also, purchased their cloths,⁴ the demand throughout both France and England being strong. The first-named country, it may be incidentally stated, was mostly supplied

¹ Florentine merchants, as early as 1114, came to England for wool; in 1275 there were woollen factories established, *Rot. Hund.* I, 353; II, 4; Cunningham, I, 185-186; already in 1284 many monasteries in England had agreed to sell wool, Peruzzi, "Storia del Commercio e dei Banchieri di Firenze," 70; Ashley, "English Woollen Industry," 35.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 193 et seq.; G. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. XCIV.

³ The guild of Por' Santa Maria originally was a wool guild, but in the thirteenth century the silk branch amalgamated with it. Silkworms are supposed to have been brought into Constantinople in the sixth century, concealed in the staffs of two Persian monks, Villari, I, 323.

⁴ Florentine woollen textiles went to Rome, Naples, Sicily, the Morea, Constantinople, Broussa, Pera, Gallipoli, Schio, Rhodes, and Salonica. In 1470-1492 Florence had eighty-three factories for silks and gold brocades, and produced more than Venice, Genoa, and Lucca combined. It had warehouses and banks at Lyons, Bruges, London, Antwerp, Avignon, Geneva, Marseilles, and in Provence. Most of the raw silk was imported from the East; cf. the "Cronaca de Benedetto Dei" (1470-1492), partly published by Pagnini, "Della Decima," II, Appendix.

by them.¹ They had warehouses in Bruges, Antwerp, and London, in Paris and Venice; owned merchant vessels on the seas and equipped a fleet for their protection.² The nobility as well as the plebeian classes participated in business, for to be active in it, instead of being a degradation, was considered a mark of distinction. Everything was subordinate to commerce and industry; the entire community contributed to their maintenance and extension, so that even politically the favored party was that the most devoted to these interests.³

The Florentine system of trade was prohibitive as against other states.⁴ In economic principles, as understood in the Middle Ages, not any people had a higher development. The theory of monopoly was anxiously and carefully guarded; not the least rivalry was tolerated. To annihilate competitors, where they could not be peaceably suppressed, was the policy not only of Florence, but of all the Italian republics. Numerous wars⁵ were fought for these restrictive dogmas; so that, first by force of arms and finally by virtue of wealth, their efficiency was in practice sustained. Taxes were levied on goods imported and exported. The city and its inhabitants grew and flourished at the expense of those who, less fortunate, were made to bear an undue proportion of burdens. Inequality in all matters reigned, where at the same time there was a constant struggle for equality.⁶

While thus attempting to crush out opposition, every

¹ For discussion of Italian merchants in France, cf. Pigeonneau, "Histoire du Commerce de la France," I, Ch. IV. Merchants were exempt from the *taille*, sentinel and military service, *droit d'aubaine*, and *mainmorte*. In 1294 at Paris the *taille* was paid, Ordinances of Paris, 1278 (*Recueil des ordonnances*, IV, 668); *ibid.* for 1294.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 159 et seq.; Cantu, VI, 577; Hallam, I, 478 (note), quotes Ammirato, 997, that the first merchant ship of the Florentines went to Alexandria in 1422; at that time Florence was most wealthy.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VIII, 159 et seq.

⁴ At least until the last part of the fifteenth century, when Florence adopted a system of free trade, Pöhlmann, "Die Wirthschaftspolitik der Florentinen Renaissance," 117 et seq.; Cunningham, I, 437.

⁵ For such wars between Genoa and Pisa, cf. Bent, "Genoa," Ch. IV; between Genoa and Venice, *ibid.* Ch. VIII.

⁶ In later times more liberal doctrines prevailed. Free trade treaties were

possible method, on the other hand, was adopted to procure abroad the same privileges as those which were being accorded to other places. To this end it was thought desirable to obtain permission to locate small colonies of traders in the chief marts of the North and of the East.¹ Thus Florence scattered her representatives in every land and every clime of the commercial world of that age.² They were charged, not only to sell her manufactured products, but also to secure the raw materials necessary for her factories, to unload her ships and to provide them merchandise for the return voyage, as well as to care for her financial concerns.

Out of this activity in traffic sprang still another, perhaps more important to the welfare of the state. Immense profits poured into Florence from all quarters of the globe; her merchants became extremely rich and soon exercised an influence on the conduct of the government; it was found that the possession of monetary resources was an easy road to power. Experience taught that it was cheaper to buy rivals with cash than to conquer them by the sword; of which fact the purchase of Lucca and the acquisition of Pisa are notable illustrations.³ This display of wealth aroused the attention of other cities, and, in the protracted hostilities which involved the Italian peninsula, Florence became the banker of numbers of her neighbors.⁴ But money as a rule was scarce and the

made in 1282 (during the Pisan war) with Lucca, Prato, Pistoia, Volterra; in 1390 with Faenza and Ravenna; in 1254, 1273, 1293, 1327, and 1329 with Pisa.

¹ For trade in the East during the fourteenth century, cf. "Practice of Trade," by Pegalotti, an agent of the Bardi firm, published by Pagnini in "Della Decima."

² Florentine merchants, notaries, administrators, and diplomats were universally prized. One day Pope Boniface VIII, seeing that all the ambassadors sent to him from different parts of the world were Florentines, said, "You Florentines are the fifth element in creation." Muratori, "Scriptores Rerum Italicarum"; Lavissee and Rambaud, II, 230; Villari, I, 350; II, 134.

³ Hallam, I, 424 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 164 et seq.; for the purchase of Lucca, cf. G. Villani, Bk. XI, Ch. CXXX and CXXXIII.

⁴ To Florence the inauguration of banks is attributed. In the twelfth century the Florentines were experts in finance, Lavissee and Rambaud II, 133; but the exiled Guelphs of the thirteenth century first gave an impetus to the money-changer's trade. In 1306 the Modenese appealed for money to the bankers of Florence; in 1206 the Salimbeni house lent 20,000 florins to Siena;

risks were hazardous in those days; hence the Florentines exacted fabulous rates of interest, attaining at times forty per cent for six months;¹ nevertheless the superior facilities offered by them both at home and abroad soon gained an even more lucrative business. The Popes intrusted them with the collection of the revenues of the church throughout Christendom, and paid for this service a high commission.² To have charge of the finances of the Roman pontificate was in that age to handle the greater part of the funds in circulation.³ The Florentines, experts as they were in remittance and exchange, undoubtedly never missed an opportunity to line their own coffers.⁴ As an indication of their economic position may be mentioned a loan to England equal to that made by the Rothschilds to Great Britain during the Crimean War.⁵ They also generalized the use of drafts, invented at an earlier date by the Venetians. The natural reaction of these

in 1321 Peruzzi had a credit of 191,000 florins and Bardi one of 133,000 florins on the Order of Jerusalem. In 1348 the house of Alberte had banks at Avignon, Brussels, Paris, Siena, Perugia, Rome, Naples, Barletta, Constantinople, and Venice, Pagnini, "Della Decima," II, sec. III, Ch. I-IV.

¹ Cf. Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 316 et seq., who discusses fully the rates of interest then prevailing and gives authorities; also Cantu, VIII, 50; VII, 424.

² In 1233 the Tuscans were forwarding remittances to Gregory IX. The Babylonian captivity was the Florentine opportunity, Villari, I, 330; Cunningham, I, 186; Heyd, 114 et seq.; Schanz, "Englische Handelspolitik," I, 111; Von Reumont, "Gesch. der Stadt Rom," III, 33.

³ For description of system of papal finances and taxation, cf. Von Reumont, III, 22 et seq.; also more especially, Cenci, "Liber Censuum," and Von Ranke, "History of the Popes," I, 305 et seq., 350 et seq.

⁴ The Florentine adherence to the Guelph party was commercial as well as political; she fought with Siena, who was her rival in influence at Rome.

⁵ The Florentines were not only the financiers of Italy, but of Europe. The Frescobaldi, the Bardi, — first mentioned at Paris after 1300, — and the Peruzzi were reckoned the most important bankers of the fourteenth century. Edward III of England is said to have borrowed at Florence the sum of 1,500,000 gold florins, and his subsequent failure to repay this indebtedness caused great distress (1340-1345), Hallam, III, 321. For Florentine banking in England, cf. Stubbs, "Constitutional History," II, 560; E. A. Bond's article in the *Archæologia*, V, 28; Castelnau, "Les Medicis," I, 205; Cunningham, I, 379; Peruzzi, "Storia," 457, 461. For that in France, cf. Pigeonneau, "Histoire du Commerce," I, 252 et seq., 305, 424; Milman, "Latin Christianity," VI, 256-257; "Revue de l'Orient Latin," III, 431. Dubois advised Philip the Fair to take the riches of the Lombards instead of that of the Templars, "Mem. de l'Académie des Inscriptions," XVIII, 2^{me} partie, 435 et seq. Del says that in 1472 the bankers of Florence were reduced in number to thirty-three.

enterprises on Florence enabled her still more to multiply her commercial relations with foreign countries. Her vessels were seen in every part of the Mediterranean, in the Black Sea, in the Atlantic, and in the North Sea.¹ Her citizens were residing throughout the East, and were domiciled in Constantinople, Egypt, Flanders, and England;² even in Hungary there was a large colony of exiles. Two fairs annually attracted to the metropolis the representatives of all these nationalities.

But the erroneous principle of monopoly, of which the Florentines were devoted and headstrong adherents, was inevitably working the ruin of their prosperity. With the ever widening horizon of navigation Florence was unable to keep pace. This small, aristocratic community, which so long had been supreme over its neighbors, found futile and fruitless its efforts to extend this same arrogant sovereignty over the re-awakening world. The period of Lorenzo de' Medici marks the height of Florentine dominion and wealth; in the very year of his death, another Italian was making the voyage which revolutionized the European balance of power.³ The discovery of the western hemisphere left to Florence and to her sister republics only the bubble of their magnificence. The reality had fled. The scene of activity was transferred from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. The mediæval organization of trade and commerce was dissolving, never again to be revived for the profit of the Italian states. Florence still stands on the banks of the Arno, displaying to curious strangers, as mute witnesses of the past, her great cathedral, her silent bridges, her monumental architecture, and her unrivalled collections of art.

¹ By the capture of Pisa Florence obtained in 1406 an outlet to the sea; in 1421 "consuls of the sea" were appointed. Soon thereafter there was a fleet of eleven galleons and fifteen smaller trading vessels chartered by private individuals, Pagnini, II, sec. I; Sieveking, "Gesch. von Florenz."

² For trade at Constantinople, cf. Heyd, II, 336; for that of Egypt, *ibid.* II, 477, 485; for Florentine trade generally, cf. Noel, I, 195-203.

³ The chart Columbus used on his first voyage in search of the Indies had been sent him in 1474 by the Florentine cosmographer, Toscanelli, Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 354-365; Winsor, II, 103; both reproduce it.

CHAPTER III

GENOESE COLONIZATION

OF the many harbors on the coasts of the western Mediterranean, Genoa, although not the most extensive, is possibly the best. In form a vast amphitheatre, surrounded with abruptly rising hills, the port affords safe shelter for a considerable number of vessels. The white piles of edifices, majestically towering in the background on graduated terraces, well earn for the city the surname "The Superb." From the earliest ages of navigation, sailors seem to have frequented this welcome haven, for legend tells of a settlement on this site prior to the building of Rome; its situation, so near to France and Switzerland, and as the natural outlet, toward the west, of the trade of Northern Italy, has always made the place an important commercial centre. During the Roman days it was on the high road to Gaul, and became a municipality. Even the Carthaginians under Mago, in the second Punic war, thought it of enough consequence to attack and in part destroy it. After this event, it simply experienced the humdrum of a frontier station, until the time of the Northern invasions, when it suffered severe hardships under the Goth and Lombard conquerors. Charlemagne annexed it to his empire, but, upon the dissolution of the Frankish kingdom, independence was secured.¹

Genoa was at the opening of the crusades a well-located maritime republic of liberty-loving, sea-roving inhabitants. It may have been an occurrence more fortunate than apparent at first sight, that the town was stormed and pillaged by the

¹ For history of Genoa, cf. generally Emile Vincens, "*Histoire de la République de Gènes*"; De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*"; Villani, "*Cronica*," and Guicciardini, "*Istoria*."

Saracens in 935;¹ for this disaster provoked a deep-seated hatred against the infidels and, what was more practical, led the Genoese to strengthen their fleet. In the eleventh century the citizens, realizing their inability, as the political conditions then were, to extend their territory or increase their resources inland, turned their eyes to the sea, whence they hoped to extract sufficient for their support and the maintenance of their freedom. All their energies were thenceforth directed to the mastery of that element. Their original enemies were the Saracen pirates, the struggles with whom hardened them in a rough school and associated them with the Pisans, who were then engaged in the same task. Joining their forces, — when it is remarkable that the Genoese took the secondary part, — these peoples, as related in a previous chapter, defeated the marauders and conquered the islands of Sardinia, Corsica, and Capraja;² the two latter fell as spoils to this city. In 1038 an expedition against the Mohammedans reached the shores of Africa.

The merchant marine of Genoa was likewise developing; for as early as 1064, thirty-five years before the first crusade, its trading craft had visited Joppa.³ When, therefore, religious zeal at the end of the eleventh century was inspiring crowds of the faithful to go to the Holy Land, this community in a strictly business manner took advantage of that favorable opportunity.⁴ While multitudes pursued their weary journey over the cheerless land routes to the far East, there were still many of the wealthier classes who preferred to make the less fatiguing voyage by sea. To these fanatics, coming from Western Europe, the merchants of this port offered their ships.⁵ While they themselves seldom took the cross, they became the

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," 221 et seq.; Vincens, I, 18 et seq.

² Hallam, I, 426 et seq.; in 1015 Benedict VIII granted possession of Corsica and Sardinia to whichever of them, Genoa or Pisa, should first drive out the Saracens. Bent, IV, XV; cf. Caffaro, "Annalista."

³ Vincens, I, 25 et seq.; Ingulf, "Chronicle of Croyland," anno 1051.

⁴ For brief statement of the influence which the crusades exerted on European commercial and industrial progress, cf. Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 85, also 315 et seq.

⁵ Vincens, I, 25 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 231 et seq.

principal agents of the crusaders and, besides their mere carriage, rendered them on several occasions most valuable services. From the beginning of this era the marked prosperity of Genoa dates. Long previously its vessels had carried numbers of individual travellers on their Christian mission; consequently its sailors were well acquainted with the highways of navigation. The more frequented places had also become leading centres for the exchange of commodities between the Orient and the Occident; for these brave seamen, conveying pious pilgrims on the decks, did not forget to utilize the holds for mercenary purposes; thus both by passengers and freight they profited to the greatest possible extent. They shipped the goods of the West to sell to the Saracens, and brought back rich cargoes of wares to be placed on European markets. When finally the wave of enthusiasm multiplied many fold the throng of adventurers to the East, this traffic was not by any means new to the Genoese, who simply enlarged their fleets and improved their facilities. Slight reflection on the magnitude of these movements lasting throughout two centuries, suggests some faint idea of the vast expense they involved, and what sums were to be made in the service of transporting any considerable number of those who participated. Genoa amassed wealth, not only in this manner, but likewise through the other incidental benefits realized in the development of international trade. Ships not only awaited the wayfarers at the metropolis, but were found at every point of embarkation, ready to receive the footsore wanderers. Provisions and other supplies required by the men of the North were also carried to distant ports, and there in foreign lands Genoese merchants displayed to eager purchasers familiar articles of food, wear, use, and necessity.¹ Sales were easy and profits large. Many times, had this relief not most opportunely intervened, the Christian army would have retreated, starved, famished, and without military stores.² These same vessels also performed not merely commissary duty, but frequently maintained block-

¹ Vincens, I, 27; Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 33.

² Vincens, I, 29.

ades and patrolled or attacked the seaboard while the invading forces were operating inland. In the first crusade both the Genoese and the Pisans thus assisted (1099); but the Venetians arrived only after the capture of Jerusalem. Naturally, the Genoese expected their reward, and in fact, as they were then the strongest naval power, full recognition was accorded them.

In 1101 the crusaders made an arrangement with the Genoese commander that, if his fleet would coöperate, his city should be granted one-third of the booty to be captured, and also certain places on the coast for the location of settlements.¹ Pursuant to this agreement, the Genoese, after rendering great aid, received material sums in cash, as well as important concessions for trade and colonial stations. A street in Jerusalem, another in Joppa, and a third of the cities of Cæsarea, Arsus, and Acre were set apart to them in perpetuity (1105).² Venice and Pisa likewise were given special privileges, which proved the source of prolonged and bitter animosity and later the cause of conflict among these three rivals in the Holy Land.³ The glories achieved by Genoa and the steady growth of its commerce were already beginning to arouse envy. Pisa, which until then had been the chief maritime state in Italy, was the first to be jealous of the rising star. Consequently, as early as 1070, war broke out, Genoa, on its side, being eager to extend its sea front to the southward at the cost of its enemy. As elsewhere narrated, hostilities

¹ Vincens, I, 39; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 231.

² The Genoese also received a third of all dues collected at the ports within Baldwin's realm, Bent, 32; by the Assize of Jerusalem they likewise enjoyed in Sidon, Tyre, and Acre: (1) absolute liberty of merchandise and warehouses necessary to carry on their business; (2) the privilege of their own laws, tribunals, and consuls in all except criminal cases; (3) the right of regulating weights and measures; (4) exemption from taxation; (5) a third share of the maritime dues, Bent, 92; cf. also generally Vincens, I, 39 et seq.; Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 33.

³ In 1256 the Genoese and Venetians fought for the possession of a convent built on a hill separating their quarters at Acre. The Hospitalers, Catalans, the people of Ancona, and the Pisans took the Genoese side; the Templars, Provençaux, the patriarch of Jerusalem, the king of Cyprus, were on the Venetian side. The Genoese ships were burned and their quarters stormed. The war lasted for two years, Lavisce and Rambaud, II, 344 et seq.

continued with minor interruptions until 1284, when the Pisans were finally and utterly vanquished.¹

In the interval between the first and second crusades the citizens of Genoa turned their attention, on their own account, to some Saracens nearer home; fitting out a powerful squadron, they reached Spain, and took Almeria (1146-1149)² and Tortosa (1150),³ in both which towns they inaugurated communities under Genoese laws and supremacy.⁴ The island of Minorca also fell into their possession. By this expedition their fame spread throughout the Iberian peninsula, and the Moors, as a mark of friendship, conceded them many favors. Subsequently, pushing along the Mediterranean shores to the west of their own city, they had within the century secured the mastery over the entire coast as far as, and even beyond, Marseilles.⁵ Their independence and haughtiness are well illustrated by the successful demand which they made, about 1170, upon the emperor for a large indemnity to reimburse them for their aid against the Sicilians.⁶

Without detailing in particular the evolution of Genoese authority in the East, suffice it to say that throughout the crusades it was being constantly augmented. Notwithstanding the loss of Jerusalem by the Christians in 1187, the enterprise of this people did not suffer serious check. By the exercise of persuasive methods and, when these failed, by the use of force, practically all the commercial privileges previously acquired from Christians were confirmed or admitted by the Mohammedans.⁷ The Genoese seem to have known how to trade as well with enemy as with friend.⁸ They made themselves indispensable; for, when another crusade was undertaken, they are again found performing their old-time services to the church, carrying men, weapons, armor, supplies of all

¹ *Supra*, p. 147; Vincens, I, 204 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," III, 68 et seq.; Cantu, VI, 720; Hallam, I, 425; G. Villani, Bk. VII, Ch. XCII.

² Cf. the *Annalist*, Guglielmo Pellianno, 1149.

³ Bent, 98 et seq.

⁴ Vincens, I, 66.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 59 et seq.

⁶ *Ibid.* I, 109.

⁷ *Ibid.* II, 7 et seq., 118.

⁸ Cf. the treaty of 1177 with Egypt and that of 1290 confirming it. The latter is to-day preserved in the University Library at Genoa.

kinds, and of course coming back, after obtaining further advantages, with mighty cargoes and vast riches.¹

Nevertheless, in the East, complications, eventually fatal to Genoese prosperity, were to arise. Seconded by the Venetians, the Franks conquered Constantinople in 1204, and Baldwin I, of Flanders, assumed the crown. As a reward for this support, Venice received grants of important concessions. The growing jealousy between the two rivals was thereby decidedly accentuated. The Genoese espoused the cause of the Greek claimant, and in 1261, after a protracted struggle of varying fortune, they succeeded in placing Palæologus on the throne.² Then it was that Genoa was at the zenith of her grandeur; all the prizes at Constantinople were for her citizens. The suburb of Pera³ and the port of Smyrna were their recompense; they controlled the Black Sea and, in the Crimea, established Caffa (Gazaria)⁴ as their principal trading point.⁵ This settlement, after so rapidly developing that the Turks soon called it the Constantinople of the Crimea, finally falling under the jurisdiction of the Bank of St. George,⁶ — the great financial institution of Genoa, — was ruled with wonderful prudence and discretion.⁷ The government, modelled after that of the metropolis, was in the hands of a consul, as governor, assisted by other appointed functionaries, including an advisory body of twenty-four members and a privy council of

¹ Vincens, I, 177.

² Heyd, II, 427-430; various small islands were conceded to private families by the treaty of Ninfio, 1261.

³ "Revue de l'Orient Latin," IV, 63-99.

⁴ A treaty with Manuel Comnenus proves that Genoa had a colony here soon after the first crusade, Bent, 113-115; "Revue de l'Orient Latin," IV, 27-63; for register of accounts, Heyd, II, 158, 169-172, 188, 193, 203-204, 381.

⁵ Hallam, III, 312; Michaud, VIII, 1-2; Gibbon, V, 255, who also cites several authorities; Cantu, VI, 723 et seq.; VII, 426 et seq.

⁶ Hallam, III, 322; Vincens, II, 170 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 425; Macaulay, "History of England," V, 542 et seq. "From the necessities of the state and the accommodation by the Bank of St George the latter now has under its administration most of the towns and cities in the Genoese dominion. These the bank governs and protects, and every year sends its deputies, appointed by vote, without any interference on the part of the republic." — MACHIAVELLI, Bk. VIII, Ch. VI. Was not this form of rule analogous to that of a trading company? Cf. also Bent, XI; Cantu, VI, 721.

⁷ Caffa in 1450 was reputed to be as rich and as populous as Genoa.

six. At Tana, the end of the main caravan routes of India and upper Asia, in Syria, at Cyprus,¹ on the coast of Africa, in Spain, and on many of the islands of the Mediterranean, the Genoese maintained colonies and mercantile outposts.² In the West, the overthrow of Pisa at this epoch was the occasion of additional renown. Nor were they neglectful of the cities and nations to which the wares of the Orient might be sold. France was their special care, for in nearly every important town of that country they enjoyed local privileges. England, too, was visited by their fleets, but with the Low Countries they appear to have had less intercourse.³

The Venetians looked with envious eyes on this commercial activity. Everywhere they sailed they encountered the hated Genoese, who held the monopoly of the best markets and the sources of supply in the Eastern trade. At Tyre, at Airi, at Tripoli, and in Cyprus, these two redoubtable foes fought their first skirmishes. Soon after the subjection of Constantinople to the supremacy of Genoa, the people of Venice seem to have resolved on a war to the death. Pisa was scarcely off the field before this almost new and untried opponent was to be met;⁴ but the power of the Genoese was apparently irresistible.⁵ In 1291 they destroyed a Venetian squadron of eighty-four vessels, capturing seven thousand persons, among whom was Admiral Dandolo. Then, for fifty years, comparative peace reigned;

¹ For the colony of Famagouste in Cyprus, cf. "Revue de l'Orient," IV, 99-118.

² Vincens, II, 9 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 294 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 428 et seq.; Gibbon, V, 255 et seq. In later times (fourteenth century) Genoa exercised official control over her colonies by means of the *Officium Gazariæ*. This body regulated traffic, directed navigation, commanded the armies, and was a final court of appeal invested with full jurisdiction over the dependencies. In many respects it was subsequently imitated by other nations, Heyd, II, 173 et seq.

³ Vincens, II, 9 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 429. They aided, too, in military matters, as in 1316, when they sent a contingent to Edward II, and in 1347 to Edward III. At Crécy Genoese archers fought on the French side.

⁴ Hallam, I, 428; Vincens, II, 19 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, Ch. XL and XLI; Cantu, VI, 727 et seq.; G. Villani, Bk. VI, Ch. LX; Bk. VII, Ch. XXIV. The first real war between Venice and Genoa broke out in 1206 over the possession of Crete; cf. *post*, p. 176.

⁵ G. Villani, Bk. IX, Ch. XCVIII, says that in 1321 the Genoese were the richest and most powerful among Christians and even among Saracens.

but, as the event proved, the Venetians were only temporarily vanquished. In 1346 hostilities again broke out; each party won a victory; the Genoese nevertheless suffered the most, for they soon thereafter sought the protection of the Duke of Milan; a truce of nearly thirty years followed,¹ preparatory to the final struggle.² Genoa, in the interval, aroused all the enemies of her formidable competitor—and they were numerous³—to come to her own aid, hoping thus to overwhelm forever the Queen City of the Adriatic. In 1378, after several more engagements and the utter rout of the Venetians in open battle, the allied fleet arrived before the city.⁴ The advance posts were stormed and an embassy was sent to ask peace; but the Genoese, determined to take the place, would not grant any terms other than abject submission,⁵ for they believed that they held Venice securely in their grasp, since not only they themselves controlled the sea, but their land auxiliaries had closed every approach from terra firma. The citizens, undaunted and bent upon one desperate effort, manned and equipped every available boat. Meanwhile the besiegers, after seizing Chioggia by assault, steered their course in through the lagoons behind it to a point of safer anchorage. The move was fatal, for the Venetians, promptly sinking old hulks in the channel, entirely blocked egress; still another passage was likewise obstructed, and the only opening left for escape was held by them. As a result of these manœuvres, the Genoese, caught in a trap at a vast dis-

¹ Peace of 1355, by which Venice abandoned her Black Sea commerce; cf. *post.*, p. 180.

² During this time the Genoese were active elsewhere. In 1346 they conquered Chios and Phocæa, in 1374 Cyprus. These enterprises are notable because they were conducted by veritable trading companies, the types of the greater organizations which two hundred and fifty years later were to follow in the North; cf. Heyd, "Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter," I, 588 et seq.; II, 408 et seq.

³ Among others Padua, Hungary, and Friuli.

⁴ Hallam, I, 428 et seq.; Vincens, II, 93; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," V, Ch. L.; Cantu, VII, 431.

⁵ Doria threatened to bridle the horses of St. Mark. The Venetians in their despair even thought of abandoning Venice and seeking a new territory, Bent, 170-176; cf. *supra*, p. 152, note 5.

advantage, found, when they wished to attack, that the available space was too narrow to permit their formation in line. Thus hemmed in, starvation forced their surrender, and their whole fleet, so proud a few months previously, was lost. A compromise treaty (1380) was signed; to Genoa Venice yielded the small island of Tenedos, and to the allies nearly all her possessions on the mainland. This peace, though not immediately disastrous, marks the beginning of Genoese decline.¹ Civil discords soon broke out; it was impossible to reorganize the navy on its former scale; the contest with Venice was resumed, and spasmodically continued until the middle of the fifteenth century, at the end of which Genoa relinquished most of her territories and fell under a foreign yoke. By the heroism of Andrea Doria the republic was reestablished, only as the shadow of itself.² Its glory had departed; the colonists had revolted or were conquered; commerce had fixed on other channels.

Genoa, however unfortunate in the later years of its career, must be remembered for the benefits conferred by it in earlier times upon its contemporaries. Through its indomitable efforts the main routes to and from the East³ were kept open during the perilous epoch of the crusades; and many of the participants owed their return to their homes and families to the diligence of the Genoese in supplying them with the necessaries of life. For these things this city should be esteemed as well as for the propagation of Western civilization in the Orient, effectuated through its numerous colonial establishments. These latter constituted a chain of enlightenment and activity among the benighted and sluggish Eastern people of that day; through them the spark of learning was kept alive, and in them were not less the centres of Christian doctrine than the marts of commerce and barter. When the circumstances of the age transferred the seat of empire to the Atlantic, Genoa inevitably crumbled, as its rival and conqueror likewise—just about

¹ Hallam, I, 431; Vincens, II, 101; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," V, Ch. I.; Cantu, VII, 432.

² Prescott, "Charles Fifth," II, 168-173.

³ Noel, I, 186-191; Prutz, 362-363, 377-378.

one century later—was destined to succumb. The development of the Northern and Eastern nations, Germany, Austria, Holland, and Scandinavia, had in a certain degree an effect on this metropolis similar to that which the discovery of the New World was in the next cycle to exert on Venice. The fall of Genoa was only one more illustration of the mutual dependence between the currents of trade and the sceptre of power.

CHAPTER IV

VENETIAN COLONIZATION

PECULIARITY is always attractive; an event or a characteristic contrary to a well-defined rule or principle arouses interest and frequently affords a topic for serious and well-merited discussion. Judged by this standard, all study relating to Venice is wonderfully tempting and creditable; for in it are reviewed the experiences of a people unique in origin, institutions, and situation, while not the less renowned for the influence which their politics, commerce, and colonization have had upon the growth of modern civilization.

Very little is known of the early history of the tribe which founded the city; the prevailing presumption is that in the first half of the fifth century of this era a few refugees, fleeing before northern invaders, settled on some of the hundred islands which are now occupied.¹ While on the one hand their location in the midst of the waters obliged these individuals to cultivate the science of navigation, on the other their insignificance and isolation saved them from the attack of foreign and domestic enemies, so that they long lived and prospered without becoming entangled in international or Italian affairs; freed from outer perplexities, their energies were concentrated on the promotion of their own welfare. The two cardinal objects of their solicitude were the maintenance of liberty under a republican form of local self-government and the extension of traffic, the latter primarily as a means to the supply of their necessities, and subsequently as a highway to the acquisition of wealth and fame. The political annals of Venice

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 200 et seq.; Hallam, I, 435; Gibbon, III, 197-198; V, 131; Michaud, V, 19; Galibert, "Venise," Ch. II and III.

are here of interest only so far as they may have a bearing upon her trade and colonial policy; to her commercial achievements attention must be chiefly directed.

In the beginning the inhabitants were undoubtedly mere fishermen,¹ visiting from time to time the neighboring mainland in order to dispose of their catch and to secure provisions for themselves and their families; perhaps even as pirates plundering the Adriatic coasts and secreting their booty in the hidden recesses of their ocean home, they taught themselves the first lessons in seafaring. Certain it is, their courage, their skill, and their resources gradually developed. For as early as the sixth century² they were sailing on the rivers of Upper Italy, cruising along the adjacent seaboard, and occasionally casting anchor off Greece and Asia Minor.³ Already, in 828, their ships having transferred the remains of St. Mark from Alexandria to Venice, this saint became the patron of the city.⁴ The merchant marine was also attaining importance, and was bringing to this port cargoes of Eastern wares, to be thence distributed to the towns of the interior. Venetian markets were drawing purchasers from Germany, Switzerland, and France.⁵ Salt was the great local product, and was then being sold throughout northern Italy. In the ninth century the famous glass manufacture originated, a source of untold future wealth.⁶ The trade and industry of this place were thus evidently of equal antiquity to those of Pisa or Genoa. Nominally claimed by both the rival empires but practically independent, Venice was augmenting politically not less than commercially, for several subject communities were springing up both on the islands and the opposite shores.

Exterior circumstances were also conspiring to the emolument of the nascent metropolis. Located at the head of the

¹ Cassiodorus describes the simple life of the Venetian fishermen and their journeys by land and sea, "Variarum," Bk. XII, Ch. VII.

² The Venetians aided Narses the Eunuch, who protected them in their monopoly of the Brenta and the Bacchiglione rivers.

³ Galibert, 186 et seq.

⁴ Cantu, V, 557.

⁵ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 200 et seq.

⁶ Gibbon, V, 132.

Adriatic—among mid-European harbors of any magnitude the nearest to the East—and easy of access to the principal continental peoples, Venice might, rightly anticipating the inevitable rise of the races beyond the Alps, even then weigh her possibilities.¹ Subsequent events would have justified reasonable expectations; for, as the nations of the North established themselves on a permanent basis, their demands increased; the East was still the land of luxuriant production, and the currents of mercantile exchange flowed and ebbed to and from the Orient. The routes for this intercourse, whether by land or sea, were limited; some of them have elsewhere been traced; but Venice, above all other cities, was at the junction of the most numerous, available, and frequented highways.² As time passed, from the tenth to the sixteenth centuries, these advantages were more and more accentuated. A people, sturdy in the defence of its freedom, hardened by incessant toil, expert by experience, skilful in the management of its own affairs, devoted to fixed ideals, faithful to the interests which it served, and favored by its situation, must assuredly win the highest degree of success.

Venice, in the ninth century, was then an important warehouse and had already opened those fortunate relations which, by proper care and attention, were to yield such a rich harvest; her merchants were the factors of many races, while her sailors were traversing the most remote waters of the Mediterranean.³ In the four centuries following she scarcely widened the field of her activities, but merely developed it and multiplied a thousand fold the sources, variety, and volume of her trade; and while her agents at distant ports were engaged filling her ships with precious cargoes, her workmen at home were busy

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 257 et seq.

² Galibert, 165.

³ Two contemporaries, Sagorninus and Forcarini (quoted "Archivio Storico Italiano," IV) speak of Venetian ships at Egypt, Syria, Tartary, Barbary, with the Saracens of Italy, Sicily, and Algiers, at the Crimea, Cairo, Damascus, Medina, and Tunis; cf. also De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, Ch. V and VI; Cantu, V, 558-559; Hallam, I, 436; Gibbon, V, 132.

turning out domestic products of their skill. Venice alone, of the Italian cities of the first rank combining navigation and manufacture, was by the union of commerce and industry distinguished from all rivals.¹

Possibly the instinct for territorial aggrandizement is innate in the body politic; more probably it is the form of expression of a national necessity; in states of small area, but intense energy, the desire is the more excusable. Venice, for example, had tested her capacities and found herself hampered in further growth by want of commensurate opportunities. At that time relatively weak as compared with the great powers of the day, there seemed little hope for the fulfilment of her ambitions. A series of unanticipated events, however, furnished her citizens the occasion immensely to enlarge the circle of her authority; for without the crusades, it may be surmised, Venice would have remained a mere Italian state, with a dominion restricted to the islands of her vicinity and the marshy regions of the estuary of the Po. Prior to participation in the Christian uprising for the recovery of the Holy Land, the Venetians had well established their reputation for valor and proficiency in naval warfare. Before 900 they had vanquished the Slavonians and the Saracens on the Adriatic, and had rescued from their piratical expeditions the neighboring districts. Several places had indeed acknowledged Venetian sovereignty in consideration of the protection extended them; and, thus attaining control over a considerable extent of seacoast, the Doge of Venice assumed the dignity of Duke of Dalmatia (998).² The city had constituted for itself commercial prosperity, a patron saint, an organized government, and a recognized country, for the Emperor of the East had confirmed the conquests made over other towns. To the Eastern Empire Venice gladly

¹ Galibert, 171 et seq.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 216, 218; Cantu, V, 558; Hallam, I, 436; the following towns recognized Venice as suzerain: Pirano, Omago, Emonia, Parenzo, Rovigno, Pola, Zara, Spalatio, Fran, Ossero, Arbo, Veglia, Sebenigo, Belgrado, Lenigrado, Curzola, Lesina; Sagorninus, "Chron." 95-101. Each town received a podestat or count as governor and paid a yearly tribute.

yielded homage,¹ obtaining, however, as recompense, many substantial privileges and favors; but for all actual services performed full payment was nevertheless exacted. For instance, her troops rendered efficient aid against the Normans in Calabria and, in return, an exemption from port dues throughout the imperial domains was procured.² While the people thus realized the necessity of maintaining good relations with Constantinople, then the centre of the highest civilization, they still, although bending the knee, never forgot to claim the just reward for their allegiance. Such was the situation at the opening of the crusades.

The Venetians were in a measure induced to take part in these enterprises by the same reasons as influenced the Genoese. Foreseeing vast chances to enrich themselves and to increase their power, they likewise perceived that, if they did not participate, they would risk losing to more energetic rivals the extensive fame and supremacy already attained. Material aims, much more than enthusiasm for the faith, actuated them.³ For the first crusade they fitted out a fleet of 60 galleys and 140 other vessels, mostly manned by their own citizens; for at that time they do not seem to have enjoyed foreign favor to as great a degree as the Genoese, nor were they so directly devoted to the cause of the pilgrims. Their object appears to have been more immediately selfish and for the sake of their own aggrandizement. In 1099 the Venetian forces, instead of joining the other adventurers in the operations around Jerusalem, first sailed to the island of St.

¹ By the end of the tenth century there was an equal alliance; the Venetians defended the Empire, which assured them a monopoly of traffic, Lavisse and Rambaud, II, 840.

² In return for aid against Robert Guiscard, Alexius I (1082) gave the Venetians a quarter at Constantinople, but they abused their privileges. In 1120 the Empire made a treaty of alliance with the Genoese and war broke out, Lavisse and Rambaud, II, 841; Alexius I also placed the Amalfitans under Venetian protection and made them pay dues to their protectors; Anna Comnena, 161, also document published by Marin, "Storia Civile e Politica del Commercio de Veneziani"; cf. also Cantu, V, 557; Hallam, I, 436; Gibbon, V, 131, 132.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 207 et seq.; Hallam, III, 311; Gibbon, V, 133; Michaud, V, 20.

Nicholas, quarrelled with the Pisans about the body of the saint known by that name, and, after defeating them, proceeded to Cyprus; from there their course was directed to Smyrna and thence to Joppa, which was rescued from impending conquest.¹ Enough booty being secured to repay the cost of the undertaking, the Doge and some of his followers went to Jerusalem, which had previously fallen; after here making terms that, when Tyre and Ascalon capitulated, they should have two-thirds of the spoils,² the Venetians required the soldiers from other places chiefly to win the victories, but subsequently did not forget to collect their own dues. Meanwhile, an attack being planned upon their city by the son of the emperor, they hastily quit the Holy Land in order to return to its defence; en route, however, they captured and devastated Rhodes and Chios, seizing and plundering Samos, Lesbos, Andros, and several other islands belonging to the Empire;³ finally they reached Venice, which their presence preserved from danger.⁴ Not only ample tangible riches were the fruits of this expedition, but the body of St. Nicholas, carried off from the Pisans, was to form on the isle of Ledo the subject of another sanctuary. Nor should it be forgotten that in those days these shrines were of commercial value, as they drew throngs of visitors, who came not merely to worship, but likewise to supply their needs. Every saintly burial-place, then, meant a larger trade.⁵ The Venetians had also been granted in the Holy Land rights similar to those awarded to Pisa and Genoa—a division of glory and financial rewards which occasioned lasting jealousy among the three republics.

Venice seems to have been associated in the next two Christian movements against the infidels, in which she continued to

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 232 et seq.; Galibert, 45.

² In July, 1100, the Venetians aided Godefroy at Jerusalem for two months on condition that he guard for them a third of the cities which they should take. With their aid and that of the Genoese, Cæsarea, Acre, Sidon, and Beyrout were conquered, Lavisse and Rambaud, II, 310.

³ Lavisse and Rambaud, II, 341.

⁴ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," I, 236.

⁵ For rivalry in trade about saints' shrines, cf. Jusseraud, "English Way-faring Life," 344.

win laurels and to amass wealth;¹ until in 1198, just before the opening of the fourth crusade, as Gibbon reckons it, this city had risen to a most enviable position.² Her authority was respected throughout the West and feared everywhere in the Orient. Constantinople, to which a nominal homage was paid, was not any longer, in the proper sense, the metropolis of the East; much more justly could this dignity be claimed by Venice. While other nations had been fighting for religious principle and for holy renown, the Venetians had skilfully profited to the benefit of their commerce and industry. The friendship of the Moors in Syria and in Egypt was valued as highly by them as that of the church in Italy, which organization strangely overlooked or forgot the society which this people elsewhere frequented. Thus morally indifferent to the choice of their allies, they determined their action by the consideration from which side they could draw the greater advantage.³

When the French and the Flemish were entering upon their fourth effort for the recovery of the Holy Land, it was natural that they should solicit the assistance of the strongest maritime state of the East. During the visit of the ambassadors despatched to Venice for the preliminary negotiations, a bargain was struck by which the Venetians agreed to transport the expedition for the price of 85,000 marks of silver and an equal share in the territories to be won.⁴ Both Genoa and Pisa refused to coöperate. Henry Dandolo was Doge; although nearly entirely blind,⁵ he has-

¹ In 1189, Isaac II gave the Venetians the establishments of the French and Germans. The Italian merchants had reduced to a minimum the profits of the Byzantine producer. The principal source of the emperor's income was cut off, for the Venetians paid no customs duties, and the Pisans and the Genoese very small sums, Lavissee and Rambaud, II, 815; cf. also Michaud, II and III.

² In 1199, Alexius III renewed the Venetian privileges and joined in an alliance against the Normans; for a brief account of the condition of Venice at this time and a short history of the fourth crusade, cf. Duruy, 305 et seq.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, Ch. XIV; Hallam, I, 437.

⁴ Gibbon, V, 133 et seq.; Galibert, 53; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 86. Duruy (p. 307) says this sum is equivalent to 4,046,000 francs or approximately \$800,000.

⁵ Dandolo was then ninety years old. The story that he was blinded when

tened the preparations so that, when the crusaders arrived, everything was in readiness.¹ But then it was found that 34,000 marks of the covenanted amount were lacking. The Venetians finally engaged to accept, in lieu of this deficit, the first suitable conquest.²

The fleet³ raised anchor and proceeded without any remarkable occurrence as far as the city of Zara in Dalmatia—a rebellious fief of Venice—which was overwhelmed.⁴ Alexius, the son of the exiled Emperor of the Orient, came hither to seek aid to restore his family to the throne. Dandolo, appreciating the glory to accrue from the fall of Constantinople, contrived by his influence to turn the adventurers in that direction. The Byzantine court had of late been favoring Pisa in matters of trade, which fact alone was sufficient to arouse the energy of the Venetians. Alexius, in the name of his father, pledged the submission of his subjects to the Roman Church. All was satisfactorily arranged and the squadron sailed.⁵ Constantinople was soon reached, attacked, and taken, the Venetians performing prodigies of valor in the sea operations.⁶ The usurper fled and the old blind Emperor Isaac was reinstated in power, but soon thereafter died. Events rapidly followed each other; Alexius, who

ambassador at Constantinople, in 1173, is disproved by the statement of Villehardouin; Buchon, "*Recherches et Matériaux*," Pt. II, 47, 223.

¹ The Venetians were discontented at their treatment by the Empire; the massacre of 1182 rankled in their minds, and they sought the opportunity to avenge their pride and their commercial losses, Finlay, "*History of Greece*," III, 252; Kugler, 267.

² De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," II, 88 et seq.; Gibbon, V, 136 et seq.; Michaud, V, 20 et seq., 30; Galibert, 53; Duruy, 307.

³ It carried 4500 horsemen, 9000 squires, 30,000 infantry, and stores for nine months. The galleys were never less than 80 feet in length, sometimes 110 by 70. Pagnini, "*Della Decima*," II, 7 et seq.; Romanin, "*Storia Documenta di Venezia*," II, 156-157.

⁴ De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," II, 92; Gibbon, V, 137; Michaud, V, 32; for this action the Venetians were excommunicated; Galibert, 53; Finlay, IV, 82; Wilken, "*Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*," V, 159-163, 335.

⁵ De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," II, 93 et seq.; Gibbon, V, 137 et seq.; Michaud, V, 35 et seq.; Galibert, 54.

⁶ De Sismondi, "*Italian Republics*," II, 96 et seq.; Hallam, I, 436; Gibbon, V, 139 et seq.; Michaud, V, 58 et seq.; Galibert, 54; Constantinople fell July 18, 1203.

had succeeded to the throne, was assassinated; whereupon Mystillus usurped the reins of government. Then quarrels arose between the Latins and the inhabitants.¹ Not any amicable agreement for the payment of the indemnity nor for the execution of the promises made by Alexius could be effected. War was declared once more; the city suffered a second siege; it was again captured and this time pillaged and sacked,² the new ruler meeting with the same fate as the previous pretender.³ Dandolo of Venice might have been elected emperor, had not his advisers proclaimed that the magistrate of a republic could never be the sovereign of an empire. The imperial dignity therefore fell to Baldwin of Flanders (1204).⁴ But the Venetians, not unmindful to obtain their full share of the prizes of victory, vastly increased their colonial domain. Trained by their long experience and exercising remarkable wisdom in the selection of their portion of the spoils, they refused the more extensive conquests because of their relatively small advantages in comparison with the expense entailed. Besides their three-eighths of Constantinople and the territory of Roumania the most important of their acquisitions were in the Black Sea; here Lazis, Nicopolis, Heraclea, Ægospotami, Rudosto, Nicomedia, and Gallipoli came into their hands; Adrianople in Thrace, Oreos and Caristos on the island of Eubœa; Ægina, Megalopolis, Calona, and Methona in the Greek Peloponnesus were allotted to them. Divrachim on the coast of Dalmatia, Patras, and all the islands of the Ionian Sea from Zante to Corfu became Venetian property. To complete their supremacy at Constantinople, they purchased for cash the additional quarter of that city assigned to the Marquis of Montferrat; Crete was also secured from the same nobleman for the sum

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 103 et seq.

² Wilken, "Geschichte der Kreuzzüge," V, 301-317; the Venetians were paid their 50,000 marks from the spoils, *ibid.* 319.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 111 et seq.; Gibbon, V, 152 et seq.; Michaud, V, 92 et seq.; Galibert, 56 et seq.

⁴ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 116 et seq.; Kugler, 284; Gibbon, V, 163; Michaud, V, 121 et seq.; Galibert, 58; Duruy, 308.

of 10,000 marks.¹ Thus the brilliantly gifted Doge, Henry Dandolo, by his energy and tact acquired for Venice a veritable realm of colonial possessions. He himself, invested at Constantinople with power second only to the emperor, died there after a brief period passed in the enjoyment of the fruits of his foresight and prudence.

The predominance of the Venetians on the Bosphorus assured them the freest intercourse with Black Sea ports, whence the numerous products of many tributary regions were brought to the West; they treated with the nations of the great valleys, the river courses of which empty into that sea. Nor did they, while in close relations with Syria, Bulgaria, Servia, Hungary, Persia, Armenia, and Mesopotamia, overlook Egypt, from which land supplies of lumber, skins, silks, cotton, sugar, fruits, nuts, and slaves were drawn.²

The Venetian republic, with less than two hundred thousand inhabitants in the municipality, had in 1206 extended its dominion over a line of establishments stretching from its own immediate neighborhood to the eastern extremity of the Black Sea,³ and including within their boundaries a multiplicity of races. Through them its influence was felt everywhere along the shores of the eastern Mediterranean and those of adjoining waters.⁴

All the new territories save Adrianople were on the coast, a fact which necessitated the maintenance of a formidable fleet for their subjection and protection; so that, although the navy of Venice was then recognized to be of the first rank, equal in strength to the maritime forces of any European country of that age, her regular men-of-war were still

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 118; Cantu, VI, 725 et seq.; Hallam, I, 432; Gibbon, V, 165 et seq.; Michaud, V, 125 et seq.; Galibert, 59 et seq.; Duruy, 308.

² Cantu, VI, 726; Galibert, 165 et seq.; for the slave trade, cf. Noel, I, 170; in 960 the Pope forbade the Venetians selling Christian slaves to the Saracens, Finlay, I, 421 (note 1).

³ For Venetian trade in Russia, cf. Noel, 150.

⁴ Cantu, VI, 726; Michaud, V, 161; about 1208 the Sultan made a treaty with Venice by which her trade with Alexandria and the Nile Valley received a great impetus, Kugler, 306.

inadequate for the task. Hence, three years after the fall of Constantinople, the senate granted to all Venetians the privilege to effect by private corsairs the reconquest of such of the acquisitions as might be rebellious,¹ on condition that they should be held as fiefs of the state; Crete² and the islands of the Ionian Sea alone were excepted. Venice thus made the ambition and cupidity of her people serve the public welfare, for her rich and noble citizens did not hesitate to stake their wealth on the possible chance of renown and landed possessions.³ While numbers of such privateering expeditions were organized and despatched against various distant and scattered points, the republic itself, in spite of Genoese opposition and intrigue, pacifying Corfu and Crete, established permanent colonies on both.⁴ Communication was successfully kept open with the far East and the wares of the Orient imported from Tana⁵ and Trebizond introduced luxury into the city.⁶

A brief account of the political relationship existing between Venice and her dependencies must now be given. The colony at Constantinople was governed by a podestat named by the Doge and grand council. This magistrate was assisted by two councils, six judges, several financial agents, and a captain of the fleet, all sent from the metropolis. Such was the usual type of administration.⁷ The soil of Crete after the great insurrection was distributed into equal shares among the republic, the church, and the colonists. A duke,

¹ Finlay, IV, 98 et seq.

² *Ibid.* IV, 272; cf. Hopf, "Gesch. Griechenlands," for a full history of Crete. He gives a list of the owners of the island subsequent to 1204; cf. also "Urkunden und Zusätze zur Gesch. der Insel Andros," 7.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 353; Galibert, 59.

⁴ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 354 et seq.; in 1207 Dandolo and Premarino defeated the Genoese corsair *Vetrano* and took Corfu, Canale, "Cronaca Veneta," §§ 65, 66.

⁵ Heyd, II, 171 et seq., 181.

⁶ The Venetians in 1225 debated the feasibility of removing the seat of their government to Constantinople, De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 353; Heyd, I, 300, 317.

⁷ For the organization of the Venetian colonies, cf. Noel, "Histoire du Commerce du Monde," I, Ch. III; Waraen, "Origine des Etablissements Consulaires"; Prutz, "Kulturgeschichte," 384-393

whose term was for two years, acted as governor-general; under him various officers, similar to those at home, were charged with the executive duties. The lands of the colonists were divided into two parts — one for the nobles and the other for the squires; to the individuals of each of these classes allotments of ground were made, and they in turn were expected to furnish a certain number of soldiers for the common defence. In later times a doge, a vice-doge, and other subordinates after the model of Venice were appointed. The Saracens, incited by the Genoese and aided by the frequent invasions of the Greeks, always rendered the situation precarious.¹

The growth of Venetian dominion vastly augmented the patronage of the Doge, who had the nominating power to so many important posts; and in the exercise of this prerogative he likewise collected a large personal revenue. Those who went out to the colony in the employ of the state also began to constitute a separate party. Sometimes they themselves, upon their return to Venice, but more often the relatives whom they had left behind, by means of their increased wealth and prestige, succeeded in elevating themselves over the other inhabitants.² A schism thus occurred and an aristocracy unconsciously sprang up. Services rendered abroad were the pride of the actors and the envy of their opponents. Rival heroes became hostile to each other; their adherents took sides; and thence feuds, intrigues, and civil dissensions. Subsequently, during the great war with Genoa, the grandees usurped the right to elect the Doge; the high council claimed the privilege to fill its own vacancies, and this dignity gradually became hereditary. When participation in trade and commerce was by law forbidden to the nobles, these latter avenged themselves by declaring that they only were eligible to hold public office. Then, as

¹ Cantu, VI, 726; Daru, "Histoire de Venise," I, 352; throughout the cities of the East, wherever there were Venetian establishments, this people, entirely independent of the local authorities, enjoyed their own government and institutions; cf. Heyd, "Geschichte des Levantehandels im Mittelalter," I, 172.

² Cantu, VI, 727; Hallam, I, 437; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 345, 347 et seq.; Gibbon, V, 133; Galibert, 68, 70, 74 et seq.

time passed and all legal procedure to secure justice became unavailing, the people had recourse to plots and conspiracies. The response of the nobility was the creation of the famous bloody Council of Ten,¹ invested with arbitrary jurisdiction over the government and its officials, as well as over the property and life of every citizen. In 1350 even the authority of the Doge had vanished into the hands of this limited body of autocrats.² The chain of evidence is complete. The extension of the supremacy of Venice beyond her fondest hopes was the death knell of her free and independent institutions. Domestic liberty was exchanged for foreign empire. Wealth and preferment supplanted moderate fortune and political equality.³

One of the strangest results of Venetian policy was the desire exclusively to control Adriatic commerce. This city established an imaginary line from Ravenna to the Gulf of Fiume, and proceeded to assess a heavy duty upon foreign vessels engaged in trade to the north of it; even those owned along the coast were not exempt from this arrogant regulation.⁴ The inhabitants of Bologna challenged it in vain, for their resistance, as well as that of others, was speedily quelled.⁵

Meanwhile the fifth and the sixth crusade took place.⁶ Both Venice⁷ and Genoa, coöperating, were realizing vast wealth and advantages; but the tension between them was becoming extreme, and encounters were more and more frequent. Genoa, formerly acknowledged as the superior on the sea, could not

¹ Leo, "Geschichte von Italien," III, 66; for a short general account, Symonds, "Renaissance, Age of the Despots," 4.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VI, 19; Cantu, VI, 726 et seq., also Ch. XXII; Hallam, I, 440; Gibbon, V, 133; Galibert, 80; Duruy, 481; Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 141.

³ Gibbon, V, 166; Cantu, VII, 430; Galibert, 71.

⁴ For the *ad valorem* duty, cf. Romanin, II, Bk. VII, Ch. I; Hazlitt, II, 276.

⁵ For war with Bologna, Canale, Secs. 288-309; cf. also Galibert, 181; Cantu, VI, 724 et seq.

⁶ Michaud, V and VI; Duruy, 309.

⁷ In 1284 Venice agreed to furnish, at the Pope's cost, twenty galleys, at her own, five, for the service of the crusaders, Hazlitt, II, 816.

brook the intolerable insolence and ambition of the Venetians.¹ The proximity of their foreign possessions likewise naturally precipitated many trade disputes, for both powers now had extensive colonies around and beyond the Dardanelles; each was anxious to exclude the other and seize the monopoly. How Genoa joined in the scheme to replace the Greek imperial family on the throne of Constantinople;² how in 1261, after defeating the Venetians, this purpose was accomplished; and how, for a time, the Black Sea was effectually closed to the latter, — have already been recounted; after which events it was only the more to be expected that the Greeks would prefer the Genoese in the distribution of favors.³ These blows, so disastrous for Venice, were regarded by her citizens as good reason for renewing their efforts to regain the supremacy and humble their rivals.⁴ Nor did they wait long; for in 1262 they won a bloody fight off Sette-Pozzi, and again, in 1264, in a terrible combat near the Sicilian shores, they annihilated the entire Genoese fleet.⁵ The emperor then accorded some few privileges to the victors, but, weakened by their own heavy sacrifices, they were not in a situation to insist upon their greater demands. Relative tranquillity reigned until 1296; then war was again declared. The Venetians, taking the offensive, entered the Black Sea and destroyed many Genoese colonial stations, but, being caught in the ice on the approach of winter, lost by cold more than half their forces (1297). The next summer (1298) the Genoese, penetrating the Adriatic, vanquished the Venetians near the Dalmatian coast;⁶ when their

¹ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 321 et seq.; Cantu, VI, 731.

² Kugler, 296, 381; *supra*, p. 161.

³ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," II, 361; Gibbon, V, 257 et seq.; Gallibert, 72 et seq.; Heyd, I, 427-430.

⁴ G. Villani, VI, Ch. LX.

⁵ In 1264 the Venetians, under Jacopo Dandolo, and Marco Gradenigo, between Mazara and Tragani off the Sicilian coast, utterly defeated the Genoese fleet under Lanfranco Barbarino, Leo, III, 35; Gallibert, 64 et seq.

⁶ G. Villani, Bk. VIII, Ch. XXIV. In this battle the celebrated traveller, Marco Polo, commanded one of the Venetian galleys. He was captured by the Genoese, taken to Genoa, and held there as a prisoner for nearly one year; during this time he dictated his early adventures to one of his companions in distress. This narrative has become famous. With his father and uncle, he,

admiral, Andrea Dandolo, only by suicide saved himself from capture; while another Genoese squadron, after a brilliant victory off Crete, pillaged its cities. Then Venice, racked by internal dissensions, accepted (1299) a truce by which it was agreed that her ships should not sail in the Black or the Syrian sea for thirteen years.¹ Troubles, indeed, never come singly. While the republic was thus abandoning to Genoa its dependencies,² the Pope was likewise exerting himself to ruin its inhabitants. For political differences with the Holy See they were twice excommunicated, first in 1283-1286,³ and again in 1308,⁴ the last bull being reputed the most violent in history. Instructions were issued to the governments of England, France, Aragon, and Sicily to treat them as public enemies. In these countries, and even more especially in Italy, their goods were confiscated and their lives taken with immunity; their trade was almost exterminated. At home, as remarked, there was revolution, schism, usurpation of authority. The period of gloom was dark and foreboding; the prestige of the Venetians seemed forever broken. But as soon as civil discords were healed an embassy was sent to the Pope for the confession of sins and reconciliation; thus peace was made.⁵

The beginning of the fourteenth century marked the opening of a policy by which it was hoped to offset past disasters. Venice, by never seeking territory on the mainland

at the age of seventeen years, had gone overland from Venice to the court of the Great Khan in Cathay; there he resided a number of years, only returning to his native city in 1295. The knowledge of the Orient imparted by his work, "The Book of Ser Marco Polo concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East," had a vast influence upon geography and exploration. Columbus was undoubtedly affected by it; cf. Flske, "Discovery of America," I, 280 et seq.; for battle of Curzola (1298), cf. Hazlitt, II, 379; Bent, 161; Marin, V, 118-124; Rومانin, II, 335-336.

¹ G. Villani, Bk. VIII, Ch. XXVII.

² For the treaty of 1299, cf. Leo, III, 52-53; Hazlitt, 389-391; Marin, V, 128-129; Villani, VIII, XXVII.

³ Galibert, 69.

⁴ *Ibid.* 76, 82.

⁵ In 1239 Venice made a treaty with the Pope by which she agreed not to make peace with the emperor without the papal sanction. The Pope in return gave certain commercial advantages in the countries to be conquered, Marin, IV, 223; Canale, Secs. 98-99, 100-101.

of Italy, had during the nine hundred years previous to this date (1338) held aloof from Italian politics;¹ but now, troubled at the loss of many of her maritime domains and at the inefficiency of her fleet, an attempt was made to obtain redress by the subjugation of more immediate neighbors.² An occasion was soon found. The principality of La Scala undertook to set up in the salt industry; the Venetians, in defence of their trade, declaring war, achieved the conquest of that region. Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, Brescia, Parma, Reggio, and Lucca fell.³ This success was quickly followed by the extension of their supremacy over entire northeast Italy, all rival states being reduced to abject submission.⁴

But, while winning these triumphs near home, the Venetians were elsewhere sustaining serious reverses. In 1343 they received a signal defeat at the hands of the Turks.⁵ Although several colonies were then captured, the misfortune was partially retrieved by the final treaty, according to which the victors granted the citizens of Venice commercial privileges in the ports of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt; their consul was also recognized at Alexandria. Considerable advantage was thus gained over the Genoese, whose ships in search of similar goods were obliged to go to the extremity of the Black Sea. Hardships were, however, not yet at an end, for public calamities of another nature quickly supervened.

In 1348 an earthquake laid a large portion of the city in ruins, and a plague carried off numbers of the leading inhabitants.⁶ Introduced by way of Venice from the East, this same pest, spreading throughout Western Europe, occasioned an incredible mortality; three-fifths of the population are

¹ For the treatment of Tiepolo, son of the Doge of Venice, and its influence on Venice in joining the Lombard League (1237-1240), cf. Muratori, XV, 208; Marin, V, 222-223; Leo, II, 282, 289.

² Cantu, VII, 431; Hallam, I, 445 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 115.

³ Leo, III, 73.

⁴ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 125 et seq.

⁵ The Turks slaughtered the papal legate and many noble Venetians, Leo, III, 77; Galibert, 85.

⁶ For the pest, cf. Leo, III, 77-78.

estimated to have died of it; again in 1360 and in 1363 pestilence ravaged the metropolis. In 1348 many Venetian merchant ships were taken by the Genoese, with whom hostilities continued until 1355, when both parties having, by the lengthy and indecisive struggle, exhausted their resources, peace was effected.¹ The republic was not, however, to enjoy any long season of tranquillity; for in 1358 Louis the Great of Hungary, at the head of the Dalmatian and Croatian forces, attacking it by land, invaded its territories and soon required the Doge to surrender the sovereignty over them.² Then there seemed little to lose. Bereft of her power over most of her former distant possessions and deprived of nearly all her neighboring dependencies, Venice scarcely retained more than her own few inhabited islands and the remnant of her earlier commerce.

Her citizens, nevertheless, were, by their indomitable will and courage, to rescue the city from the shades of despair. Some few families, descended from the great merchants of prosperous days, having successfully preserved, through these disasters and catastrophes, their fortunes, were wont to display luxury and live at vast expense. On the one hand, sumptuary laws were voted to prevent such excesses, while, on the other, participation in trade, henceforth forbidden to the nobility, was reserved as the exclusive right of the plebeian classes. Retrenchment was adopted and enforced in every branch of the government. After the conspiracy of the Doge, Falieri, in 1355, had been terminated by his execution,³ an era of comparative calm lasting twenty-two years was experienced, both at home and abroad.⁴ Strength was being harbored for the desperate struggle approaching.

It has already been narrated how the fourth war with

¹ For treaty of 1354-1355, Leo, III, 82-83; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," IV, 330.

² *Ibid.* V, 4 et seq.; Galibert, 92.

³ *Ibid.* 92: Falieri's conspiracy was a rising of the lower classes against the aristocracy, Leo, III, 83-84.

⁴ During these twenty years Venice warred with Hungary. Trieste, Carrara, and Candia revolted, Muratori, XII, 429; Marin, VI, 148, 149, 162.

Genoa broke out in 1377; how Venice was besieged in 1379 by a hostile fleet and by the united troops of Hungary and Padua; how the Genoese commander, by his falsely calculated manœuvres, succumbed to the Venetians; and how, finally, notwithstanding, the Queen of the Adriatic was obliged by treaty to yield up her land dominions to the king of Hungary, as well as the island of Tenedos to her rival.¹ But the turning-point had been reached; the darkest epoch of Venetian history had passed; the series of misfortunes extending from 1261, when the Genoese obtained the supremacy at Constantinople, to 1380, when they almost captured Venice herself, was ended. Although so repeatedly victorious, they had won their triumphs at an enormous sacrifice. Immense treasure had been spent and their best blood ruthlessly shed. Genoa was utterly prostrate.²

In spite of mishaps and sufferings sufficient to overwhelm any ordinary state, Venice still showed signs of powerful vitality. Events were quickly to respond to the well-founded anticipations of her people; for within five years they, while recovering their former possessions of Dalmatia and Croatia, had established their authority over Hungary and Greece.³ Before 1404 Corfu had been repurchased, as well as Napoli in Roumania, Argos, Durazzo, and Treviso reconquered.⁴ Rapidly regaining their predominance in northern Italy and for once looking toward the westward,⁵ the Venetians, as a recompense for services rendered, secured extensive trading privileges from King John I of Portugal, granted for the ports of his kingdom during a period of one hundred years. In 1407 they bought Lepanto and Patras, while in 1412 they effected the subjugation of Schenigo. In the Mediterranean their commerce had once more attained the ascendancy. Quarrelling

¹ *Supra*, pp. 163-164, De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," V, 234 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 432; Galibert, 99 et seq.

² For peace, cf. Leo, III, 96; Hallam, I, 431; Vincens, II, 101; De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," V, 260; Cantu, VII, 432.

³ De Sismondi, V, 276 et seq.; Galibert, 121 et seq.

⁴ As the result of the war with Francesco of Carrara (1406), Leo, III, 114.

⁵ De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VI, 71 et seq.; Galibert, 124 et seq.

in 1416 with the Turks, they fought and whipped them,¹ freeing from their grasp the islands of Negropont and Crete, the chief importance of this victory being its influence upon the general situation. The credit of the Venetians in the Orient was reassured and all its riches were reopened to them. Their city, again arbitrator of the East, mistress of the Adriatic, and exercising in Italy supremacy greater than ever, was in 1420 at the zenith of its glory. Within forty years, after barely escaping impending invasion, it had risen to a condition unparalleled in prosperity and unequalled in power. Such a sudden political and commercial recuperation is unexampled in history.²

Throughout the fifteenth century Venice continued to add somewhat to her acquisitions. In 1423 the Emperor of the East, incapable of defending his outlying territories against the Turks, began to sell them one by one; the republic purchased Salonica,³ a very useful centre, but the subsequent defence of which cost vast sums. In 1426 the war with Milan resulted in some conquests in Italy, obtained, however, at the loss of financial prestige.⁴ The public debt was constantly growing, and between 1409 and 1449 Venetian securities dropped in quotation from seventy-nine to twenty-eight per cent of their original value. In 1453 Constantinople finally fell before the Turks, who at once loomed up, as a dark cloud, on the Eastern horizon.⁵ For a time, by treaty with other nations and by determined resistance, Venice succeeded in driving back the rising tide of their dominion, while their enmity was also the occasion of another profitable enterprise. When the last crusade, at the instigation of Pope Pius II, was undertaken, the Venetians transported the forces of the

¹ May, 1416, fight before Gallipoli.

² For Venetian prosperity, cf. Darn, II, 190; Muratori, XXIII, 946; Marin, VII, 153 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 432; Gallibert, Ch. VIII.

³ Leo, III, 125.

⁴ Florence was allied with Venice. The Pope intervened and peace was made December, 1426, but war soon broke out again. In the end the sovereignty of Brescia fell to Venice, Leo, III, 126; Machiavelli, IV; Muratori, XXIII, 1086-1087.

⁵ Gallibert. 144.

church to their destination; and as a reward received the gift of the island of Cyprus.¹ On the other hand, in the hostilities almost continuously waged from 1463 to 1479, the Turks captured Negropont, Lemnos, and a part of the Eubœa. The possession of Cyprus proved disastrous; for, to the pernicious tendency of Cypriote manners, soon afterward introduced into the metropolis, the decadence of Venetian character is mostly attributable.²

In 1480 Venice leased at an annual rental the isle of Veglio, and in 1483 made a similar arrangement regarding Zante. Subsequently a war broke out, in which the Venetians were pitted against all Italy, even including the Pope; they were excommunicated,³ but, being victorious, exacted the removal of this sentence,⁴ and considerably extended their Italian realm. This struggle involved great expense and rendered a further increase in the scale of port dues and import duties necessary to secure sufficient revenue, while the bonded indebtedness was largely augmented.⁵

A rapid survey of the causes of Venetian prosperity during the fifteenth century,⁶ when the city was at the height of its power, will not now be without interest; they were threefold, the magnitude of the colonial domain, the exclusive system of commerce, and the permanency of the government.⁷ Throughout the Middle Ages, Venice strove to erect her national edifice upon these foundations, which, only after several long and severe contests with aspiring rivals, were firmly established by might of arms.

The fundamental basis of success was commerce.⁸ Three to four thousand ships, manned by fifty-two thousand sailors, were engaged in navigation, and sixteen thousand men were employed in the yards and docks.⁹ The entire trade of the

¹ In 1488-1489 Cyprus was transferred to Venice by Caterina Carnoro, Leo, III, 192-193; Galibert, 151 et seq.; Michaud, IX, 36.

² Michaud, IX, 34.

³ May 25, 1483.

⁴ 1485.

⁵ Galibert, 163.

⁶ Leo, III, 197-198; V, 62-63.

⁷ Galibert, 183.

⁸ Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 143; for history of Venetian commerce, cf. Galibert, "Venise," Ch. IX; also article on Venice in McCulloch's "Commercial Dictionary."

⁹ In the fifteenth century there were 45 large galleys with 11,000 seamen, and

East was virtually in the hands of the Venetians, who supplied Europe with Oriental wares. From the vicinity of the Black Sea, from the ports of Syria, and from the remote districts of Africa, their vessels brought rich cargoes to be distributed in the West. Nearly all people were tributary to Venice, for any nation which refused to buy of her soon came to want and was compelled to submit.¹ Immense gains accrued to her citizens; on the foreign merchandise imported at the metropolis, valued yearly at ten million ducats, the gross profits were forty per cent; twenty per cent paid freight and other costs, while a net balance of equal amount remained to be added to the capital invested.²

Not only private persons and organized companies participated in this traffic, but the state also used its war galleys as merchantmen, for the benefit and convenience of the inhabitants.³ Four squadrons annually sailed: the first, which, in order to cover a wider field of operations, was divided into three sections, each taking a different route, but combined reaching all the seaboard cities of Greece, the Dardanelles, and the Black Sea; the second, which called at the towns of Syria and of Crete; the third, which, trading with the people of Egypt, bartered the products of the Black Sea—especially slaves—for Ethiopian and Red Sea commodities; and lastly, but perhaps the most important in its results, the fourth, which, cruising westward off the shores of Africa and passing through the straits of Gibraltar, turned northward along the Portuguese, Spanish, and French coasts, entered the English Channel, and visited Bruges, Antwerp, and London.⁴ On this

3000 small vessels from 10 to 100 tons with 17,000 men, and 300 big ships with 8000 men, Pagnini, "Della Decima," II, 7 et seq.; Romanin "Storia Documenta di Venezia," II, 156-157; Cantu, VII, 433.

¹ Notice particularly her wars with Genoa. For short account, "Encyclopedia Britannica," article "Venice."

² Cantu, VII, 433 et seq.

³ *Ibid.* VII, 434; Galibert, 177.

⁴ Galibert, 177, Cantu, VII, 434 et seq. Venice was at first indisposed to trade with England, but Genoese competition forced her to it, Cunningham, I, 414, 425; the regular course was Syracuse, Majorca, Spain, Portugal, England, and the Low Countries. The channel ports were frequented rather than London. The whole trade was under the direction of a commodore elected by

voyage the Venetians, coming in contact with the merchants of these industrial centres, effected mutually advantageous exchanges. The raw materials of the Orient were thus carried to ready markets, and the manufactured goods of the West, then so speedily developing, found their way, by means of Venetian ships, to the distant regions of the South and East. The Flemish squadron was, for a long time, in both directions, the most secure and most efficient method of transportation. In the far Orient and in the Mediterranean the Venetians practically controlled all supplies and furnished all demands, while to the North the members of the Hanseatic League were the chief purchasers. But the vessels, despatched by the government to every quarter of the globe, did not in the least compete with individual efforts; they only supplemented them.¹

The usual procedure was to rent the respective fleets, manned and equipped, to those who bid the highest price. The state received only this rental, occasionally increased by a percentage of the profits realized in the enterprise; all other privileges and immunities were guaranteed to the lessee, who was at liberty to sublet any portion of his concessions; not only ships, crews, and stores were provided, but likewise sufficient men-of-war were sent as an escort to afford ample protection; for, as a necessary adjunct to commercial and colonial supremacy, Venice maintained a navy unsurpassed in that age and assuring free action in every sea.²

A policy of extreme protectionism — harsher in its effects on other nationalities than any previously or seldom since adopted by a people — was at this time the principle of administration and conduct. The spirit of monopoly pervaded commercial transactions.³ Competition was not sufferable. The Vene-

the great council; each vessel had 80 archers on board for defence, and the galleys were manned by 180 Slavonian oarsmen, *Ibid.* I, 425 (note 10), quoting R. Birron, "Calendar of State Papers" (Venetian), I, LXI; a staple was established about 1490 at Pisa, but 600 sacks of wool were sent to Venice, Rymer, "Fœdera," XII, 390.

¹ Cantu, VII, 434; Galibert, 178.

² Galibert, 178.

³ Legislation of a distinctly protective character began in the fourteenth

tians, indeed, were then almost without rivals; for the other Italian cities had been crushed; neither Spain, France, England, nor Holland had yet developed; while Portugal was, in fact, the first of the Western powers to occasion anxiety. The Hanseatic League, so powerful in its neighborhood, served rather as an aid than a competitor, being always disposed to buy what was offered on its leading markets, Bruges and London. Venice so thoroughly patrolled by her war galleys the shores of the Adriatic and other adjacent waters as to annihilate in its incipency any attempt to escape her edicts. Foreign merchants only by paying double freight rates were permitted to forward their merchandise by her vessels; but could neither build nor purchase boats in any of her ports.¹

By these means Venice had created a colonial empire; for, throughout the Mediterranean every harbor was frequented by her ships. From Italy eastward she owned the coast line to the farthest extremity of that sea. Its principal islands belonged absolutely to her; many others in reality, if not in name, were also hers; at Constantinople her sway was unfettered for half a century, while in the Black Sea she held important territories. The Greek Peloponnesus was almost entirely Venetian, and in the Italian peninsula the authority of the city was unassailable. A detailed inventory of her possessions, while tedious, would not nearly so well as the activity and industry of her population confirm her claims to greatness. The Venetians were everywhere; the custom of establishing fixed colonies had been early adopted, and in the lands under their rule official governors and other functionaries, as well as considerable numbers of citizens, permanently resided.² On the other hand, crowds of natives from the dependencies were always to be seen in the metropolis, which likewise drew

century, though there are earlier cases. The theories of the mercantile system began to be put into definite shape in the sixteenth century, Adams, 286 (note 1).

¹ Cantu, VII, 436; Galibert, 181.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VII, 338 et seq.; Cantu, VII, 432 et seq.; Galibert, 168 et seq.; *supra*, p. 176-78.

its soldiers from the isles of the sea.¹ Thus there was a constant intermingling of the governing and the governed peoples, an habitual intercourse among all classes of many climes.

When the internal situation is examined the inhabitants are found enjoying much more individual liberty than generally prevailed elsewhere, while in their prosperous epochs they were moderately taxed and lightly burdened.² Other nations, subject to their monopoly, contributed largely to the municipal support; at the close of the fifteenth century the revenue from such sources was enormous.

Stimulated by their enterprises abroad, the Venetians carefully promoted their manufactures. At the time of their highest commercial success they did not forget their salt mines, fisheries, and glass factories, which still yielded vast returns. Armor, lace, leather, cordage, cloths, wax, sugar, liquors, soaps, and fine goldsmithy work were also objects on which they exerted their skill and displayed their ability. Profound mystery surrounded all their industries, of which, by the practice of secrecy, they aimed to retain their exclusive control.³ The emigration of artisans was rigorously forbidden, and if any such unfortunate, who had perchance left the place, refused to return, an emissary was sent summarily to despatch him. The city itself had a population numbering about one hundred and ninety thousand persons. The nobles charged with the administration of public affairs devoted themselves closely to politics, while the citizens were equally assiduous in their attention to commerce. The people were usually rich; there were many big incomes and the cost of living was extremely moderate. For these reasons, Venice also attracted throngs of foreigners, who came to serve her as soldiers, sailors, mechanics, or expert workmen.⁴ Here they obtained the opportunity to better their worldly position; em-

¹ Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 142.

² For comparison between Venice and Florence internally, Symonds, "Age of Despots," 215-235.

³ Cantu, VII, 436 et seq.; Galibert, 171 et seq.

⁴ Galibert, 171; *supra*, p. 187-88.

ployment was easily secured and investments safely made; here sales of merchandise were readily negotiated and profits were the greatest. Hence both for the poor and the well-to-do the metropolis offered a similar fascination. Tranquillity at home was effected through this rapid development of domestic affluence. The years lost by many of the other Italian republics in revolution and dissension were spent in perfecting trade facilities and manufacturing methods. With the capital early accumulated and with superior financial resources, the Venetians never faltered in the days of darkest despair. The National Bank became famous for its economic system; from the twelfth to the end of the eighteenth century its reputation remained unblemished.¹

Among European cities, Rome alone exceeded Venice in wealth at the close of the fifteenth century, while in actual prestige not any comparison is possible. By labor, by travel, by intercourse with many nations, and by fortune, the Venetians had become highly cultivated. Their civilization, their government, their skill, and their breadth of knowledge, although much envied by their contemporaries and frequently the occasion of their hatred, caused them to be respected and admired.² The rare gems of architecture, still standing on these isles, — so long ago deserted by the fleets of the world and now lonely in the immensity of waters, — sumptuously decorated with marble, porphyry, and precious stones, only feebly suggest to the most vivid imagination the magnificence of the past.³ The power of Venice was derived from trade. The corner-stone of prosperity was commerce, which itself rested on the broad foundations of a colonial domain. Without her colonies, Venice was a mere shadow, as she was for a brief interval in the fourteenth century and is again to-day. Shorn of them, her splendor departed.

Until the end of the fifteenth century, Venice maintained her supremacy, although after the capture of Constantinople

¹ Galibert, 173; Hallam, III, 322.

² Michaud, IX, 56; Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 126.

³ Galibert, Ch. XII.

by the Turks in 1453,¹ as already stated, they gave considerable annoyance to her merchant vessels and her Eastern dependencies; but not for fifty years did the Venetians confess themselves inferior. Time, however, works wonderful transformations. When the Portuguese, who had since 1412 been active in navigation, found the new route to the Indies, soon after the discoveries of Columbus beyond the unknown sea, the hour fatal to Venetian greatness had sounded.² Already, in 1503, Venice was obliged to sign a humiliating treaty with the Sultan, and not long subsequently France, Germany, Spain, and Italy combined against her.³ Her dominion shaken, her islands depopulated, and her riches wasted, peace was concluded in 1576; then an attempt was made to repair the losses, but interminable conflicts with the infidels followed, and at the close of the sixteenth century the Queen of the Adriatic was not yet herself again.⁴

The seventeenth century passed mostly in fighting the Turks,⁵ who were steadily making inroads on Venetian territories; one after another the colonies were succumbing to Constantinople. Venetian commerce was meanwhile losing its importance, for the general field of international trade was being so enlarged, and so many new highways were being opened, that the exclusive control of the Mediterranean was not any longer worth defending; monopoly had fallen; Venice was fast on the road to decadence; her affluence gone, her strength exhausted, the people forgot their ancient spirit. Neutrality was the first resort to escape destruction in the wars raging throughout Europe, but even this expedient without substantial friends avails little. In 1797 Venice surrendered to Napoleon, and for the first time foreign soldiers were

¹ War again with the Turks in 1499; peace finally in 1539. Leo, V, 164, 474.

² When the news first came that spices had reached Portugal direct from India, the price of such goods fell in Venice more than fifty per cent, Adams, 289 (note 1); Prescott, "Charles Fifth," III, 286 et seq.

³ The famous league of Cambray, cf. Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 125 et seq.; Gallibert, 205 et seq.

⁴ For brief account of Venice in the sixteenth century, cf. Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 141 et seq.

⁵ Leo, III, 669 et seq.

Thus did Venice rise,
 Thus flourish, till the unwelcome tidings came
 That in the Tagus had arrived a fleet
 From India, from the region of the sun,
 Fragrant with spices — that a way was found,
 A channel opened, and the golden stream
 Turn'd to enrich another. Then she felt
 Her strength departing, and at last she fell,
 Fell in an instant, blotted out and razed ;
 She who had stood yet longer than the longest
 Of the four kingdoms — who, as in an ark,
 Had floated down, amid a thousand wrecks,
 Uninjured, from the Old World to the New,

* * * * *

. . . and with unclouded splendor.”¹

The causes for the decay of Venice were numerous. Nature, by the drifting of the sands into the lagoons and harbor, was a mortal enemy. The growing importance of Constantinople under the sultans as the Eastern metropolis; the defeat of the Venetians by the Turks on several occasions; the loss of the colonies; the steady development of manufacture in other European countries; the rise of Trieste and Ancona; the competition of the commercial nations of the West; the enmity of Emperor Charles the Fifth, who imposed duties double the ordinary on her goods, — these circumstances combined to hasten Venetian decline; but, more than all, by the practice of their own exclusive policy and by the continued exercise of their despotic control over trade, so favorable to them in earlier ages, the Venetians themselves closed the doors of Europe against their own wares and merchandise.² When navigation was limited to the Mediterranean and a little strip of water beyond it, monopoly was advantageous; but when the Atlantic spread out its vast expanse to mariners, the system of restriction collapsed of its own weight, and first crushed those who had supported it. Venice found it impracticable to enforce her arbitrary edicts, but she never desisted in the

¹ Samuel Rogers' Works, "Italy," XI.

² De Sismondi, "Italian Republics," VII, 339.

attempt. America was discovered, the Cape of Good Hope doubled; Venice was left mistress of the Adriatic, and even for a brief time of the Mediterranean.¹ But what availed this isolation? Commerce had sought other channels, other routes; there was not anything which prevented Venetian sailors sharing the glories of the New World. But, by some inconceivable infatuation, they turned not their eyes westward beyond the Straits of Gibraltar. While Portugal, Spain, Holland, France, and England were competing for rich prizes of untold value, Venice was seeking territory in Italy, and putting forth her best efforts to conquer Bergamo and Cremona, already doomed like herself to adversity. The inventions and discoveries of other nations never aroused her citizens, nor, seemingly, reached their ears. By an incredible fatuity they fought for the pebbles, while others picked up, undisputed, the pearls.

The Venetians, as Daru says, remained as stationary as the Chinese. To the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the declining metropolis endeavored to apply the same rule of conduct as to the fifteenth. Failure ensued and once more it was demonstrated by experience that progress is an unalterable characteristic of humanity, that the principle of yesterday is often to-day antiquated and worthless. In politics, trade, and commerce only that people which, constantly advancing, modifies its policies to accord with the age can retain its power and, thereby successful in its enterprises, prove its right to prolonged prosperity and national existence.

NOTE. — While the cities of Italy were propagating commerce, civilization, and Christianity in the East, those of the Hanseatic League were performing a very similar service for mankind in the countries of the North. Although separated by the natural barrier of the Alps, the representatives of these two sections early met and in time developed important relations. On the one hand, from the Genoese colony of Caffa or Gazaria, on the Black Sea, a long overland trade route stretched away across the plains, then occupied by roving bands of barbarians, to the distant city of Nov-

¹ The Venetians urged the Arabs of Egypt to oppose the Portuguese in India in every possible way; they also discussed for a moment the opening of a Suez Canal, and even the project of securing, through an alliance with the Russians, an overland route around the Turkish dominions, Adams, 290.

gorod, the most easterly of the Hanse towns ; on the other, the northern fleet of Venice annually arrived at Bruges for the exchange of merchandise. While thus, and by many other channels of communication, the manufactured goods of the Mediterranean states and the more precious wares of the Orient were carried to the peoples of the Baltic and the Low Countries, and their own raw products sold to the merchants of the South, the intercourse among the cities of the North themselves was increasing.

The existence of numerous pirates and rivals on the sea caused the trade of Venice and Genoa to be conducted under the auspices of their respective governments ; in the same way the hordes of robbers by land rendered some common protection necessary for those who would participate in traffic throughout the regions of Germany, Poland, and Russia. These conditions in due course occasioned the organization of the Hanseatic League ; at first a society of merchants designed for the mutual protection of its members abroad, it was transformed in the fourteenth century into an association of towns for self-defence at home ; henceforth the League became in a measure a state, enjoying many of the attributes of independent sovereignty ; wars were waged in its interest and treaties signed in its name. The height of its power was attained about 1375, and during the next century prosperity reigned. The rise of the Scandinavian countries was the first sign of danger, the gradual evolution of England was more threatening, but the rapid advancement of the Netherlands in authority and commerce, which took place in the seventeenth century, was the final stroke to the good fortune of the League.

Among the towns Lubeck soon gained the ascendancy ; there the headquarters of the association were situated, and there all appeals or disputes were ultimately decided. In early days the cities were divided into three groups—the Wendish and Saxon, the Westphalian and Russian, and those of Gothland, Livonia, and Sweden ; subsequently there were four divisions, of which Lubeck, Cologne, Brunswick, and Dantzic were the capitals. As the chief object of the union was commercial, so it established warehouses, or “factories” as they were called, at various prominent centres ; the principal of them were at Wisby, London, Novgorod, Bruges, and Bergen. In each of these places merchants enjoyed special privileges of extra-territoriality and immunity from local interference in the pursuit of their business. They themselves were organized as independent corporations subject only to the statutes of the League ; they chose their own officers, executed their own justice, and afforded themselves mutual protection. So far these establishments bear great resemblance to those of the Italian republics in the Orient, but here the similarity ceases. In the outposts founded by Pisa, Florence, Genoa, and Venice there was a decidedly civic, or perhaps it might better be termed a national, influence. These different communities—

rivals among themselves—owed their origin and their maintenance to one or the other city; in the factories of the Hanse there was union only because of mercantile conditions. At Bruges, at London, at Novgorod, were grouped together, for the time being, traders from a dozen or twenty politically independent municipalities, some owing allegiance to the emperor of Germany, others to the king of Sweden, still others to the czar of Muscovy, the king of Poland, or some more petty potentate. Beyond the objects of commerce—however strong this tie may have frequently been—these men were not moved by any common patriotism. As the centuries passed and nations evolved by the amalgamation of the smaller principalities, the influence of lack of union became more and more apparent; in the end this fact occasioned the downfall of the organization; and it is because of it that, in spite of the vast and durable achievements accomplished by the Hanse towns in the promotion of trade, in the diffusion of civilization, and in the institution of law and order, it cannot be said that they effected any colonization.

PART III
MODERN TIMES

CHAPTER I

RISE OF PORTUGUESE COLONIZATION—THE EAST

THE farthest goal of legendary adventure was destined to be the earliest point of departure in modern colonization. Portugal, lying beyond the Pillars of Hercules, — the Lusitania of the Romans, — was the dwelling-place of those who were the first to break the charm of the Mediterranean. Until the time of the Venetians, that sea had alone been frequented; around it the principal races had been grouped; over it the bulk of traffic had passed. During antiquity scarcely any waters beyond its boundaries had been traversed; in the Middle Ages, although the existence of the ocean without its circumference was becoming better known, only narrow belts of this limitless deep had been navigated, and then merely as channels leading to, emptying into, and concentrating in, the Mediterranean. All roads had been comprised within it, had led thither, or had been subsidiary to it. The peoples residing upon its shores had been so favored by location as readily to become the trade magnates of the world. The great nations of ancient and mediæval days had owed the possibility of their successes, political and economic, to their situation on it.

From the era when the Phœnicians had approached the Straits of Gibraltar to the end of the fourteenth century the confines of navigation were only imperceptibly enlarged; activity in this area had increased a thousand fold, but the sole extension granted to mariners of the Middle Ages over their predecessors had been the toilsome route along the western coasts of Portugal, Spain, and France to British ports, and thence through the English Channel to the Dutch marts of the North Sea. Small indeed the progress of three thousand

years had been, as measured by the exploration and invasion of new waters. With the decay of Venice, however, the sceptre of commerce was to vanish from the Mediterranean, which henceforth was to remain an inland lake for many centuries—till human genius cut for it an eastern outlet; to be shunned rather than visited, to be circumvented by that very trade of the East, its former source of prosperity. For nigh four hundred years this sea was to be more efficiently closed than ever the avaricious merchants of its strand had dreamed in the time of their strictest monopolies. As in antiquity the hardest navigators had seldom dared to sail, for the sake of the richest treasures, to the westward of the Pillars of Hercules, so in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the discoverers and explorers of America and the Orient did not need to double the Rock of Gibraltar to secure patrons for their expeditions and purchasers for the precious wares conveyed by their returning vessels.¹

Whatever may have subsequently been the disasters to be mourned and the errors to be condemned of the people who the first undertook to widen the horizon of the universe to the slowly opening eyes of humanity, it is in any event but fair to praise their courage, to recall in memory the glorious execution of their projects, and to study the results effectuated by them. The Portuguese, although they afterward yielded to temptations,—also irresistible to many of their contemporaries and successors in the same field of enterprise,—deserve careful consideration for the long-continued tenacity with which they persisted, systematically and with the utmost precision, to achieve their tasks of discovery and colonization.²

But if, indeed, they merit respect, one man, even among

¹ Payne, 9 et seq.; for the improvements in navigation and nautical science which contributed to these results, cf. Cantu, VIII, 56 et seq.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 2; as illustrative of the influence of environment upon a nation, Professor Freeman says, the realm of Portugal was "not actually continuous with her own European territory, but it began near it and it was a natural consequence and extension of her European advance. The Asiatic and American dominion of Portugal grew out of her African dominion, and her African dominion was the continuation of her growth in her own peninsula," "Historical Geography of Europe," XII, Sec. 3.

them, rightly and almost exclusively claims the commendation and the gratitude of mankind. It is rare to see one individual awake a sleeping race; still rarer to know that he has within his own lifetime set the nation in full motion and survived to realize in a degree the accomplishment of his hopes and prophecies; and most rare to find him—of noble birth, of vast wealth—first hated and despised by his countrymen, eventually loved and revered not less by his compatriots than by successive generations. Such a favored personage, however, was Dom Henry of Portugal,¹ patron of the earliest Portuguese navigators, and precursor of all those noble-minded men who staked their fortunes on the existence of the discredited lands of unknown seas. He must therefore always be reckoned as one of the most prominent characters in the dawn of modern enlightenment.²

King John I of Portugal, who reigned from 1385 to 1433, by his victorious wars against the Moors of Barbary and by the important explorations of his time justly gained the surname of the Great. Prince Henry, one of his sons,³ had participated with him in the siege of Ceuta in 1415, and had had the opportunity to obtain from Moorish sources much valuable information concerning the physical features and the products of Africa. He seems then to have resolved to devote himself to the investigation, the promotion, and the advocacy of the means essential to the extension of Portuguese dominion and influence beyond the deep. Upon settling again in his own country, he

¹ For his life and influence on navigation, cf. Richard H. Major, "Life of Henry of Portugal, surnamed the Navigator, and its Results, etc., etc.," London, 1868; Washington Irving, "Life of Columbus," Ch. III; Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 316 et seq.; Henri Schaefer, "Histoire de Portugal," 2d Epoch, Bk. 1, Ch. II; De Stella and De Santuel, "Essai sur l'Histoire du Portugal," reigns of John I and John II; Cantu, VIII, 63 et seq.

² Speaking of Prince Henry's personality, Zimmerman says: "He was in life a peculiar sort of a fellow; far from all joys and pleasures, he always lived in his lonesome castle. He never drank wine, . . . nor did he ever give way to passionate words. Studies of every kind fully occupied his time. His face was ugly and even repulsive, but his quiet straightforward countenance and his attractive speech riveted everybody," (tr.) Zimmerman, I, 7.

³ Johnston says Prince Henry was the second son of King John I, Winsor makes him the third, Fiske thinks he was the fourth, and Zimmerman declares him to be the fifth.

established his residence at Cape São Vicente,¹ the southwestern extremity of Portugal; and there, surveying the mighty elements to be subdued, he studied history, navigation, and geography. His position as Grand Master of the Order of Christ assured him the financial resources required for the execution of his dreams.²

The same spirit, it must be remembered, which had moved the earlier crusaders of the North to undertake their expeditions to the far East was now rife among the Spaniards and the Portuguese against the Moors. Protracted struggles with these infidels had aroused an excess of enthusiasm in the breasts of these Southern Christians; for which reason they might the more be expected to detest the Mohammedans, who at their very doors were threatening to overwhelm them, if they did not hold them back. Offensive hostilities were chivalrous, but defensive measures were absolutely necessary.³

Another factor to stimulate the maritime ambitions of the Portuguese was envy and jealousy of Venice. The Northern fleet of this metropolis undoubtedly touched at their ports on its annual voyage to the Netherlands and to England.⁴ The display of Eastern wares by its traders, the demand in Portugal, the knowledge of the profits netted in this traffic, and the innate disposition of a coast people to frequent the sea, — all these circumstances combined to infuse in them a desire to rival the skilled navigators of the Adriatic.⁵

The atmosphere was also full of rumors. The Genoese, it is

¹ More precisely the promontory of Sagres, or "the sacred promontory supposed to be the westernmost limit of habitable earth"; cf. Flake, "Discovery of America," I, 319.

² Lucas calls Prince Henry "the first and well-nigh the noblest figure in modern history," "Historical Geography of British Colonies," III, 17.

³ Raynal, I, 187-191; Leroy-Beaulieu, 41; Cantu, VIII, 65; Flake gives a vivid picture of the effects of the struggle with the Moors upon the Spanish disposition and activity, "Discovery of America," II, 566 et seq.; his statements are also equally applicable to the Portuguese. The union of a religious spirit with one of adventure is marked in the subsequent history of the Portuguese. Lucas says they were commanded on being sent out "to begin with preaching, and if that failed to proceed to the sharp determination of the sword," "Historical Geography of British Colonies," III, 71.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 186.

⁵ Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 439; Leroy-Beaulieu, 41; the spirit of

supposed, learned the outline of the African continent as early as 1281. The two Vivaldi seem to have doubled the Cape of Good Hope, but their entire crews, with the exception of one survivor, were lost; in 1292 other parties from the same city, attempting to repeat the trip, suffered a similar catastrophe. About that date some of their compatriots probably arrived at the Canary Islands, which were again visited in 1341 by the agents of a Genoese merchant, Nicholas de Reno. An Englishman is likewise said to have reached Madeira about 1377;¹ and the Spaniards appear to have run upon the first-named group two or three times before the end of the fourteenth century. French mariners of Dieppe and Rouen possibly trafficked in 1364 with the inhabitants on the west coast of Northern Africa, perhaps pushing farther south than the famous Cape Bojador.² It is, therefore, not strange that Prince Henry, hearing during his campaigns many more details than were current at home, determined to secure in these remote regions a strong foothold for the Portuguese nation.

It should also not be forgotten that the art of navigation had at the opening of the fifteenth century considerably developed. The Venetians were employing, in their trade, vessels of large dimensions; the methods of sailing them had also experienced a marked improvement, and even a rude sort of compass may have been sometimes used.³ The extreme limit of exploration on the African coast was then Cape Non; seamen of that age were as fearful of rounding it as those of antiquity had been of passing through the Pillars of Hercules. Superstition declared that he who went beyond the dreaded spot would never come back.⁴ The first expedition of Prince Henry, despatched under his instructions in 1412, failed,

rivalry was mutual, as demonstrated by the prolonged hostilities of the Portuguese with the Egyptians, the latter being incited by the Venetians, *post*, p. 210.

¹ Winsor, II, 38.

² Parkman, "Pioneers of France," 187 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 62-63; Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 320 et seq.; *contra*, cf. Major, "Life of Prince Henry;" *post*, p. 205 note 4, and Ch. X and XI.

³ Winsor, II, 94; Cantu, VIII, 59.

⁴ Quem passar o Cabo de Nãõ ou voltará ou nãõ.

like all its predecessors. Notwithstanding popular prejudices, moved by which the people protested against fruitlessly wasting the money which might be so religiously expended in defeating and converting the Moors, Henry continued year after year to equip a fleet to cruise southward with mandatory orders not to retrace its course without going farther than the point previously attained by the former enterprise. Adopting this principle of conduct, his captains finally, in 1418, doubled Cape Non and, barely escaping shipwreck in the whirlpool of unknown currents off Cape Bojador, were driven by favorable winds on the Canary Islands.¹ The report made of their beauty and fertility so charmed Prince Henry that he sent back the adventurers, Jean Gonzales Zarco and Tristan Vaz Texeira, as well as Bartholomew Perestrello, in company with colonists and provided with seeds and implements for agriculture. The three navigators, after locating their followers, undertook a supplementary voyage to ascertain the nature of a dark, cloudlike object which had long attracted their attention. They soon discovered, in July, 1419, a densely timbered island, to which they gave the name Madeira, the Portuguese word for wood.² Upon their arrival home the information of this new acquisition created an excellent impression. The next year the two original explorers, each of whom had been appointed governor of one-half of Madeira, again accompanied by Perestrello, the governor of the Canary Island settlement known as Porto Santo, returned to their possessions, prepared to colonize and till them. In Madeira the forests were found so impenetrable and difficult to clear that fire was employed for their destruction, the conflagration, it is said, lasting seven years. The cultivation of the sugar-cane and the vine, together with lumbering, became the principal industries and yielded a good revenue.³

¹ Cantu, VIII, 64 et seq.

² *Ibid.*; the island of Madeira was actually discovered by Perestrello, whose daughter subsequently became the wife of Columbus; cf. Winsor, II, 36-38; *post*, Ch. III.

³ Cantu, VIII, 64; Raynal, I, 47-50; several authors have shown how many more obstacles the Portuguese had to meet in these voyages than those which

In spite of these magnificent results, Prince Henry was for twelve years prevented by public opposition and by domestic dissensions from the pursuit of his designs. This period he utilized in study, surrounding himself with the learned geographers of his age, among them being Jacoma, the most skilful map-maker of the day.¹ Meanwhile the nation maintained the same old antipathy to his schemes; it was thought utterly foolish to consume vast treasure and sacrifice hundreds of lives in the attempt to round Cape Bojador; furthermore, if these efforts were opportune, what utter nonsense to wish to send men away to inhabit distant regions when the parent state itself was so sparsely populated. The rulers of earlier times had been endeavoring to induce people to settle in Portugal; Prince Henry, on the contrary, was desiring to take them out of the country.² Nevertheless, in 1432, Henry succeeded in fitting out another fleet, in command of which he placed Gilianes³ of Lagos, who, overcoming the obstacles of the elements, doubled the formidable promontory. Great was his surprise when, instead of boundless oceans beyond, he saw land extending far to the southern horizon. After planting the cross and taking possession of the territory in the name of his king, he sailed for home; his welcome was enthusiastic.⁴ As a mark of approbation, the king, Duarte, bestowed upon his brother Henry the islands already discovered. Several further voyages along the African coast occurred prior to 1435; then until 1441 there was another serious interruption. In that year Antonio Gonçalves and Nuno Tristam, in the course of a cruise capturing some blacks, carried them to Portugal as visible evidence of their success;⁵

Columbus encountered, for example, the apparent change in the position of the stars and the extremes of climate.

¹ Otherwise known as Jayme, and was a native of Majorca, *Harrise, Bibliotheca Americana Vetustissima* (New York, 1866), 261.

² Cf. Major, "Life of Prince Henry."

³ Fiske makes this name read, in English, Giles Jones, "Discovery of America," I, 323.

⁴ Cantu, VIII, 65; the French had already preceded the Portuguese in these regions, Raynal, I, 51; Parkman, "Pioneers of France," 187 et seq.; *contra*, Lucas, III, 15; Johnston, 122-123; cf. also *supra*, 203 note 2, and *post*, Ch. X and XI.

⁵ Ten negroes were then brought back, and thus began the slave trade

whereupon, with a view to the spiritual welfare of the heathen, Pope Eugene IV, in his recognized capacity of sovereign of all the isles in the unknown seas, granted to the Portuguese crown, upon its request, any lands which might exist between Cape Bojador and the Indies.¹

Public opinion then appears suddenly to have changed. The glory and the riches won by so many adventurers at last had their effect. Booty and slaves were temptations too strong to be resisted.² Expeditions became more frequent;³ Cape Verde was passed; then the Venetian Cadamosto, in the employ of Prince Henry, reached Gambia and the river of gold; John Fernandes, penetrating somewhat inland, inaugurated most happy relations with the natives, among whom he resided for several months. The islands of Cape Verde were first visited in 1460⁴ and the Azores soon thereafter.⁵ Almost all returning ships were bringing negroes from the Dark Continent. There was now not any difficulty to secure seamen; not only the Portuguese were willing, but mariners from every part of the Mediterranean — especially Italy — were anxious to join in these enterprises. Numerous small colonies were established on the African coast⁶ and explorations were pushed to a point a hundred leagues beyond Cape Verde.⁷

Dom Henry died on November 13, 1460,⁸ being sixty-six

under the pretext of affording an opportunity for the conversion of this race to Christianity, Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 323; II, 429.

¹ Bull of Pope Eugene IV, in 1442; *not* of Martin V, as stated by Las Casas, and Washington Irving in his "Columbus," I, 193; cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 325 note.

² Raynal, I, 51.

³ For a most entertaining account of these various voyages see Harris, "Voyages," "consisting of above six hundred of the most authentic writers," republished by a number of men under this same title (London, 1744).

⁴ Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 326; Zimmerman says the date should be 1455-56.

⁵ The exact date of the discovery of the Azores is in doubt; cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 326.

⁶ How and why the Portuguese in early days neglected these African settlements is explained by Leroy-Beaulieu, 42; Heeren, 28 (par. 8).

⁷ For progress of the Portuguese in Africa, cf. "The Colonization of Africa," by Sir Harry H. Johnston, Cambridge, 1899, 27-60; briefly, Cantu, VIII, 65 et seq.

⁸ Winsor's (II, 225) and Fiske's statement ("Discovery of America," I,

years of age; although not himself a sailor, he had well earned the title of the Navigator; to him is certainly due the praise of having courageously persisted in his designs of discovery and navigation until he finally conquered the prejudices and ill-will entertained by his people against him. When he expired the Portuguese were united in their intention to execute his plans, which had already developed far beyond his most sanguine dreams. It was a wonderful transformation of national sentiment in a lifetime.¹

After the decease of Prince Henry the conquest and conversion of the Africans moved forward in a constant manner. In 1481 a settlement and a fort were built by the Portuguese at a place called Mina, and in 1484-85 Cape St. Catherine and the Congo were reached by their vessels. Somewhere in this region they located the mythical King Ogane,² the imaginary high lord of Southern Africa, who never showed any part of his body except one immense foot. Then otherwise known as Prester John, he has subsequently been sometimes identified with the emperor of Abyssinia. The Portuguese king, resolving to enter into communication with this personage,³ first selected as his emissary a priest, who, travelling overland, soon returned, having lost his way for want of a knowledge of the languages spoken on the Dark Continent. A second land expedition failed, although one of the explorers⁴ did send back the important news that the farther extremity of Africa was surrounded by water. Then in 1486 the king

326) that Prince Henry died in 1463 is disputed; cf. Schaefer, "Portugal," 530 note, who cites a royal act of cession of certain lands which had belonged to Prince Henry, to another person, dated December 8, 1460; Sousa, II, 111.

¹ For an account of the discoveries made under the patronage of Prince Henry, cf. Schaefer, "Portugal," 410 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 63 et seq.; for this same period consult also J. P. O. Martins, "Portugal nos Mares."

² He is mentioned by Marco Polo; cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 285, 330, 474, who refers to Yule's "Cathay," I, 174-182 ("Hakluyt Society Series") and Marco Polo, I, 204-216; cf. also Cantu, VIII, 69 et seq.

³ The king was only complying with the request of the negro sovereign of Benin, who prayed that missionary priests might be sent to his court, Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 330.

⁴ The names of the two explorers were Palva and Covilhao; they reached India and Ethiopia but never returned to Portugal. Covilhao is said to have delivered a letter from the king to the Negus of Abyssinia.

fitted out a fleet which quit Portugal with express orders not to deviate from a southerly course until some definite information was obtained of the famous Ogane. Bartholomew Dias, who was in command,¹ had also determined to double the reputed promontory. Driven by storms beyond where he had anticipated, he arrived off the island of Saint Croix, without perceiving his mistake until after he had passed it. Then in great joy he retraced his steps to Lisbon, having gone only a few hundred miles to the eastward; but he had in fact discovered the Cape of Good Hope.² The search for Ogane, it is needless to say, had utterly failed and was abandoned. For ten years, however, it was impossible to find a navigator sufficiently hardy to venture into the unknown ocean of the Orient. Then Vasco da Gama, setting out on July 18, 1497, with three vessels and sixty seamen, accomplished the long-desired task. After rounding the Cape and visiting the island of Mozambique, he touched at Chiloe, Mombasa, and Melinde on the eastern coast of Africa, at which last-named point he obtained from Mohammedan sailors particulars of the route to India, and hired a Mussulman pilot. In twenty-three days he appeared before Calicut.³ There, barely avoiding death at the hands of the infidels, he escaped with his ships and anchored at Lisbon in the latter part of 1499. The existence of the waterway between Europe and East India was thus demonstrated.⁴ The gratification of the Portuguese upon the return of Da Gama was unbounded; honors were heaped upon him, while the entire nation aroused itself to grasp the extraordinary opportunity opening before it.⁵

¹ Bartholomew, brother of Columbus, was with this expedition, Winsor, II, 41 (and note 3).

² Cantu, VIII, 70; Heeren, 26 (par. 5, note); this promontory was first christened the "Cape of Storms," but subsequently, at the suggestion of the Portuguese monarch, was given its present name; cf. Raynal, I, 52; Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 332.

³ The entire duration of the voyage from Lisbon to Calicut was thirteen months.

⁴ Raynal, I, 52, 128 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 71; Heeren, 26 (par. 5 note); for this voyage cf. "The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama" ("Hakluyt Series"); for its effects on Spain and on the life of Columbus. cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 498; II, 92.

⁵ Raynal, I, 130, 131.

Whatever discontent yet prevailed in the minds of a few conservative individuals was conclusively dispelled by this success.¹ The number of those desiring to go to the Orient was so great as to cause the government embarrassment. Even to make a choice among the rivals for leadership was difficult. Finally Pedro Alvarez Cabral was chosen commander of the next expedition, and under him was placed, as lieutenant, Bartholomew Dias. The fleet, consisting of thirteen vessels, was well manned and fully supplied. Several monks were delegated to introduce Christianity, and if their efforts failed there were twelve hundred soldiers to exact due respect from the natives. Apparently in order to evade the dangerous currents and contrary winds off Africa, Cabral formed his course far to the westward and thus accidentally (1500) ran upon the shores subsequently christened Brazil,² which glorious event was at once reported to the king by a boat especially detailed for the purpose. Strangely, Pinzon, the Spanish navigator, had only a few months previously cruised in the same region³—a fact of which Cabral was still ignorant.⁴ After the unexpected occurrence of finding land in that vicinity, the Portuguese steered eastwardly for the Cape of Good Hope. Here furious storms were encountered; Dias, the original discoverer, and four ships were lost; only six vessels reassembled at Mozambique; but after some delay on this island, Cabral pushed forward to Calicut.⁵ In that city he was amicably received, a Portuguese consul was commissioned, and trading with the natives began. Quarrels nevertheless soon broke out, in which many lives were sacrificed;

¹ Cantu, VIII, 276.

² Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 96 et seq., who quotes Dr. Robertson as stating that even had Columbus never lived America would then (April 22, 1500) have been discovered; cf. generally Sir Arthur Helps, "Spanish Conquest of America"; Watson, "History of Spanish and Portuguese South America"; and "Brazil," by H. Morse Stephens in "Encyclopædia Britannica"; also Cantu, VIII, 277.

³ The date of Pinzon's discovery was January 20, 1500; Cabral left the Tagus, March, 1500, Winsor, VIII, 369-371. Sufficient time had not elapsed for the former to have reported his exploit in Europe.

⁴ Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 505 and note.

⁵ Cantu, VIII, 277; for Cabral, cf. Noel, "History of Commerce," I, 90.

Cabral, obliged to take his departure, then called at Cochin, Coilan, and Canamore, where he established friendly relations, and amassed precious cargoes. Some weeks being thus spent, he turned homeward, arriving at Lisbon in midsummer, 1501. In 1502 Vasco da Gama made another most auspicious journey to the Indies¹ and in 1503 was followed thither by Francisco de Albuquerque, who constructed in Cochin the earliest European fort. Francisco never came back, but Alfonso de Albuquerque,² his nephew, after a lengthy voyage, transported to Portugal enormous treasure.³

The Crown, now bent upon extending its sovereignty over the Orient, not only in name but also in fact, appointed Dom Francisco Almeida the first viceroy and governor-general of the Indies.⁴ In 1507, safely disembarking in India, he there materially increased the dominion of the Portuguese, although he scarcely inaugurated any permanent form of rule. During his time, he was constantly engaged in hostilities with the Zamorin of Calicut and with the Egyptians, who, seconding the Venetians in their jealousy of the growing Portuguese power, were doing everything possible to retard its development. After an administration notable both for himself and his country, Almeida at the close of his three years' term started for the Tagus; but death overtook him in a petty skirmish with some natives on the west coast of Africa, a little to the north of the Cape.

Alfonso de Albuquerque, although not at once officially designated as viceroy, was then invested with the chief command.⁵ After occupying Calicut, he captured, in spite of a stubborn resistance, the city of Goa,⁶ which, in 1559,

¹ For account of this voyage, cf. J. P. O. Martins, "Portugal nos Mares," 65 et seq.; "The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama" ("Hakluyt Series"); Cantu, VIII, 287.

² Cf. article "Alfonso de Albuquerque" in "Encyclopædia Britannica," by H. Morse Stephens.

³ For some account of the wealth of India opened to Portuguese adventurers, cf. Cantu, VIII, 283 et seq.; a more extensive review is contained in "Portugal nos Mares," 1-96; for Portuguese conquest in the East, cf. John Bruce, "Annals of the Honorable East India Company," I, 13 (London, 1810).

⁴ Cantu, VIII, 288.

⁵ *Ibid.* VIII, 289.

⁶ Raynal, I, 134.

became the capital of spiritual and temporal authority in the Indies. In 1511, Malacca being taken, vast riches were carried away on Portuguese ships, only to be lost in a storm off Sumatra. The famous stronghold of Ormus surrendered in 1515.¹ At the end of this year Albuquerque died.² While the governor-general had been effecting his exploits, other explorers had discovered, besides Sumatra and Malacca, Ceylon and the Spice Islands. Portuguese sailors soon reached China (1517), and finally, in 1542, Mendez Pinto, after a long series of adventures, barely missed shipwreck on the shores of Japan. Already, at the time of the decease of Albuquerque, the Portuguese had almost attained the height of their supremacy,³ but it may be perhaps better said that in 1540 their colonial domain was the greatest.⁴

Goa, the Eastern metropolis, maintained for a hundred years its preëminence.⁵ The course of Indian trade was radically changed; the overland routes were abandoned; Lisbon suddenly supplanted Venice as the principal receiving point of the West;⁶ and thence vessels conveyed still farther northward to Antwerp, for distribution, the wares of the Orient.⁷

¹ For the trade and magnificence of Ormus, cf. Cantu, VIII, 299.

² Noel says, "The work accomplished by Albuquerque was prodigious, and his country, which followed its ups and downs with feverish attention, showed itself justly proud of it," (tr.) "History of Commerce," II, 97; of the policy of Albuquerque, Zimmerman, as if quoting him, says, "I repeat once for all, if Portugal wishes to avoid war in the Indies, it must either send out sufficient people and arms, or it must seize the principal coast points," (tr.) "European Colonies," I, 31.

³ Heeren attributes chiefly "to the noble spirit and to the immense authority, both military and civil, of the first viceroys — of Almeida and still more of the great Albuquerque — the possibility of founding such an empire": cf. Heeren, 27 (par. 6 note); cf. also Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 181 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 289 et seq.

⁴ "About 1540 Portugal had attained the zenith of its power; in less than sixty years it had founded a commercial empire which extended to the confines of Persia and had its origin at the boundary line between the African continent and the European coast," (tr.) Noel, II, 100.

⁵ Noel, II, 96; Heeren, 27 (par. 6 note).

⁶ Lisbon "had immediately become a cosmopolitan city, which the ships of all nations frequented, and whither came to supply themselves the people who had not yet been able directly to procure at their place of origin the spices of India," (tr.) Noel, II, 83.

⁷ Foreign ships were required, however, to go to Lisbon to obtain these

The Portuguese had, before the middle of the sixteenth century, extended their sovereignty over an immense empire; on the coasts of Africa and Asia, from the Straits of Gibraltar to Canton in China, all transactions were in effect under their control; a nearly uninterrupted line of commercial and military posts had been established; the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea were practically in their grasp.¹ The entire commerce necessary to supply Europe with the multiple variety of strange and rare merchandise brought from the Orient, and for which there was such a strong demand, was exclusively in their hands.² The united efforts of the peoples recently trafficking with the Indies to overwhelm them proved unavailing. The conquest of the Egyptians by the Turks (1517), after the former's defeat by Albuquerque (1508), removed the last vestige of opposition.³ Not a native potentate of the East could withstand these successful warriors and merchants, while not one contemporary European country had yet entered into competition with them. The highest earthly tribunal, the Pope,⁴ had, in advance,⁵ confirmed their rights to all their future discoveries. Spain alone, at a later date, succeeded in curtailing this grant by acquiring the papal concession⁶ of one-half of the new-found world to itself; but

wares, and this absence of Portuguese vessels from the local European carrying trade subsequently incited competition, *post*, Ch. VII and XVI.

¹ For extent of Portuguese power, cf. Raynal, I, 132-134, 152-193, 254-265 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 44; Cantu, VIII, 299; Heeren, 26 et seq. (par. 5, 6, and 7 and notes); Merivale, 45.

² "The valuable cargoes which the Portuguese fleets brought to Europe from the East Indies, and the riches with which the sales of them filled the treasury of the great Emanuel, lowered the price of Eastern commodities in the Italian marts, and created a spirit for distant navigation and commerce among the rising maritime states in the North of Europe."—JOHN BRUCE, "Annals of the East India Company," Introduction, I, 1; he cites Laftan, "Histoire des Découvertes et des Conquêtes des Portugais."

³ Cantu, VIII, 290; Payne, 41 et seq.

⁴ Sixtus, IV, Heeren, 26 (par. 5 notes); Leroy-Beaulieu, 44; *supra*, p. 206.

⁵ There had been a series of bulls relating to this question from 1442 to 1481, of which the last was the most important.

⁶ Bull of Pope Alexander VI, Leroy-Beaulieu, 44; afterward confirmed and modified by the convention of Tordesillas in 1494, and a second bull of 1506, Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 452 et seq.; II, Appendix B, 580 et seq.; cf. *post*, Ch. III; also Heeren, 25 (par. 3).

the other moiety, quite sufficiently large, still remained Portuguese.¹ Unhindered at this epoch in their search for wealth, the agents of this nation exchanged with, sold to, and bought of the aborigines on their own terms; accepted their gifts and exacted their tribute; when it pleased them, unreservedly seized their property; and did not hesitate to make them slaves² whenever convenience dictated. So accustomed were they to violent, arbitrary conduct that resistance surprised them and occasionally their rapacity led to their own discomfort.³ Acting in the same manner everywhere they went, they frequently aroused by their autocratic methods distrust and enmity;⁴ while, on the other hand, the prosperity of the early adventurers in the Orient was so marked that vast throngs were attracted from the parent state to populate these territories.⁵ Such was the rapid rise of Portuguese power in the East during this age that it won for King Emanuel, as for his predecessor John, the surname of the Great.⁶

While the Indies had thus within sixty years of the first visit of Da Gama become a most important acquisition, Portugal had woefully neglected its possessions in the western hemi-

¹ Merivale, 46 and 47; for text of this bull, cf. Zimmerman, I, 9, 10 (foot-note).

² For some illustrations of Portuguese cruelty and rapacity, cf. Raynal, I, 268-270.

³ An illustration in point is the fate which overtook their ambassador, Perez. On the first voyage to China, in 1517, while he was at Peking treating with the government for trade concessions, the sailors of his fleet came in conflict with some Chinese subjects. With difficulty the vessels escaped, but poor Perez, deserted, was thrown into a Chinese prison and after several years of incarceration there died. Relations between the two countries were naturally for some time strained, Cantu, VIII, 292-293.

⁴ "They [the Portuguese] left on record no evidence of a definite system, which, however faulty, might have acted as a bond to hold together their dependencies." — Lucas, III, 74.

⁵ "The Portuguese flocked to the East in such numbers that the little kingdom at home was half depopulated." — PAYNE, 45; still, as Lucas says, "there was a sea, not a land dominion, a monopoly of trade rather than a military empire," "Historical Geography of English Colonies," III, 45.

⁶ Schaefer, 576 et seq.; Heeren, 58 et seq. (par. 10); others call him "Fortunate" or "Lucky," which is more exactly the translation of the Portuguese epithet "Venturoso."

sphere.¹ The extensive region, so accidentally revealed by Alvarez Cabral and to which Spain had subsequently waived any right of priority,² was not yet accounted of much value; its inhabitants, merely uncultured, simple-minded savages, without industry, commerce, or art, were despised, while its products, then solely agricultural, were considered of inferior utility. Neither gold nor silver had at that time been discovered, and even diamonds, when secured, were not prized. Brazil, a land without charms, was for a comparatively long period avoided by the Portuguese, to whom the resources of the Orient were available.³ These men preferred the East, where riches might be so easily amassed by trade and speculation, rather than the West, where they could be extracted from the earth only by toil. Hence the first settlers who betook themselves to South America were Jewish exiles seeking relief from religious persecution at home, and convicts whom the government shipped thither.⁴

Brazil began to receive attention only after the death of the great Emanuel, which occurred in 1521. His successor, John III, in 1525-1530 introduced the system in vogue in the Azores and in Madeira,⁵ according to which a certain length of the coast was assigned to some nobleman invested with the absolute ownership of the tract, its hereditaments and aboriginal people; these concessions were called captaincies, and those to whom they were awarded, known as captains, were usually

¹ Cantu, VIII, 211-212, 216; Heeren, 28 (par. 8), 59 (par. 11); Merivale, 47; Adam Smith says, "During this state of neglect it [Brazil] grew up to be a great and powerful colony," "Wealth of Nations," 447.

² In the first instance neither Spain nor Portugal had made settlements; the Portuguese subsequently sent out the earliest colonists.

³ "Brazil appeared to them no otherwise than as a pleasant, fruitful, and well-situated country, capable, indeed, of furnishing abundance, — but not of gold and silver, — very fit for any sort of improvement, but destitute, as they supposed, of mines." — HARRIS, "Voyages," II, 168, or Ch. III, § XV, par. 27.

⁴ "Brazil was used only as a place of transportation for convicts, the earliest instance, I believe, of the adoption of such a system by any modern people." — MERIVALE, 47; Raynal, V, 9-13; H. M. Stephens points out that it was the first Portuguese establishment in the nature of an agricultural colony; Leroy-Beaulieu attributes to these circumstances its slow but substantial growth; Cantu, VIII, Ch. XII, 211 et seq.

⁵ Raynal, V, 14; Heeren, 60 (par. 13); Cantu, VIII, 213; Payne, 46; the captaincies were first inaugurated after 1530, Winsor, VIII, 350.

clothed with supreme civil and military authority, and might in turn make sub-grants. Only the width of their jurisdiction along the seaboard was measured, while its depth inland was unlimited. Many adventurers solicited these fiefs with their almost unbounded power; but it was still apparently impossible to direct the course of general emigration toward the New World. Fighting with the savages and among themselves occupied the earliest days of these fortune hunters. One of them, Diegue Alvarez, by dint of artifice managing to ingratiate himself into the favor of the natives, dwelt among them for years. Then returning to Portugal, he made a wonderful report upon the situation, but his compatriots would not listen to him. Subsequently several Jesuits went out to convert the heathen;¹ and they, being successful, were followed by others. Thus matters drifted in Brazil, and the country was merely the refuge place of Jews, criminals, a few stragglers, and many priests, until the deplorable catastrophe of Portuguese history intervened.²

In 1580 Portugal lost its liberties to Spain. Philip II, alleging as an excuse some pretext, seized by force of arms the Portuguese throne.³ This sudden transformation into a Spanish province was extremely disastrous, and in fact marks the end of the most glorious epoch of national existence.⁴ The promises solemnly made to protect and safeguard the interests of the conquered kingdom were ruthlessly broken. The Portuguese dependencies in India, Africa, and America, claimed as appendages of the Spanish Crown, and as such annexed to its domains, — with the exception of the Azores Islands, — recognized the sovereignty of Philip; but Spain, unfortunately proving incapable of properly defending these magnificent acquisitions, they were at once

¹The Jesuits were first introduced by Governor General De Sousa in 1549, Winsor, VIII, 350.

²Heeren, 84 (par. 4); Merivale, 47; Cantu, VIII, 213 et seq.; for some account of Brazilian administration, cf. Raynal, V, 99-105.

³Cf. "Portugal," by H. M. Stephens in "Encyclopædia Britannica."

⁴Raynal, I, 286; Heeren, 82 (par. 1); Cantu, VIII, 303; Leroy-Beaulieu, 49; Payne, 53; Schaefer, 621.

open to attack from all its foes. To appreciate what such exposure meant is not difficult, when the number of these enemies at that time is recalled. The Spaniards, likewise seemingly jealous of the natural advantages enjoyed by the former Portuguese colonies over their own establishments, appear to have resolved to deprive them of any such superiority. Among the restrictive measures imposed was the prohibition to trade with the Low Countries;¹ the lucrative commerce maintained between Lisbon and Antwerp was thus annihilated.² Several hundred Portuguese ships, some thousand guns, and large sums of money were also preëmpted by Spain for purposes of war. By these dastardly acts, Portugal was robbed of its supremacy on the seas; where its flag had been previously unrivalled, it almost ceased to be seen. The Portuguese themselves were reduced to abject poverty. Their possessions in the distance, as well as their affluence at home, had vanished. All were poor: a few became conspirators and rebels, but for sixty years their efforts were to be unavailing. Many more, indeed, abandoned their firesides and, secretly fleeing from the Spanish dominions, emigrated to France, Holland, or England, or to the newly rising settlements of these nations. Wherever they went, they were cordially welcomed and counted as among the common opponents of Spain.³ Meanwhile the realms of Portugal were gradually being appropriated by the different hostile powers. The Netherlands especially made the most of the favorable opportunity. Cornelius Houtman,⁴ a citizen of Holland, who had once served under the Portuguese colors, was the first of his countrymen to take a Dutch expedition to the East.⁵ His people fell heir to the greater portion of the Indies.

¹ Cantu, VIII, 305; the trade with the Indies was also restricted to a very few ships annually, a policy in accord with that adopted by Spain toward its American possessions, Schaefer, 622; in fact, however, the most serious blow to Portuguese commerce was the loss of the greater number of its vessels, which went down with the Armada, De Stella and De Santuel, I, 154.

² *Supra*, p. 211 and note 6; *post*, Ch. VII.

³ De Stella and De Santuel, I, 151-156.

⁴ *Cf. post*, Ch. VII.

⁵ Heeren, 85 (par. 7); Cantu, VIII, 305; Payne, 54.

As soon as Portugal was forbidden to supply Holland with the products of this region, which were so essential to prosperity, the Dutch conceived the design of helping themselves and assuming the place recently declared vacant. Spain was impotent to prevent. Philip had a preference — by necessity, it is true — for land warfare, and the fate of the Armada left the wide expanse of ocean free, without obstacle or interference, to Holland and England. Brazil, also assailed by the Dutch, was partially conquered;¹ only the personal bravery and stubborn resistance of the colonists saved them from utter subjugation,² for at one time the invaders occupied about one-half of their territory.

¹ Raynal, V, 40-47; cf. *post*, Ch. IX.

² Heeren, 113 (par. 6); Merivale, 48; De Stella and De Santuel, 170 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 214; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 447; Leroy-Beaulieu, 52; the first successful attack made by the Dutch upon Brazil occurred in 1624 under the auspices of the Dutch West India Company; cf. Payne, 58.

CHAPTER II

DECLINE OF PORTUGUESE COLONIZATION—THE WEST

WHEN in 1640 John, Duke of Braganza, became the independent sovereign of reliberated Portugal, the situation of the country was indeed desperate. A prolonged struggle was still to be waged by his subjects in reëstablishing their own government and wresting from Spain their liberty. The revolution lasted fully twenty-five years.¹ The past grandeur of the Portuguese had nevertheless disappeared; the bare shadow of their former vast domains was visible. In the Orient their authority was acknowledged only over Goa, Maçao, and Damão; while, to the west, Brazil alone remained faithful and intact, for there the Dutch had withdrawn by force of circumstances.² Madeira and the Azores were not recovered until a later date. Thenceforth, first under the tutelage of France, and then of England, Portugal has continued until to-day a weak state.³

After the restoration of national freedom, the Portuguese possessions in the East were unimportant, while Brazil, on the other hand, steadily increased in value;⁴ but before further narrating the history of this present sister republic, it is now time briefly to review the political and economic organization of the Oriental dependencies in the famous days of their fabulous wealth. As they in a great measure owed their origin to jealousy of Venice, so they were, in a remark-

¹ Schaefer, "Portugal," 623 et seq.; De Stella and De Santuel, 167.

² Raynal, V, 58-68; Heeren, 117 (par. 14); De Stella and De Santuel, 170, 172 et seq.; *supra*, p. 217; *post*, Ch. IX.

³ "The adventurous spirit of this distinguished people had been broken by their union with Spain."—JOHN BAUCE, "Annals of the East India Company," I, 25.

⁴ For history of Brazil, cf. Varnhagen, "Histoire du Brésil."

able degree, modelled upon the same pattern as those of that city. The settlements of Portugal in Africa and Asia formed, in fact, little more than a chain of commercial stations;¹ serving as centres of their spheres of influence, they afforded havens from storm and places of refuge from hostile fleets, but were rarely, if ever, devoted to industrial or agricultural pursuits.² The conditions existing at that epoch in the regions where these outposts were located did not favor any regular cultivation of the soil; nor was such labor necessary, or nearly so profitable as the simpler and less tedious occupation of barter and exchange; hence the communities of the East were for the most part strictly mercantile in character.³

The Indies were prized by the Portuguese, not as landed estates, but chiefly for their commerce. From the time of the earliest efforts made to control them, the dominant thought was to secure their exclusive markets; the entire course of subsequent policy was in accordance with this aspiration.⁴ The determination to develop traffic to the uttermost thoroughly accounts for the scheme of government and administration applied by the parent state to its colonial establishments. Portugal was not content with a share of their exchanges, but, like its forerunners of the Middle Ages in this field of activity, not anything less than an absolute monopoly sufficed. Competition would have reduced the proceeds, and an immense profit was the ideal. Nevertheless the expedient of chartered trading companies was not here adopted; commercial privileges were directly reserved to the Crown. Theoretically trade was free to all citizens, but practically it was hedged around by so many rules and restrictions as to be open to a very

¹ "In nearly every case the Portuguese, merely supplanting the Arabs, who possibly themselves supplanted Phœnicians or Sabæans, had established themselves at, etc." — JOHNSTON, 31.

² As Zimmerman remarks, the Portuguese had generally simply seized the forts formerly belonging to the Arabs or to the Berbers, and where such was not the case they had built them for themselves; cf. also Lucas, III, 43-44.

³ Heeren, 26 et seq. (par. 5, 6, 7, notes); Cantu, VIII, 295 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 42-44.

⁴ "The Portuguese were traders even more than conquerors; the Spaniards were conquerors alone." — LUCAS, III, 43.

limited few. The regulations prescribing the methods for its conduct were countless. In the first instance royal permission was always a prerequisite. The ships employed were huge men-of-war, which, while freighted with cargo, were manned by several hundred marines and soldiers. This small army not only protected the merchants during their visits to the Indies, but was also serviceable if the galleons were attacked by foreigners on the homeward trip; for the British and the Dutch, indeed, frequently lay in watch off the African coast to capture their treasures.¹ This inconvenient system of transports was obligatory mainly by reason of the endeavor to obtain unduly exaggerated advantages; but, while fancifully assured of the enjoyment of fruits forbidden to others, Portugal was, in fact, suffering enormous losses. These vessels, slow-moving, carrying numbers of individuals without immediate interest in the prime object of the enterprise, fitted out by the government, making fixed voyages at certain seasons, terrifying not merely the Europeans but likewise the inhabitants of the Indies,² whose good-will and friendship would have been invaluable and otherwise easily won, manifestly perpetuated a delusion.³

In their desire to seize and retain the whole traffic of the regions within their empire, the Portuguese fell into the error which had misled their predecessors. They believed that force of arms was essential to effect the ends of trade. Never was there a more fallacious proposition, but most of the nations have nevertheless regarded it as in some degree

¹ "The Portuguese served for setting dogs to spring the game, which, as soon as they had done, was seized by others," "A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea," by William Bosman (English tr., 2d edition, 1721), 2, cited by Lucas, II, 66.

² As to the hostile policy of the Portuguese toward foreigners, a most amusing story is quoted in Harris, "Voyages," II, 182, as told by a French traveller in the year 1717.

³ Heeren, 26 et seq. (par. 5, 6, 7, notes); Cantu, VIII, 300; Leroy-Beaulieu, 43 et seq.; especially for extent of Portuguese maritime power and commerce at this epoch, cf. J. P. O. Martins, "Portugal nos Mares"; for exhaustive account of the Portuguese in East India, cf. "The Modern Part of an Universal History from the Earliest Account of Time," published by a number of gentlemen in London, 1759, IX, 234-382.

true. The people of Portugal were not an exception. A vast naval armament, a large military equipment, numerous forts, and a complicated mechanism of colonial administration were deemed indispensable for the development of peace-loving commerce. Still, their own experience in China and Japan, where these magnificent accessories were entirely wanting, disproved this theory, for not anywhere else in the world were their returns greater and more regularly realized.¹ The benefits elsewhere derived from monopoly were more than offset by the increased expenditures and by the loss of freedom, flexibility, and permanence, incidental to such a policy. And what availed the precautions against the Indians and the Africans, when the foe so near at home not only appropriated the colonies, but absorbed even the parent state?²

The Portuguese also proclaimed Lisbon the sole European port to which their ships might resort and at which they might discharge their cargoes.³ The transportation of the wealth of the Indies to their own capital city was the only labor required of their mariners. Unlike the Venetians, they never undertook to distribute these goods to their European customers. Whoever wished to buy must come to Lisbon, and foreign craft must carry the merchandise thence. The citizens, seemingly dazzled by the fabled riches of the East, and forgetting that the mere acquisition of products without sale profits little, relied upon the fact of an exclusive supply to attract purchasers to their metropolis.⁴ For a time their contemporaries were

¹ Heeren, 59 (par. 11); Leroy-Beaulieu, 38.

² The most disastrous effect of the monopoly of the colonial trade upon Portugal was the decline of its own industry. Adam Smith says, "Spain and Portugal were manufacturing countries before they had any considerable colonies. Since they had the richest and most fertile in the world they have ceased to be so," "Wealth of Nations," 482. He further explains at length why such is the case. Again, he says that the colonies have not aided the development of manufacture or agriculture in either of these countries, *ibid.* 331; also Merivale, *Lect. VII and VIII*, 187 et seq.; Raynal, I, 288-294.

³ "They brought back the riches of the East to Lisbon only, and left it to the Dutch to distribute them through other European ports." — LUCAS, III, 73; Heeren, 27 (par. 7 note); Cantu, VIII, 296; Leroy-Beaulieu, 48.

⁴ "Lisbon was content with its own trade as an emporium" — YEATS, "Growth and Vicissitudes of Commerce," 202.

complacent; but they soon discerned that if they must go to the Tagus they themselves might just as well sail to the Indies.¹

Possibly the corruption of morals within the nation contributed as much as its deficient and absurd trade organization to subsequent decadence.² For this fact the political system was partially to blame. As already stated, the administration of the Indies was intrusted to a viceroy, stationed at Goa, invested with supreme authority, both military and civil; this officer was appointed for three years only, lest, by a longer term, he might become too powerful and consequently insubordinate to the Crown. The result was that almost universally these governors, regardless of means and methods, improved their limited opportunity to amass wealth. Petty functionaries, not less than the chief executive, were likewise devoted during their period of service to their personal aggrandizement. The utter faithlessness of these public servants to the general welfare of their country weakened the foundations of its structure; for their own emolument they wilfully betrayed the interests of the fatherland. Portuguese ships and traders paid as taxes, port dues, and customs collected in the Indies immense sums which went directly into the coffers of the viceroys and their subalterns; the metropolis received a bare dribble of its revenues; the participation of officials in trade was the capstone of demoralization.³ From the highest to the lowest the representatives of the government were unscrupulous; and the rare righteous spirits mentioned in history were too feeble to stem the tide. The Eastern colonial edifice of Portugal, when touched from without, collapsed therefore, as if built on sand.⁴ After the Spanish occupation, little of this

¹ "The first who flung themselves upon the route traced out by the Portuguese were the Dutch, on the morrow of their separation from the Spanish monarchy." — NOEL, II, 151.

² For causes of Portuguese decline in colonial power, cf. Raynal, V, 174-214.

³ Heeren, 83 (par. 2 note), quoted by Merivale, Lect. II, 46; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 461; De Sismondi, "Economie Politique," 12th Essay, 130 et seq.; Schaefer, "Portugal," 622; Cantu, VIII, 302; Leroy-Beaulieu, 49.

⁴ To other evils must be added the corruption and misconduct of the clergy, Heeren, 83 (par. 2 note); Cantu, VIII, 321 et seq.; Von Ranke, "History of the Popes," II, 228 et seq.; Schaefer, "Portugal," 622; more especially for

vast domain was ever recovered by its former proprietor.¹ Coherence was lacking; even Spain could not maintain its supremacy; the people of the North appeared, enforced their claims, and made their own distribution of this empire, only hindered by each other in their struggle to secure the larger share of the abandoned inheritance.²

As Africa lies about midway between East India and South America, so the rise of the settlements on its west coast forms in a fashion the stepping-stone between the Portuguese possessions of the Orient and the Occident. While the Asiatic establishments were admittedly restricted to legitimate commerce, the enterprises on the Dark Continent were almost entirely dependent upon the nefarious slave trade. The degeneration of past centuries had prepared the nation for dealing in human flesh. As early as 1464 negro prisoners taken in the Moorish wars were sold in Portugal; already in 1520 this custom was widely diffused, but, very slow in its development, did not become important until after the year 1713.³ Saint Paul de Loanda in Africa was the chief market, while Angola, the Congo, and Guinea were the principal districts from which the blacks were obtained. Practically every other pursuit was there ignored, for the fortunes to be made in this one traffic were enormous. By it the disasters of the East, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were partially retrieved, and the destinies of Brazil immeasurably affected. For the African colonies its continuance was vital; when it was abolished, they decayed.⁴

By a peculiar coincidence, Portugal, while controlling the sources of supply, also owned the region whence the demand for slaves was first the strongest.⁵ Brazil, the long neglected,⁶

the Paulists, Raynal, V, 31-38; Payne, 92; for the general corruption of morals, cf. Raynal, I, 270.

¹ *Supra*, p. 218.

² *Supra*, p. 216 and 213 note 4.

³ Date of the Peace of Utrecht, confirming Portugal in the possession of Brazil and conferring the right of the "Assiento" or slave trade on England.

⁴ For the Portuguese in West Africa, cf. Johnston, 41 et seq.; Heeren, 28 (par. 8), 84 (par. 5); Leroy-Beaulieu, 50-51.

⁵ Leroy-Beaulieu, 51-52.

⁶ Cf. "Brazil," by H. M. Stephens, in "Encyclopædia Britannica"; for early history more at length, Harris, "Voyages," I, Ch. II, § 16.

despised estate of the West, was gradually assuming to itself a more permanent basis of growth in which slavery was to play an efficacious but most reprehensible part. Its territory was sparsely inhabited by Indians, who were at the same time very intractable and of inferior intellect. The Portuguese would, nevertheless, have reduced them to bondage, had it not been for the influence of the priests, at whose instance the central government in 1570 issued a prohibitory proclamation.¹ The original settlers, the Jews, declared the soil extremely fertile,² and were convinced that with sufficient manual toil it would produce most bountifully; but the hands were lacking. Hence the current of the slave trade, as soon as inaugurated, most naturally turned in that direction.³ The decrees respecting the employment of the natives were indeed for many years disregarded, until about 1760, when the great prime minister, Pombal, succeeded in enforcing them. Still, servitude of the negroes flourished side by side with that of the aborigines; and to the adoption and long perpetuation of this form of labor, so pernicious in itself, the original development of Brazilian wealth was undoubtedly due. After the edicts by which the Indians finally regained their freedom, the traffic in blacks multiplied many fold.⁴ Brazil was, therefore, the land, not only substantially the first in which the impious system took root, but likewise the earliest to profit by it. Slavery was here ultimately suppressed only in 1885-1886.

Prior to the middle of the eighteenth century the commerce of Brazil, like that of the East, was effected by periodical fleets. Lisbon, Oporto, Rio de Janeiro, Paraiba, Olinda, and San Salvador marked the stages in their voyages. At that time the

¹ "The missionaries, as far as possible, stood between the natives and the Europeans, and shielded the former from the oppression of unjust and rapacious men."—EDWARD BURKE, "European Settlements," I, 164; the same statement is true of Spanish-American colonies. More especially for the condition of the Indians in the mines of Brazil, cf. Noel, II, 132, 133.

² *Supra*, p. 214 and notes 3 and 4.

³ That the commercial interests of West Africa were linked with those of the Americas was recognized later by the Dutch in their West India Company; cf. *post*, Ch. IX.

⁴ Raynal, V, 105-111; Merivale, 48 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 52 et seq.

transactions had attained considerable value, being equivalent to the total exchanges between Portugal and all other European countries. Pombal, who was kindly disposed toward monopolies and trusts, then created two mercantile companies,—one for the district of Pernambuco, and the other for that of the Marañon,—in reality dividing the trade of Brazil exclusively between them. This change was in the end far from beneficial, since the volume of business immediately and steadily declined.¹

Happily for the eventual prosperity of Brazil, the mines of precious metals were not found until 1691;² and even after that date mining was so dangerous and unremunerative that it very slowly advanced. The Paulists, the offspring of former deported criminals by Indian women, were almost the only people engaged in it. The trade in diamonds, which were discovered some thirty years later, became much more important, and assured the growth of the central provinces. Permission to seek these stones was at first granted to a single corporation, while the official rules by which the industry was controlled were most minute. Every possible means was taken to limit the output, with the object of restricting the stock and consequently maintaining the price.³ The number of workmen and the product of each laborer was limited; persons not regularly employed were forbidden to approach the diamond fields, and any illegal traffic was punished by death.⁴

Thenceforth the history of Portuguese colonization is not noteworthy. In 1703 Portugal fell under the influence of England, and afterward acting in concert with this rising maritime power, avoided through its friendship many losses which other-

¹ Raynal, V, 92-98; Merivale, 50 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 53 et seq.; more especially for restrictions imposed on Brazilian trade, cf. Noel, II, 132, et seq.

² Winsor, VIII, 356; cf. also Raynal, V, 146-152.

³ The returns, nevertheless, were far inferior to those derived from agriculture, Blackmar, 55; "The value of the diamonds found and worked from 1740 to 1820 in all Brazil was scarcely equal to the output of the sugar-cane and coffee plantations during eighteen months."—Noel, II, 147.

⁴ Raynal, V, 152-168; Heeren, 164 et seq. (par. 17), 206 (par. 19); Cantu, VIII, 219 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 54 et seq.; Merivale, 52; cf. "Compendio Narrativo do Peregrino da America," by Nuno Marquez Pereira.

wise might have been sustained. A long period must therefore be passed in silence.

The story of the separation of Brazil¹ from the parent state is most remarkable. At the instigation of Napoleon I, in 1807, a secret partition,² for the joint benefit of France and Spain, was made of Portugal, which by reason of its devotion to England was doomed to annihilation. On December 1 an imperial army of occupation entered Lisbon, confident of the capture of the royal family; it was, however, too late, for only the previous day the entire court had sailed under British escort for Brazil.³ The seat of government was thus transferred to the dependency, which subsequently⁴ by due recognition became an empire, and from 1808 to 1821 enjoyed the privileges incidental to such a rank. Many of the obstacles to trade and commerce were during this time abolished, and the presence of their ruler enabled the inhabitants to secure numerous other direct advantages.⁵ Banks were organized, educational facilities increased, industries fostered, and highways constructed. Brazil indeed received a national inspiration. The momentum achieved was too great ever to admit of a backward step.⁶ When the king embarked on April 26, 1821, to resume his throne in Europe, it was impossible again to reduce the incipient state to the condition of a colony. The Crown Prince, Dom Pedro, remained as regent; but within a few months, yielding to the urgent solicitation of the people and to immediate exigencies, he proclaimed himself, on October 12,

¹ For brief story of Brazil in the eighteenth century, cf. Heeren, 301 et seq. (par. 53 et seq.); Payne, 43, 46, 58, 59, 77, 104; for concise account of more modern times, *ibid.* 333.

² Calvo, V, 118.

³ The Portuguese fleet, consisting of eight ships of the line and numerous other vessels, weighed anchor November 29, 1807, and, after calling at Bahia, arrived at Rio de Janeiro March 7, 1808. For this period of Portuguese history, cf. De Stella and De Santuel, II, 61 et seq.; Payne, 337.

⁴ Decree of December, 1815, Winsor, VIII, 357.

⁵ Merivale, 53 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 56 et seq.

⁶ The tendency of events was not by any means immediately favorable. For an impartial view of the conditions existing in Brazil, and the causes which subsequently contributed to the Revolution, cf. De Stella and De Santuel, II, 85 et seq.

1822, Emperor of independent Brazil.¹ The sovereign of Portugal was then so involved in the reestablishment of his own authority at home, as to be incapable of offering any serious resistance to this act of secession. The outcome in any event could not the least be doubted, for the younger nation was not only the more populous, but also the richer. Thus Portugal lost its only American possession, which may justly be considered as the most important of all its dependencies in any age. The severance was accomplished with comparative ease and subsequent relations have always been amicable. Brazil still continues in spirit Portuguese, although the admixture of other races² and the removal of the Portuguese blood to new soil and fresh skies seem to have created a reinvigorated activity; for during the nineteenth century it has been the more progressive of the two states. Subject to the liberal tendencies of the western hemisphere, its citizens ultimately wearied of the last political tie which served to remind them of their connection with Portugal. The bloodless revolution of November 15, 1889, by which Dom Pedro II was exiled, is familiar to all. The recently born republic has not yet attained its full development; with the growth and further perfection of free institutions an increasing degree of prosperity is assured.

The population of Brazil in 1890 was 14,333,915 (now approximating 17,000,000), its area 3,209,878 square miles, while Portugal had, including the Azores and Madeira, 5,049,729 inhabitants and a *superficie* of 38,038 square miles; the total foreign trade in 1897 of the former was £48,319,884 (about \$241,599,420), of the latter country \$75,803,796.

¹ For brief account of separation of Brazil, cf. Heeren, 407 (par. 35) and 455 et seq. (par. 9-14); also Southey, "History of Brazil."

² In Brazil, as in some other South American states, the system of so-called "interior colonization" is in favor. Inducements are officially extended by the government to attract immigration from Europe. Land is offered to the settlers under very reasonable conditions,—several methods being in force,—and special concessions in local self-rule are extended to the communities of foreigners thus formed. Considerable numbers of Germans, Swiss, and Italians have been attracted, and many such establishments known as "colonies" exist, among them some of a certain importance. They have been chiefly effective in the extension and promotion of agriculture.

While the enterprises in America have borne magnificent fruit, in the Indies, as recorded, disaster ensued, and in Africa only shame. Of the immense colonial realm of earlier ages, Portugal still retains: in the Atlantic, the Azores, Madeira, and Porto Santo, which are constituent parts of the kingdom, enjoying the same political rights as the mainland provinces; in Asia, the dependencies of Gôa, Damão, Diu, the Indian Archipelago, and Maçao; in Africa the Cape Verde Islands, Guinea, Prince's and St. Thomas' Islands, Angola (consisting of Congo, Loanda, Benguella, Mossámedes, and Lunda), and Portuguese East Africa (including Mozambique, Zambesia, Lourenço-Marques, Inhambane, and Gaza). The entire area of the colonies proper is 801,100 square miles, with a population of 9,148,707 inhabitants. The statement hereunder shows the detailed figures:¹—

COLONIAL POSSESSIONS

	Area Square Miles	Population
Africa :		
Cape Verde Islands	1,480	114,130
Guinea	4,440	820,000
Prince's and St. Thomas' Islands	360	24,660
Angola	484,800	4,119,000
East Africa	301,000	3,120,000
Total in Africa	792,080	8,197,790
Asia :		
In India, Gôa	1,390	494,836
Damão, Diu, etc.	168	77,464
Indian Archipelago, Timor, etc.	7,458	300,000
China, Maçao, etc.	4	78,627
Total in Asia	9,020	950,917
Total Colonies	801,100	9,148,707

¹ All statistics are drawn from the "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 893-911.

The following table gives the colonial budgets for 1899-1900, and the value of imports and exports for various recent years as indicated:—

Colonies	Revenue	Ordinary and Extraordinary Expenditures	Imports	Exports
Angola	\$1,822,960	\$2,174,765	\$6,890,797 ²	\$7,104,124 ³
Cape Verde . .	393,259	345,536	1,682,692 ¹	210,177 ¹
Guinea	61,187	234,018	495,261 ¹	240,987 ¹
Prince's and St. Thomas' Islands }	436,532	358,550	1,797,027 ¹	2,739,936 ¹
East Africa . .	4,671,912 ¹	4,261,426 ¹	9,578,130 ³	1,938,449 ³
India-Gôa, etc. .	1,016,157	1,142,169	879,250 ¹	282,390 ¹
Macao	476,688	481,029	9,469,824 ¹	8,860,218 ¹
Timor	156,093	191,154	343,777 ²	266,223 ³
Total	\$9,034,788	\$9,188,647	\$31,136,768 ³	\$21,642,504 ³

Portugal is lately participating in the general reawakening of European endeavor in Africa, where it seems destined to experience a revival in the importance of its possessions. Statesmen and capitalists are united in their desire and efforts to retrieve on that continent some of the misfortunes suffered in the past. Time alone will show whether they may realize in a measure their aspirations again to acquire a first-class colonial empire.

Whatever the future may have in store for this valiant race, it must ever be acknowledged that Portugal, small in area and feeble in population, has by its labors in distant lands relatively accomplished for the development of civilization, commerce, and navigation more stupendous and enduring results than any other country.⁴

¹ 1898.² 1897.³ Approximate annual trade.⁴ Southey, "History of Brazil," quoted by Merivale, 45; Leroy-Beaulieu, 41.

CHAPTER III

SPANISH COLONIZATION PRIOR TO 1642

THE history of Spanish colonization is now interesting, because the people of the present age are eye-witnesses of the close of its career; it is memorable as in fact the record of the system first elaborated and practised by a state whose period of activity has been entirely comprised within modern days; it is impressive in that it treats of the discovery, exploration, and enlightenment of remote regions where, out of tyranny and oppression, freedom rose; but it is paramount by reason of representing one of the two leading types of colonial enterprise. Spain and England exemplify in this field distinct methods of thought and action. Since the rise of Spanish dominion on the western hemisphere one or the other of these powers has controlled the greater number of dependencies. While in truth Holland and France have, by their respective policies, exercised potent influences, still, for design and execution, Spain, first in time, and subsequently, England stand unrivalled. The study of the narrative of that nation which was the earliest to penetrate the mists enshrouding the New World is therefore approached with expectancy; for with it an era began, incomparable in development and attainments with those of antiquity and the Middle Ages combined.

It is a truism to say that the progress effectuated in this direction during the two thousand years preceding 1492 is not to be deemed of nearly as much consequence as the achievements realized within the past four centuries; that this assertion is not exaggerated, consider only a moment the expanding process in constant play since the rediscovery of

America by Columbus.¹ What comparison do the mediæval fleets of the Mediterranean, even together with the Indian trade, bear in relation to the commerce of the wide Atlantic and the traffic of the still broader Pacific? At the end of the nineteenth century, very limited districts of the earth's surface are unexplored, while, at least for practical purposes, the general physical features of every land are known.

When Columbus was soliciting the patronage of the Spanish court for his contemplated expedition, the spirit of maritime ambition was manifest only among the Portuguese; but they had not yet arrived at the southern extremity of Africa. Such reflections amply confirm the truth of the proposition. An equally momentous thought is that the first fifty years of navigation after 1492 are by far the most prolific in results. Between that date, so memorable in Spanish and American annals, and 1542, when the Portuguese sailor, Mendez Pinto, visited Japan, exploits in any age unparalleled in magnitude and significance were embraced.²

The chronicles of Spanish colonization may well be divided into four sections; the epoch of discovery from 1492 to 1542; the era of monopoly from 1542 to the end of the seventeenth century; the season of reform, almost measured by the eighteenth century; and the period of decadence, approximately corresponding to the nineteenth century. The aim will here be to review these different phases of growth and decline, with a view to tracing cause and effect, as well as theory and practice in the application of policies and management, rather than merely to enumerate the particulars of colonial history.

The earliest as well as the most fruitful participation of Spain in voyages of discovery was directly due to exterior influences. Let the facts be always borne in mind that Columbus was not a Spaniard, his training was not Spanish, and his final resolution to sail to the westward was not due to Spanish persuasion. In every respect, the conception of his project was foreign to Spain and its people; even in its execu-

¹ For pre-Columbian voyages, cf. Fluke, "Discovery of America, I, 148 et seq.

² *Ibid.* II, 8.

tion the queen, by whom the financial resources were supplied, represented in her acts merely an infinitesimally small proportion of her subjects. The sympathy and material assistance furnished by Isabella must be reckoned far more individual than national in their character.¹

The blood and the birth of Columbus naturally stamped and qualified him for his career; after reading the story of Genoese commerce, and learning from himself that he was not the first admiral of the family, his inclination for the sea is readily understood. When it is realized that at the age of fourteen years he had been a sailor under the Genoese flag; that ten years later, being then twenty-four years old, he went to Lisbon, and thenceforward, inspired by the memory of Prince Henry, served for the greater part of fourteen years on Portuguese vessels, his technical skill as a navigator not any longer occasions surprise.² Meanwhile, having married the daughter of the noted Perestrello,³ he had maintained his home for a time in the island of Porto Santo.⁴ Columbus, not a man of routine, satisfied to imitate what others before him had done, combined study and speculation with the practical exercise of his profession. As early as 1474, when in his twenty-eighth year, he concluded that the Indies could be reached by sailing to the westward. Subsequently, never doubting this proposition, he was constantly seeking new arguments in its support.⁵ Portugal,

¹ Fiske, "Discovery of America," 408 et seq., 414 et seq.; Winsor, II, 5 et seq., 304 et seq.

² For discussion of the date of Columbus' birth, his family, and his early years, cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 342 et seq.; Davey, "Cuba and Porto Rico," Appendix I; Washington Irving, "Life of Columbus," I; Winsor, "Christopher Columbus."

³ *Supra*, p. 204.

⁴ For the importance of this period in Columbus' life, cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 353 et seq.

⁵ For some of the influences which worked upon Columbus, cf. Bancroft, I, 7, who traces the argument back to the Pythagoreans and Aristotle; cf. also Rosscher and Jannasch, 41; Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 368 et seq., who likewise explains the influence of the knowledge that "Cathay" was bounded on the east by water, a fact first known to the Europeans in the thirteenth century, "Discovery of America," I, 277; subsequently (354 et seq.) he quotes the letters addressed to Columbus by the celebrated Florentine

as his adopted country and as the sea power of that day, appeared to him to have the right to whatever benefit might accrue from any attempt to give effectual demonstration to this theory. For several years, however, he cherished his project in secret,¹ apparently not knowing to what high personage to apply for patronage, as Prince Henry had then been dead some time;² but finally, after the improvement of the astrolabe,³ he took courage sufficient to present a formal petition to King John II. Unfortunately for the Portuguese nation, but happily for the world, the explorations of its mariners along the coast of Africa were well advanced; and all those who were interested in promoting these enterprises wished, pursuing their own efforts, to prevent the Crown from adopting any measure which might lessen their subsidies or detract from their success. In brief, although turning to the West should prove the shorter course to the Indies,⁴ Portuguese seamen did not favor the idea, believing that, were further discoveries in that direction made, sources of competition would be opened which might divest them of their existing rights and future profits, acquired or to be acquired by the eastern routes; for it must never be forgotten that Columbus regarded the Indies as his ultimate destination. This element of opposition, due to fear of rivalry, combined with the antagonism of those who held that the government had already wasted too much money in fruitless expeditions, almost sufficed to secure the immediate rejection of his plans.⁵ Still, as a tentative compromise, and perhaps with the view of depriving a foreigner of any

cosmographer, Paolo del Pozzo dei Toscanelli, favorable to the theory of finding the Indies in the west; a correspondence which seems to have had a determining influence on the former; cf. also *ibid.* I, 395; *supra*, p. 155 note 3.

¹Of course Columbus did not originate the idea; many others thought likewise.

²*Supra*, pp. 206-207.

³For importance of the astrolabe and compass, cf. Fluke, "Discovery of America," I, 257, 396; Winsor, II, 97.

⁴The great argument in favor of the project of Columbus was the fact that the new route to the westward would be shorter than that to the east, Fluke, "Discovery of America," I, 374 et seq.

⁵For the obstacles which Columbus met and the enterprises in which he

credit which might redound to the national glory, the king, while professedly holding the matter under advisement, resorted to a dastardly trick. A Portuguese fleet was secretly despatched in 1484 to accomplish, if possible, the proposed results; naturally and most righteously the endeavor failed.¹ The commander, nevertheless, reporting upon his return that he had accurately followed the written outlines previously submitted, Columbus was mocked as a hypocrite, scoundrel, and ignoramus. He thenceforth became a wanderer, at once quitting the land which, having breathed the inspiration into his soul, had failed to profit by it.²

Genoese by birth, Columbus was equally Portuguese by experience and education; by the union of the characteristics of these two nationalities, another race, in spite of itself, was to profit. At the time when the self-exiled dreamer left the Portuguese court, Spain was just beginning to develop into an unified nation; as the nearest and a hostile state to Portugal, it was logical that he should next approach its sovereigns. The desire to acquire outlying possessions to counterbalance the African domain of their neighbors and the wish to compete with them in trade ought very readily to have induced the Spaniards to welcome any projects which might lead to these ends. But prejudice and ignorance were rife, while national poverty, due to the prolonged Moorish wars, was a plausible and honest excuse for rejection. How Columbus consequently wandered for nearly eight years incessantly toiling to convince, persuade, and influence his hearers, while his brother Bartholomew was endeavoring to secure the patronage of the English and French monarchs, is too well known to bear repetition.³ His final triumph over all enemies and the glorious results attained by him, as the effect of persistent effort and strong conviction, were destined to dwarf into insignificance the achievements of his predecessors and rivals on the ocean.

was engaged during the period immediately following 1474, cf. *ibid.* I, 381 et seq., 396.

¹ Winsor, II, 3.

² Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 397 et seq.

³ *Ibid.* I, 400 et seq.

Spain reaped the harvest; but the seeds had been sown elsewhere; so, when reflecting upon these exploits, let it be remembered how much credit is due to Genoa and Portugal for the inherited instinct and instilled inspiration by reason of which Columbus was not merely an ordinary seaman, but a skilled mariner.

It is not necessary, nor is it the intention, to review the voyages of Columbus, his contemporaries and successors.¹ Suffice it to recall the fact that the development of Spain into a colonial power was sudden and rapid. Like in many similar instances, unexpected success turned the tide of popular opinion.² The opening of a shorter and more available route, as it was believed, to the Indies, in advance of the Portuguese, who had so many years been seeking in vain, was the occasion of widespread enthusiasm.³ Spain, lately united as a nation, foresaw for itself a brilliant future. While the Portuguese king and people were bewailing their own stupidity and blindness,⁴ the Spaniards earnestly resolved to impose their sway over the newly found regions, and to eclipse their competitors in the East Indian traffic.⁵ Not only numerous adventurers soon sought to imitate the great navigator, but also the government, anticipating a plentiful harvest of wealth, undertook to organize on a preconcerted plan the commerce and trade of its possessions.⁶ Within eight years of the time when Columbus first put foot on the western hemisphere, the Spaniards had some knowledge of the entire eastern coast line of South America and were acquainted with most of the West Indian Islands.⁷ The immense range of their explorations, never theretofore equalled in any such brief period, well deserved the recognition accorded to the Crown by the church. When many years previously the lands beyond and within the seas had been bestowed upon Portugal,⁸ they were be-

¹ For elaborate details of Spanish conquests in America, cf. Harris, "Voyages," I, Ch. III.

² *Supra*, pp. 205-206.

³ *Ibid.* I, 440.

⁴ Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 441 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 460.

⁶ Moses, Ch. XI.

⁷ For complete chronological table, cf. Winsor, VIII, 511-556.

⁸ *Supra*, p. 206.

lieved to be much less than in reality; as soon as this error of calculation was perceived, it was not considered in equity unjust to give to Spain the territories revealed through the prowess of her sons and representatives. Leaving Portugal unmolested in the enjoyment of the rights to which, under the original intention, when scrupulously and conscientiously executed, it was entitled, Spain was thus in the common acceptance of that day invested by the Pope, just prior to the beginning of the sixteenth century, with the legal ownership of one-half share of the unknown or at best only slightly known districts of the earth.¹ Spain, acting under this deed of gift, steadily continued to extend its absolute authority, first in 1508–1510 over the larger islands to the east of the Gulf of Mexico; next over Mexico, in 1519–1521, by the expedition of Ferdinand Cortez; subsequently over the Peruvians (1525–1535), through their subjugation by Francis Pizarro, and finally over the Philippine Islands by their discovery in 1521. Thus before 1542 the Spaniards had visited and proclaimed their supremacy over the West Indies, Florida, Mexico, California, and the whole seaboard—both east and west—of South America, even stretching out their power across the Pacific Ocean to include the Philippine archipelago.² Of all these acquisitions they alone lost Brazil, owing to a misconception of its geographical situation.³ Besides their transatlantic dominions they also owned the Canaries, since 1483, several isles in the Mediterranean, and numerous strongholds in Africa. At that epoch the nominal empire of Spain had attained its full extent, but vast tracts of the mainland and many islands were still to be brought under subjection.⁴

¹ Pope Alexander VI made this grant by his bulls of May 3 and 4, 1493, Washington Irving, "Columbus," I, 194; Heeren, 25 (par. 3); Bancroft, I, 9; Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 453 et seq.; II, Appendix B. 580 et seq.; Zimmerman, I, 9, 10 (footnote), for text of bulls.

² For this period of Spanish exploration and conquest in North America, cf. Bancroft, I, Ch. I to IV; Prescott, "Conquest of Mexico," I, 217 et seq.; Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 213 et seq.; Heeren, 53 et seq. (par. 1–9); Merivale, 4.

³ *Supra*, pp. 209, 215.

⁴ Fiske fixes the date when "this wonderful manifestation of Spanish energy practically ceased" as 1570, and attributes this latter fact to her

During this early period the immediate returns from trade were not nearly as great as had been anticipated.¹ Remembering the preconceived idea that the eastern coast of the Indies had been reached and the consequent presumption that the wealth of the Orient there existed, it was certainly discouraging to find on these shores only unclothed savages, dense forests, and Indian huts.² For many years the Spaniards indefatigably sought the fabled abodes of mighty potentates.³ Columbus himself died in ignorance of the reality.⁴ The conquest of Mexico was the first considerable material recompense to cheer the drooping spirits of his compatriots, who, disappointed in their hopes and baffled in their efforts to reconcile the characteristic features of their possessions with those of the East Indies, were divided in opinion as to the practical benefits to be derived from them. The later discovery of gold mines in South America and the invasion of Peru⁵ soon following, were events which further increased the ardor of the people and awakened the interest of the government in the development of the dependencies.⁶

"entering upon another task . . . the attempt to suppress Protestantism in Europe and to subdue the revolted Netherlands," "Discovery of America, II, 555. How the other nations — more particularly the Dutch and the English — profited by this change in policy will clearly appear in subsequent chapters. Full details of the Spanish discoveries in the East may be found in "The Modern Part of a Universal History" (London, 1759), IX, 383-628.

¹ Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 497, 498; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 441; Washington Irving, "Columbus," I, 362.

² Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 497; II, 83; Raynal, III, 258.

³ "In an incredibly short time the adventurers of Spain overran the country. They plunged into forests, crossed rivers, ascended mountains, and endured hardships and fatigue, led on by mad visions of sudden wealth; no matter how fertile the soil, how pleasant its climate, or how rich its vegetation, no land could tempt them to settle." — F. W. BLACKMAR, "Spanish Institutions of the Southwest," 67.

⁴ Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 506 et seq.; "Conquest of Peru," I, 192; Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 390, 448, 476, 515; II, 30; in this connection the will of Isabella, who died in November, 1504, is interesting; cf. Zimmerman, I, 248.

⁵ For the Spanish power in Peru from a constitutional standpoint, cf. Moses, Ch. II; for more details of the actual conquest, cf. C. W. Markham, "History of Peru."

⁶ Merivale, 4, 5; Raynal, III, 365; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 442 et seq.; Prescott, "Conquest of Peru," I, 197. Gold was first discovered in 1496 on Hispaniola, Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 483; cf. *ibid.* II, 403, 408.

The moment for the adoption of a colonial policy was likewise auspicious.¹ Granada had just fallen; ² the united kingdoms of Castile and Aragon had, after a protracted and bitter struggle, crushed the power of the Moors. These wars being terminated, numbers of nobles and soldiers out of occupation were longing for a renewal of their hardy life.³ The very earliest expedition of Columbus comprised several such adventurers,⁴ while the eager search for the precious metals is indicative of their ambitions. Another element was the church.⁵ In Spain the fervor of the crusades had been perpetuated to that epoch by the proximity of the Mussulmans, in whose salvation or extermination the priesthood saw a holy calling. But the Moors now under their influence, and the entire nation legally and confessedly Christian, the clergy were looking for other fields of activity.⁶ Over and above all, the Crown was anxious to recoup the enormous expenditures occasioned by its military successes, as well as to procure employment for its idle aristocrats and captains.⁷ For these reasons the disclosure of a new world, not only as affording a place of action but equally as a probable source of revenue, was regarded as most opportune.⁸ The southern ports of

¹ For conditions in Spain at that time, cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, 3-4; Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 504.

² Isabella indeed required Columbus to await the fall of Granada before she would finally consider his project, Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 413.

³ Prescott, "Conquest of Mexico," I, 217; "Conquest of Peru," I, 193; Rosscher and Jannasch, 39; Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 463-479.

⁴ At the suggestion of Columbus many convicts were released from Spanish prisons upon condition that they accompany him to America on subsequent voyages, Raynal, III, 358 et seq.; W. Irving, "Columbus," I, 362.

⁵ "The religious factor played a very important part in the colonization of Spanish America, and the institutions of the country are not to be explained without great attention to this fact." — BLACKMAR, 53.

⁶ Columbus himself was moved by some fantastic idea of chastising or converting the Turks, Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 415 et seq.

⁷ "No reign perhaps can compare in volume and variety with that of the Catholic kings. From their untiring minister, Jimenez, to the ragged uplander, who was shipped to Messina with one of Gonsalvo's drafts, or to the longshore boatman who sailed with Columbus for Heaven knew where, every Spaniard seemed infected with his ruler's energy." — HUME, "Spain," 29.

⁸ For the curious combination of motives which led the Spaniards to embark on Columbus' enterprises, cf. R. and J. 41 et seq.; Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 214; Zimmerman, I, 225-227.

Spain consequently teemed with navigators and sailors fitting out for their projected enterprises. In the main, these men, by their energy and daring, achieved that which was desired; for, although the monetary profits were for a long time inconsiderable, these voyages helped to open up vast territories formerly unknown, and to bring a knowledge of them home to the people.

In this labor of exploration and extension of national supremacy the humble clergy strongly and beneficently co-operated.¹ Their earlier work, however marred in later years by corruption and despotic practices, is deserving of high eulogy. Side by side with the seekers of gold, the self-sacrificing, frugal priests toiled for the salvation of the Indians, unconsciously performing a far more momentous task in the introduction and diffusion of civilization. The church at its entry into the New World, divesting itself of the cruelties and persecutions in force in Europe, reassumed its primitive simplicity and benevolence. A striking evidence of the transformation of methods is the almost utter absence of the Inquisition, which was only rarely used in America.² One of the chief designs of the devout Isabella was the conversion of the heathen.³ Neither any means was forgotten nor any exertion considered too great to accomplish this one end. The lives of the Spanish missionaries form by their self-denial a strong contrast to the reckless careers of unscrupulous adventurers; going to dwell among the savages and to instruct them in religion, they abandoned home, friends, and magnificent places of worship for the solitudes of the wilderness. Moreover, the church, recognizing the humane motives of the Spanish Crown, subordinated the regulation of spiritual affairs to the state. The Council of the Indies, of which further mention will presently be made, was granted the privilege of veto over papal bulls concerning America. The Pope, likewise, in

¹ Heeren, 53 and 55 (par. 2-5); Cantu, VIII, 195 et seq.; Moses, Ch. IX. *Contra*: Merivale, 13 and 14; W. Irving, I, 197.

² First *auto-da-fé* in Mexico, 1574; in Peru, 1573, Moses, 260.

³ Cf. her will, Zimmerman, I, 248; *supra*, p. 237, note 4; W. Irving, "Columbus," I, 197, 361, 494.

1501 giving up all claims to financial management, and in 1508 waiving his pretended rights to patronage, the government was thenceforth intrusted with complete spiritual as well as temporal authority.¹ It was in the exercise of this guardianship over the welfare of the natives that Las Casas,² the first bishop of Mexico,—a sublime character in his benevolence and humanity, and a leading writer on Spanish-American history of that period,—discountenanced the use of the aborigines for hard labor; and accepted instead the suggestion to increase the number of African negroes imported for menial service, thus unwittingly tolerating—as he afterward realized—a slavery as baneful in its operations as the practical workings of the plans of his opponents.³ Still, notwithstanding this deplorable error of judgment, which did not develop in its full horror until a later epoch, the influence of the priesthood, especially of the Dominicans and the Jesuits, was for the general good.⁴

From the time of the original voyage of Columbus, Spain became in a limited degree a colonial power;⁵ for, after having lost upon this occasion one of his vessels by wreck, he concluded to leave some of his followers on the island of Hispaniola. Here, the Fort of the Nativity being built, a few men remained to trade with the inhabitants. This small company of intrepid mariners constituted the first historic community of Europeans on American soil. For long years the establishments of the

¹ Cantu, VIII, 186; R. and J. 140 et seq.

² The works of Las Casas are a prime source for the history of this period; cf. also an article by G. E. Ellis; Winsor, II, 299-342.

³ Although Herrera says, "If they (the slaves) are not hung, they never die, and prosper there like orange trees," Cantu, VIII, 122; Heeren, 57 (par. 8); E. J. Payne, 44; Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 495 et seq.; "Conquest of Peru," II, 235 et seq., where the arguments of Las Casas are stated at length; "Conquest of Mexico," I, 218; Bancroft, I, 124, who gives an excellent account of the origins of slavery. For brief sketch of Las Casas, cf. Prescott, "Conquest of Mexico," I, 371 et seq.; Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 437, 474.

⁴ For relations of the church with the Indians, cf. Moses, Ch. IX; Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 446 et seq.

⁵ Heeren, 25 (par. 4); R. and J. 4, 132; for particulars, W. Irving, "Columbus," I, 153; Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 438, 466, 481, 496; II, 483 et seq.; a work containing many details of the history of the Spaniards in these regions is Southey, "Chronological History of the West Indies."

Spaniards were mere forts, the more often temporary and easily removable as hearsay or the search for wealth dictated. Efforts were nevertheless continually made to create permanent settlements and to introduce agriculture. Free passages, exemption from taxation, free land under fixed conditions of cultivation, free seeds, free stock, and free trade with the mother country, were some of the inducements offered. A certain number of scientists and mechanics were employed to go out to give the necessary instruction to emigrants.¹ On the other hand, the government reserved these possessions exclusively for Spaniards; foreigners, Mussulmans, and Jews were not allowed in the colonies.² The absolute ownership of forests and mineral wealth was claimed for the Crown. On all gold found a license of 66 per cent was payable to the treasury.³ In spite of these restrictions and the excessive pretensions of the state, it must be admitted that the policy advocated and adopted by Spain at this date for the domestic development of its dependencies was comparatively enlightened and humane. The desire was to promote the interests of the colonists quite as much as the profit of the metropolis.⁴

Notwithstanding the spirit of the clergy, of wise legislation, and of special provisions for the protection of the natives, their lot, wherever they came in contact with the Spanish settlers, was unhappy.⁵ The popular impression that the heathen was inferior, in the scale of humanity, to the Christian, tolerated the exercise of harsh slavery and utter cruelty. Isabella

¹ W. Irving, "Columbus," I, 338, 361; Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 486; R. and J. 132.

² Blackmar, 297; Moses, 13, 56.

³ Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 486 (note); W. Irving, "Columbus," I, 336.

⁴ Moses, Ch. II; Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 486 et seq.

⁵ Fiske explains how Columbus himself believed it "a kindness to these cannibals to enslave them and send them where they could be baptized and rescued from everlasting perdition; and then again they could be received in payment for the cargoes of cattle, seeds, wine, and other provisions which must be sent from Spain for the support of the colony," "Discovery of America," II, 432, 435, 441 et seq.; cf. generally Leroy-Beaulieu, 11 et seq.; Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 496 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Econ. Pol." 123; Merivale, 5 and 6; Raynal, III, 354, 3 63 et seq.; IV, 3-10; Payne, 89.

proclaimed the absolute freedom of the Indians, but her own distant people, disregarding such edicts, undertook to justify themselves — perhaps conscientiously — by the assertion that only through bondage could the aborigines be brought under the influence of Christianity; for it is true that when at liberty the latter withdrew from intercourse with the whites. Still, this system of servitude weighed heavily upon them, and hastened their extermination.

Almost immediately upon the first return of Columbus to Spain, measures were taken to frame regulations for commerce with the Indies, as the regions¹ which he had visited were supposed to be.² A board of three was established at Seville to manage their affairs. In the rules prescribed by it, a high degree of magnanimity was manifested. Even over the protest of the great navigator,³ the privilege of making voyages to the New World was, upon certain terms, accorded to all private persons or organized associations.⁴ Any one might enter into competition upon agreeing to pay a percentage of his profits to the Crown. Judged by the standards of the age and by their professed objects, the laws of Ferdinand and Isabella for the conduct of business were not less discreet and liberal than those for administrative purposes.⁵

As soon as, under the impulse of these prudent methods, the commerce of Spain with its new possessions began to attain some volume, the government determined that a stronger supervision was necessary. In January, 1503, more ample powers were conferred upon the Board of Indian Affairs, and it became known as the Casa de Contratacion, so famous in

¹ Blackmar emphasizes the fact that the Spanish administrative system was largely based on Roman law; a circumstance which is not, however, astonishing, inasmuch as Spanish legislation itself originates in the same source.

² W. Irving, "Columbus," I, 195 et seq.; Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 460.

³ For privileges accorded to Columbus, cf. R. and J. 4, who cite Herrera, "Decadas," I, 1, 9.

⁴ Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 487; "Conquest of Mexico," I, 216; Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 486 (and note); II, 84, 90 et seq.; W. Irving, "Columbus," I, 335 et seq., 486.

⁵ For some details of these regulations, cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," I, 461.

Hispano-American history.¹ This body was not merely a commission of inquiry to obtain information concerning the colonies, but it also had the chief direction of their trade, and was even invested with the functions of a court of admiralty. The Royal Council of the Indies, subsequently created in 1571, at Madrid, as a tribunal of appeal and advice, while theoretically limiting its control, never deprived it of the principal authority over the dependencies. If restricted in its activity to the original designs of its founders, the Casa de Contratacion would have continued to be a most effective institution for the welfare of America, but, afterward perverted from its first intents, it in fact became one of the most pernicious elements in the oppression of Spanish rule. The policy of Spain prior to 1542 was in its general characteristics more enlightened than that previously elaborated by any other nation, and in its practical application was fully abreast with and adequate to the times.

¹ For a very clear description of the Casa de Contratacion and its powers, cf. Moses, Ch. III; also Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 490; Leroy-Beaulieu, 26.

CHAPTER IV

BRILLIANT PERIOD OF SPANISH COLONIZATION IN SOUTH AMERICA

As the reputation of the colonies for wealth gradually increased, their importance vastly augmented and the number of immigrants, attracted by their riches, steadily multiplied. To protect the Crown in its prescriptive rights, to maintain order among the colonists, and to settle the differences between them and the natives, a more complicated form of government was required. The royal ordinances of Charles V, published in 1542, mark this transition.¹ In that same year the Casa de Contratacion was remodelled. The earliest viceroy for Mexico was named in 1540, who, as well as the viceroy for Peru, first appointed in 1542, were the supreme representatives of Spain in the western hemisphere. Under each of them several governors and captains were placed. Again, the audiencias of the two provinces just mentioned were then inaugurated, as high courts of justice and advisory councils. At a later date the viceroys counted four and the audiencias ten. About the middle of the sixteenth century the old institutions for trade, so efficient in their day, were in many respects being rapidly outgrown, while the ultimate operation of the recently introduced regulations was destined to be baneful.²

Spain was undoubtedly at that time the chief European state; its empire was also the most extensive, even before its

¹ Heeren, 54 (par. 3); R. and J. 131; Moses, Ch. III; Herrera, "Historia General," dec. 7, lib. 6, ch. 5, quotes these laws in full; Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 418, 477, describes how they were received in America. The chief source of all statements concerning Spanish legislation for the colonies is "Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias."

² Cf. article by Markham, in Winsor's Collection, on South American Colonies of Spain.

absorption of the Portuguese possessions in 1580. Charles V and the Philips evinced as much intolerance and avidity in colonial affairs as in European politics. When, in 1542, the former promulgated his celebrated "New Laws," the story of Spanish misrule began. Already dreading the secession of the colonies and thinking by proper measures of repression to obviate such a contingency, Spain sought by every means to enfeeble their local administration;¹ but the principal preoccupation of the authorities was to extort the largest possible amount of revenue from the people. The policy was adopted of forcing the rapacious adventurers in America to share their spoils with the government. By virtue of monopolies, licenses, and duties, generally excessive in their scale, the Crown managed to secure for itself a goodly portion of the booty. But above all, the most characteristic feature of Spanish sovereignty was the corruption and tyranny of the viceroys and their subordinates.² In spite of the stringent edicts of a watchful and fearful king, they succeeded in abusing their trusts and reaping enormous illegitimate profits.³

The discovery by the Spaniards of considerable quantities of gold in their new territories was the signal for an exodus of daring spirits to those regions. Spain was not then overpopulated,⁴ nor was there any other special local reason to urge men to leave the fatherland, but the inducement beyond the Atlantic was too great to be resisted by these aspirants for military renown and more substantial rewards.⁵ The hordes

¹ Cantu, VIII, 187 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 19 et seq.

² *Ibid.*; *ibid.*; Prescott, II, 229 et seq.

³ Cf. Markham's article in Winsor's Collection. "The Spanish sovereigns always gave explicit instructions concerning the minutest details of procedure; even so small a matter as sending irons for branding cattle had to receive the royal sanction." — BLACKMAR, 162.

⁴ The population of Spain at the end of the fifteenth century was about 4,250,000, Zimmerman, I, 226; Moses, Ch. XI.

⁵ Prescott quotes Andrea Navagero, who then wrote, "Seville was so stripped of its inhabitants after the exodus to America had occurred, that the city was left almost to the women." For the indolent character of the Spaniards of that day, cf. R. and J. 41, 132; Cantu, VIII, 183-184; Leroy-Beaulieu, 3, 5; Hume says, "The colonists cared only for gold; they would not till the soil," "Spain," 85.

of individuals who then migrated to America were not moved by any high moral purpose; they came not even to found homes. At the best, they regarded their residence as temporary; for whenever riches should be amassed, they were to return to Spain for the enjoyment of them. Even in the pursuit of wealth these fortune hunters avoided hard labor. For gold they did not work the mines, but preferred the simpler plan of confiscating the accumulations of the natives.¹ Agriculture was unpractised and almost unknown. The South American staples of the present day, such as coffee, cocoa, rubber, sugar-cane, and cotton, were then only imperfectly grown and to a limited extent. Such a wise man as Peter Martyr exclaimed, "What need have we to cultivate in America that which can be equally well produced in Southern Europe?"²

The Spanish acquisitions, typically colonies by conquest, developed very slowly.³ In all Peru there were said to be not more than six thousand Spaniards in 1546, and their total in the western hemisphere in 1550 is estimated not to have exceeded fifteen thousand.⁴ In the eye of the law, the soil belonged exclusively to the king.⁵ He alone might grant it to whom he wished and upon such conditions as pleased him. Hence the multiple restrictions placed by the government upon the departure of subjects. Express royal permission was required; but this favor was only accorded to individuals whose family had for two generations been unconvicted of crime or heresy; and a person proposing to emigrate must also state an acceptable reason for his desire. To obtain the license to

¹ Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 442.

² J. B. Say, Pt. IV, Ch. XXII-XXIII; Leroy-Beaulieu, 5; Peter Martyr, "Ocean," dec. VIII, ch. 10.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 5 et seq.; R. and J. 133, 147. *Contra*, Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 446.

⁴ Moses, Ch. XI. "The effect on population is very uncertain; for evidence is conflicting. Some writers speak of severe restrictions placed on emigration and thus ascribe the lack of recruits in Spain to the exodus of every able-bodied man to America. A Venetian envoy describes Seville as being depopulated by emigration." — HUMPHREY, 91. *Supra*, p. 245, note 5.

⁵ Cantu, VIII, 183; R. and J. 133; Leroy-Beaulieu, 4.

leave Spain was a preferment which only the rich and powerful could gain; consequently the majority of those who went to America were of noble birth. The colonist must likewise determine his destination in advance; for after arrival by the most direct route, the privilege of removal to another province was not easily secured. Seville was the only authorized port of embarkation. Ship captains were, under heavy penalties, charged with the due observance of these regulations, the strict enforcement of which restrained emigration to insignificant proportions.¹

Although the Spanish Crown gave little thought to the adoption of methods to increase the colonial population, great haste was manifested in the organization of adequate governments. While citizens were not deemed absolutely necessary, governors, councils, and subordinate officials were needed to retain possession and to collect from the aborigines and settlers the tribute levied upon them. It is therefore not surprising to find elaborate and costly administrations set up in almost desert wastes.² Lands, together with their inhabitants, were distributed among the soldiers with prodigality.³ The system of *encomiendas*, or serfs attached to the soil, was inaugurated.⁴ The king, as high protector of the heathen, thus intrusted the care of a certain number of them to his chosen vassals. A sort of feudal order was built up. The grantees of these estates were sworn well and truly to defend the Indians and to promote by every possible means their political, religious, and social advancement. Any violation of this oath involved forfeiture of their rights. The natives on their side were bound to

¹ R. and J. 147 et seq., who cite Herrera, VIII, 3, 1; Benzoni, III, 21, and Gomara, "Hist. General de las Indias," Ch. 162; Leroy-Beaulieu, 6; Moses, 56-62; Hume, 266.

² Moses, 92-95.

³ The deed of a grant of land ran thus: "To you such a one is given an *encomienda* of so many Indians with such a *cacique*, and you are to teach them the things of our Holy Catholic Faith." — BLACKMAE, 59, who cites Herrera, "Hist. General de las Indias," V, Ch. XI; Helps, I, 194.

⁴ Cantu, VIII, 184; Merivale, 6, 11; Leroy-Beaulieu, 12 et seq.; R. and J. 4 et seq., 133 et seq.; otherwise known as *repartimientos*, a system which began to be inaugurated as early as 1499 in Hispaniola, Fiske, II, 434, 441; Prescott, "Mexico," III, 247, 344; Raynal, III, 450; IV, 355-356.

render agricultural services to their encomendero;¹ the laws formally prohibited any but the slightest association between them, in order to obviate abuses which might arise therefrom. The encomiendas were originally given for the most part only for a few generations; as their terms expired, they reverted to the Crown, which then took definite measures for the permanent welfare of the aborigines.² These tracts of land were frequently of immense extent and included several thousand people. Humboldt in his day mentions one which counted four cities, forty-nine villages, and nearly eighteen thousand individuals.³

The general plan selected for the protection of the Indians — with the exception of those in the mines and such as were under the control of the Jesuits — was to place them in a situation of legal minority.⁴ They were theoretically non-existent, and could not perform any binding act. At first this policy was to their advantage, as it guaranteed them against the rapacity of the Spaniards; but later, when their development and progress would have been beneficial for the colonies, their status proved a serious obstacle. Although the legislation of 1542 and subsequent years threw the strong arm of the state so efficaciously around these half-civilized wards, and marked the end of their earlier defenceless condition⁵ when thousands perished under the ruthless hand of their captors,⁶ still, great diversity of opinion prevails as to the strictness with which enactments relating to them were enforced.⁷ In any event their position constantly ameliorated, and it must be in justice admitted that, alone among the modern nations of Europe, Spain endeavored to accord to these waifs of Providence the

¹ For slavery in America, cf. Blackmar, 58. How Charles V tried to make the Indians live in villages, *ibid.* 120.

² "Recopilacion," VI, 2; I, 11, 14.

³ Humboldt, "Neuspanien," II, 166.

⁴ Merivale, 6; Leroy-Beaulieu, 11, 12.

⁵ Heeren, 56 (par. 6 note); Merivale, 6; R. and J. 133, 140.

⁶ R. and J. 132, who cite Benzoni, "Hist. del Mondo Nuovo," 4, 7 et seq., 138; cf. also Prescott, "Mexico," III, 410 et seq.; Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 435 et seq.

⁷ Benzoni contrasts the policy of Mendoza in Mexico with that of Nunes Vela in Peru, "Hist. del Mondo Nuovo," 58; R. and J. 138 et seq.

security of law. With due regard to their simplicity and ignorance, the treatment extended them was certainly commendable. The Crown made every effort to prevent their molestation or oppression.¹ All opportunity for misconduct on their own part was removed. The clergy voluntarily pardoned in them actions which in the whites would have been mortal sins; for the church indeed was preëminently the factor in their guardianship.² Spain alone not merely succeeded in preserving and perpetuating the stocks on the conquered soil, but indeed, improving, partially civilizing, and amalgamating them with Spanish blood, created mixed races of importance.³ In most other instances of colonization the invasion of the European has occasioned the annihilation of the aborigines.⁴

The solicitude for the natives was not without an ulterior motive.⁵ From the time of Charles V the Spanish government seemed intent upon the organization and maintenance of a kind of balance of power between them and the colonists. It was sought to attach both elements of the population directly to the Crown, so far as possible keeping them apart and antagonistic to each other.⁶ While thus the Indians enjoyed many privileges and the highest degree of legal protection, still they were not free from taxation; on the contrary, in business affairs they were subject to imposts very similar to those applicable to the whites; they paid, for instance, on wholesale transactions at the rate of five to fourteen per cent, as well as the internal revenue and capitation dues.⁷

The prevailing beneficent policy did not, however, extend to those employed in the mining regions.⁸ In these districts

¹ "Recopilacion," II, 18, 34; VI, 6, 10, 12, 42; De Sismondi, Twelfth Essay; Cantu, VIII, 188 et seq.; R. and J. 136, 137; Heeren, 56 (par. 6 note).

² R. and J. 136.

³ A fact probably due to some racial characteristic; contrast the habit of the French and the English in North America in regard to marriage with the Indians.

⁴ R. and J. 137 et seq.

⁵ *Ibid.* 138.

⁶ *Post*, p. 262.

⁷ Raynal, IV, 336-351; Cantu, VIII, 184.

⁸ For some account of the mines, cf. Raynal, III, 477-485; IV, 190-214, 360-362; for treatment of the Indians employed in them, cf. Noël, II, 133; Leroy-Beaulieu, 14.

every native from eighteen to fifty years of age was liable to six months' labor in the mines every three and a half years. This service was regarded as almost inevitably mortal, for, though strict regulations governing it existed, they were so violated that four-fifths of the individuals drafted died before their term of toil expired. Good pay they were promised, but a portion was reserved for food and other necessities furnished, while the rest and usually more was spent in liquor supplied by the employer. Thus the latter had their work, and in fact gave them little or nothing, while many of them were being constantly seized into slavery for debt.¹

The majority of the Spaniards who came to America managed to secure the gift of an *encomienda*.² They themselves, settling together in communities, were supported by the revenue collected from the aborigines on their landed possessions. The neglect of agriculture, contrary to the theory and practice of modern colonization, tended to the growth of towns. The same characteristic of a landscape without any scattered habitations, so noticeable in Spain, became the feature of Spanish America. Cities, in which the people huddled together, were always preferred to country districts. The development of densely crowded centres was, moreover, favored by the fear of the hostile savages.³ The laws, as is known, also prohibited the owner of a feudal estate from residing among his vassals;⁴ everything thus conduced to municipal life. The ordinary method in the establishment of such a corporation was the concession of all the privileges incidental thereto to some one person.⁵ He was generally authorized to construct the build-

¹ "The Spanish rulers, like the Spanish adventurers, looked to America for direct returns of gold and silver more than for any revenue from indirect sources." — LUCAS, III, 64.

² Cantu, VIII, 183 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 7.

³ "The consequence of this system was to maintain in the Spanish possessions a multitude of adventurers, — the dregs of Europe, — who were driven beyond the seas by the single desire to acquire gold and silver from the mines, to enrich themselves in the quickest way possible, in order to return to the Continent to enjoy their fortunes obtained by the oppression of the native peoples." — (tr.) NOZL, II, p. 132; *supra*, pp. 237 et seq., 245-246.

⁴ Raynal, IV, 386-390; Cantu, VIII, 184; *supra*, p. 248.

⁵ The Spaniards seldom erected new cities, but generally rebuilt and en-

ings, to dispense justice, and to appoint local officers, with the inheritance of the same powers to the two succeeding generations of his family. He was further obliged to set apart for the public edifices, to be erected by him, certain lands out of his grant, and then he might reserve others to his own use; the remaining ground and houses were distributed by lot to the first comers. These settlements, situated for the most part in the vicinity of the mines, absorbed practically the whole Spanish population.¹ Among them Lima, Mexico, and Quito became the most important.²

In the cities of Spanish America little real, healthy activity existed. Almost all the men might be classified into office-holders and place-seekers.³ The positions under the government were so arranged as to afford employment to many; while indeed graduates in the professions, aspiring to these appointments, came thither in much greater numbers than were required. For instance, at Caracas there were six hundred lawyers and judges among thirty thousand people. Multiplicity of litigation was not only one of the baneful ills of this new country, but one of its worst pests.⁴ Priests, doctors, and titled but idle gentry also abounded. The whites monopolized the official posts, and continued so to do for nearly three centuries. Notwithstanding the fact that the creoles became in time by far the more numerous, they were virtually excluded from the service of the Crown;⁵ to them the avenues of education, as well as those of social and political advancement, were in effect closed, although theoretically all citizens were equal before the law. Meanwhile the

larged those which belonged to the aborigines, Humboldt, "New Spain," II, 69; Ulloa, "Viaje á la America Meridional," V, 4.

¹ Heeren, 55 (par. 4); Merivale, 7, 8; Leroy-Beaulieu, 17, 18.

² For some account of the City of Mexico under the Spaniards, cf. Raynal, III, 490-499; of Lima, *ibid.* IV, 215-228.

³ Moses, Ch. II.

⁴ Leroy-Beaulieu, 9; R. and J. 152, 153 et seq. Depons (I, 63) divides the Spanish colonists into those who were ruined by litigation and those who were enriched by it; cited by R. and J. 156.

⁵ Of one hundred and sixty viceroys only four and of six hundred and two captains-general only fourteen were creoles, Zimmerman, I, 425; Heeren, 56 (par. 6); Merivale, II, 12, 14; Leroy-Beaulieu, 9.

Spaniards who did not procure the coveted favors lived in idleness and effeminacy. Absolute violation of the fundamental principles of wise administration and good order was thus for a long period tolerated; it was the avowed system of Spain.¹

The fixed policy of the parent state was to divide the inhabitants into several different grades; its effort was to create many independent communities, one within the other. Every authority on the subject of colonization accords to Spain full credit for its knowledge and skilful application of the motto "Divide et impera"—"Divide to rule."² The design which actuated this doctrine was to prevent any common union of feeling or spirit among the entire population. It was hoped that the dependence of the colonies upon the mother country would by this means be forever assured. Complete disruption was in fact realized. Cantu says there were in the Spanish possessions seven clearly defined castes;³ while others reckon even more. The distinction was based upon color. The names Chapeton, Creole, Mestizzo, Mulatto, Terceron, Quarteron, and Zambo are well known.⁴ In a region where whites, Indians, and negroes intermarried, a large number of various shades of skin and degrees of blood was the infallible result. Each formed a class; each section of this society, so manifold in its differentiation, held aloof, envious of that above it and disdainful of that below it. In this division the Spanish authority found its safeguard. The individuals of the lower ranks were the best friends to Spain, as they looked to the metropolitan government to redress their grievances against their intermediate but more directly to be feared superiors.⁵ At the top of the social scale, the white man stood pre-

¹ Moses, Ch. II. "But through a series of centuries every economic heresy, every wrong-headed experiment, every foolish nostrum, was allowed to work its worst upon the national industries, until they were ultimately strangled."—HUME, 89.

² Rosscher and Jannasch seem to think that this division of the colonial population into castes is a natural and inevitable consequence of conquest; "Kolonien u. Kolonialpolitik," 6; 149, 152; Merivale, 7, 8, 12; Heeren, 86 (par. 6); Cantu, VIII, 189; Leroy-Beaulieu, 4, 10.

³ Cantu, VIII, 189; R. and J. 149.

⁴ Raynal, IV, 325-336.

⁵ Moses, Ch. II.

eminent; he was the gentleman—alone so recognized and treated. When the Crown wanted to detach some popular leader from his partisans and, while honoring him, dislodge him from a position where he might do harm to the state, the patent of "white" was conferred upon him.¹ In the eye of the law this promotion was a benefit, for he was henceforth considered "white," and enjoyed the political and legal attributes of a white man; but being at the same time taken out of his sphere, he became the object of envy and hatred on the part of his former friends and admirers. Such advancement was therefore a doubtful compliment, frequently most profitably and adroitly used.

Discrimination of caste was not the only seed of discord which the Crown undertook to sow among the colonists. The natural jealousy of emigrants coming from various portions of the kingdom was accentuated and inflamed; provincial antipathies, so prevalent in every continental nation, were perpetuated; and the system of isolation enforced upon the settlers in America strongly tended to increase mutual mistrust. Free removal from one district to another was, because of legal obstacles, very difficult; hence intercourse and trade were almost paralyzed. Serious material hindrances also existed. The roads were left in impassable condition or were entirely wanting;² bridges were unbuilt, and even the seas, by reason of complex currents, rendered navigation between Mexico and the South extremely hazardous. New regional animosities were likewise fostered, so that lowlanders and highlanders, the seacoast dwellers and those residing on the interior plains, became inveterate enemies. Spain, in truth, left not a stone unturned to foment dissension among its American subjects.*

Nor did the terrible dismemberment which was engrafted on social life play a less important rôle in the political scheme. Above this conglomerate, disordered, disunited, shattered, entangled, and jarring mass of humanity, the viceroy, as the

¹ R. and J. 151; Leroy-Beaulieu, 11.

² Raynal, III, 487.

* R. and J. 151-159; Merivale, 8, 12, 18, 20; Leroy-Beaulieu, 16 et seq.

delegate of the royal authority in each colony, stood.¹ In the beginning he enjoyed semi-regal privileges; but through the growth of the influence of his councils or "audiencias," and by the creation of many captains-general, his jurisdiction was gradually curtailed.² The Crown always manifested a decided dread of its own appointees.³ While ostensibly commissioned to wield power, they were in practice deprived of it. As a rule, individuals of weak personality were selected; strong men were not desirable.⁴ During his seven years of office the viceroy was, as it were, set up in isolation on his pedestal. His court was magnificent, but every possible means was taken to restrain him from friendly association with the people of his territory. For example, he could not, while in the capital city, eat at the same table with any one outside of his own immediate family. Here, as elsewhere and on all occasions, the particulars of his conduct were minutely prescribed. When his term expired, he returned to Spain, where his administration was liable to a searching inquiry. Complaints of the most trivial nature might be lodged against him. As a matter of fact few of these royal representatives escaped unscathed;⁵ while many of them, it is undoubtedly true, were unscrupulous adventurers of the basest type.⁶

The audiencias and high courts of justice alone limited the viceroys in the exercise of their functions.⁷ The former, while professedly a sort of privy council, were in fact supervisory boards placed over the governor. Their chief duty was to report any misconduct or suspicious action on his part. They

¹ Cantu, VIII, 187; R. and J. 153; Merivale, 11 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 19, 20.

² Raynal, IV, 351, 352; Prescott, "Conquest of Peru," I, 198; R. and J. 153.

³ "It was the policy of the Castilian Crown to allow no one of the great colonial officers to occupy the same station so long as to render himself formidable by his authority." — Prescott, "Conquest of Peru," I, 233.

⁴ Many instances of such men are cited by Markham in his "History of Peru" (Winsor's Collection).

⁵ R. and J. 154.

⁶ Moses gives a good discussion of this phase of the system in Ch. IV, entitled, "Spanish Policy in America." Cf. also Markham, "History of Peru" (Winsor's Collection).

⁷ Cantu, VIII, 187; R. and J. 154; Leroy-Beaulieu, 20.

communicated directly with the Crown, and might, in case of necessity, give their instructions to the colonists. The members, who were of honorable position in Spain, were well paid, but were subject to detailed regulations quite as much as the viceroy himself.¹ The audiencias were naturally a thorn in the latter's life.²

The Council of India,³ the supreme ruling body, under the king, for America, was, as previously stated, created in 1571.⁴ Its members were of the utmost distinction and its authority for centuries was respected and unchallenged. Invested with royal prerogatives, its resolutions, when voted by a two-thirds majority, were final. In early days, by reason of its importance, this tribunal constituted a part of the court and followed the king wherever he went; subsequently it regularly convened at Madrid. Subordinate to this board was the old Casa de Contratacion, established in the time of Columbus, but after the organization of the Council of India, divested of its absolute control. Such was the system of society and of government elaborated by Spain for its possessions.

The extent of the Spanish territories is familiar to all. In time, they included entire South America, Central America, Mexico, and Greater California, besides the various West India islands. These vast regions were distributed into the viceroyalties of Peru and New Granada, with the captaincies-general of Guatemala, Porto Rico, and Caracas, and the viceroyalties of Mexico and Buenos Ayres, with the captaincies-general of Chili and Havana.⁵ The viceroys of Mexico and Peru received an annual salary of sixty thousand piasters, and those of New Granada and Buenos Ayres forty thousand piasters.⁶ The captains-general were paid about nine

¹ Raynal, IV, 352; R. and J. 155.

² Moses, Ch. IV.

³ For description of the Council of India, cf. Blackmar, 51.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 243. Heeren, 54 (par. 3); Cantu, VIII, 188; R. and J. 155; Leroy-Beaulieu, 20.

⁵ Heeren, 299 (par. 49); Cantu, VIII, 187.

⁶ Leroy-Beaulieu, 19. Viceroy of Mexico, twenty thousand ducats, viceroy of Peru, thirty thousand ducats; Moses, 85-90; cf. also Humboldt, "New Spain," V, 18 et seq.

thousand piasters each. These dignitaries were also the recipients of costly presents and large perquisites, so that generally they amassed millions during their incumbency.¹ Officials of lower rank were likewise bountifully remunerated, and had ample opportunity to gather riches, as the struggle for these positions testifies. Scarcely a white man lived in Spanish America who did not constantly maintain a lobbyist at Madrid to solicit an appointment or promotion.²

Brief reference must now be made to that institution which, while outside of the real administration of the colonies, effected in fact the most beneficial and benevolent work accomplished by Spain. The missionary service performed among the more remotely situated Indians by the Jesuit priests was inspired by high motives.³ These fathers, realizing what they by their sacrifices in Brazil, while under Portuguese rule, had done for the welfare of the aborigines, were anxious, when this colony fell into Spanish hands in 1580, to widen the field of their activities. Las Casas,⁴ one of the truly great men of his age, had previously inaugurated a similar project, which, although promising brilliant results, had met with such opposition as to be limited in its consequences.⁵ The government, therefore not entirely unacquainted with the system of the Jesuits, welcomed them with pleasure. From the time of Isabella it had been seeking means to ameliorate the condition of the savages and to convert them to Christianity, but such plans had always been thwarted or evaded by its own disobedient subjects. As the Crown benefited through the labor of the priests by the extended recognition of its authority over immense areas of country and over vast numbers of the natives, so it willingly

¹ Depons, II, 23; Robertson, II, 343; Leroy-Beaulieu, 19.

² Offices were sold in Madrid to the highest bidder, Merivale, 11; Leroy-Beaulieu, 9.

³ Cf. Moses, Ch. IX, entitled, "The Jesuits and the Indians"; Prescott, "Conquest of Peru," II, 233-237; R. and J. 161; Leroy-Beaulieu, 21 et seq.; *supra*, p. 239.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 240. Cf. Works of Las Casas; also Markham's "Essay on South American Colonies" in Winsor's Collection, and Baralt y Diaz, "Hist. de Venezuela," I, 306.

⁵ For this early missionary service by Las Casas, cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 464 et seq.

bore the preliminary expense. These advances were subsequently at least in part reimbursed, as for every individual who came under their care and protection the Jesuits annually paid one dollar into the Spanish treasury.

As elsewhere stated, white colonists were not tolerated in the tracts exclusively reserved to the Indians; into these regions the fathers alone penetrated, picked out a favorable location, and began to communicate with the inhabitants. The arrival of the monks, the messengers of peace, was so different from the invasion of pillaging troops as to puzzle these simple-minded people; at first they hesitated; then, when fully reassured, they soon became friendly and finally confidential. A village, with its church, school, guest house, priests' home, and public square, was laid out, the surrounding fields cleared, a few cattle and the necessary seed supplied at the cost of the state. Four to six soldiers were also detailed as a guard for each establishment; small forts, garrisoned by seventy or eighty men, were likewise scattered throughout the districts of the missions. The lands were tilled in common by the aborigines under the supervision of the priests, and, after the products required for their own support had been set aside, the surplus was sold for the profit of the community. With this money improvements were made, agricultural implements bought, and many luxuries obtained. Considerable sums, of course, were expended upon church ornaments and furniture. Exports not unimportant in quantity and value were shipped to Spain, and the purchases made in that country were always extensive. Thus the missions helped to build up international trade.

Although intercourse with the whites was as far as possible avoided, still each settlement provided temporary accommodation free to all; but only very rarely was the passing traveller permitted to remain more than one night, and then not any direct communication with the natives was allowed; monks were constantly in his company. As might be presumed, the latter, if left untrammelled, would have had many opportunities to amass wealth; perquisites of every kind were, however, strictly forbidden. In the beginning this regulation was almost

universally observed, but subsequently some flagrant instances of its violation occurred. To the credit of the order, nevertheless, it must be stated that the most zealous of its members were content to live on the pitiful salary granted to them. Beyond their daily task they sought not the world, but, in the silent desert or wilderness, achieved results far more enduring and more fruitful than all the widely heralded conquerors by the sword. They introduced to the savages the knowledge of primary education, of crude industry, of agriculture, of architecture, of municipal government, of social usages, of commerce and trade. Ordinarily only two monks resided at each of these stations, the elder superintending the religious and intellectual department, the younger the material and economic branches. Together the fathers directed the most minute details of life; and frequently for a mere whim of the superior the establishment was removed to some other place.¹

The first and most remarkable of the missions was located in Paraguay, and dated from 1609.² Others were situated throughout the Spanish colonial possessions, the greater number being founded in the seventeenth century, some in the first half of the eighteenth, and a few, chiefly those of northern California, as late as 1772 to 1784. The population of these communities varied from two hundred to three thousand individuals, the larger being near the seacoast. Many, by reason of their wealth and production, attained importance. Other orders, such as the Dominicans and Franciscans, undertook to enter this sphere of activity, but never met with success in their endeavors. The three cardinal principles of all these organizations were, to convert the heathen to Christianity, to protect them against the contamination of the white man, and to render them self-supporting.

The exertions of the Jesuits were undoubtedly sincere. Their conscientious struggles and noble self-sacrificing lives

¹ For details of the mission system, cf. Blackmar, 112, 151.

² Cf. J. Pfotenhauer, "Die Missionen der Jesuiten in Paraguay"; also Moses, Ch. IX.

form a strong contrast with the idleness, profligacy, and avarice of the other priests of their age, inhabiting the cities and well-populated regions. Their immediate influence was enormous in its effect on the development of native resources and their direction in proper and profitable channels, while the ultimate consequences in the stimulation of trade and the extended knowledge of America and its products transmitted to the nations of Europe, were without doubt even still more permanent. The most prosperous period of the missions was just prior to the middle of the eighteenth century.¹ Pombal, the famous Portuguese premier of that time, was their inveterate enemy; by a law forbidding the clergy to enter into commerce, he succeeded in suppressing the Jesuits in Brazil. Then, unfortunately for them, by an exchange of provinces with Spain, Portugal acquired control of their chief field of operations in South America. Here they naturally fell. Subsequently some scandals, connected with their administration, were called to the notice of the Pope, and in 1773 the order was finally dissolved. Other monks, sent to replace them, were badly received by the Indians; these latter revolted, fell into disputes of an internecine nature, and the vast fabric erected by the fathers crumbled within a few years. But the impress of their institutions remained; so that, if they are now judged by the achievements of their prime, it must be said, well and faithfully done.²

¹ Cf. J. Pfitenhauer, "Die Missionen der Jesuiten in Paraguay."

² For description of missions, besides the authorities already cited, cf. Raynal, III, 525, 526; IV, 298-325; Von Ranke, "History of the Popes," II, 229 et seq.; Prescott, "Charles Fifth," II, 323 et seq.; Rosscher and Jannasch, 141 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Pol. Econ.," 127; Payne, 91, 94; Cantu, VIII, Ch. XI, 195 et seq.; Merivale, Lect. X, 285 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 15, 16. The sources are Humboldt, "Relation Historique," 373, and Depons, II, 136 et seq.

CHAPTER V

COMMERCIAL POLICY AND DECADENCE OF SPANISH COLONIZATION

ATTENTION is now once more to be turned from the tranquil solitudes of Christianizing and civilizing effort back to the consideration of the busy marts of scheming and speculating men, while at the same time the most self-interested and least sensibly managed branch of Spanish activity is to be reviewed; for in its commercial policy of early days Spain was extremely arrogant and unwise. The distinctive characteristics of Spanish rule in its different periods are here also the most apparent; from 1542 to 1700 the history of colonial trade is in many respects unique.

The establishment of the colonies gave a strong impetus to industry.¹ To supply with manufactured products these new markets aroused the greatest energy throughout Spain.² Not only sailors on the sea found steady employment, but workmen in every department felt the influence of the American demand.

¹ "Indeed the orders were so numerous that ten years' labor, according to the estimates then made, would not have sufficed to fill them. Workmen consequently multiplied, and under Philip II, Seville, where the trade with America was concentrated, employed sixteen thousand looms for weaving cloths and silks, and more than one hundred and thirty thousand hands. Shipping increased in like proportion, so that at the beginning of the sixteenth century Spain owned more than one thousand merchantmen." — CANTU, VIII, 185. For later prejudicial effects of monopoly on Spanish industry, cf. *ibid.*; also Smith, "Wealth of Nations," as quoted *supra*, p. 221, note 2; also Payne, 51. The expulsion of the Moriscoes in 1613 likewise contributed materially to the decline of Spanish prosperity, Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 567, 562; Raynal, IV, 376-392.

² "Thus it fell about that Spain became for a short space a manufacturing country. . . . The hands in Toledo were quintupled between 1525 and 1550. In some towns beggars and vagabonds were forced into the factories." — HUME, "Spain," 83.

It was this traffic which the Crown sought to reserve to its subjects and to control for its own profit; the theory seems to have been that, if the people were protected in its exclusive enjoyment, they could well afford to submit to the regulations prescribed by the government. In its mercantile organization Spain adopted the antiquated notion of a prohibitive monopoly.¹ Jealousy of rivals and fear of competitors were the two prime motives by which the state was guided. Working along this line of thought, an unequalled system of restriction was elaborated.²

It is already known how the Casa de Contratacion was inaugurated at Seville,³ how every person going to America must there embark, and how practically all transatlantic commerce was limited to that one port. The kingdom of Castile, which had originally borne the cost and risk of the enterprises of discovery, was determined to reimburse itself. Seville was therefore at first the chosen place; but natural causes steadily worked against it, for the Guadalquivir gradually filled up, and ships constantly grew larger, until finally, in 1720, that city was abandoned in favor of Cadiz.⁴

The most unreasonable provision, having the most obvious effect, related to the number of vessels which might participate in the American trade.⁵ For the purpose of better supervising the imports, only two squadrons of merchantmen were annually permitted to sail. These fleets were restricted to twenty or twenty-seven transports. Porto Bello, the point of destination, became, for Peru and Chili, the metropolis, to and from which harbor wares were conveyed overland by mules. Upon the arrival of the cargoes feverish animation pervaded this little town.

¹ The system of Spain was a state monopoly as distinguished from that of a company, Moses, Ch. XI. "Spain tried to create a government of monopoly instead of granting a monopoly to companies." — BLACKMAR, 49.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 23, 24; Heeren, 58 (par. 9); Cantu, VIII, 185 et seq.

³ *Supra*, p. 242. Heeren, 58 (par. 9); Cantu, VIII, 188; Merivale, 8 et seq.; R. and J. 162 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 26.

⁴ At first "all trade [had] to go through Seville; later Cadiz was favored." — BLACKMAR, 297; Raynal, IV, 371, 372; R. and J. 162.

⁵ Heeren, 58 (par. 9 note); Merivale, 9; Cantu, VIII, 185 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 27.

The strictest formalities were observed in the transactions connected with the sale and exchange of merchandise; the admiral, and the governor of Panama met, in advance, to fix prices, unless, as it sometimes happened, the home authorities had furnished the quotations at which articles must be sold and accepted. After such negotiations as were necessary, the goods were landed and a fair was held. Vera Cruz was, for Mexico and Central America, the port of entry; thither Spanish galleons went every three years. While a duly recognized trading company did not exist in Spain, the actual outcome of these methods was quite as monopolistic and deplorable. The merchants of Seville naturally soon obtained control of the sea caravans; for their community and identity of interests caused them to act in unison. On the other side of the ocean, in Mexico and Lima, the dealers were organized as close corporations. By agreement or intuition, the supply was always less than the demand. Spain, careful not to allow any competition with itself, also strictly proscribed intercolonial commerce. Scarcity and high values were the aims in view. How well these measures succeeded and how much the masses endured is readily appreciated, when it is remembered that profits of one hundred to three hundred per cent were realized. The colonial market was treated as a vast field for inordinate speculation.¹

Likewise, in respect to their exports, the inhabitants of America were harassed with similar regulations.² The cultivation of such fruits and crops as were common in Spain was forbidden,³ and the transportation of colonial manufactures thither was not tolerated. The most burdensome condition was the usually existing surplus of products, pre-

¹ Cf. Moses, Ch. IV, entitled "Spain's Economic Policy in America"; Raynal, III, 554-558; IV, 228-237, 372, 376; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," Ch. VII, Pt. 2; Merivale, 9; Cantu, VIII, 186; Leroy-Beaulieu, 27, 28; R. and J. 163 et seq.; Markham, "Essay on South American Colonies of Spain," in Winsor's Collection.

² Cf. Markham, "Essay," as cited; R. and J. 165 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 28, 29.

³ "Spain forbade the cultivation in the colonies of such raw products as came into direct competition with the home industries."—BLACKMAR, 297.

pared and destined for exportation. As the fleets could take only a certain portion of these articles, and their shipment to other countries was prohibited, the excess above that purchased by the Spaniards formed a total loss. Failure to sell at the time of the great fairs enervated the colonists and involved them in despair and ruin. The majority of them were yearly doomed to this ill luck; but those residing the farthest from the ports suffered the most severely because of the difficulty and additional expense of bringing their wares to the seaboard.¹ The worst feature of the entire Spanish commercial administration was its red tape, and intricate mechanism.² Honestly to comply with the various statutes and rules caused incalculable trouble, delay, and cost, while non-observance of the most minute detail meant extortionate fine and generally confiscation of goods. The practical result of the multiple requirements of law was the suppression of much of the energy of the people.³

A lack of knowledge and a want of adequate organization, also, frequently contributed to disasters which otherwise might possibly have been avoided.⁴ Spain was as fearful of the introduction into the colonies of ideas as of material commodities. Many books were placed under the ban; every dealer in America must keep a catalogue of his stock on hand and annually furnish the authorities of the Inquisition with an advance list of the works which he proposed to offer during the year. The seller or purchaser of an interdicted volume was subject to heavy amends.⁵ Literature, indeed, was always discountenanced. Secrecy was the watchword of the Crown, and any information concerning the affairs or relations of the dependencies was rigorously concealed.⁶

To a policy wherein the colonists themselves were so grievously oppressed, the exclusion of foreigners from Spanish territories was an inevitable corollary.⁷ Strenuous care was taken

¹ R. and J. 166.

² "Spain's difficulty has always been that she has so many sides, so many alternative policies." — HUMPH, 2.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 30.

⁶ Moses, Ch. XI.

⁴ R. and J. 157.

⁵ Leroy-Beaulieu, 21.

⁷ Merivale, 10; Leroy-Beaulieu, 24 et seq.

to guard against exterior competition on American markets. All Europe, as a fact, was envious of these realms, and any state which had dared would have liked to seize them. In early times Spain was perhaps justified; but the penalties were out of proportion to the misdemeanors and in the light of modern civilization appear barbarous. Without special permit, trade with individuals of other nationality was punished by death and loss of merchandise; such persons landing on Spanish soil were liable to execution or to forced labor.¹ Only when the fallacy of these measures, as indicated by the decline of commerce, was realized were the sentences commuted into certain licenses and taxes.² Still the Spanish colonies were almost impossible places of residence for strangers, owing to their persecution by the Inquisition. Until 1750 the arrival of an alien vessel off the coast precipitated international complications. This attitude, perchance admissible in the age within which it was assumed, long outlived the day when rationally it should have been abandoned.

As the other European countries peopled their West Indian acquisitions, this tyrannical system, seconded by the desire of the colonists to dispose of their surplus stocks, unsold to Spain, led to the inauguration of contraband trade.³ This traffic soon became quite as important as the volume of regular business, and, in fact, conduced much more to the development of South America. With the protracted existence of such an abnormal situation the perversity of Spanish theories is at once recognized.

While illegal transactions were increasing, legitimate commerce was constantly declining. At the height of its prosperity the total never exceeded in amount that of one of the smallest English possessions.⁴ The greater the flow of precious metals from America the more Spain imagined its wealth sufficient and well assured forever; its inhabitants commenced

¹ R. and J. 158 et seq. As based on the "Recopilacion," IX, 27, 14, 7 et seq.; Blackmar, 27; Moses, 13, 56.

² Moses, Ch. XI.

³ Cantu, VIII, 186; R. and J. 161 et seq.; Merivale, 15 et seq., 17; Leroy-Beaulieu, 30, 31.

⁴ R. and J. 166.

to disdain industry. Those engaged in manufactures were said to be employed in "low and base occupations."¹ The respect formerly manifested for manual labor was forgotten.² Abandonment of their usual pursuits reduced the people to the position of factors for other nations; they not any longer shipped their own wares to the colonies, but preferred to import the products of other races for reexportation.³ It was found easier to act as broker than as producer. The collection of percentages, taxes, and export duties on others' goods was considered quite as remunerative as more tedious toil.⁴ The Spaniards failed for some time to appreciate the instability and debasing influence of their passion for easy and quick profits. Gold and luxury hastened their decadence.⁵

Jealousy and cruelty also caused the colonists to be distrustful and hateful of Spanish rule; they resented the poverty which the metropolis by its faulty legislation imposed upon them. While governors and petty officials returned to the old country at the end of their term of service enriched by their ill-gotten gold and silver, the settlers themselves, for want of unhampered markets and active exchanges, stagnated in idleness and struggled with distress, when they did not actually resort to smuggling for a livelihood.⁶ As they, in the natural course of affairs, developed larger and more varied needs, so they groaned more and more under the torments of restriction and oppression.⁷ Finally, realizing the magnitude of its losses,

¹ "The white man and the black cannot work side by side on equal terms, hence manual labor came to be regarded by the Europeans as degrading." — G. MCCALL THEAL, "South Africa," II, 34.

² For interesting comments, cf. Zimmerman, I, 43 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 25, 26.

³ "And indeed as things are now [about 1700] managed, she wastes her unhappy subjects, the Indians, and her still more unhappy negro slaves, in digging gold and silver for other people." — HARRIS, "Voyages," 164.

⁴ R. and J. 174.

⁵ Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 334, 399, 442; Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 445.

⁶ "Riches gained without labor produce no extended or lasting prosperity. . . . The true basis of wealth is industrial production. . . . Beneficent ends cannot be obtained by means which disregard human suffering or trample on human rights." — HUME, "Spain" (Preface).

⁷ Raynal, IV, 392-402.

perceiving that other European states were expanding in territory as well as in power, and in part compelled by force, Spain began in some degree to yield to the changed conditions.¹ At the commencement of the eighteenth century this nation seems at last to have resolved to endeavor to rescue the trade of its colonies and to recover its former prosperity; from 1714 to 1788 it therefore labored by heroic remedies to redeem its waning fortunes.

Philip V of Anjou ascended the Spanish throne in 1700; for thirteen years the War of the Succession was waged; the Treaty of Utrecht, which in 1713 closed it, marked the first modification in national policy.² Already during the period of this conflict the harbors of Chili and Peru had been provisionally opened to the French merchants of St. Malo. By the terms of peace the English were accorded the right of supplying forty-eight hundred slaves annually to South America, and of sending a merchant ship of five hundred tons to the fair of Porto Bello; as a matter of fact they not only soon violated this latter provision by despatching a bigger vessel and subsequently several, but even went so far as to establish factories in the more important places; the contraband traffic prosecuted from Jamaica also augmented. These concessions and events proved disastrous to Spanish commerce, which rapidly decreased during the next thirty years.³ From 1739 to 1748 Spain and England were again involved in hostilities.⁴ It was then conclusively settled that neither of the two races — Anglo-Saxon or Latin — was thenceforth to be excluded from intercourse with the western hemisphere.⁵ In 1748 the annual sea caravans being abolished, Panama and Porto Bello at once lost their prominence, while Buenos Ayres, previously

¹ Heeren, 205 (par. 17); Leroy-Beaulieu, 31.

² Heeren, 205 (par. 18).

³ By the Treaty of Utrecht, the right of *asiento*, or of supplying slaves to the Spanish colonies, was also transferred from France to England; for details, cf. Southey, "West Indies," II, 207-208; also Leroy-Beaulieu, 32; R. and J. 168 et seq.

⁴ The Spanish War, Heeren, 205 (par. 18).

⁵ Cf. generally, Markham's "Essay" in Winsor's Collection; also R. and J. 168.

noted only as a smuggling centre, experienced a corresponding impulse.¹

Meanwhile, at home, Spain was reforming its method of rule.² The Council of the Indies, the puissant but antiquated authority over the colonies, was being deprived of many of its functions. The ministry of the same name, first created in its stead as an experiment, was short-lived. The government of the American possessions was then distributed among five Ministers of the Crown. This division of responsibility, though destroying the harmful influence of the Indian Council, itself resulted in an administration which, because of its complexity and lack of unity, was equally as slow moving and pernicious.³ It frequently happened that the Spanish representatives in America, subordinate to different departments, would receive instructions flatly contradictory to each other. Situated as they were, two to three thousand miles from the capital, much friction thus occurred; and the want of well-directed, harmonious action was fatal to prosperity.

Cadiz, also, still remained the sole city of Spain permitted to participate in the colonial trade; in which — theoretically free to all Spaniards — only those who could afford to purchase the dearly bought licenses might engage. While the English were making the most of their opportunities at Porto Bello, the Dutch had surreptitiously seized control of mercantile affairs at Caracas. In this neighborhood the largest quantity of cocoa in the world was grown; ⁴ and for that article the Spanish demand was the greatest. Yet in sixteen years only one ship sailed from Caracas to Spain, and in twenty years only five vessels accomplished the voyage in the opposite direction. The Dutch in the meantime securing a monopoly, the Spanish Crown finally awarded the privileges of this district to a private organization known as the Guipuzcoan Trading Company.⁵ By this latter association regular communication

¹ Raynal, IV, 402-438; Merivale, 16 et seq.

² Moses, Ch. XIII.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 30. For chronology, cf. Winsor, 511-556.

⁴ Raynal, IV, 90-94.

⁵ *Ibid.* IV, 94-105; Southey, "West Indies," II, 275; Heeren, 205 (par. 17 note); R. and J. 167; Leroy-Beaulieu, 32.

between San Sebastian and Caracas was inaugurated; the production of hides, cattle, and cocoa decidedly increased, and a generally marked revival occurred in the colony.¹ It was the first promise of a happy issue to the reforms undertaken and uninterruptedly pursued by the Bourbon dynasty.

An effort being made, in 1748, to open other seaboard cities to the American trade, so many failures ensued at Cadiz as to force the authorities temporarily to desist in their plans. In 1764 Charles III instituted monthly packet-boats between Corunna and Havana; every two months there was a like service for Buenos Ayres, whence supplemental branch lines ran to numerous other places. In 1765 traffic with the West Indies was declared accessible to all Spaniards, upon payment of a tax of six per cent on the value of the cargo. The arrivals in Cuban waters rose annually from six vessels in 1765 to more than two hundred in 1778. From 1765 to 1770 the duties collected at Havana tripled, and the exports of the island augmented fivefold. Cuba and Porto Rico, to which this experiment at first alone applied, were then the least important of the Spanish territories. The government long hesitated to yield its monopoly in the other dependencies. Hence the chief establishments were the last to which liberal treatment was accorded. The benefits of a modified policy granted to Cuba in 1765 were, however, conceded in 1768 to Louisiana; in 1770 to Campeche and Yucatan; in 1778 to Peru, Chili, Buenos Ayres, New Granada, and Guatemala; and in 1788 to New Spain.² The ban on intercolonial transactions was likewise removed in 1774, and the Spanish rates on many imported articles lowered.³ The state, in its endeavors to be impartial to these regions and so far as possible to equalize their prosperity, even divided their ports into two classes, *the greater* and *the less*, or the more and the less favorably situated; on those to which nature had been the most gracious, the Crown prescribed the higher scale of imposts and dues, with the intent to drive

¹ R. and J. 292.

² Heeren, 300 (par. 50); R. and J. 169.

³ *Ibid.* 169 et seq.

shipping to the inferior harbors.¹ Under the propitious influence of these vast ameliorations the colonies made rapid progress in the later years of the eighteenth century. From 1778 to 1788, for example, the volume of their commerce with the mother country multiplied ninefold and the revenue derived by Spain from their imports in similar proportion. South American agriculture and cattle raising also promptly felt the beneficent effects of the adoption of more enlightened doctrines.²

The two abiding characteristics of Spanish colonization from the administrative point of view are the attempt to reproduce European methods in the New World and the persistent suspicion and mistrust shown toward the colonists. A fully developed form of rule was introduced among a simple, untutored people.³ Favoritism was fostered and every man became a detective set over his neighbor. Under such conditions any free and homogeneous growth was out of the question. Such perfection as was attainable was achieved at the very first; dry decay and corruption naturally followed. Spain at the end of the eighteenth century, failing to accompany its commercial reforms with the requisite changes in political organization, still considered the colonies as furnishing thousands of lucrative posts for its citizens. Multitudes of strange Spaniards, invading these possessions, regarded the masses as their legitimate prey. Their object was to accumulate wealth for support in their retirement when they again returned home; for few, if any, of the office-holders established their permanent residence in America. The government also, clinging to the caste system, with all its absurdities of envy and hatred, continued to sacrifice the civil welfare of its subjects to the principle of division for rule.⁴

Another evil factor was the priesthood;⁵ for, little by

¹ R. and J. 170, who cite Depons, II, 357.

² Merivale, 17 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 32 et seq. For other details of Spanish commerce, cf. McCulloch, "Dictionary of Commerce," article "Colonies."

³ Heeren, 56 (par. 6).

⁴ *Supra*, p. 252 et seq.; Merivale, 28 et seq.; R. and J. 171; Leroy-Beaulieu, 34.

⁵ Raynal, IV, 352-355; Merivale, 13 and 14; Leroy-Beaulieu, 21; *contra*, Cantu, VIII, 196 et seq.

little, the primitive uprightness and honesty of the clergy were lost. Except in the missions the temptations speedily increased. Freedom from the rigor of the Spanish hierarchy and the inducement of riches in tenths attracted many low-minded, weak-kneed priests to America. Here, in the populous centres of life, constantly declining in respect, they degenerated in profligacy and debauchery, until they became a scourge to the inhabitants. Among the chief obstacles to the development of the country was the large extent of the landed estates which the church gathered into its hands in perpetuity or *mainmorte*.¹ In some provinces at the time of the insurrections it owned eighty per cent of the real property, and in several cities the monasteries covered seventy-five per cent of the total area, while the number of monks was immense.

During the three hundred years of Spanish supremacy the colonists were growing in civilization, intelligence, and power. When the eighteenth century closed, the heroic and brilliant example of the North American Revolution was well known to them. Within the first years of the nineteenth century Brazil, a nation in their midst, was also preparing to achieve its independence. The Spanish Americans felt that they likewise had long enough worn the shackles which bound them. Even the reforms granted had only rendered them the more ready for the acquisition of their liberty. Spain was about to experience the unfortunate termination of its protracted policy of oppression. Civil commotions began as early as 1806 at Caracas; in 1810 the people of Venezuela presented to the regent the following demands:—

- “1. Equality of rights of all citizens with those of the inhabitants of the mother country.
2. Freedom of cultivating all products and manufactures.
3. Freedom of importation and exportation from and to all Spanish and friendly harbors.

¹ “In the year 1749 the income of the church was equal to the entire revenue of the state, about 321,000,000 reals.” — BLACKMAR, 44. If such was generally the condition, is it strange that in the colonies the same greed was shown?

4. Free trade between Spanish America and the possessions of Asia.

5. Free trade between Spanish America and the Philippines.

6. The abolition of commercial monopolies, indemnification being taken by way of duties.

7. Freedom of working the quicksilver mines.

8. The reservation of one-half of the public offices in South America for American-born citizens.

9. The establishment of a junta in each capital to guarantee the execution of these reforms.

10. The restoration of the Jesuits for the conversion and education of the Indians."

This statement was in brief the record of three centuries of misrule.¹

Spain refused to yield; the consequences were inevitable. Venezuela declared its independence July 5, 1811, but attained it only after a twelve years' war, in 1823.² New Granada rebelled in 1810, was successful in 1819, and was afterward temporarily united with Venezuela under the name of Colombia. The revolution also broke out in Mexico in 1810 and lasted until 1821, when Spain acknowledged defeat. In the same memorable year (1810) the fourteen provinces of Rio de la Plata, or Buenos Ayres, also revolted; their liberty was won in 1816. Chili fought from 1810 until 1818, when the Spaniards were finally routed. The last Spanish territory on the American mainland was Peru. There the struggle endured the longest and thence the Spaniards were not driven until 1824. Then Bolivar, the deliverer of Colombia, crossing the frontier, forced them to evacuate the capital city of Lima. Until 1826 a few Spanish soldiers still maintained a foothold in the interior. Guatemala, in 1821, and Bolivia, in 1825, likewise became free states.³ Unfortunately all these new re-

¹ Heeren, 459 (par. 15, 16 note); Merivale, 28 et seq. Cantu, XII, 420 et seq.; R. and J. 176; Leroy-Beaulieu, 34.

² Cf. Baralt y Diaz, "Résumé de la Historia de Venezuela."

³ Cf. Markham, "Essay," in Winsor's Collection.

publics subsequently required many years to attain conditions of political stability. In many ways, therefore, their emancipation appears to some writers to have been premature; but, if so, Spain alone is to blame for the evil results of its tutelage.¹

When the Spanish troops abandoned Peru, the flag of Spain forever disappeared from the American continent; for California, Louisiana, and Florida had already ceased to be Spanish. Louisiana, ceded by France to Spain in 1762, had been restored to its former owner in 1800, and ultimately in 1803 sold to the United States; Florida, in 1819, had been purchased by the Union; and California, as a part of Mexico, had expelled the Spaniards in 1822. Thus there remained to Spain in the western hemisphere after its South American disasters only the two islands of Cuba and Porto Rico.

Prior to the discussion of Spanish colonial history in the nineteenth century only one further question must be considered. Some attention must now be devoted to the influence reciprocally exercised by the colonies upon the metropolis.² Not any one can fail to perceive what an immense preponderance the discovery of Columbus gave Spain in European politics of the sixteenth century. Its possessions entitled it to rank and recognition as the first European power. Until the War of the Succession its position was unchallenged; not any nation sought to attack this supremacy. In that conflict, however, England showed that she was henceforth to be the most dreaded rival of Spain in distant enterprises. Their American domains not only vouchsafed Charles V and Philip II a moral superiority, but they also furnished them the sinews of finance with which to fight their battles in Europe. It was in the economic point of view that their transatlantic empire was apparently most important. The surplus profit derived from it for the treasury, especially in early days, was

¹ An excellent brief history of the Spanish-American states since their independence is given by Payne in his "European Colonies," Ch. XVI-XXII, pp. 230-353; generally, R. and J. 176 et seq.

² Merivale, 146; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," Ch. VII, Pt. 3 (certain paragraphs); R. and J. 170 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 35 et seq.

reckoned to be enormous.¹ Still the Crown was never provident of these riches, but expended them recklessly and frequently in barren and entirely unprofitable schemes.² Except in the ability to wage war little benefit was derived from its reputed colonial wealth. The streams of precious metals flowing from America to Spain, although vastly overestimated, were under the prevailing commercial system at one time sufficiently great materially to depreciate their values.³ The accumulation of gold and silver in the country raised prices of Spanish products so much as to render competition with other European peoples impossible.⁴ Considering, nevertheless, the total of receipts and expenditures for the various colonies, it is certain that Spain never realized a sum adequate to compensate for the lack of the larger returns which might have been gained from well-directed manufacture and carefully fostered trade.⁵

The state was blind in its policies. Industry was despised.⁶ Commerce was habitually debased and obstructed. Philip II went so far as to prohibit the exportation of domestic

¹ Records of Seville are cited to show that in seventy-five years the king had received equivalent to £91,000,000 sterling from America; cf. Harris, "Voyages," II, 165; also Smith, "Wealth of Nations," VII, Pt. 2; R. and J. 172; Cantu, VIII, 187; Heeren, 27 (par. 7); Leroy-Beaulieu, 36.

² Charles V left a debt of twenty million ducats, Hume, 89.

³ In Peru the yearly surplus about 1700 amounted to 2,935,106 Spanish dollars, but other colonies were then showing a deficit. For the surplus received by Spain from the various colonies about the middle of the eighteenth century, cf. Raynal, III, 559; also *ibid.* IV, 83-85, 243, 244, 296. For methods and amounts of taxes, cf. *ibid.* 462-371.

⁴ Noel has very carefully estimated the amount of gold in Europe at the time of the discovery of America and during the eighteenth century; he shows the effect of its afflux on the markets of Europe, Noel, II, 323; cf. also Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 398 et seq.; Raynal, IV, 376-393; R. and J. 172; Cantu, VIII, 187; Prescott, "Ferdinand and Isabella," II, 499; Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 567.

⁵ Cantu says that toward the end of the eighteenth century Spain was deriving a revenue approximating \$10,000,000 net from its colonies, "Universal History," VII, 187. This estimate appears to be greatly exaggerated; cf. Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 468; Merivale, 23. Rosscher and Jannasch prove by Humboldt, "Neuspanien," IV, 375, that the net revenue of Spain did not at that time exceed 9,800,000 piasters, "Kolonien u. Kolonialpolitik," 170 et seq.; but the currency of Spain was then greatly depreciated.

⁶ Leroy-Beaulieu, 37; Cantu, VIII, 185; R. and J. 172.

commodities with which Spain could have supplied the world.¹ When goods were sent abroad, it was imagined that a positive waste of capital had been sustained. Traffic by land as well as by sea was thus paralyzed. In America the mines alone were highly prized; while many occupations which might have flourished were absolutely forbidden.² The development of the merchant marine, which would possibly have maintained Spain to this day as a first-rate power, was not merely neglected, but entirely thwarted. What comparison could the advantage of facilitating the collection of taxes, by limiting intercourse with America to two annual sea caravans and one port, bear to the losses suffered by other cities and the thousands of idle or unbuilt ships? The Spaniards retarded the prosperity not only of their colonies, but even more their own.³

Spain, remaining from 1500 to 1700 dormant, almost inanimate, languished by reason of inactivity; not until a foreign prince in the latter year mounted the throne was this decadence perceived. When the nation awoke, it found its slow-moving, heavy vessels outdistanced and outnumbered by the lighter and swifter craft of the Dutch and the English.⁴ Formidable competition was then to be met; but the Spanish people were as sluggish as their fleets, for they wrestled first, and perhaps the most, with themselves to grant their own reforms. The merchants of Seville, enriched by the ancient system and consequently wedded to it, were the stubborn opponents of more liberal principles. Likewise the office-holders were corrupt; any measure which threatened the ill-gained profits of this class encountered strenuous antagonism. The Spaniards were therefore nearly a century

¹ R. and J. 172.

² *Ibid.* 173.

³ Of the lessons to be learned from Spain it is to be noted "that trade in her case did not 'follow the flag,' notwithstanding her strenuous efforts to maintain a monopoly; because the home manufactures were crushed with intolerable burdens, while the workers were demoralized by constant wars and by the false belief that coin was wealth instead of a token of wealth."—HUME (Preface).

⁴ This fact was already evident at the time of the Armada (1588).

in adopting those methods of progress which, if promptly and generously inaugurated, might have reassured their sovereignty.¹ Spain indeed showed its impotence in its inability to suppress smuggling, which, during a hundred years at least, was carried on in a practically open and unrestrained manner. Immense profits and undue avarice, resulting in the idleness, profligacy, and corruption of all grades of society, were the rule.

At the end of the eighteenth century revolution swept over North America and Western Europe. The national edifice of Spain was destined to totter before Napoleon. The colonies seized the opportunity which they had evidently been long and expectantly awaiting. Spain was placed in the awkward predicament of needing English help against the usurper of the crown, while England, for business purposes, was secretly friendly to the independence of these possessions. The Spaniards were obliged to seek as an ally one of the worst foes of their colonial policy. The occasion, so propitiously presented, was welcomed by their American subjects, who, after protracted and varied struggles, succeeded in throwing off the yoke.

With the separation of the colonies, Spain not merely lost their territory, but also at the same time its trade and influence with them.² Unlike many other countries which, shorn of political authority over dependencies, still retain moral and mercantile supremacy,³ this nation was deprived of them all. Since the period of the South American uprisings, British transactions with these regions have always been the most important; at present those of Spain with its former colonies are extremely small, being exceeded by the share of nearly

¹ After a discussion of the history of Spanish policy in America (pp. 263-292), Moses says the new legislation "was essentially a code of freedom. It was a violation of the fundamental features of Spain's traditional policy; but it was for the advantage of both Spain and Spanish America. It called into action creative forces which had slept for centuries, and it gave indications of the beginning of a new economic life. But relief through freedom came too late."
— Moses, 292.

² R. and J. 178; Leroy-Beaulieu, 38, 39.

³ For example, England.

every other state. Of the older fabric, language, laws, and religion alone survive. The Spaniards, through deep-seated prejudice, antiquated views, and persistent obstinacy, sacrificed within twenty years, or even less, their splendid dominions on the Western continent. Political tyranny and commercial monopoly were the sources of disaster. When the power of Spain withered in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, it fell almost as rapidly as it had risen; in the light of history it is only surprising that it could have endured until then.

CHAPTER VI

SPANISH COLONIZATION IN CUBA, PORTO RICO, AND THE PHILIPPINES

THE Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rico, the Canaries, and a few other scattered islands were after the secession of the provinces on the American mainland the sole remnants of the vast empire which Spain had for three hundred years so ruthlessly, recklessly, and despotically ruled. As compared with its previous career the story of later Spanish colonization is unremarkable; but as illustrating the deeply rooted causes which led up to more momentous events, a brief review will not be without interest. Scarcely any reference has yet been made to Cuba, Porto Rico, or the Philippines, because they were, prior to 1800, of secondary rank in the Spanish régime;¹ from that time forward they take the leading part. In the middle of the eighteenth century Cuba was still a poverty-stricken, uncultivated, and neglected land.² Before 1765, the date of the capture of Havana by the British fleet,³ three or four ships from Cadiz, having sold their outward cargoes in the coast cities of Mexico, called there annually to secure return freight. Spain then accorded an extension of the trade formerly reserved to Cadiz to merchantmen from nine Spanish ports, and after 1789 all vessels might participate in the slave traffic. These measures improved the condition of Cuban commerce and industry, and indirectly, to some degree, benefited the

¹ Merivale, 35, 107 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 190 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 251.

² Cuba was the second island discovered by Columbus; he died believing it to be a part of the Asiatic mainland, Davey, 49. The first settlement on it was effected under the direction of his son, in 1511, Prescott, "Conquest of Mexico," I, 220; for early history of the island, Raynal, VI, 324-368; for many details at length, Southey, "West Indies"; for its poverty, R. and J. 26, 166; Payne, 72.

³ Heeren, 246 (par. 48 note).

people. Decided prosperity, however, was not known until 1809, when, by royal proclamation, intercourse with this island was declared accessible to seamen of every nation.¹

Cuba itself was, by its long career of moderation,² exempt from the excesses of the South American colonies; just mature for more vigorous development. As the preceding century had been a period of affluence for Jamaica and St. Domingo, so the early years of the nineteenth were to be an era of good fortune for Cuba. At the dawn of this latter epoch, much of the soil was worked by free labor; for, out of a population of three hundred thousand inhabitants, approximately not more than one hundred thousand were slaves.³ The proportion of negroes to masters was less than in any other important West India dependency except Porto Rico. Bondage in Cuba was as gentle as anywhere in the world.⁴ The blacks were docile, contented, humble creatures, while the whites were kind-hearted, easy-going, leisure-loving, and unambitious.⁵ Many small landowners existed;⁶ wealth was reasonable; profits were fair; trade, while not highly flourishing, was on a good, permanent, and steady basis. Individuals could make a livelihood without great exertion, and there was a state of pronounced tranquillity. Although as an organization not yet self-supporting, and from time to time requiring appropriations and subsidies from Spain to cover its deficits, this colony was still in a much more healthy and robust condition than those on terra firma.

The Spaniards, warned by the dull mutterings of South

¹ Merivale, 36.

² "From that time [sixteenth century] until near the close of the eighteenth century she [Cuba] scarcely had a separate history and was affected by current events only in the same manner as the other Antilles and the adjacent continent."—ROWAN AND RAMSEY, 87.

³ For general treatment of slaves, Hill, 170; Merivale, 35; Leroy-Beaulieu, 252.

⁴ A concise history of Cuba may be found in the "Encyclopædia Britannica"; its early annals are contained in most works of Spanish discovery; cf. also the writings of Las Casas; and Jacobo de la Pezuela; "Historia de la Isla de Cuba," as well as other books mentioned in bibliography.

⁵ Cf. Ramon de la Sagra, "Historia de la Isla de Cuba."

⁶ Merivale, 35.

American discontent, had likewise undoubtedly resolved to anticipate any disaffection in Cuba; for this possession was even then prized by the Crown, yet ignorant of its vast possibilities. Spain must indeed for once be credited with the application of methods more enlightened than those of any other European country. After 1809, when the island was first fully opened for commerce, the Cubans, upon payment of a slight tax, enjoyed the privilege of sale and purchase in every market, and of shipment under any flag. Considering that neither England nor France had liberated their respective territories from the thralldom of restrictive regulations, this reform was of wonderful significance; by it well-being was assured.¹

Without the gifts of bountiful nature and an indisputable superiority in climate and facility of approach the efforts of man would have been in vain. An extensive area, every part of which is within easy access of the sea, combined with a variety of agricultural products and lands, which, when contrasted with others of the Gulf of Mexico, were almost inexhaustible in their luxuriance, rendered Cuba ready to respond in ample measure to human labors.²

The cultivation of sugar was then, as now, the main pursuit.³ The legislation of England and France prevented their West Indian colonies from selling elsewhere than to the parent state. As soon, then, as Cuban ports were free to general trade, the vessels of other nations were seen coming hither to make their purchases. Some six thousand ships annually visited these harbors, but not more than one-third of them were Spanish,⁴ the majority being foreign. The virgin soil of

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 252, 253; Payne, 361 et seq. The island was most prosperous between 1763 and 1834, Hill, 64. There is, however, another side to Spain's treatment. "Beginning with that year [1808] she initiated the unwise policy of sending to Cuba as captains-general men imbued with no other motive than that of reaping from its revenue private fortunes with which to return to Spain." — HILL, 65. *Post*, p. 286, note 3.

² Merivale, 36; Leroy-Beaulieu, 252 et seq.

³ Hill says the sugar trade originated under the patronage of Philip II in 1523, "Cuba and Porto Rico," 76. *Post*, Ch. XI, notes.

⁴ Leroy-Beaulieu, 252; Merivale, 41.

many neglected districts was more productive than the worn-out lands of Jamaica and St. Domingo; consequently profits were better and more quickly realized.¹ The marked success and the auspicious future of this culture did not fail to attract considerable capital and many residents. Indeed, numerous English planters of Jamaica and other adjacent islands, foreseeing the loss of their former prosperity, went to settle in Cuba. Sugar became at once the great staple; its production is estimated to have increased fourfold between 1800 and 1820, and from 1880 to 1885 averaged eighty times as much as in the first year of the century.² Next to the principal crop, tobacco experienced the most notable development. The abolition of the government monopoly in 1815 caused a rapid augmentation in the volume of sales, which in peaceful days still retain their importance.³

In this early period, coffee was likewise extensively grown. The value of the 90,000,000 pounds annually raised was reckoned at \$20,000,000.⁴ The plantations were frequent, and many of them large. With the subsequent fall in price, as tranquillity prevailed in South America, the Cubans could not compete; hence a gradual decline in the output until 1868. Unfortunately, during the ten years' rebellion, the few remaining coffee fields were almost utterly destroyed, so that now this industry may be said to be practically extinct.

Another element of Cuban progress during this epoch which supplemented the more liberal policy of the Crown, was the immigration of throngs of loyal Spaniards from the rebellious provinces.⁵ The seditious spirit of the age never pene-

¹ Yet sugar "was not even then [eighteenth century] an article of common consumption, and one of the earliest prices quoted is equal to 43 cents a pound [86 cents to-day]." — ROWAN AND RAMSEY, 100.

² "Cuba in times of peace produced about 1,000,000 tons of sugar-cane, more than twice as much as Java, the next largest cane-sugar country in the world, and more than five times as much as any other cane-sugar country." — HILL, 71; "Statesman's Year Book" (1900) 1196-1197.

³ Payne, 361; Merivale, 36.

⁴ "Annual Cyclopædia," (1897), 254; for other resources of Cuba, *ibid.* 255 et seq.

⁵ Leroy-Beaulieu, 253.

trating the island, capital sought here a refuge from the civil disturbances and revolutions of Mexico and South America.¹ The white population was thus stimulated by the influx of a very strong factor. While the new-born republics, for many years involved in the throes of internal dissensions and the birth of political independence, were stagnating in their trade relations, Cuba, in the full enjoyment of peace, commercial advantages, and an abundant stock of funds and energy, was advancing by swift strides to a position of mercantile supremacy. A conjunction of exterior circumstances also combined, about the same time, to favor the ascendant movement. In 1812 the slave trade was abolished in the English colonies, soon afterward in the French dependencies, and within a brief interval ceased throughout the world. The economic losses and social disorders occasioned by these acts of legislation in the communities affected, not less than the inertness of the former Spanish possessions on the mainland, by reason of their local upheavals, were all gains for Cuba.² With the additional demand for its sugar, a consequently bigger production and the wane of human bondage in the other West Indies, the number of slaves here vastly increased.³ Free labor on the plantations was impracticable and too costly; but as the proprietors became more and more wealthy the extent of land in each place grew greater and greater. From 1790 to 1820, therefore, the negroes introduced exceeded a total of 225,000. When the traffic was officially declared at an end, the Spaniards still persisted in winking at the vessels which regularly carried to the island thousands of Africans. In 1820 Spain

¹ "While the events recorded in the previous chapter [risings against Spain] were taking place on the Spanish Main, a strange quiescence pervaded those islands of the West Indies which still acknowledged the Spanish dominion." — Root, 95.

² Merivale, 37; Leroy-Beaulieu, 254 et seq. "Emancipation in the British West Indies had for a time added enormously to their prosperity [of the Cuban planters], until the value of slaves underwent so great an appreciation that it no longer became profitable to purchase them, and only actual owners derived any benefit." — Root, 97. The increase was from £50 to £350, *ibid.* 96; Payne, in 1889, wrote, "Cuba still enjoys the benefit of slave labor," which, however, was not strictly true, "European Colonies," 362.

³ Merivale, 39; Leroy-Beaulieu, 254.

had agreed by treaty to suppress this nefarious business; but in 1842 an English commission found that from 1817 to that date 335,000 blacks had been shipped thither. England then proposed that an international tribunal be established at Havana to investigate and give freedom to all individuals fraudulently imported.¹ Although never adopted, this proposition scared the Spanish authorities into activity; the laws enacted were subsequently strictly enforced, so that from 1845 to 1855 the slaves transported to Cuba did not reach more than 55,000; in 1850 the trade had virtually stopped.² Slavery, however, continued legally to exist as late as 1880, when it was abrogated as one of the reforms consequent upon the ten years' rebellion, a seven years' apprenticeship being substituted for it.³

It was thus one of the anomalies of Spanish policy that in Cuba, which until then had been almost exempt from the blight of human servitude, Spain should, at the very moment when other nations were discarding it, adopt this iniquitous system; and stranger still that, while the other colonies were seeking to avoid its detrimental effects, it should here prove one of the causes of enhanced prosperity. Such, however, is the fact. In 1800 the population of Cuba consisted of 200,000 whites and 100,000 slaves; in 1835 there were 400,000 whites, 300,000 slaves, and 100,000 free blacks; in 1850 the whites counted 600,000, the slaves 450,000, and the free colored 200,000.⁴ Meanwhile, the value of the exports rose from \$3,000,000 in 1800 to \$20,000,000 in 1835, and \$30,000,000 in 1850. These statistics give a fair idea of the parallel progress of slavery and commerce in the first half of the nineteenth century. With the intent of evading taxation, the number of slaves in later years was most probably understated; for, as Lord Aberdeen, in 1843, asserted, the negroes then actually owned in Cuba approximated 900,000.⁵

¹ Cf. Moses, chapter on relations of the English and the Spanish in the colonies.

² Root, 83.

³ For statistics regarding the slaves, cf. Rowan and Ramsey, 177-179.

⁴ Merivale, 70.

⁵ Quoted by Leroy-Beaulieu, 254.

As in the early history of Spanish settlement on the mainland everything was abandoned in the search for precious metals, so, in this island, all was subordinated to the culture of sugar. Except the English and French markets, Cuba controlled the world;¹ in 1830 it furnished one-fifth of the entire quantity consumed in Europe,² and afterward the proportion was greater. The output was increased by every possible means. To cultivate the cane, negro servitude was considered a prerequisite. The dignity of the Spanish master degenerated into extreme severity; slavery, at its best an iniquity, as here illegally and corruptly maintained was a curse. Under the baneful contact of a contraband traffic in human flesh, the morality of the planters retrograded. The large admixture of foreign adventurers, attracted by the fabled profits of sugar growing, also tended to degrade the descendants of the first settlers. Self-respect was forgotten. In the rush for quick returns all was secondary to the end in view. The previously recognized rights of slaves were disregarded; the right of marriage, the right of sale, because of cruelty, to another master, the right to hold property, and to purchase freedom were openly violated.³ The reputation of the colonists for humanity had been utterly forfeited. Harshness had succeeded to kindness in the treatment of the negroes, multitudes of whom were ruthlessly sacrificed. The average length of life on a plantation was not more than ten years; and natural reproduction was insufficient to make good the losses by premature death.⁴

When, finally, about 1850, the slave trade, so long surreptitiously pursued, was repressed, the planters found it necessary to search elsewhere for the cheap labor essential to the perpetuation of their well-being. The introduction of the Chinese, then regarded as inevitable, engrafted another vice upon Cuban society.⁵ The traffic in coolies became almost

¹ Merivale, 38.

² *Ibid.* 39, 40; Leroy-Beaulieu, 256; Payne, 363.

³ For slavery laws in Cuba, cf. Davey, 31.

⁴ Merivale, 40.

⁵ Leroy-Beaulieu, 257; cf. also, on the question of coolie labor, Davey, 37.

as bad as that in negroes had been. Prior to 1885 seventy thousand Chinese had been shipped into the colony, while at the present day their number is still considerable. The deception in engaging these individuals to leave their homes, the horrors of their transportation, and the hardships imposed upon them after their arrival combined to arouse the indignation of the civilized world. It is easy to perceive that the bases of Cuban prosperity, however broad, were decidedly fragile. Outward splendor was indeed attained only by the destruction of thousands of human beings and the repudiation of all principles of honor. Dependent upon the demoralizing system of slavery and coolie labor, success could be simply ephemeral. In reality the good fortune enjoyed by Cuba did not correspondingly redound to the benefit of the metropolis. Under the new policy, so brilliantly inaugurated in 1809, the latter could not compete with stronger rivals. For example, in 1830, out of a total of \$16,000,000 worth of goods imported into Cuba, Spain only supplied articles to the value of \$2,000,000. Of the exports, the same fact was true. In times of prosperity seventy-five per cent of the sugar came to the United States, about fifteen per cent¹ went to England, while Spain only received two per cent. The abandonment of ancient dogmas, it is clear, while advancing the welfare of the Cuban proprietors, implied very little, if any, increase in their transactions with the parent state.²

That country, incapable of seizing the opportunity to develop its maritime commerce, sought by its proverbial appeal to schemes of taxation to improve the condition of its finances. Freedom of trade meant merely the possibility of traffic upon the payment of duties ranging from seven and one-half to thirty-three per cent *ad valorem*;³ compared with the

¹ Payne, 362.

² If we consider, however, the actual amount of trade done by Spain with Cuba, we can see that the agricultural policy pursued in this century paid the mother country. "Although Spanish trade with Cuba has been gradually declining, its value in the past is shown by the fact that in 1854 Spain's exports to Cuba exceeded those sent in 1792 to all her American colonies, which then included nearly one-half the settled hemisphere." — HILL, 92.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 258 et seq.

universally prevailing doctrine of monopoly, even this régime appeared liberal; on the other hand, it was exceedingly profitable. Cuba, which had always required monetary aid and subsidies, soon began to turn a surplus into the home treasury. Dazzled by the remarkable results first achieved and deluded by false hopes into the belief that their methods were infallible, Spanish statesmen were blind to the modifications effected by other nations in colonial policy. The reforms instituted by Spain at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while unprecedented, still marked only a half-way stage; for, when England and France were aroused, they vastly outdistanced the Spanish government in letting down the bars of restriction. Thus it was that during an intermediate period the concessions made to Cuba provoked great activity; when competitors elaborated similar, but still broader theories, a reaction followed.

Again, the desire to exaggerate healthy success occasioned the violation of these very principles. Under the guise of extreme generosity, many articles of utility were admitted to Cuba free, providing they were of Spanish manufacture or origin;¹ a differential tariff, aimed principally at the United States, was devised. Such merchandise as cottons, woollens, crude iron, and flour were, by reason of the duties assessed, necessarily purchased at second hand from Spain; while the introduction of items in these classes, from the States, where they could naturally have been bought much more cheaply, was prohibited.² Cuba had every incentive to foster friendly relations with its northern neighbors, who consumed three-fourths of its sugar. But they, angered at the artificial exclusion of so many of their products of industry, adopted a retaliatory measure imposing upon the latter commodity a higher rate. The distress inflicted upon all grades and degrees of society by this procedure is well-nigh inconceivable. The island, deprived of the chief outlet for its staple, saw its pros-

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 259.

² For restrictions placed by Spain on American trade with Cuba, cf. Root, Ch. VI.

perity vanish.¹ Spain, persistent in its efforts unduly to stimulate the Cuban demand for some few goods which could be only imperfectly produced at home, threw away at one stroke all legitimate income from excises as well as the riches of its subjects.

Discontent was consequently rife. The wages of workmen were not only reduced by competition with slavery and the Chinese, but the need of their labor likewise ceased. The planters, for their part, suffered the loss of a proportion of their capital, invested in plantations formerly valuable, now, for want of a market, unremunerative and, in many instances, worthless. Nor did the central government afford them redress or recompense in any other direction. The public indebtedness increased; taxation multiplied; officials became more numerous. A vast organization of employees and red tape was erected to gather the gradually declining revenues. The more difficult to collect, the more individuals were required to make collections. Possibly, with an honest administration, Cuba could still have been saved to Spain; but behold another generation of profligate agents. As one and two centuries previously many viceroys in South America fraudulently enriched themselves and permitted their subordinates to rob the innocent people, so again, in Cuba, official corruption was universal.² Justice was on the statute books, but not any man without wealth could secure its enforcement. Voluntary gifts and luxurious presents, on every occasion, were the only means to avert the hatred and revenge of the duly constituted authorities.³ The contraband trade became enormous. By these vices of rule the creoles were especially affected; excluded from all branches of public employment, they were likewise debarred from a share of the spoil. Spaniards came among them to reside, strangers to whom they paid

¹ For commercial relations between the United States and Cuba, cf. Davey, 65-120.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 256.

³ "The peculation in the custom-house at Habana was estimated at forty per cent and at Santiago de Cuba seventy per cent of the entire receipts."—ROWAN AND RAMSEY, 114.

not merely legal, but more often illegal, tribute; and then within a few years, with fortunes amassed, went thence to old Spain.¹ The treasures of Cuba were thus being transported beyond the seas. Small wonder that the lowering clouds of dissatisfaction grew darker.

After the marvellous awakening of the early decades of the century, Spanish policy had not simply stagnated for sixty years, but had, in fact, experienced a relapse. Slavery, untenable after emancipation within the United States, officialism, and mercantile restrictions finally engendered rebellion. In 1823, 1829, 1844, and 1850 uprisings and conspiracies had occurred,² but not until 1868 did any thoroughly organized effort to throw off the yoke take place. The revolution of 1868³ in Spain had its echo in the colony. This revolt, a conflict fiercely waged on both sides, lasted ten years. Sheer exhaustion ultimately compelled the Cuban party to accept the conditional ameliorations promised. During the long struggle, the production of sugar had fallen fifty per cent. Taxes meanwhile augmented twenty-five per cent, and still the revenue to Spain decreased in the total. In the decline of commerce the United States, as the principal nation trading with the island, sympathized the most.⁴

To pacify Cuba, Spain, in 1878, entered into certain engagements for reform. Still, as Leroy-Beaulieu, writing in 1890, said, "Even yet the Cubans enjoy neither administrative nor commercial liberty."⁵ Slavery had indeed been abolished and Cubans sat in the Cortes, but the economic and financial conditions were gloomier than ever. An enormous military garrison, as if in a conquered country, a wasteful

¹ "From the captain-general down to the humblest trader in Barcelona all expected to pocket something out of the spoils of Cuba." — Root, 100. *Supra*, p. 250, note 3, and p. 265.

² Cf. article "Cuba" in "Encyclopædia Britannica," and "American Cyclopædia."

³ For the history of this war, cf. the magazines of that period, especially the *Atlantic Monthly*; also "Encyclopædia Britannica" and "American Annual Cyclopædia," article, "Cuba."

⁴ Leroy-Beaulieu, 263.

⁵ *Ibid.*

administration, and an extravagant and burdensome form of colonial government, due to the stubbornness of the parent state, could have but one consequence. Taxation was the scourge of Cuba. According to ex-Minister Ruiz Gomez,¹ of Spain, the annual rate, a few years ago, in the French West Indies was \$4 to \$5 per capita; in Canada, \$6; in Cuba, \$22. Paper money, quoted at a discount of sixty per cent, was commonly in circulation, but the taxes were payable in silver at its face value. Excessive imposts, a depreciated currency, differential tariffs favoring Spain, which nevertheless could not increase its trade, the attempted and, in a great measure, consummated annihilation of American business, the practical prohibition to Cubans to buy where they found abundant supplies, duties of forty per cent on American meats, ninety-six per cent on American flour, and the real starvation of 1,500,000 people to the profit of a few Spanish provision houses, which carried wheat from America to Spain to reship it to Cuba,² were grievances so well known as not to require elaboration, not the less absurd in their character than serious in their results.

History strangely repeats itself. As in the case of its former possessions in South America, Spain trifled with the Cubans. Reforms which, boldly adopted and conscientiously enforced, might have materially benefited their commerce and industry were ruthlessly delayed, and, if voted, were surreptitiously evaded and skilfully misconstrued. The treaty of reciprocity with the United States failed of renewal by Spain, thus effectually closing American markets to sugar, tobacco, and some other staples, and depriving Cuba of cheaper manufactures.³

¹ Quoted by Leroy-Beaulieu, 265.

² "A barrel of flour could be bought in New York, carried to some port in Spain, whereby it became naturalized as Spanish flour, reshipped across the Atlantic, and delivered in Habana for \$8.75; while if sent direct from an American port it would have cost the wholesale dealer \$10.46." — ROWAN AND RAMSEY, 117; Leroy-Beaulieu, 267.

³ According to Mr. John Hyde, statistician, cited by Mr. Hill, American exports to Cuba in 1892-1893 exceeded the entire volume of the exports to Asia or South America exclusive of Brazil. From 1893-1894 to 1896-1897 the imports into the United States from Cuba declined 75.7 per cent; their exports to that island 61.7 per cent, "Cuba and Porto Rico," 94.

At the same time the duties on many products imported into the mother country were raised. After autonomy, the panacea-to-be of Cuban evils, had been discussed *pro* and *con* in endless debate by the Cortes until it became the shuttlecock of all parties, a weak and generally unsatisfactory measure was finally passed on February 14, 1895. Ten days subsequently, the date appointed, the last revolution began.¹ Beyond that point the purpose of this narrative does not extend. How for three years the Cuban patriots courageously fought and unflinchingly died is a very enticing and praiseworthy theme. The record of personal achievement and universal sacrifice is glorious. Compare the action of these bold-spirited, unyielding men, battling for their rights, to the vacillating, alternately cruel and flattering, policy of the Spanish authorities; for even in the moments of despair Spain clung to its traditional system. Vain promises of amelioration, intimidation, repression, extermination, if need be, were the standards of its conduct. Not one substantial, honest effort, other than by the use of armed force, was ever made to remedy existing wrongs.

In the cause of humanity, in the memory of its forefathers, in the light of its own professed and practised principles, the great Republic of the North could not refrain from tendering to the struggling inhabitants of Cuba the hand of good fellowship. Not merely respect to itself, its trade, and its manufactures bade it require justice,² but the more commendable motive of opening the closed doors of a famished house to the bounty of the neighboring harvests, the obligation of giving plentiful food to the starving, inspired this nation to exact mercy.³ Appeals, unheeded and rebuffed, precipitated war with Spain. The most advanced and the most antiquated

¹ For general history of this revolution and the complications which precipitated the war between the United States and Spain, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia," for recent years, article "Cuba."

² A valuable table of statistics, showing the exports of the United States to Cuba 1887-1897, is given by Hill, 94.

³ "But beneath all the scheming of trusts and capitalists and the love of adventure of mere filibusters there is deep down in the minds and hearts of the American people an utter repugnance for the political methods of which Cuba affords an illustration." — Root, 101.

of the civilized races of the West were face to face. Spain, in its habitual manner, proposed reforms, but the time for parleying had expired. By many sacrifices Cuba is free. May the American people be as wise as brave, and, leading this younger sister by the highway of liberty, point out to her the responsibilities and functions of a righteously administered and peace-loving state!

The latest available statistics relating to Cuban commerce under Spanish rule are for the year ending April, 1896. During that period the imports amounted to \$66,166,754 and the exports to \$94,395,536. Of the former, those from Spain were valued at \$25,951,003.27, and of the latter those to that country at \$4,216,355.59; the trade with the United States was respectively \$40,017,730 and \$7,530,880. In 1898 the imports from the island into the States were to the sum of \$15,232,477; in 1899 they were \$25,411,410; on the other hand, the exports to Cuba in those years were \$9,561,656 and \$18,615,707.¹ According to the census taken early in 1900, under the direction of the provisional government, the total number of inhabitants was found to be 1,572,797, of whom 910,298 were native whites. There were 142,218 foreign-born whites, 234,638 negroes, 270,805 of mixed races, and 14,857 Chinese. The population of the city of Havana is 235,981.

Among the dependencies of Spain Porto Rico was unique. Neglected and underrated until very recent times, it enjoyed the blessings of reasonable prosperity without attaining fame.² In the beginning a place to which convicts were transported, it also had the doubtful distinction of being a notable centre for the smuggling trade with the Spanish realms on the American continent;³ but it escaped the curse of an exces-

¹ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 1197.

² For brief history of Porto Rico, cf. Hill, Ch. XVI; for the early period, cf. Southey, "West Indies"; more briefly, Merivale, 41-45; Leroy-Beaulieu, 269-271; Payne, 296-312; and books cited in Bibliography.

³ For extent of contraband trade in the West Indies, cf. Root, 83; for some account of the buccaneers, Davey, 51-53.

sively disproportionate share of slaves. After the loss of the South American possessions, Spanish statesmen directed more attention to this island. Fortunately escaping the Cuban régime, as a less valuable region, it was subjected to laws decidedly different from and fewer than those of its larger neighbor. It may well be said that in the absence of details, model legislation consists. Multiplicity of statutes and multitudes of officials are menaces to national or colonial progress.

At the opening of the nineteenth century, as previously, and even now, the whites of Spanish descent in Porto Rico were far in the ascendancy. Owners being formerly liable to a certain tax per capita for every negro held, the number of the latter was always relatively small. During the days of slavery, which ceased in 1872, the proportion of blacks to whites, never augmenting, tended to decline. Sugar and coffee, the great products of the island, have at all times been successfully raised with free labor; so that even the Chinese never here gained a foothold.¹ From the year 1815, each immigrant was given about six acres of land for cultivation, with an additional allowance for each slave; the collection of church tenths was suspended for fifteen years, and after that period fixed on a very low scale; the *alcavala*, or impost on sales, was abolished. Commerce was also favored by the admission of foreign merchandise upon the payment of seventeen per cent duty.²

The effects of these sensible enactments were immediate and permanent. The 165,000 freemen and 17,000 slaves of 1810 had increased in 1890 to 815,000 individuals (including 300,000 colored). The census bulletins of 1900 show that there are at present 953,243 inhabitants, of whom 304,352 are of mixed blood and 59,390 negroes.³ The area of Porto Rico is 3668 square miles. Its trade in 1897 amounted to \$16,155,056 for the imports and \$14,629,494 for the exports; of these figures \$1,988,888 and \$2,181,024, respectively, were for the United States. According to the returns for 1899, the imports into

¹ Hill, 164; Payne, 362. The number of Chinese now in the island is only 75.

² Merivale, 42.

³ "Porto Rico Census," War Department Bulletins.

the States were to the value of \$3,179,827, and the exports from this country \$2,685,848.¹

Differently from the majority of planters in other Spanish colonies, the residents of Porto Rico have usually regarded it as their permanent home. Their sojourn has seldom been transient, but, on the contrary, they have had all their interests in the island where they expected to die and to be buried. In a word, they have been Porto Ricans, not Spaniards. The people, generally disposed to rural pursuits, are very simple in their habits and modes of life. The smaller proprietors, who work their own lands, without hired help, are known as Xivaros; and in their hands are the greater number of plantations.² While the ratio of population to the area is six times as dense as in Cuba, still the proportion of dwellers in the cities is materially less.

One remarkable feature of this community in the past has been its uniform freedom from domestic disturbances; consequently, the garrisons have been comparatively insignificant; Spain, confident in the allegiance of the inhabitants, as attested by almost unbroken tranquillity, never burdened them with many soldiers. Leroy-Beaulieu, writing in 1890, said, "It is probable that Porto Rico may remain a dependency of Spain; if the metropolis is prudent and liberal, it will possibly be the last débris of Spanish power in the New World."³ Correct in this presumption, neither he, nor any other person, anticipated the welcome which foreign invaders would be given. The measure of hidden discontent was, however, plainly shown by the cordiality with which the United States troops were received when they disembarked. The joy of the Porto Ricans at emancipation from the Spanish yoke was an unmistakable evidence of their long-cherished hopes. As participants in American citizenship, they will without doubt be

¹ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 1198.

² "Porto Rico is essentially the land of the farmers. . . . There are . . . some 21,000 smaller holdings."—HILL, 159. Capitalists came to Porto Rico from San Domingo and the Spanish Main, *ibid.* 155; Merivale, 42 et seq.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 271; Payne in 1889 said, "There is here no question of separation from Spain," "European Colonies," 364.

not the less esteemed for their loyalty than for their industry and agricultural wealth.¹ Porto Rico is the gem of the Spanish domains which have fallen under American control.

The earliest European expedition to visit the Philippines was under the leadership of the Portuguese navigator Magellan,² who is justly reckoned as among the worthy successors of Columbus. In the year 1519-1520, while in the Spanish service, after passing through the straits which still bear his name, this famous seaman sailed westward, discovered the Ladrões,³ and, finally, reached the Philippines. On April 25, 1521, he perished in battle with the natives on the island of Mactan, one of this group.⁴ While Magellan was thus the first European to land and die on these shores, the Arabs had already prior to that time opened communication between them and India. Not until 1565 did the Spaniards attempt to take absolute possession.⁵ Philip II then sent Miguel Lopez de Legaspi, with a small armed force and six monks, to raise the standard of Spain and the cross of Christianity. The organization of this invasion was typical of subsequent policy. Soldiers and priests always went side by side. The Portuguese, arriving during Legaspi's sojourn, laid claim to the archipelago under their grant from the Pope.⁶ The Spanish commander thought the papal bull in behalf of his king quite as good, and drove off the aggressors. Spain, indeed, had the

¹ For a brief account of the resources of Porto Rico, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1898), 648.

² For his biography, cf. J. P. O. Martins, "Portugal nos Mares," 129 et seq.; for a brief account of his life and this voyage, Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 184-210. This journey around the world was occasioned by the dispute between Spain and Portugal concerning the ownership of the Molucca Islands under the various papal bulls. Charles V finally sold his claims to Portugal for 350,000 ducats, Heeren, 60 et seq. Especially for Magellan's voyage, cf. article by Edward E. Hale in Winsor's Collection, VIII, 591 et seq.; also Worcester, "The Philippine Islands," 1-4.

³ For an early description of the Ladrões, cf. Raynal, II, 504-517; for present conditions, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" for 1896, 1897, and 1898, 360; for history, *ibid.* and "Encyclopædia Britannica," XIV, 199 et seq.

⁴ Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 205.

⁵ Heeren, 84 (par. 6 note); Cantu, VIII, 191 et seq.

⁶ Heeren, 85 (par. 3 note).

right to these dominions as west, while Portugal demanded them with equal justice as east, of the longitudinal line established by the church in its recent division of the world. The difficulty consisted in the fact that every deed of territory must have an eastern and a western frontier. Regardless of the spherical form of the earth, the Pope had fixed only one boundary, instead of two;¹ there the rival parties met. The dispute being somewhat later decided in favor of the Spaniards, as first occupants, they kept the Philippines.² Legaspi chose Manila, in the winter of 1570-1571, as the capital; and here, in 1572, he expired.³

Soon after his death Limakong, with a force of Chinese pirates, attacked Manila, nearly captured it, and made other serious trouble. In 1590 the Sultan of Sulu defeated the Spaniards, who were endeavoring to subdue his people; for two hundred years subsequently the freebooters of these islands continued to harass shipping and infest the coast regions. Dutch vessels besieged Manila in the early years of the seventeenth century, and confiscated many Spanish treasure galleons, sailing to and from Mexico.⁴ Relations with the Chinese were also frequently strained; in 1662 their leader, after taking Formosa from the Dutch, planned to expel the Spaniards from the Philippines; the latter anticipated this action by a general massacre of the Chinese residents, except the few who escaped. In 1762 Manila, after bombardment, fell into the hands of the British, and was sacked by them, but the treaty of 1763 restored the title of Spain. From that time to 1898 the Spanish were in uninterrupted, though not by any means tranquil, possession.⁵

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 236 and note 1.

² For some account of this dispute and its attempted settlement, cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 488.

³ "Whatever may have been the incentive which impelled the Spanish monarchs to encourage the conquest of these islands, there can be no doubt as to the earnestness of the individuals intrusted to carry out the royal will. . . . The Manila seat of government had not been founded five years when the governor-general solicited royal permission to conquer China." — FOREMAN, 483.

⁴ For an account of the conflicts with the Dutch, cf. Foreman, 322.

⁵ For brief history of the Philippines, cf. Worcester, 1-20; "Annual

The Philippines are peculiarly the land of revolts and rebellions. As long ago as 1622 the first sedition occurred; again in 1629, in 1649, in 1660, in 1744, in 1823, in 1827, in 1844, in 1872, and the last against Spanish sovereignty in 1896. These uprisings were invariably due either to the tyranny of the priesthood or to excessive taxation.¹

The friars while primarily performing a civilizing task almost fully as praiseworthy as that of the Jesuits in South America, were never as pure in their motives or conduct.² In later days by their avarice, by their accumulation of real property in mortmain, and by the influence exercised over secular affairs, they became, indeed, an insurmountable obstacle to progress. In reality the clergy have always been much more readily obeyed than the duly constituted civil authorities.³ At the very beginning of the Spanish occupation differences having arisen between the governor and the Bishop of Manila, the royal decree adjusting this dispute was most favorable to the church, which since then has never surrendered any of its prerogatives.⁴

By reason of their admirable location for the Eastern trade, the Philippines, if properly governed, might have yielded, as they still may, enormous profit. Excellently situated, on the road between America and Asia, they themselves supply a variety of valuable products. Hemp, sugar, cotton, tobacco, coffee, and tropical woods are the chief commodities shipped abroad; the mineral wealth is also practically inexhaustible.⁵ But the Spaniards knew not how to work and utilize these riches, for their rule was vicious and corrupt.⁶ Even to

Cyclopædia" for 1896. Their early annals, as found in Harris, "Voyages," and elsewhere, are well summarized by John Foreman in the "Philippine Islands," London, 1892; cf. also "Encyclopædia Britannica."

¹ Worcester, 16-20.

² For an interesting account of the Friars in the Philippines, cf. Foreman, Ch. VIII.

³ For the great power of the church, *ibid.* 484.

⁴ Worcester, 9.

⁵ For agricultural and other resources of the Philippines, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" for 1896, 1897, and 1898.

⁶ For methods and extent of Spanish commerce in the islands, cf. Foreman, Ch. XV.

the hour of their conquest by Admiral Dewey, these islands enjoyed the unique position of having the most antiquated form of paternal colonial administration in existence.¹

Commerce with Spain was originally transacted by way of Mexico. One vessel annually made the round trip between Acapulco and Manila,² the Crown contributing a yearly subsidy of seven hundred and fifty thousand piasters; the regular deficits, which nevertheless occurred prior to 1784, were paid out of the Mexican surplus. Then, in 1785, a chartered company secured control of the trade and held its concessions until 1834.³ In 1809 the English were permitted to establish themselves at Manila, and in 1814 the same privilege was granted to all foreigners. From the earliest times the Spaniards had never prized the group sufficiently to prohibit sailors of other nationality from trafficking with the aborigines—a rather strange exception to their usual policy. Four additional places of entry were declared open in 1855; and in 1869 the tariff rates were reduced on many articles. Subsequently, as well as after the outbreak of the last rebellion, Spain endeavored to apply other reforms, which, however, came too late. Taking advantage of the existence of the free ports, the English, in the first part of the nineteenth century, succeeded in monopolizing nearly the entire Philippine business; but recently the tendency has been from England to France.⁴ The total of

¹ Payne, 357. "Every impediment possible in the present day seems to be placed in the way of trade."—FOREMAN, 435. "The same of folly was reached in the relationship which existed between the Philippines and the viceroyalty to which they were attached."—ROOT, 65, 66 et seq. An enumeration of these follies is there given.

² Raynal, III, 499-504; Cantu, VIII, 199 et seq; Heeren, 84 (par. 6 note). These state galleons, called "Naos de Acapulco," continued from a year after the foundation of the colony to the second decade of the present century. The last state galleon left Manila for Mexico in 1811, and the last sailing from Acapulco for Manila was in 1815, Foreman, 277. "The state galleon made only one voyage a year, there and back, if all went well, but if it were lost, the shipment had to be renewed, and it often happened that several galleons were seized in a year by Spanish enemies."—*Ibid.* 280.

³ "Real Compañía de las Filipinas," Foreman, 288; Heeren, 300 (par. 51 note).

⁴ Payne, 357; compare statistics of trade in "Annual Cyclopaedia" for recent years under article "Philippines."

the principal imports in 1897 was estimated at \$17,342,990; of the exports, \$41,342,280; of which the respective shares of the United States were \$94,597 and \$4,383,740. According to the latest returns for 1899 the imports into the United States that year reached \$4,409,774, and the exports from this country were valued at \$404,171.¹ The area of the islands, including the Sulu group, is about 115,300 square miles. Their population approximates 8,000,000. In 1897 the revenue amounted to \$17,474,120 and the expenditures to \$17,258,152.²

A large number of the natives pursue the higher branches of education, such as Greek, Latin, French, and English; but the study of Spanish is so distasteful to rich and poor alike that few speak the former official language.³ Here it is not practicable further to describe the Philippines; many excellent works have already been published concerning the people, the country, and its productions. Let attention only be called to one serious topic in the archipelago—the labor question. The islanders themselves, having never developed in agricultural pursuits, chiefly live by hunting and fishing. As Payne says, "The laborers are mostly either Chinese or Malay immigrants. . . . At present the Philippine villages are very

¹ The trade of the islands with the United States has been as follows:—

	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899
Imports into the United States .	\$4,731,366	\$4,982,857	\$4,383,740	\$3,829,003	\$4,409,774
Exports from the United States .	119,255	162,466	94,597	127,804	404,171

"Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 1200.

² Statistics drawn from the "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 1199-1201. The archipelago was ceded by Spain to the United States under the treaty of December 10, 1898, upon payment of \$20,000,000; subsequently it appears that the two small islands of Cibitu and Cagayan were omitted by error in the description of the group; they have been bought for \$100,000 additional.

³ "Annual Cyclopædia" (1897), 667.

much as they were when the Spaniards came, . . . except the churches and schools founded by the Jesuits," who were expelled in 1768.¹

It is not remarkable that, writing thus twelve years ago, this author should have added, "It is possible that they [the Philippines] will ultimately fall into the hands of some community of English descent."² So fate decreed. The glorious achievement of Admiral Dewey on that May Day of 1898, whether for weal or woe, brought them and their inhabitants under the influence of the great Republic. A new problem arose, perhaps more vital to the conquerors than to those whose allegiance was so unexpectedly transferred; the solution of the many perplexities involved in the possession and management of this group will long require the gravest consideration on the part of the wisest statesmen present and to be. May they be blessed and directed by the all-knowing Providence in their Herculean task!

The people standing at the threshold of the twentieth century have viewed the collapse of the last important edifices in the Spanish colonial domain. Spain, after a reign of just about four hundred years over an empire on which the sun never set, retained, at the termination of the war with the United States, but a mere remnant of its vast realms. In Oceanica, the Caroline Islands and Palos, as well as the Ladrões (except Guam) with a total area of 610 square miles and a population of 37,000 souls, were yet Spanish; but since then they have been sold to Germany.³ In Africa, Spain still owns territory amounting to 243,877 square miles, and having 136,000 inhabitants. A further district on the Campo and Muni rivers, measuring 69,000 square miles and counting 500,000 residents, is in dispute with France.⁴

A detailed discussion of the reasons for the misfortunes suffered by the Spaniards in colonization is not necessary. In every epoch and region the seeds were sown to reap the whirlwind; to repeat the causes would be a long and monotonous

¹ Payne, "European Colonies," 357 et seq.

² "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 1041, 626.

³ *Ibid.* 375.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1041.

onous undertaking. Too centralized an administration, utter lack of self-government, corrupt officials, avaricious greed for quick returns at the sacrifice of future prospects, a restrictive commercial system, trade monopoly, erroneous economic doctrines, the admission of the church to an exaggerated share in public affairs, selfish priests, and general wastefulness of resources, accompanied by enormous taxation,—are the elemental defects to which disaster was due. The Crown always clung to the maxim that it was the right of the parent state to draw all possible benefit and advantage for itself from the colonies, irrespective of the interests of the latter. In the light of experience this expression should apparently be modified to read “regardless of the cost to the former,” for indeed the dependencies imposed a heavy burden. Leroy-Beaulieu somewhere says, “Spain never has had the true colonizing spirit.” Conquest would more aptly designate its motive of action in taking possession of foreign territory. Whatever may have been the temporary objects, the results are clear: the record must inevitably be closed with the verdict of failure due to false policy and deplorable methods.

CHAPTER VII

RISE OF DUTCH COLONIZATION AND PROSPERITY OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY

DUTCH colonization, not less in its rise than in its development, presents many peculiarities. For the first time in modern history, consideration must be given to the efforts of a republic which, though passing through a protracted and sanguinary struggle, had scarcely attained its own freedom before it won by its prowess a distant empire.¹ By a strange anomaly this commonwealth, so arduous in the protection of the privileges of its own citizens, deeded away in absolutism, to a private association, the rights of millions of its vanquished subjects. A commercial organization—frequently imitated on a smaller scale—is to be described,² to which, by its charter, the arbitrary dominion over vast regions was granted; a state was erected within a state. A further circumstance connected with the rapid growth of the Dutch colonial realm is in the fact of its acquisition by the expulsion of another European people, rather than by the direct subjugation of native races.³

Just prior to the birth of Charles V the mercantile and industrial conditions of the Netherlands were most satisfactory.⁴

¹ "Everybody knows that the United Netherlands not only made themselves free and independent, but rich and powerful also, by their long war with Spain."—HARRIS, "Voyages," II, 160.

² "The company of the Great Indies, without model in antiquity or in the Middle Ages, and destined to serve as a type for those which were to follow it."—(tr.) NOEL, II, 157.

³ "They could break the Spanish-Portuguese power only by cutting off the feeders of that power in the East and West, and in doing so they acquired a colonial dominion."—LUCAS, IV, 25.

⁴ Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 4, 63 et seq.; McCullagh, "Industrial History of Free Nations," II, 139 et seq.; Prescott, "Charles Fifth," I, 88.

At that early day many local corporations, or guilds of merchants united for the sale of their wares, — models in miniature of the great companies which were to follow in subsequent centuries, — existed. Ghent and Bruges¹ had long been centres of importance. How all the nations of Europe, shipping to these places their raw materials, were taking thence, in return, quantities of manufactured articles;² how the famous Northern Squadron of Venice annually visited this neighborhood;³ how, during the Middle Ages, Milan, Florence, Genoa, Mantua, Pisa, and other Italian towns of lesser note, sent their own products and Oriental imports thither both by land and by sea; and how intimately the cities of the Low Countries were allied with the Hanseatic League,⁴ — are well-known facts proving that the characteristics of the Dutch were already, by training and occupation, firmly fixed.⁵ Commerce may be declared to have been a national essential.⁶ Still, since the decline of Venice, with the exception of the North Sea and English transactions,⁷ and of the vessels which went to make purchases on the Lisbon market, most of the traffic — by far the major portion — was overland with Germany and Italy. The fisheries formed the chief seafaring industry, the domestic demand and the exportation of fish

¹ Both these cities were famous trading marts. Ghent was at one time the most populous city of the world, and Bruges is best known as the chief warehouse of the Hanseatic League; cf. Hallam, "Middle Ages," III, 302 note; Yeats, 165.

² For a good history of Dutch manufactures, especially of the woollen industries, cf. McCullagh, II, 17 et seq., 34, 37, 50 et seq., 74 et seq.

³ *Supra*, p. 186.

⁴ *Supra*, p. 195.

⁵ "The political and commercial connection between England and the Low Countries had subsisted for centuries, and the successive kings of England had uniformly protected the degrees of independence, which the seventeen provinces and the house of Burgundy enjoyed, and by this policy kept open the commercial exchanges on a large scale between this realm, the Netherlands and the Hanseatic League — more particularly with the city of Antwerp." — JOHN BRUCE, "Annals of the Honorable East India Company," Introduction.

⁶ Motley, "United Netherlands," III, 511 et seq.; Prescott, "Philip II," I, 331, 337; Bancroft, I, 477; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 195 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 60 et seq.; for the natural obstacles which the Dutch had to overcome, cf. McCullagh, II, 10, 11 et seq., 17 et seq.

⁷ For volume of English trade, cf. McCullagh II, 70.

being large.¹ A local change was also occurring. With the decadence of Venice, Bruges and Ghent were beginning to lose their supremacy, and with the ascendancy of Portugal, Antwerp was gradually assuming the leadership.² The principal cause for the decay of the two first-named Flemish communities was the removal of foreign agents to that port.³ Next to Antwerp, Amsterdam was in possession of the most valuable trading concessions from European sovereigns; and the intercourse with the North was then opening, which was to elevate the latter place above all rivals.⁴

The Dutch at this time had a considerable navy. Before 1500 they had participated in several noteworthy maritime engagements, and had met with frequent victory; for the protection of their fishing smacks they had stood alone against the united fleets of England and France. In the sixteenth century their resources in ships and sailors continued substantially to augment.⁵ The very losses sustained by them in some unfortunate encounters of that epoch testify to the strength of their sea power.⁶

Under Charles V, Antwerp developed into the capital of the North.⁷ A constantly increasing number of Dutch vessels went thence to Lisbon to bring back rich cargoes of Oriental products, which were afterward distributed to Scandinavia, Germany, England, and Scotland.⁸ About two thousand craft

¹ For the Dutch fisheries, cf. Yeats, 231; McCullagh, II, 26 et seq.

² Prescott, "Philip II," I, 338; Hallam, "Middle Ages," III, 303; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 65, 141.

³ McCullagh, II, 67 et seq.; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 139, 141.

⁴ Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 87, 162 et seq.; II, 19; McCullagh, II, 69, 231.

⁵ "In 1590 it [Holland] had humbled more than once the Spanish navy." — RAYNAL, I, 306.

⁶ Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 118, 128, 158 et seq.; McCullagh, II, 77 et seq.

⁷ "Lisbon was content with its own trade as an emporium and favored Antwerp because it was a city under the same government." — YEATS, 202. *Supra*, pp. 216, 221 and note 3. For an excellent chapter on the grandeur and decline of Antwerp, cf. Beestemé, "Anvers Metropole," I, 35-78; for full history of its commerce, Eugene Gens, "Histoire de la Ville d'Anvers," 124 et seq., 341 et seq.; for details at length; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 163 et seq. Generally, McCullagh, II, 227; Motley, "Dutch Republic," I, 83; III, 95; Prescott, "Philip II," I, 338 et seq.

⁸ Raynal, I, 307.

were then owned in this city, of which the population approximated one hundred thousand souls.¹ Representatives of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese merchants came to sell their wares on this market.² The existing wealth and luxury were faithfully reflected by the ceremonial attending, in 1549, the triumphant entry of Philip.³ Another circumstance showing the prevailing prosperity is found in the high rentals obtained for property; save at Lisbon, houses here commanded better rents than those in any other town of that day.⁴ Antwerp became not only the commercial and financial metropolis,⁵ but also, before the end of the sixteenth century, had grown into an industrial centre.⁶ Armor, military supplies, paints, glass, wire, silk and woollen yarn, cloths, carpets, velvets, satins, and damasks were manufactured. In 1560 the famous Hotel de Ville was begun.

The splendor of Antwerp naturally redounded to the welfare of all the Netherlands.⁷ During the entire reign of Charles V both this city and the provinces enjoyed decided material and economic success. But when Philip II came to the throne the situation changed.⁸ From 1556 to 1609 the Dutch waged a desperate conflict for their independence, which, while declared in 1579, did not gain final recognition until 1648. In 1576 Antwerp was given over for a second time to

¹ Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 173, 177, based on M. Garonne.

² "Even Turkish merchants brought Oriental goods by way of Marseilles overland to Bordeaux and thence by ship to Antwerp."—YEATS, 202.

³ The cost attending another similar reception (1555) amounted to 260,000 florins in gold, Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 179.

⁴ *Ibid.* I, 177.

⁵ "Before the reign of Elizabeth the English princes had usually recourse to the city of Antwerp for voluntary loans; and their credit was so low that, besides paying the high interest of ten or twelve per cent, they were obliged to make the city of London join in the security."—HUME, "History of England," IV, 364.

⁶ "Manufactures of wool, linen, tapestry, fustians, silks, and carpets flourished; the tanyards and sugar refineries were the largest in Europe. Its glass manufactures rivalled those of Venice. . . . One company of merchant adventurers employed 30,000 men in Antwerp, besides 20,000 others in various parts of the Low Countries."—YEATS, 203; McCullagh, II, 228; more at length, Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 179 et seq.

⁷ *Ibid.* I, 139 et seq.

⁸ *Ibid.* I, 185; Noel, II, 151.

pillage by the Spaniards;¹ but, although practically ruined, was not long lost to its liberty-loving defenders. Throughout the protracted hostilities which followed, first in the hands of one and then of the other party, this place never recovered its bygone prestige. Its mercantile supremacy vanished. The capitalists, not only of Bruges and Ghent, but likewise of Antwerp, removed to the North or to England.² To the troubles of this period in the Low Countries, precipitating the rapid decadence of Flanders and the decline of this port, the rise of England as a manufacturing nation is, in a great measure, due;³ to these events the progress of Amsterdam is clearly attributable.⁴

The Spanish dominion was ever antagonistic to the freedom-aspiring, fresh-air-breathing spirit of the Dutch, who had immemorially been a fighting and trading race. Commerce and war had mutually aided each other in their early struggles.⁵ Revolution was requisite to the thorough test of their powers; resistance against despotism was an unavoidable preliminary to their future advancement. For these rebels it was fortunate that the Spaniards had territories in every part of the world, that they might legitimately prey upon them and conquer them.⁶ The oppression of Flanders and the annihilation of Antwerp were also necessary, in consequence of which wealth and industry took refuge in the northern districts, where they formed the mainstay of the republic. Had it not been for this dreadful combat the full development of Holland would probably already have been attained. The Dutch previously controlled the demand of France,

¹ Motley, "Dutch Republic," III, 107 et seq.; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 186 et seq.; McCullagh, II, 229.

² Hume, "Spain," 159.

³ The exodus of manufacturers to England began even at an earlier date (1338), McCullagh, II, 70, 186, 229 et seq.; cf. generally, Prescott, "Philip II," II, 113-115, 169; and Motley, "Rise of the Dutch Republic."

⁴ "The civil wars in the Netherlands which depressed the commerce of Antwerp created that of the States-General of the United Provinces."—J. BRUCE (Introduction); McCullagh, II, 264; Bancroft, I, 478; Payne, 54.

⁵ Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 195, 332.

⁶ For attack on Spain, cf. Lucas, IV, 25.

England, and Germany.¹ What other opening, under Spanish rule, for their enterprise? As obedient subjects they could only transact business with Spain and other countries of the South as far as permitted by the laws of the Crown; but the limitations were inevitably narrow, for the parent state, in its own special domain, would not brook competition where it might have profited the Dutch. With the Portuguese they could deal, but only on condition that they invade not the ocean of the Orient, peculiarly appropriated by Portugal. In brief, the Netherlands, always obliged to buy at second hand, had little to derive from Spanish friendship.²

The hostility of the Spaniards conferred vast benefits upon the rebellious people;³ their trade regulations could not any longer be enforced; their monopolies were not regarded of further right in Holland; their commerce with other nations might be attacked with impunity, both by the naval and mercantile fleets of the Netherlands; and their possessions were exposed to the guns of hostile men-of-war.⁴ Happily for the Dutch, they were as strong on the sea as the Spaniards were weak. While the former were pressing forward, the latter were retrograding; Holland had a short length of coast, Spain had a long shore-line; the one had not any colonies, the other had many. In 1579 the federation of the Seven United Provinces was accomplished; the Republic was born in the midst of strife; in 1580 Portugal came under Spanish jurisdiction; Spain, although larger, was weakened.⁵ Henceforth the Dutch viewed Portuguese interests as their own.⁶ The only question was how and when to proceed. By civil discord, their earlier overland traffic had been rendered

¹ Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 195; McCullagh, II, Ch. X and XI; Payne, 54.

² Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 2 et seq.

³ For the real benefits of the war with Spain, cf. *post*, 308, note 4.

⁴ Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 560; Payne, 55.

⁵ Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, I, 197.

⁶ *Supra*, p. 217. For relations and rivalry between the Dutch and the Portuguese in the Indies, cf. "Modern Part of an Universal History," X, 273-583; also Harris, "Voyages," I, Ch. II, sec. XVI.

almost entirely impossible; now they realized that the sources of the Eastern commodities required for their markets and factories were closed. To turn their vessels, accustomed to the navigation of the North Sea, into southern waters was not, however, difficult; while the need for such action was paramount if they would not let their prosperity wither, their wealth decrease, and their affairs fall into the hands of others.¹

As soon, then, as Portugal was annexed to the Spanish Crown, Holland at once cast covetous eyes upon that country's Indian dependencies, of which, within a few years, it was to achieve the conquest.² Had not the union of Portugal with Spain been coincident with the birth of the United Netherlands as a commonwealth, the Dutch would perhaps never have recognized the want, and certainly would not have had such a favorable opportunity, if at all, for expansion in the Orient. If Lisbon had maintained its Eastern trade, they would have continued to draw their supplies thence; and consequently would not have felt the necessity that their own ships should go beyond the Tagus. Had they, indeed, made the effort to approach the Indies during Portuguese supremacy, they would have met strong protest and vigorous resistance. But the rival flag had disappeared from the sea. Spain, venting its hatred on its recent subjects of the North, shut its own ports, as well as those of Portugal, against the mariners of Holland.³ Hence the Dutch were, for the purpose of perpetuating their industries, forced to appropriate to themselves the commerce of the East, which at that moment, by the ruin of Portugal and by the feebleness of Spain, was without a master. The decree excluding them from intercourse with the Iberian peninsula, with the intent to crush them, was the occasion of their almost immediate triumph.⁴ Never did an

¹ Heeren, 85 (par. 7 note); Motley, "United Netherlands," III, 512 et seq.; McCullagh, II, 238 et seq.

² De Sismondi, "Economie Politique," II, 130.

³ Raynal, I, 307; Cantu, VIII, 305; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 8, 23; Leroy-Beaulieu, 61; Bancroft, I, 477 et seq.; Hume, "Spain," 195.

⁴ Raynal, I, 307; McCullagh, II, 264. Elsewhere he says, "The influence

act of hostility more speedily contribute to the welfare of the party attacked. Without the traffic of the East Indies, Holland would not have acquired a colonial realm; with it the Republic not only gained territory in the Orient, but also became a first-class European state.¹ Bereft of the means of providing their numerous manufactures and markets with the raw products essential for them, the United Provinces might have quickly become impotent; with those facilities they built up, not merely an immense trade, but, at the same time, a most formidable navy to protect their vast merchant marine.²

Political occurrences then vouchsafed the Dutch the activity for which their situation, experience, and mode of life had so well fitted them. They did not waver an instant, when the decision was to be taken.³ In the midst of a terrible struggle at home, they boldly resolved to strike their hated foe at the most vulnerable point. The loss of the Invincible Armada, in 1588, was a fortunate coincidence for the future of Holland. Spain became unable to defend its widely scattered possessions. An even more important result for the Netherlands was the bitter animosity engendered between the Spanish and English races.⁴ Holland and England, by virtue of the same exterior circumstances, — the downfall of Portugal and the weakness of Spain, — were equally attracted to the development of their sea power, and both, in consequence, embarked upon their career about the same date.⁵ All know how afterward they became competitors, then enemies, and

which their trade with India and their settlements there exerted in maturing and extending the greatness of the Dutch has often been overrated." — *Ibid.* II, 308.

¹ "Alone among all the continent, a people small in territory, but endowed to an exceptional degree with the energy and with the perseverance which make great nations, then held, with respect to commerce the first place in the world; it was Holland." — (tr.) NOEL, II, 236.

² "By the end of the sixteenth century more vessels were built in the docks of Holland than by all the ship-builders in Europe besides." — YEARS, 207. "More ships are said to have entered the harbor of Amsterdam daily than there are days in the year." — *Ibid.* 207; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 3.

³ McCullagh, II, 235 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 61.

⁴ Fiaks, "Discovery of America," II, 559.

⁵ Bancroft, I, 480.

how, ultimately, England broke the Dutch supremacy.¹ To trace these events is not especially the design, except so far as they relate to colonial ventures; but in this respect the greatest reasons exist for reference to such relations.

Just before 1600 a new era for the Low Countries was about to dawn. The people, long previously prepared, were, when the opportunity arose, not slow to avail themselves of it.² The Dutch policy, although rapidly evolved, was only another phase of the deeply rooted mercantile instinct; not a novelty, it was simply a different manifestation of the ancient spirit.³ Prompted by commercial exigencies, these efforts owed their inauguration to the conditions of international politics, which, while they rendered it necessary that the inhabitants of the Netherlands should enter this field of action, likewise most luckily opened to them the possibility of preserving their well-established superiority in trade.⁴

The Dutch, ambitious to discover an available route to the Indies, had been endeavoring for some time to find a northern passage to the East;⁵ when finally realizing the inertness of

¹ "The Dutch were later than the English in attempting to get to the East, but owing to their long-established indirect trade with India, through Lisbon, they succeeded in getting there before us."—SIR GEORGE BIRDWOOD AND FORSTER, "The First Letter Book of the East India Company," Introduction, xliii. It is interesting to note that these authors predict a return to the old overland route of commerce with India, when once the intervening nations are thoroughly civilized. R. W. Frazer states in detail the reasons for final British success, attributing the outcome largely to the policy of Louis XIV; cf. Introduction to his "British Rule in India" (New York, 1897).

² The Dutch were not only prepared through their long experience as mariners, but they had already, in fact, some knowledge of the East. One of their own compatriots, John Huygan van Linschoten, had in 1596 published a work containing an account of the journey which he had made to India on a Portuguese vessel, and described his residence of thirteen years in that distant country, Motley, "United Netherlands," III, 513 et seq., 516.

³ McCullagh, II, 265.

⁴ *Ibid.* II, 309. "The commercial power of this little people had in fact its birth in the hostility of the Spanish Crown."—NOEL, II, 151. Writing a little subsequently, in the reign of James I, "Sir Thomas Overbury says, that the Dutch possessed three times more shipping than the English, but that their ships were of inferior burden to those of the latter . . . the Dutch at this time traded to England with six hundred ships, England to Holland with sixty only."—HUME, "History of England," IV, 514.

⁵ Raynal, I, 306.

Spain, they courageously decided to compete on the same course.¹ A fortuitous incident enabled them to satisfy their zealously fostered desires. Cornelius Houtman, one of their compatriots who had sailed on Portuguese galleons, was languishing in a Lisbon prison, where he had been incarcerated for debt.² The Portuguese government being unwilling to release him, he appealed to some Amsterdam traders, engaging, in consideration of the amount paid for his ransom, to pilot their vessels to the Orient.³ His proposition was accepted. Under the wonder-working enthusiasm of a new-born state, the Dutch were not terrified at any danger; their national independence assured, they were confident of their ability to win their share in the distribution of the regions lately disclosed to European enterprise. Hardened by the sufferings of a protracted struggle with human foes by land, they hesitated not to brave the perils of the deep. In 1595 Houtman led the earliest Dutch expedition, of four ships, around the Cape of Good Hope, arriving during the autumn in India.⁴ The island of Java was the objective point, where he succeeded in forming an alliance with the principal ruler, and defeated an uprising instigated by the Portuguese.⁵

The return of the first two or three fleets from the Orient revealed two significant facts: the wealth of the Indies, and the incapacity of the Portuguese or Spaniards to hold them. In the joy of recent triumph Dutch adventurers multiplied. The merchants of Amsterdam located, in 1598, settlements in Java and in the Moluccas.⁶ The Spaniards were then the most detested and isolated race in Europe; any movement

¹ For the maritime expeditions and explorations of the Dutch, cf. Motley, "United Netherlands," III, 515; generally, Heeren, 85 (par. 7 note); Bancroft, I, 479; Leroy-Beaulieu, 61.

² Authorities differ on the details of Houtman's imprisonment, some agreeing with the text, cf. Noel, II, 153; others state that he was a prisoner in the hands of the natives on the coast of Africa, Payne, 54. Whichever is correct is a matter of little consequence.

³ Raynal, I, 308, 309; Cantu, VIII, 305; Payne, 54.

⁴ Raynal, 309; Heeren, 85 (par. 7); Cantu, VIII, 305; McCullagh, II, 308; Bancroft, I, 479.

⁵ J. Bruce, 27; also Theal, "South Africa," II, 11.

⁶ Raynal, I, 310 et seq.; McCullagh, II, 311; Leroy-Beaulieu, 62.

tending to weaken them was heartily welcomed and abetted by their enemies. In the Eastern trade, therefore, Holland could count upon the good-will of the peoples of Northern Europe, who, formerly obliged to supply themselves in Spanish markets, were glad to make their purchases elsewhere. The Dutch, too, by reason of their peculiarly businesslike traits, were actually able to undersell the crafty Spaniards; hence a brilliant future lay before them.¹

If the opening of the route to India by the Cape and the discovery of America had, a century previously, transformed the commercial highways of the world, the arrival of Dutch vessels in Oriental ports is not the less notable as marking the inauguration of progressive ideas in mercantile policy. Portugal and Spain belonged to the old school; Holland, France, and England constitute the new. Holland merits the credit of having first adopted reformed methods. Notwithstanding its many faults, the system pursued by the Dutch was the earliest designed to overthrow the doctrine of closed seas — *mare clausum*.² Prior to their participation in East Indian affairs, a torpid languor had characterized this traffic. By mutual consent the Spaniards and the Portuguese had, for nearly a hundred years, divided the ocean between themselves, and rigorously barring all foreigners from their domains, had tacitly agreed not to interfere with each other. Thus competition did not exist. The theory still prevailed that a nation might exercise an exclusive control over a body of water, as well as over a certain extent of land;³ the sovereign of the discoverer was the absolute possessor; to others its navigation was forbidden. First the Dutch, subsequently the English, by sending ships to India, attacked this mistaken dogma. Grotius was one of the most celebrated authorities to demonstrate its legal fallacy.⁴ In any event the Dutch, having

¹ For the extent of Dutch trade, cf. McCullagh, II, 266.

² For a discussion of this question, cf. Wheaton, "International Law" (edited by A. C. Boyd, 3d ed., London, 1889), 256.

³ Motley, "United Netherlands," III, 513; Rosscher and Jannasch, 256.

⁴ Grotius went even further than modern writers; cf. his "De Mare Libero" (1609), the immediate purpose of which was to attack the pretensions then

become, during their long conflict with the Spaniards, accustomed to violating the laws of Spain, cared little for their observance.¹

The organization of the Dutch East India Company, while contrary to the principles of freedom professed by the United Provinces,² is, nevertheless, to be regarded as excusable in the light of circumstances.³ Inability otherwise successfully to cope with the difficulties of the Oriental trade justified its creation. In the condition of international politics three hundred years ago, before the construction of vast naval armaments; when the consular corps was not yet instituted; when, indeed, ministers resident in half-civilized lands were not known; when transactions in remote regions were not the least protected by national forces; when, on the other hand, the representatives of European states did not hesitate to incite the natives to pillage, treachery, and assassination; when hostile ships lay in wait to capture and destroy the homeward bound vessels, laden with precious cargoes,—it was then soon realized that private resources were too restricted to guarantee safety to Dutch mariners⁴ exploring strange seas and invading territories at least technically held by enemies. The Netherlands, long familiar with guilds in their industries and having well-conducted associa-

held by Spain; cf. McCullagh, II, 334. Selden subsequently published an answer to it, "*In Mare Clausum*," asserting exclusive English rights over the Channel and adjacent seas. For this subject, cf. also Grotius, "*De Jure Belli ac Pacis*," II, Ch. III, secs. 8-13.

¹ McCullagh, II, 309; Motley, "*United Netherlands*," IV, 226.

² There is not any absolute contradiction; for, "The people of the United Netherlands were in name and reality the freest on the Continent of Europe; yet the great majority of them had no direct voice in the government. The municipalities . . . were self-perpetuating corporations. . . . The directories of commercial bodies were modelled after this pattern."—THEAL, II, 186.

³ Heeren, 86 (par. 9); Motley, "*United Netherlands*," IV, 124 et seq.; R. and J. 256 et seq.

⁴ The preamble of the charter of the Dutch East India Company reads: "That the said companies should be united in a firm and certain union, and in such manner that all the subjects of the United Provinces may participate in the profits thereof."—LUCAS, IV, 29. For a general discussion of guilds, etc., cf. Letourman, 495 et seq.

tions in the fisheries, readily conceived that their ends would be more quickly attained through the union of their energies. To break the monopoly of Spain and Portugal in the East, a company alone was sufficient.¹

For the proper management of the Indian trade, an immense capital was also required. Unlike Spain, Holland did not possess any wealthy nobility; as a struggling republic, its treasury was not overfilled. Riches did exist, but they were widely scattered among the industrial and commercial classes. Only to equip, man, and freight an adequate fleet of merchantmen for the Orient involved an expenditure beyond the means of most individuals; but this outlay was merely the beginning, for the ships must be thoroughly armed, or accompanied by a suitable naval escort.² Then, before any returns could be secured, an interval of two or three years must pass in uncertainty. Worse than all, if the expedition never came back, the loss meant bankruptcy and ruin.³ Private initiative was thus impracticable, if not impossible. A powerful incorporated society was on the other hand able to assume the risks, to suffer the unavoidable disasters, and to venture the amount of funds the most likely to prove remunerative. A company, also, could act in such a manner, and make such a display of strength when necessary, as would insure the respect and obedience of those semi-civilized or barbarous princes with whom dealings must be had. The exercise of authority was one of the prime essentials for success.⁴

Other contingencies of the epoch likewise tended to render the results attainable by an organization more satisfactory than they could have been under personal enterprise. The situation of trade at that date was vastly different from its

¹ R. and J. 256; Leroy-Beaulieu, 62 et seq.

² McCullagh, II, 316.

³ "The loss of life was appalling, as the Indianmen were fighting as well as trading vessels, and usually left Europe with two or three hundred men. The crews were very largely composed of recruits from Germany and the maritime states of Europe." — *THRAL*, II, 23.

⁴ Leroy-Beaulieu, 64 et seq.; R. and J. 256, 261; Motley, "United Netherlands," IV, 125; J. B. Say, 301 et seq.

present status. Lack of system was the prevalent obstacle. Too many vessels went to one port, while perhaps not any visited another. Brokers desiring to buy or sell certain products arrived at unseasonable periods. Credit was in its infancy. Combined with these annoying features, the absence of geographical knowledge and the want of trustworthy information on questions of supply and demand were serious hindrances. Commercial education had not yet been inaugurated; the capital of private houses, most woefully deficient for any important task, was also not only timid, but jealous. Bad faith, unfair competition, and perfidious disloyalty were constant menaces to any deserved good fortune. The disposition of petty merchants to practise fraud in the sale of their wares, for the purpose of netting enormous profits, worked to the detriment of the general welfare; the similar propensity on their part in their purchases to resort to deception aroused the hostility of the natives with whom they dealt; the perpetuation of business relations necessitated the suppression of extortion on the one side as much as the removal of distrust on the other.¹ All these circumstances, both political and mercantile, prevailing at that time, seem to have warranted the establishment of a legally authorized society.

The East India Company was granted its first charter on March 29, 1602;² but its elements already previously existed. Many classes of merchants in various towns were leagued together in their respective councils. The federation of a number of these guilds constituted the new organization, the capital stock of which approximated \$5,000,000, divided into 2153 shares.³ Nearly fifty-seven per cent of the total was

¹ For the general truthfulness and application of these principles, cf. R. and J. 263 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 65 et seq.

² For a complete discussion of this charter, cf. Theal, II, 15; also Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 59 et seq.; McCullagh, II, 311; Cantu, VIII, 305; Heeren, 86 (par. 8 note); Motley, "United Netherlands," IV, 125 et seq.; R. and J. 252 et seq.; Bancroft, I, 480; Payne, 54.

³ "The original capital of this commercial association was only 14,211,648 livres; 8,084,813 l. was furnished by Amsterdam; 2,934,540 l. 8s. by Zealand; 1,180,905 l. by Enkhuizen; 1,034,000 l. by Delft; 587,109 l. 12s. by Hoorn, and finally 390,280 l. by Rotterdam. This capital, which has never been increased

owned in Amsterdam, the association of which city was the controlling factor; the remainder was distributed among Zealand, Delft, Rotterdam, Hoorn, and Enkhuizen. The conduct of affairs was in the hands of a great council of sixty members, residents of Holland. Seventeen directors, named by the States-General, formed the supreme managing board.¹ A governor-general, invested with military and civil jurisdiction, lived at Batavia, and during the most prosperous days under-governors were established at Malacca, Ceylon, Banda, Amboyna, Macassar, the Cape, and in the Moluccas.² All officials and employees were required to swear obedience to the Company, and allegiance to the States-General of the Netherlands.³ To the care of the officers and representatives of the corporation, the administration of the possessions, the supervision of business with foreign countries and with the Indian potentates, as well as the maintenance of the land and naval forces, — in brief, all the common public interests of the federated guilds, — were intrusted.⁴ The local societies,

and which from the beginning until January 1, 1778, realized on the average annually 21½ per cent, was divided into sums of 6600 l. called shares; their number was 2153." — (tr.) RAYNAL, I, 455.

¹ Heeren, 86 (par. 8 note); Cantu, VIII, 305; R. and J. 252 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 67 et seq. For details, Motley, "United Netherlands," IV, 125 et seq.; Raynal, I, 444-454. A most interesting series of engravings and an elaborate description of the meetings of the "Conseil" is given by Noel, II, 156 et seq.

² R. and J. 254.

³ The authority of the Dutch East India Company was exercised by means of a vast number of admirals, governors, and commanders, each with his council, but wherever these came in conflict the lower in rank gave way to the higher.

⁴ Raynal, in describing the origin of the Dutch East India Company, says: "Organizations were formed in most of the maritime and trading cities of the United Provinces. Soon these too numerous associations injured one another by reason of the exaggerated price to which the craze for purchasing made merchandise in the Indies rise, and because of the depreciated values which the necessity of selling produced in Europe. They all were on the point of perishing as the result of their competition, and because of their inability separately to resist a redoubtable enemy whose cardinal principle was to destroy them. In this crisis the government, sometimes more enlightened than individuals, came to their aid. The States-General in 1602 united all these different associations into one under the name of the Company of the Great Indies. To it was conceded the right to make peace or war with the princes of the Orient, to build fortresses, to choose governors, to maintain garrisons,

known as Chambers, engaged and freighted their own vessels, sailed them, and negotiated their own transactions under the direction and with the advice of the principal body.¹

Simplicity and strength were at the beginning the characteristics of Dutch methods; economical in its expenditures, moderate in its projects, and reasonable in its anticipations, the Company devoted itself steadfastly and unremittingly to its single purpose — the increase of Dutch trade in the Orient.² Colonies were never founded for motives of religion, conquest, or civilization;³ commerce was the one aim in view; any other results achieved were merely incidental to the main object, that Holland should become the market-place for the exchange of commodities both from the East and the West. Everything else was secondary, and any doctrine or action not favorable to this design was disregarded or omitted.⁴ Such unity of conduct, while obviating any complicated theory, quickly produced two marked consequences which, although perfectly normal, were strangely inconsistent with the maxims of a liberty-loving people. This mercantile corporation, primarily so free in the privileges accorded to its members, gradually became, in power and authority, more and more centralized. To all intents and effects a mighty dependent state arose within the Commonwealth of the United Provinces;⁵ while the Dutch confederation was a republic, the East India Company developed into an aristocracy, exercising over its vast realms a sovereignty as absolute, haughty, and unmerciful as that

and to appoint civil and judicial functionaries." — (tr.) "History . . . of the Commerce and Establishments of the Europeans in the Indies," I, 311 et seq.

¹ Heeren, 86 (par. 8); R. and J. 253; Leroy-Beaulieu, 67 et seq.

² McCullagh, II, 317; Heeren, 86 (par. 10); Leroy-Beaulieu, 68 et seq.

³ Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 42; Cantu, VIII, 309.

⁴ A suggestive discussion of the original aims and subsequent evolution of the Dutch East India Company closes with these words: "The double rôle of the company of the East Indies in its capacity of merchant as well as of sovereign was the first cause of its decadence and fall." — (tr.) "Le Régime des Protectorats," published by Institut Colonial International (1899), 11 et seq.

⁵ "It was a new state placed in the state itself which enriched it and outwardly increased its strength, but which might in time diminish the political energy of democracy, which consists in the love of equality, of frugality, of laws, and of fellow-citizens." — RAYNAL, I, 313.

of any autocrat; following in the footsteps of Portugal and Spain, this organization not only set up a monopoly, but inflicted the chains of political slavery upon the millions of its subjects. The annihilation of competition and the restriction of supply were the inevitable complements of its system.¹ Unavoidably adopted as the sole means firmly to fix Dutch influence in the East, the Company, perverted from its original principles, grew to be an immense commercial machine.

The Dutch, natural heirs to the Portuguese possessions, generally encountered little resistance in India; but, wherever and whenever necessary, they did not hesitate to evict the actual occupants. In 1598 Admiral Waerwijck, en route to the Orient, with fourteen vessels, met a Spanish-Portuguese fleet; and having defeated it, instituted an establishment on the island of Java, as well as another in the kingdom of Johore.² The Portuguese, after their rigorous rule of nearly a century, were almost as much hated as feared by the natives; their policy had been of the sword, so that when the Dutch appeared off the Indian coasts, they were welcomed as liberators from the tyranny of old masters.³ The newcomers, indifferent to the acquisition of territory and overlooking all else in their search for profitable trade, did not at first undertake to impose their own administration upon the aborigines. Instead of waging war against the latter, they made treaties to protect them from their former oppressors in consideration of exclusive commercial concessions.⁴ Fortunately, also, for their prestige, the Dutch soon demonstrated their ability to drive out their predecessors, and thus rapidly assured their own supremacy.⁵

¹ De Sismondi, "Economie Politique," II, 130; Heeren, 87, 143; Leroy-Beaulieu, 69.

² Waerwijck was "the real founder of the Dutch Colonies in the East." — CANTU, VIII, 306.

³ Motley, "United Netherlands," IV, 230; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 63 et seq.; Heeren, 87 (par. 10 note); McCullagh, II, 310; Payne, 55; Raynal, I, 374 et seq.

⁴ McCullagh, II, 318.

⁵ Motley, "United Netherlands," IV, 227, 228, 231; Raynal, I, 316 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 306; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 67; Leroy-Beaulieu, 69; more especially for the decadence of Spanish trade, cf. McCullagh, II, 314 et seq.

In Tidor and Amboyna (the Molucca Islands) settlements were already made in 1605-1607.¹ Maçao, from which the Portuguese were expelled, was used as a base of operations to secure the Chinese traffic. Within the first thirteen years after its creation, the Company owned 800 armed vessels, had captured 545 hostile ships of untold value, and was paying annual dividends varying from twenty to fifty per cent.²

The earliest efforts of the Dutch in the Orient were directed to the control of the clove and nutmeg cultures.³ They located where these products might best be cultivated, and then, either by purchase, agreement, or force, effected the destruction of the plants in all other districts. If they still found that the quantity grown was too great they burned the surplus; in this manner, the output being limited, prices were artificially raised.⁴ The prosperity due to this monopoly attracted the attention of the English East India Company, and soon precipitated hostilities.⁵ The latter attempting to establish its agents in the same regions, a serious struggle ensued. Both parties, however, temporarily compromising, in 1619, their claims, it was stipulated that they should enjoy joint rights and privileges in the Molucca and Banda groups.⁶ Of the total crop, the Dutch Company was to take two-thirds and its rival the remainder. An English community was,

¹ Heeren, 87; Raynal, I, 333 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 306; Payne, 55.

² Some of the early dividends declared by the Dutch East India Company were as follows: July, 1605, 15 per cent; May, 1606, 75 per cent; July, 1607, 40 per cent; April, 1608, 20 per cent; June, 1609, 25 per cent; August, 1610, 50 per cent; December, 1612, 57½ per cent; August, 1615, 42½ per cent; February, 1616, 62½ per cent; April, 1621, 37½ per cent, Yeats, 212. "The net profit upon the cargoes of forty-three ships which returned out of forty-six which were despatched during the first six years of the company's existence was estimated as equal in value to £32,000,000 sterling." — *Ibid.*; for the importance of the Indian trade in 1608, cf. Motley, "United Netherlands," IV, 411 et seq.; McCullagh, II, 313, 324; Cantu, VIII, 307; for many more particulars and detailed statements, Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 16 et seq., 20.

³ Heeren, 163 (par. 14); Merivale, 56; Motley, "United Netherlands," IV, 228; Cantu, VIII, 307.

⁴ Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 503; De Sismondi, "Economie Politique," II, 131; Leroy-Beaulieu, 71; R. and J. 281; Payne, 55.

⁵ Birdwood and Forster (Introduction); Motley, "United Netherlands," IV, 230; McCullagh, II, 318.

⁶ *Ibid.* II, 320; Mill, "British India," Book I, Ch. II; Payne, 57.

in consequence, started at Amboyna, much to the disgust of the residents;¹ but one day in 1623 the new arrivals, justly or unjustly accused of a seditious plot, were arrested, tried, and executed.² The mutual hatred, long existing, after this deplorable event may be easily imagined.³

Nevertheless, as against their common enemies, Spain and Portugal, the success of the one nation was to the profit of the other. Ormus, on the coast of Persia, had long been an important Portuguese centre, when the English planned its ruin. With the aid of a British squadron, the Shah succeeded, in 1622, in dislodging the invaders, after one hundred and twenty years' possession; the city itself was razed. This triumph did not redound to the immediate advantage or glory of England; but rather, as the death blow to Portuguese authority, rendered the position of the Dutch more secure; for they had at this time far outdistanced the English in competition for empire in the Orient.⁴

In 1624 the Chinese, and in 1638 the Japanese, opened their doors to commerce with the Dutch, both these races receiving them with pleasure as deliverers from Portuguese misrule. The island of Formosa soon fell into the hands of the East India Company, and not long afterward Corea was reached by its fleets. Within a short interval its sailors had also visited Australia, Van Diemen's Land, and New Zealand; and

¹ The English seem to have been equally violent in the display of their hatred against the Dutch, Mill, Book I, Ch. II.

² McCullagh, II, 321; Payne, 57. For several woodcuts as ludicrous as they are horrible, but which give some ideas of the tortures inflicted upon the English on this occasion, cf. Harris, "Voyages."

³ For rivalry between the English and the Dutch in the East Indies, and the massacre of Amboyna, cf. Raynal, II, 21-27; Hume, "History of England," IV, 517. For later competition and quarrels, Hume, VI, 38 et seq., 97 et seq.; McCullagh, II, 334, 336, 339. The act of navigation was the final outgrowth of this animosity (1651); for the subsequent increase of Dutch commerce in spite of this measure, McCullagh, II, 341. For the first naval war between England and Holland (1652-1654), cf. *ibid.* 342 et seq. In this struggle, "The great Dutch Admiral de Ruyter was everywhere, at one time on the Guinea Coast, at another raiding the Leeward Islands, and threatening the Barbados, and again sailing up the Thames and Medway while Monk, hard pressed, could scarcely keep London safe." — Lucas, IV, 98. For the second war (1664-1667), its causes and results, McCullagh, II, 348 et seq.; also Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 360.

⁴ Birdwood and Forster, 335, note 1; Cantu, VIII, 306.

occupied the shores of Malabar and Coromandel, as well as those of Ceylon (1658). The efforts made to plant colonies in Africa, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope, scarcely need be mentioned. Such, in brief, was the extent of the Eastern domains of the Netherlands.¹

The Dutch had already, in 1619, built the new city of Batavia, on the island of Java,² and there set up the seat of government for their Oriental realm.³ This place rapidly developed; at times its population is said to have amounted to five hundred thousand inhabitants, and it was in the middle of the seventeenth century the metropolis of those regions not less than the central point of Dutch power, which was exercised over a length of coast-line stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to Corea, and over innumerable lands in the intervening seas.⁴ Batavia barely failed to become the sole capital of the republic; for, in 1672, when Louis XIV was menacing the independence of Holland, this hardy race, rather than submit, had resolved voluntarily and en masse to emigrate to Java and there reconstruct their state.⁵ Batavia bore a great resemblance to Amsterdam. With its busy dockyards, crowded wharfs, streets threaded with shaded canals, the long quays, the numerous vessels in port, and the mammoth warehouses, it was indeed a typical Dutch town. The regulations of the East India Company required that all merchandise from the far Orient must first be carried thither and thence reexported to Europe.⁶ The city was the residence of the governor-general and the headquarters of the administration in the East, only second in this respect to Amsterdam.⁷

¹ Heeren, 112 (par. 4 note), 163; Raynal, I, 319 et seq., 374 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 306 et seq.; Payne, 60, 111 et seq., 120.

² After a full description of Batavia, Noel says, "At its quays all merchandise purchased in Asia arrived, and thence was shipped to Europe." — (tr.) "Histoire du Commerce," II, 15; Raynal, I, 438.

³ Raynal, I, 419; Heeren, 112 (par. 4); Cantu, VIII, 307; Payne, 56.

⁴ Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 503.

⁵ Birdwood and Forster (Introduction).

⁶ "Six months was considered a quick passage between ports of the Netherlands and the roads of Batavia, where their ultimate destination was made known to the skippers by the governor-general and Council of India." — THEAL, II, 23.

⁷ Cantu, VIII, 308, 310; Payne, 56; McCullagh, II, 366.

After Batavia, the Cape of Good Hope would naturally be considered most important as a port of call and a refuge for craft engaged in the Indian trade.¹ Unfortunately, for some reason it was only at a very late date that the Dutch perceived the advantage of such an establishment.² The immediate object of the colony then founded was simply to assure a base of supplies, although strategically the situation was also excellent. In 1652 Van Riebeck, a ship physician, located here the first emigrants.³ A few head of cattle and a tract of land were given to each individual; agriculture soon flourished, and settlers were attracted. The colonists were under strict control. Ships of other nations were not allowed to approach or to have any intercourse with the shore. The people themselves were not permitted to take any part in trade, or even to sail along the African coast. As everywhere under Dutch rule, absolute exclusion was the policy.⁴

The aim of the East India Company was, as stated, purely commercial; all else was secondary. In the execution of its early designs, extreme moderation was shown. The glory of conquest for its own sake never dazzled the Dutch. After having accomplished the expulsion of the Portuguese, they did not endeavor to succeed them as political sovereigns. On the contrary, they usually destroyed even the forts and other military works which they had captured. They maintained armed forces only at places of vantage; these they made their collecting and distributing stations. In a business

¹ Raynal, I, 391 et seq.; Heeren, 113; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 503; Cantu, VIII, 307 et seq.

² About the same time (1619-1620) the Dutch and the English sent out orders to have this region explored for a suitable site for a settlement.

³ For Van Riebeck's colony and his sojourn at Table Valley, cf. Lucas, IV, 6 et seq.; he was subsequently in command at Malacca and later secretary of the Council of India.

⁴ Raynal, I, 407 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Econ. Pol." II, 129 et seq.; Payne, 60. "After dismissing one commander for violating the rules, the Directors at Amsterdam sent the following message to his successor (1667): 'That you may know how to conduct yourself in the future upon the arrival of Europeans, we have now to direct you not to refuse them water; but as to refreshments to give them as little as may be in any way possible, giving them in particular no provisions, ship stores, or the like, etc.'" — Lucas, IV, 46,

light, they treated the inhabitants of the districts where they went with scrupulous honesty and every consideration.¹ They preferred that the latter procure the merchandise, and then they bought it of them in wholesale quantities; at times they even advanced money to cover the necessary purchases. This plan enabled the Company to avoid costly permanent settlements at many minor ports and demonstrated to the natives the confidence imposed in them, which happily they almost universally reciprocated. At regular intervals a fleet would make a trip touching along the seaboard, gathering the goods, casting accounts, and selling other articles in return, or the traders would bring their wares to the nearest Dutch city.² These methods worked admirably and were very economical. Religion and politics never being intermingled with commerce, the aborigines had not in this respect any occasion for animosity. In the colonies Protestantism alone was tolerated.³

By such prudence and discretion the Dutch not only appropriated the European-Oriental trade, but secured for themselves most of the traffic of the East. They furnished India with commodities from China, Japan with goods from India, the islands with the products of the continent, and *vice versa*.⁴ One of the strongest bulwarks of their power was the exalted reputation which they sustained for truthfulness and fair dealing; again, by their system of employing local agents in their transactions, they inspired in them a general interest in their concerns, for the recompense of these men depended upon their diligence. Indeed it has been said that the Dutch Company paid the highest figures in the Orient and sold at the lowest prices in Europe.⁵ Competition under these circumstances was impossible. The reason was that any unnecessary incidental expense was reduced to the minimum. Although profits were smaller in percentage, the volume of business was vastly increased. The results of this policy were

¹ Heeren, 87; Leroy-Beaulieu, 69.

² Mill, "British India," I, 105.

³ Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 42; Cantu, VIII, 309.

⁴ Leroy-Beaulieu, 69.

⁵ Birdwood and Forster (Introduction). *Contra*, R. and J. 261 et seq., 281.

remarkable.¹ From China the Netherlands received tea and silk; from Ceylon, pepper and cinnamon; from Cochin and Calicut, likewise pepper; from Japan, camphor and copper; from the island of Mauritius, ebony wood; from Persia, opium; and from Siam, rice. On the other hand, Holland supplied all these regions with woollens and flax-made cloths.² Such was the situation for the greater part of the seventeenth century — the period of development.³

Two significant features of this time should not be overlooked: how the East India Company preferred to fix its principal establishments on the islands rather than on the mainland, and how small a number of colonists, in the true sense of the word, went out from Holland.⁴ Very few of the people who did leave the mother country took part in agriculture; the most of them, grouped in the important centres, were chiefly engaged as factors, brokers, and traders, or else in the administration of public affairs.⁵ Toward its employees the Company was just as straightforward in its conduct as toward its patrons and subjects. Uprightness, strict honesty, uncompromising obedience and devotion to its welfare were exacted, and brought due reward. Participation in trade on their own

¹ Mill, "British India," I, 64, 94.

² McCullagh, II, 252 et seq.

³ Raynal says: "Their first step was to establish among the peoples of Europe the exchange of the products of the North with those of the South. All seas were soon covered with the vessels of Holland; in its ports all merchantable goods were collected; from its ports they were shipped to their respective destinations. They [the Dutch] regulated the value of everything, and they did it with such judgment as to prevent any competition. The ambition of giving greater stability and greater extent to its enterprises rendered the Republic in time all conquering. Its dominion stretched over a portion of the continent of India and over all the important islands of the ocean which surrounds it. It dominated by its fortresses or by its squadrons the coasts of Africa, whither it had turned its glance attentively and with a view to its useful ambition. The only regions in America where the cultivation of the soil had sown the seeds of real wealth, recognized its laws. The magnitude of its combinations embraced the universe, of which, by reason of its toll and industry, it was the inspiration. It had attained unto the universal sovereignty of commerce." — "History of the Establishments and of the Commerce of the Europeans in the Indies," VI, 371.

⁴ Theal, II, 23; Merivale, 55; Heeren, "Ideen," II, 66.

⁵ Leroy-Beaulieu, 68.

personal account was forbidden to subordinates.¹ Any violation of the rules and regulations or any breach of trust was visited with swift and condign punishment. Prior to 1650 not only the standard of character was high among those connected with the management, but a real simplicity prevailed in customs, dress, and life throughout the territories of the Netherlands. Even at Batavia, during this epoch, luxury was not known.²

The Dutch East India Company enjoyed unequalled prosperity so long as it conformed to the ideals of its early career;³ for more than a hundred years it flourished,⁴ and at the beginning of the eighteenth century was the most powerful trading and commercial organization of Europe; the year 1718 may be declared approximately to mark the opening of the era of decadence.⁵

¹ Heeren, 86 et seq.; Merivale, 56.

² Raynal, I, 465; R. and J. 273.

³ "During the seventeenth century Holland was so rich that it took almost all the loans issued by France and England and was contented in these transactions with a rate of interest varying between four and six per cent."—(tr.) NOEL, II, 333.

⁴ The Treaty of Munster (1648), by which the eighty years' war with Spain was closed, concisely indicated the extent of Dutch power at that epoch, Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 51; one hundred years later, in 1751, William IV, Prince of Orange, in a communication to the States-General clearly set forth the causes which had contributed to Dutch prosperity, Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 41 et seq.

⁵ Many authorities fix this date as 1722.

CHAPTER VIII

DECLINE OF DUTCH COLONIZATION IN THE EAST

THE consolidation of the two English East India Companies occurred in 1702, and within a few years the new society thus created was rivalling the Dutch corporation; but the most serious danger to the latter arose from changes made in its own methods. The Dutch had in the first century of their colonial activity limited themselves almost exclusively to commerce, barter, and exchange, having scarcely any permanent settlements and employing in their transactions the intervention of the natives; subsequently, adopting a plantation policy, they began to pay more attention to the cultivation of certain products of the soil. In the Indies they decided to apply a system similar to that which the Spaniards before them had practised in many of their possessions. Unfortunately altering the nature of their aims, they modified the characteristics of their rule and sowed the seeds of ultimate disaster. Upon close examination of internal conditions, the gradual loss of vigor is evident, although outwardly apparent strength was still maintained.¹

In the latter half of the seventeenth century the coffee berry was carried from Arabia to Java.² It proved exceedingly

¹ Heeren, 204 (par. 16). "This prosperity found its danger in the abandonment of the original traditions of simplicity and of wisdom, in the decadence of the morals of the agents of the Company, and in the economic and administrative faults of which the Company was guilty." — (tr.) NOEL, II, 161.

² "As early as 1650 the industrious Dutch carried the seeds of coffee trees from Mocha to their colony in the far East, enlarged the enterprise rapidly, and were able in 1719 to appear in the great markets of the world with large supplies of coffee from Java. Encouraged by this success they established similar plantations in Sumatra, Ceylon, and the Sunda Islands. The French and the English followed their example, and in a short time the coffee tree had made the voyage around the world. In 1690 Governor Witsen presented a cof-

thrifty in this location and soon became the principal source of remuneration in the colonial trade. About the same time the sugar-cane was introduced into the Moluccas and Java. For these enterprises it was necessary to draw emigrants from Europe; to this end large tracts of land and a fixed number of cocoanut trees were promised to each male settler, while presents of money were offered to those of the other sex; but, finally, because of the enthusiasm with which the latter accepted its generosity, the Company was obliged to abandon these bounties. Marriage with converted native women was thenceforth permitted. Another feature deserves particular mention — the few slaves and the kind treatment accorded them.¹

In the work of colonization, every nation undertaking the task seems to single out some article of production as the object around which its care and solicitude turn; it is *the* commodity from which wealth is anticipated; all else is subordinated to it and, as compared with it, considered valueless. The government, zealous to promote the single coveted specialty, surrounds its cultivation or extraction with detailed regulations, retains an exclusive control over it, and expects to derive from it an exaggerated profit. Generally the hopes so highly strung are vain and deceptive. A great output may be attained, vast fortunes made, immense revenues raised, a monopoly established, glory and magnificence may ensue; but invariably, like the golden apple so beautiful to the eye, this success is corroding the heart, corrupting the character, and implanting in the national constitution the germs of senility, decay, and decline.

fee plant to the Botanic Garden of Amsterdam, where it bore fruit and produced many young plants; from these the East Indies and the West Indies have been furnished." — SIMMONDS, "Tropical Agriculture," 33.

"The first coffee plants grown in Java of which we have historical accounts were brought from Kanamore in 1696; but they perished in the earthquake and flood of 1699; and the honor of reintroducing the precious shrub belongs to Hendrik Zwaardkrom. The first shipment of Javanese coffee was made in 1711-1712, but it was not till after 1721 that the yearly exports reached any considerable amount." — H. A. WEBSTER, article "Java," in "Encyclopædia Britannica."

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 81.

In South America gold and silver were the ruin of Spain; in Cuba, sugar; in the Dutch Indies spices were the origin of evil. Had the East India Company been satisfied to derive from its dominions the legitimate returns of a trading system, all would have continued well; but, regardless of the results achieved along this line, the possibilities of fabulous riches dazzled, blinded, and too strongly tempted the sturdy, conservative Dutch people. Although the coffee and sugar cultures were, in the early part of the eighteenth century, considerably developed in their dependencies, the spice trade still remained the fetich; in time the heedless, imprudent policy of devotion to this one idol involved the Company in excesses, occasioned its bankruptcy, and irretrievably cost the state its preëminence in Oriental affairs.¹

From the very first the Dutch cherished exaggerated notions of the spice business.² In a degree their anticipations were unduly elated by the prevailing European fashion of the seventeenth century.³ Spices were of comparatively recent introduction; they were just beginning to be used by constantly increasing numbers, and bade fair within a brief interval to be universally in vogue. Moreover, at that epoch only certain islands of the Indian Ocean were the sources of supply, so that whoever ruled them effectually controlled the trade. The Dutch, in fact, became their fortunate possessors. How, in their desire to dictate prices, they only cultivated those regions where the production was the most luxuriant and perfect, how they absolutely prohibited the culture in districts neglected by themselves, and how unhappily the efforts of the Dutch Company to share these territories with its English

¹ Scidmore, 94.

² "As soon as the Dutch were firmly established in the Moluccas they endeavored to appropriate the exclusive trade in spices; an advantage which those whom they had just despoiled had never been able to secure."—(tr.) RAYNAL, I, 334. "To assure themselves the exclusive output of the Moluccas, which were justly called the gold mines of the company, the Dutch employed every means which an enlightened avarice could suggest. Nature even came to their aid."—(tr.) *Ibid.* 343-344. The last sentence refers to the earthquakes, storms, and difficulties of navigation which prevail in this region.

³ An advance in the price of India pepper was the chief motive for the establishment of the English company, Birdwood and Forster (Introduction).

competitor terminated, are already known. After the expulsion of this rival the Dutch pursued, with renewed vigor, their doctrines of monopoly.¹ They adopted the illogical plan of inordinate gains on small sales. Every nerve was strained to limit the output with the intention of augmenting quotations. The theory of less profit and large transactions was unappreciated.²

These prudent, sensible men seemed as crazed by the spice trade as their foes, the Spaniards, were maddened by the search for gold. All was abandoned in their infatuation for this one siren; wealth was risked for its maintenance, and prosperity was eventually lost by the succession of disasters directly traceable to this cause. The Dutch, in quest of the imaginary riches presumably to be acquired by the continuance of their exclusive methods, fought other nations, defied nature, and demoralized themselves. Their long struggle with England in the East was for the freedom of the spice market; the devastation of the fields outside of their duly organized plantations was an attempt to resist the edicts of a higher power; while the necessity of resorting to arbitrary injustice and a vicious mode of administration to assure the efficacy of their restrictive measures led to the corruption of their own character and government. As the Dutch had first settled on the islands of the Indian Ocean, there cultivated spices and gained affluence, so, subsequently, they there first committed excesses and entered upon their decline.

The extirpation of the surplus of spice plants was barbarous and, likewise, most injurious to national interests. While this practice may have been unavoidable in order to reduce the production and frustrate contraband traffic, it was inherently mischievous.³ Many officials were required to enforce the

¹For some account of the spices grown in the Dutch Indies, methods of administration, cultivation, and volume of trade, cf. Raynal, I, 334 et seq. Among the chief items in this commerce were pepper, nutmegs, cloves, and cinnamon.

²Roscher and Jannasch, 281.

³Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 503; De Sismondi, "Econ. Pol." II 131; J. and J. 281; Leroy-Beaulieu, 71; Payne, 55.

observance of regulations in districts where the crop was purposely destroyed.¹ A complicated administrative mechanism and a vast expenditure being requisite, without any directly positive returns, this wastage in condemned regions offset, in great part, the enormous profits realized elsewhere. Considerable military and naval equipments were equally indispensable to second the decrees of the governors, to secure the obedience of the natives, and to prevent illicit trading with foreign competitors.² Unfortunately for the reputation which the Dutch had previously enjoyed, this fatal policy of wilful limitation of the stocks drew upon them the bitter hatred of the inhabitants, who could view only with horror the sacrifice of the fruits of their labor and the desolation of large portions of their fatherland. This animosity, at times manifesting itself in open resistance, resulted on several occasions in the almost total annihilation of the aborigines and the ruin of agriculture.³ Extortion became common, cruelty was frequent, and massacres were consummated in the application of these unnatural laws.⁴ To obtain the highest degree of gain the Company was tempted to buy as cheaply as possible. As the entire traffic was in its hands, it had full power to fix its own purchase price. On this question interminable quarrels with the planters arose, the latter claiming in all probable justice that their toil was insufficiently remunerated. In Java, Ceylon, and Sumatra, war was a normal condition; in the other colonies of the Orient the situation was little better.⁵ The tyranny of the ruling nation grew to be intolerable. At first so liberal, when freeing these same people from the oppression of Portugal and Spain, Holland, absolute master in turn, exceeded its predecessors in the absurdity of its ordinances and in the severity of their execution.⁶

¹ Raynal, I, 345.

² *Ibid.* I, 356.

³ Torrens, "Colonization of South Australia," 190; R. and J. 281.

⁴ Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 503; De Sismondi, "Pol. Econ." II, 171; Leroy-Beaulieu, 71 et seq.; Payne, 112.

⁵ Raynal, I, 460-461.

⁶ McCullagh, II, 323 et seq.

Possibly the Dutch East India Company would still have been able to survive the moral ignominy of its hostile treatment of foreigners and its harsh disposition toward the natives had its own officials remained faithful to their duty.¹ But as the scheme of administration extended and the organization of the colonial government became more involved, the opportunities for infidelity, misconduct, treachery, and corruption augmented.² Alas! unhappily, as so often before and since, trusted and honored public servants were, for the sake of their own personal aggrandizement, not slow to betray the confidence placed in them. The corporation fell as plunder to its own agents; dishonesty entered every department. In earlier days the emissaries residing in its possessions had been few. A fleet alone was charged with the maintenance of Dutch authority in the East. After the epoch of the change in policy the number of functionaries permanently living abroad rapidly multiplied. Those who wished to attain wealth—so many at all times—craved employment in the foreign service; those who longed for prestige at home solicited places for their favorites and retainers; ambitious politicians created new posts in order to have more influence at their disposal.³ Whoever went out to India, Java, or the Moluccas, the directors in Holland overlooked or tolerated their misbehavior; frequently they connived at it.⁴

The chief abuse which developed was trading by the representatives of the Company on their own account.⁵ The regulations of 1658 forbade this individual participation in business, and the value of merchandise which could be brought back to Europe was likewise limited; but both these provisions were openly and wilfully disregarded. A large and lucrative commerce was carried on by subordinates, who were often

¹ Heeren, 205.

² For a survey of the causes for the decline of the Dutch East India Company, cf. Lucas, IV, 8 et seq.

³ The company owed its fall "not so much to the competition of powerful rivals and to its losses in war, as to the corruption which its system of government fostered among its officials."—Lucas, IV, 351.

⁴ Raynal, I, 463 et seq.; R. and J. 273; Leroy-Beaulieu, 72 et seq.

⁵ Heeren, 361 (par. 20); R. and J. 273, 285.

aided by officers resident in Holland. An attempt was made to economize by paying insignificant salaries, and to prevent the violation of rules by an army of inspectors. The small pay and the tribute exacted for silence rendered illegitimate practices the more flagrant. Thus the effort to redress wrongs only tended to increase them. With the greatest effrontery, employees appropriated even vessels to transport their private cargoes to Europe. In Japan the illegal traffic exceeded the regularly authorized transactions. Petty clerks, earning small wages, died, leaving fortunes of hundreds of thousands of florins, and governors, at the end of their terms, returned to Europe having amassed millions. The Company went so far as to recognize these illicit profits by imposing a tax upon them. Not any wonder situations in the Orient were sought with avidity!¹

At home the rivalry for employment under the East India Company was not the less keen. The law provided that government officers should not be elected to any position by the corporation; nevertheless, in the first half of the eighteenth century nearly all its leading officials were in the public service. The majority of the directors from Amsterdam were aldermen of that city. In 1748 the heir to the throne became governor-general with very extensive functions.² Next, the higher posts were declared hereditary, so that gradually the management constituted a limited aristocracy. With this deterioration in the character of its governors, disorganization went hand in hand. The directors ceased actively to take part in affairs; instead of meeting periodically, they came together only twice a year; the moneys and the accounts were neglected; general confusion prevailed. In spite of the protests of a few of the more honest and outspoken members of the board and of certain exasperated citizens, the States-General, tempted by the cupidity of some of the deputies, ultimately refused to inaugurate reforms, accepted and approved incomprehensible financial statements, and left all

¹ R. and J. 273 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 72 et seq.

² His annual salary was 200,000 florins; R. and J. 287.

the vices of administration unchecked. Public interests were entirely subjected to personal gain.¹

The like inertness pervaded every branch of the service. Whether by negligence or lack of foresight, many antiquated regulations were being maintained, which, harmful in their origin, were in later days most baneful in their effect. The rule which required all vessels engaged in the Asiatic coasting trade to call at Batavia was the most absurd,² for the free navigation of British mariners in those waters was sounding the death knell of Dutch commerce. Another equally senseless provision was, that ships from the Orient must sail around the north of Scotland instead of coming up the English Channel.³

The perfidy of agents in the East and the mismanagement of officers at home hastened the decline of the East India Company, at the same time threatening ruin to the Netherlands.⁴ Between 1671 and 1740 the corporation lost two-thirds of its vessels. Its welfare was also being daily more and more menaced by the increasing competition of its English rival; while, in Holland, the state was dictating more stringent conditions of existence. When, in 1748, great modifications were made in the charter and the prince apparent was elected governor-general,⁵ it was likewise decreed that a yearly tax of 1,250,000 florins, half in coin and half in products, should be paid. Furthermore, the annual license fee was fixed at 40,000 florins plus three per cent on the net profits.⁶ This exaction on the part of the government was fatal. The association, burdened with these additional obligations, saw its indebtedness augment with terrifying rapidity.⁷ The wise

¹ Raynal, I, 466-469; Leroy-Beaulieu, 73 et seq. For some further discussion of the mismanagement of the affairs of the Company, cf. Raynal, 470-477. Another modification made in the rules after 1647 was the inauguration of salaries for the directors, R. and J. 272.

² Raynal, I, 463; *supra*, p. 319, note 6.

³ Heeren, 298 (par. 46 note); R. and J. 274, 275; Leroy-Beaulieu, 74, 75.

⁴ McCullagh, II, 367.

⁵ Lucas, IV, 64.

⁶ In 1729 the Company had likewise paid 3,600,000 guilders for an extension of the charter; cf. *post*, p. 338.

⁷ Heeren, 361 et seq. (par. 20 note); Merivale, 56.

men of Holland seem to have been bereft of reason. Hoping against hope for some favorable turn in affairs, the most fallacious doctrines were adopted. Absolute secrecy was enjoined upon the directors and officials in charge, so that the Dutch people should not learn the perilous situation.¹ Meanwhile, effectually to conceal these disasters, loans were made in the Orient at ten per cent rather than in Europe at three; money at this fabulous rate was even used to meet the regular dividends.²

Prosperity had departed and the Company was on the edge of the abyss of destruction. From 1603 to 1693 there had been annually imported into Holland 60,000,000 to 120,000,000 florins' worth of merchandise, which had been sold to enormous advantage. In 1655 it is said 57,000,000 florins net were realized, and in 1693 nearly 100,000,000. At times the stock was quoted at 1000 for every 100 par. In less than 130 years 180,000,000 florins were distributed as profits, aside from imposts, loans to the state, the cost of the erection of many public buildings, — among them the city hall of Amsterdam, — and the construction of an immense mercantile marine.³ The exigencies of international politics were growing more and more pressing, which fact, combined with the swiftly developing competition of other nations, presaged ultimate ruin. In 1730 the losses of the corporation already amounted to 233,000,000 florins.⁴

¹ Raynal, I, 459, 460.

² *Ibid.* I, 468; Leroy-Beaulieu, 74 et seq.

³ Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge gives the annual dividends paid by this company, from 1605 to 1774, an excellent index to the rise and fall of its prosperity. For example, the dividends were, in 1606, 75 per cent; in 1612, 57½ per cent; in 1627, 32½ per cent; in 1642, 50 per cent; from 1605 to 1648, the average annual rate was 22+ per cent; with few exceptions, when the dividend was passed, the percentage throughout the seventeenth century was above 20 per cent; after 1750, it was rather under than over that figure; cf. Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 71, 74 et seq.; *supra*, p. 317, note 2. For the value of merchandise annually sold by the company, *ibid.* II, 78; cf. also Cantu, VIII, 309 et seq.; McCullagh, II, 367; Raynal, I, 457.

⁴ Cf. Noel, II, 161. In 1751 the net assets of the company did not exceed 62,480,000 livres, but of this amount only 38,060,000 livres were "good." At that time the annual revenue was 27,940,000 livres, but the ordinary disbursements amounted to 20,480,000 livres; cf. Raynal, I, 457-458. The situation was then already acute.

The war with England to decide the supremacy of the seas broke out in 1780. For very nearly 180 years that country, envious of Dutch power, had been biding the opportunity to crush it. England, having practically annihilated French colonial rule, was now strengthening herself for the final struggle with her most redoubtable rival.¹ During the first year of the conflict, so many Dutch vessels were taken or sunk that the Company was obliged to suspend payments;² before its close, in 1783, many of the possessions in the Orient had been captured; some of them were afterward returned to Holland, but others, quite as important, were confiscated forever. Moreover, one of the provisions of peace was the free navigation of these waters.³ Again, the English had, in 1774, discovered spice trees on the coast of New Guinea; and the French had likewise introduced the cultivation of cloves and nutmegs, on an unlimited scale, into their Eastern dominions. Thus the Dutch monopoly was broken on every hand.⁴

The States-General, in 1789, ordered a searching examination into the accounts of the Company.⁵ It was shown in the report, made six years later, that since 1694 the expenses had annually exceeded the receipts by several millions of francs; that loans had been constantly made to cover these deficits; that in 1779 the sum borrowed was 168,000,000 francs; that in 1791 the debts amounted to 238,000,000 francs; in 1794, just before this exposure, the assets approximated 15,287,000 florins, while the liabilities were 127,550,000 florins.⁶ The society abandoned in 1795 its authority, still nominally

¹ Cantu, VIII, 310; Heeren, 298 (par. 46 note).

² "Out of an yearly average of 135 ships calling at the Cape, only 29 now called." — LUCAS, IV, 192.

³ Already some time previously the Dutch had, in fact, lost their exclusive control over the coasting trade of the Orient, Raynal, I, 462.

⁴ Raynal, I, 478-480; Cantu, VIII, 310; Leroy-Beaulieu, 76.

⁵ For a previous official report on condition of Dutch commerce in 1751, cf. McCullagh, II, 365.

⁶ A florin is worth a trifle more than two francs. The actual as well as the relative value of the moneys of France and Holland have, however, changed since the time mentioned in the text.

existing over the entire Oriental trade, except that of China and Japan; all its other territories were then surrendered to the state. The final cessation of its activities came in 1798, and its legal dissolution followed some two years subsequently (1800).¹

The celebrated Dutch East India Company fell the victim of its own maladministration. Perpetual monopoly was the delusory phantom after which it grasped. How in this vain effort every principle of reason, logic, honesty, justice, and common sense was violated, is apparent. Not satisfied with the exclusive control of markets, the organization attempted to amass riches by the practice of extortion. The wanton destruction of natural wealth, the cruel subjection of the native populations, and the total banishment of foreigners from its domains were incidental to the one end. For a time—indeed nearly a century—this corporation, untrammelled in its undertakings and, to a great extent, undeveloped in its procedure, flourished; but as other European powers besides Holland gradually became stronger, their rivalry grew more threatening; and consequently the methods of the Dutch in self-defence were more minutely elaborated; nevertheless, as the arrogance of these people increased their prosperity declined. The doctrine of the free navigation of the seas, for which they had formerly contended against the Portuguese, was afterward repudiated by them.² Inaugurating their series of colonial enterprises with the profession of the most liberal theories of that age, they had eventually built up a monstrous tyranny. Their very successes, so often exaggerated and fictitious, had enticed other nations to redouble their endeavors to participate in the Eastern trade, while, on the other hand, their despotism in the Orient involved them in continual hostilities with the aborigines, and caused these latter to welcome the enemies of Holland as their own deliverers. Con-

¹ R. and J. 278 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 75, 76; Payne, 140; Alleyne Ireland says the indebtedness of the company at the time of its dissolution approximated \$45,000,000, "Tropical Colonization," 196.

² *Supra*, p. 310, notes 2 and 3.

stant warfare within and without their settlements was the most potent force working for evil.¹ Red tape, official corruption, and lack of patriotism were the natural accompaniments of their system.

One of the most serious faults of the Company was its thoughtlessness of the future. Exclusively engrossed in the task of procuring quick and large gains from its distant possessions, the study of ways and means for their permanent welfare was neglected or forgotten. Satisfied with the mere present condition of its domains, it failed to perceive the changes in administration and form of government required by the enlightened reason of the ages. Bound up in a routine of the old-fashioned type, it was considered discreditable to adopt any detail advocated or practised by others. The Dutch, strangely enough, committed errors very similar to those perpetrated by their ancient enemies, the Spaniards. In the East they were, as these latter in the West, devoid of all spirit of improvement, progress, or reform; both reaped the harvest of antagonism at home and abroad, of dazzling, but insecure and briefly enduring, profits, of persistent smuggling, dishonest representatives, and ultimate bankruptcy.²

The Company, inspired solely by mercantile aims, never, in the strict sense, founded colonies. The one exception was in the Cape of Good Hope — an establishment which was, indeed, purely agricultural; but even in this instance the Dutch scarcely appreciated the full utility of that point as a strategic post. Under their rule this community did not flourish; notwithstanding the beautiful climate, location, and natural wealth of the region, it only very slowly developed. The absurd restrictions imposed upon the colonists, forbidding trade with the neighboring native tribes, the frequent conflicts with these latter, owing to the bad faith displayed toward them, the religious persecutions, which here alone took place, and

¹ For a summary of the wars of the Dutch in the East, cf. John Bruce (Introduction), 14 et seq.

² For a description of the reasons of Dutch failure in colonization, cf. Yeats, 26.

the prohibition of commerce with other nations, inconceivably diminished the importance of this station.¹ The latent possibilities of the district were quickly manifest upon its final transfer, in 1815, to British sovereignty.²

This blindness to the value of regular settlements is strongly illustrated by the story of John Purry, a Swiss in the hire of the Company during the early part of the eighteenth century, who formulated the theory that a country, in its own interest, should plant permanent and self-sustaining colonies, rather than simply mercantile outposts. He favored the healthy sections of the temperate zones. First turning to his employers for the practical execution of his plans, he desired that they take possession of certain tracts of land to the north of the Cape and in South Australia. He wished to see there grown the fruits of the respective soils, such as corn, nuts, olives, and grapes. The reward for his pains was discharge from his position; for it was feared the loss of the spice monopoly would ensue from these schemes. Purry, afterward having asked the approval of the French Academy of Sciences, but being repulsed, went to England. Purrysburg, in the vicinity of the boundary line between South Carolina and Georgia, was the result of the adoption of his projects by the British government.³

The aversion of the Dutch toward fixed colonial establishments bore fatal consequences when the spice trade declined. Without European colonists in considerable numbers scattered throughout their numerous territories, it was impracticable to inaugurate and maintain other cultures. Habituated to one class of articles, they at length perceived that the

¹ De Sismondi, "Econ. Pol." II, 129 et seq.; R. and J. 270; Leroy-Beaulieu, 81 et seq. "When the Dutch first occupied the Cape, the Netherlands had nearly if not quite reached the summit of their power, and by the time when the settlement had grown out of its infancy, the strength of the mother country was stationary, if not beginning to decline. Had South Africa been settled 50 years earlier, it is conceivable that its fortunes as a Dutch colony would have been greater." — LUCAS, IV, 33.

² *Post*, II, Ch. XXII, entitled, "English Colonization in Cape Colony and South Africa."

³ Payne, "European Colonies," 111.

opportunities of many decades had been wasted.¹ Coffee, sugar, rice, indigo, and other tropical crops had been sacrificed for spices; nations raising these staples, it was realized, were far in the lead.²

The Company, moreover, did not continue to adhere to the liberal principles which it at first professed; on the contrary, its rule had become tyrannical. Can there be imagined any higher form of despotism than that which decrees the destruction of quantities of rich agricultural products with the avowed intent to increase their price?³ Under this policy, an immense extent of fertile fields was devastated in the East Indies, while multitudes of the aborigines starved for the necessities of life. The same system dictated the massacre of hundreds of thousands of persons that these edicts should be obeyed, that smuggling should be rendered very nearly impossible, and that the supervision of the spice business should be facilitated.⁴ These transactions left indelible stains on the reputation of those who participated in them.⁵

In two other aspects the conduct of the Dutch merits praise. Religious persecution and slavery were almost unpractised. Protestantism, although introduced into their realms, was rarely advocated by force, but only by gentle persuasion. The conversion of the heathen to Christianity did not constitute one of their objects. Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and Paganism were not merely tolerated, but never disturbed. However the lack of missionary spirit may be regarded, this disposition was certainly fortunate for the subject races, who were free from the Inquisition and from every kind of sectarian oppression.⁶ Human bondage was not adopted on

¹ Yeats, 219; also Birdwood and Forster (Introduction).

² Cf. Payne, 64.

³ Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 503; Leroy-Beaulieu, 71; R. and J. 281; De Sismondi, "Econ. Pol." II, 131; Payne, 55.

⁴ For commercial regulations of the Dutch in the Orient and trade statistics, cf. Raffles, 243, 244.

⁵ R. and J. 281; Leroy-Beaulieu, 71 et seq., 80 et seq.; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 503; De Sismondi, "Econ. Pol." II, 131.

⁶ "The invariable maxim, sprung from the fundamental law, [has been] to permit all kinds of religion and to maintain tolerance in this respect as the

any large scale in the East Indies, simply for the reason that it was not needed. The cultivation of the spice trees does not require any close attention such as coffee, sugar, or cotton planting exacts. Domestic servitude alone was permitted; while, in the course of time, the blacks, fused with the natives, practically disappeared. In 1843, it was said, there were only ten thousand slaves in all these dependencies.¹

The effects of the rule of the East India Company in the Orient have been described; what now of the influence exerted on Holland itself? During the seventeenth century the acquisition of the colonies developed in the Dutch remarkable faculties. Notwithstanding the errors of the prevailing system, the people, as individuals, manifested an activity and an energy previously unexampled; a small community living behind dikes and below the sea level, they had scarcely wrested their own freedom from despotism before they set out to win liberty from tyranny for the great Eastern world. Such an empire as that erected by them had never arisen in so brief a period; rapid reaction on the Netherlands was a necessary consequence. Holland, finding wealth and trade in distant regions, was soon recognized as a leading European power. During times of prosperity the government likewise shared in the financial gains. In 1602, 25,000 florins were paid by the Company into the treasury for its first charter; in 1647, 1,500,000 florins on account of renewal, and in 1696 3,000,000 florins.² Besides, all merchandise imported into Holland, as well as the stock and the income of the cor-

most powerful means to attract foreigners from neighboring countries and to increase the population of these provinces. The constant policy of the Republic necessarily rendered this country a sure asylum for all persecuted and oppressed foreigners. No allowance, no treaty, no consideration for any prince, no prayer of any power whatsoever in the world, has ever been able to make the state waver in this protection and in this safeguard extended to those who took refuge in this country." — Extract from the address of William IV, Prince of Orange, in 1751, VAN D. BOGAERDE-D.-T.-BRUGGE, II, 42. These words equally apply to the colonies; cf. also Payne, 112; Cantu, VIII, 309; Josiah Child argues to the contrary that the spirit of domestic tranquillity in Holland was unfavorable to colonial development, "On Plantations," 196.

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 80, 81.

² R. and J. 259.

poration, was taxed.¹ The facility of collecting these revenues fascinated the States-General, while the increasing greed of the authorities in placing additional burdens on the society materially augmented its difficulties. Ultimately, the Dutch themselves were the sufferers; for, when the East India Company, crushed by the enormous mass of its debts, ceased to exist, the nation was obliged to assume these obligations.² Thus its final failure recoiled on those who had so much contributed to it. The long-continued violation of well-grounded economic principles involved Holland at the end of the eighteenth century in multiple disasters.

For the sake of the sums extorted from the Company, Holland had incurred the hatred of Europe. With England the struggle, lasting nearly two centuries, terminated as is well known. Devotion to restricted trade at any cost also had its natural, but still noteworthy, culmination in domestic affairs. During the seventeenth century monopoly became the watchword of the Dutch; a craze in favor of extensive combinations prevailed. The tendency to exclusively privileged associations was then as marked in the Netherlands as the inclination to trusts in the United States at the present day. How strangely, indeed, history is repeated!³

The Dutch, by their daring, industry, and perseverance conquerors of the sea, their own country, and a colonial empire, merited better success than they attained after two centuries of toil. Not only did they fail to secure adequate returns from their vast possessions, but, in spite of their brilliant past, they were at the commencement of the nineteenth century on the verge of destruction. Notwithstanding their economy, assiduity, prudence, and conservatism, they had been dragged down. The mistake dated back two hundred years, and the

¹ Raynal, I, 492-497.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 79; *supra*, p. 332. How different the situation a century previously! "In the beginning of the eighteenth century Holland had claims to the amount of 3,000,000 guilders upon its debtors in various parts of the world." — *YEATS*, 219. For the prejudice already sustained by the state in increase of taxation and of the public debt, cf. McCullagh, II, 329, 357, 361.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 78, 79; McCullagh, 331 et seq.

malady was of similar duration. A free people had, under the guise of a commercial institution, promoted the most vicious of tyrannies. After driving out the Portuguese in the name of liberty, they had erected in the Orient a despotic oligarchy. Insincerity and avarice were the inevitable accompaniments of a privately organized body politic. The corporation became greater than the creating state: excess followed excess until in its utter demoralization the government was seriously embarrassed.

Such were the conditions just prior to 1800. The East India Company had very nearly ruined Holland. But for these reasons should its establishment be irrevocably condemned? Consider a moment the aims and purposes of its founders. Expressly constituted to open a trade which otherwise would have long remained closed; destined to send ships over seas until then hardly explored; consecrated at first to the development of commerce between the East and the West, which, without its help, would have been neglected; acting as a general means for the diffusion of vast funds of information and knowledge of the Orient,—the benefits to all Europe wrought by its early activity and efforts must be duly acknowledged. The perversion which its original principles suffered, the corruption which consumed its honesty, and the injury which it inflicted upon the race are deplorable; still even these evils must perhaps be regarded as necessarily coincident with the evolution of the European colonial system; possibly this test was unavoidable in order that others might profit by these errors, and Holland itself subsequently draw instruction from such unlucky experiences.

On the eve of the nineteenth century the situation of the Dutch was in every respect most difficult. The supremacy on the ocean lost to England in 1783, the sovereignty over their own little land about to be relinquished to Napoleon, the national existence to be merged with that of France in 1811, these people at home and abroad were impotent, like a ship without engine or rudder, to be blown hither and thither by every varying wind of political fortune. France, it may

be said, had their country; England, their dependencies; and the United States, their commerce. While the two former rivals were quarrelling over the territorial spoils, American enterprise had seized the trade of the Dutch; and it can be truly declared that this new-born competition was as mortal to the Netherlands as the discovery of the western world had been to Venice — the Italian metropolis of the Middle Ages.

Immediately after the surrender of the East Indian dominions to the state, strenuous endeavors were made to improve their affairs and to retrieve past disasters. In the interval between the cessation of business by the Company (1794) and the capture of the colonies by England (1811), Holland was represented in the Orient by several honest and courageous governors-general, among whom Daendels (1808–1811) will always be celebrated.¹ His efforts were directed to augmenting the scope and influence of Dutch power in these regions. Abandoning the mere mercantile spirit and looking beyond the value of the annual output of products, he aimed at the higher civilization of the inhabitants, desired the allegiance of the native potentates rather than the yearly tribute of the fruits of their toil, and was determined to render justice to the masses as well as to secure the obedience of the petty princes. He proposed to introduce, side by side with trade, education, religion, and refinement.² It is easy to realize how far his projects were in advance of the principles of the defunct corporation. Fearless in his actions and upright in his motives, even though the English were then threatening these possessions, Daendels did not hesitate to require of the local sovereigns absolute submission, to extend traffic impartially to the aborigines, to exact forced labor for the construction of highways and fortifications, to reform the system of agriculture,³ to suppress the corruption of his subordinates,

¹ For career of Daendels, cf. Scidmore, 22; Cantu, VIII, 311; Leroy-Beaulieu, 277; Payne, 355.

² Cantu, VIII, 311.

³ Ireland quotes at length from Sir Stamford Raffles and Mr. Henry Scott Boys in describing the land-tenure system of Java, "Tropical Colonization," 197.

to reorganize the administration, and to make vigorous resistance to hostile attacks. Unfortunately, the annexation of Holland to France, involving the recall of this resolute character, interrupted his comprehensive plans.¹

England, which almost at once assumed control (1811), for about six years ruled over the Dutch colonial realms. Sir Stamford Raffles, the British emissary in Java, intent upon inaugurating the policy in vogue at Madras and Bombay, proclaimed that the soil belonged to the government, and decreed that every native should pay to the state a land tax averaging from twenty-five to fifty per cent of the usual crops.² The chiefs, relegated from office, were placed on a salary or pension; but, discontented with this very distasteful arrangement, they were soon conspiring to massacre the resident foreigners, when the island again fell into the hands of the Dutch.³

¹ His spirit may be judged from the following quotation, "I found it necessary to place myself above the usual formalities and to disregard every law but that which enjoined the preservation of the colony intrusted to my management;" cited by Raffles, Introduction, xi.

² For a very instructive table of statistics showing the details as to all revenues and expenditures in the island of Java and its dependencies divided into three different periods: (1) 1802-1805 (before Daendels came); (2) 1808-1810 (under Daendels); (3) 1812-1815 (under Raffles), cf. Raffles, 1, 343.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 277 et seq. For an elaborate history of the island of Java from the earliest times to 1811, cf. Raffles, Bk. II, Ch. X and XI.

CHAPTER IX

DUTCH EAST INDIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND DUTCH COLONIZATION IN THE WEST

HOLLAND was more favored than Portugal, her predecessor in the colonial field. Upon the downfall of Napoleon, the contingencies of international politics ordained, not simply that their own fatherland should be recovered by the Dutch, but likewise that nearly all their distant territories should be returned; of the latter they lost, as the final result of the European upheaval, only the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon.¹ Happily emancipated also from the grasp of the East India Company, the nation was then free to prosecute those reforms in colonial administration so long awaited and so much needed. Would that the Dutch, perceiving the opportunity, had been equal to their task! But the labor was slow and protracted, even if yet effectual improvement can be said to have been accomplished.²

Among the Oriental possessions regained in 1816, Java immediately assumed the first rank. Madura, Sumatra, and Borneo are other valuable dependencies.³ Dutch rule was, however, reinaugurated only after considerable friction with the natives, who had eventually learned to prefer their English masters. In 1825 an insurrection broke out in Java which lasted five years; and various contentions with the British were also not adjusted until 1824. Meanwhile frequent complications between the two countries due to the rapidly growing trade and influence of England in the East were more and

¹ For list of places captured by the English from the Dutch, cf. Payne, 139, 143.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 274 et seq.

³ Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 843 et seq., for list of Dutch possessions.

more necessitating some permanent partition of this region. Finally, it was agreed that England should withdraw from the islands and Holland from the mainland. The former thereby obtained the district of Singapore — although the port itself is an island — as well as the Coromandel and Malabar coasts; while the latter, on the other hand, secured the undisputed ownership of several important places, and more particularly achieved the essential concentration of its dominions, which since then have been materially increased. The acquisition of Sumatra, in 1838, is especially worthy of notice.¹

After the retirement of the English the Dutch long vacillated, irresolute what theory to adopt for the interior régime of their establishments. At first, with the view of lessening the displeasure of the inhabitants at their return to power, they appear to have been disposed to continue the policy introduced by the temporary rulers, according to which the lands had been farmed out to the chiefs. Governor Daendels during his term had had forty million coffee trees planted in Java, so that this berry had now become the principal, if not the exclusive, staple.² When the Crown, nevertheless, ascertained that, under the British method, the amount of revenue raised from this crop was still inadequate, it forthwith decreed that the aborigines should cultivate it under the superintendence of the authorities, and hand over to the latter two-fifths of their production. The people at once relapsed into bondage; they found it impossible legally to sell the remaining three-fifths; for the state's share only could be offered on Dutch markets, and trade with foreigners in this article was forbidden.³ Contraband traffic and rebellion followed. So long as the government could control the supply of coffee its profits were enormous; but with the large quantities smuggled to China and there bought by competitors, quotations fell. The usual deficit ensued; recourse was had to a loan; many of the houses then engaged in Eastern business failed, and disaster

¹ Payne, 356.

² *Ibid.* 355.

³ For a discussion of the culture system, cf. Anton, 132, 133; Scidmore, Ch. VIII and IX.

once more was threatening. In 1824 the king himself intervened by the formation of a commercial company considered sufficiently strong to save the situation. Matters, however, grew worse, and the five years' insurrection occurred.¹ Holland was again on the eve of abandoning the island when a man as capable as indomitable appeared on the scene.

Van den Bosch, governor-general of Java, in 1830 took Diepo Negoro, the rebel leader, prisoner, ended the revolt, and set up a desirable local administration. The system,² perpetuating his name, consisted in the substitution of Dutch rule for that of the chiefs, and in the multiplicity of cultures. The state exacted of the natives one-fifth of their days of labor, and required that one-fifth of their land should be devoted to crops which were in good demand in Europe, as, for example, rice, sugar, tobacco, spices, indigo, coffee, and tea. Prices were fixed from year to year in advance, and the tillage of the soil was strictly supervised. The Handels Maatschappij, a mercantile association with 37,000,000 florins capital, was likewise organized, under royal protection, to act as the authorized intermediary for the transportation and sale of Oriental products.³

Under this policy, agriculture flourished, commerce increased, and the population multiplied.⁴ In a few years the output of sugar and coffee more than doubled, while the result attained in the cultivation of tobacco, tea, and many other articles was very similar. The number of vessels necessary to carry these commodities to Europe was naturally much larger, while many foreigners, especially the Chinese, were attracted to the colonies. Still, the Dutch had not fully profited by their experience with the earlier East India Company, for the reforms effected by them were really much more ap-

¹ Cantu, VIII, 311.

² Ireland gives a description of the Van den Bosch system as based upon J. W. B. Money, "Java, or How to manage a Colony," "Tropical Colonization," 204; cf. also Leroy-Beaulieu, 278; "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 849; Scidmore, 96, 112-114.

³ Cantu, VIII, 311.

⁴ "The population increased tenfold during the half century that the culture system was in operation." — SCIDMORE, 109.

parent than substantial. The new methods were, in brief, the revival of the coercion of labor and the monopoly of markets. Nevertheless, peace was reestablished and the supremacy of Holland assured; for the people were pleased by the removal of their chiefs from absolute power, while the latter were flattered by being taken into the public service.

Politically Java is distributed into residencies, divisions, regencies, districts, and communes, or townships. At the head of each regency and every minor subdivision is placed a native chieftain of greater or less distinction according to the importance of the post. The more prominent positions are of course given to the more noble princes. To the office of regent an annual salary of \$4000 to \$7000 is attached, besides a certain proportion of the fruits of the soil under his jurisdiction. These officials are directly responsible to the governor-general, and form a complete civil administration so far as regards local and police control. They are charged with the allotment of lands for agricultural purposes,—nearly all of which are held in common,—and with the collection of the rents. In each of the twenty-two residencies, or counties, a Dutch functionary, aided by several subordinates, is located; he is known as a resident. Technically, his sole duty is to watch the tracts under tillage for the government's account; but in fact, while exercising his authority as lightly as possible, he superintends the entire conduct of affairs in his district. The governor-general, appointed by the Crown, is supreme. He holds office for five years, has a grand council of five members and a cabinet of seven ministers for his assistance and advice. Dutch appointees in the Indies must be educated at a special colonial school at Delft.¹

For twenty years the Van den Bosch system of rule continued in full vigor. Since 1850 various modifications have been introduced, but the groundwork still remains materially unaltered. The principal revision has been the legislation at different periods, favoring the conversion of realty into individual

¹ Ireland, "Tropical Colonization," 75 et seq.; "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 829; Leroy-Beaulieu, 279 et seq.; Payne, 351.

property; and personal possession, even though temporary, already exists. Efforts are being made to change this condition into private ownership; but little has yet been accomplished in that direction, as the Dutch prefer to let the native population work out its agrarian policy unhindered, unrestricted, and without any appearance of coercion.¹ The most essential reforms were inaugurated in 1870, and subsequently the Dutch Indies have been making rapid progress.²

The tendency of the century has been to promote coffee and sugar planting; for the state these are the only two products now grown; others have been abandoned. Next to rice, which is the traditional staple of the Javanese, coffee is the most popular. The latter crop in 1897 amounted to 156,503,866 pounds. The entire output of the natives is now purchased at a fixed price; besides, considerable quantities (68,338,400 pounds in 1897) are raised directly for the government. Although many improvements have been lately effected, ameliorating the situation of the peasant classes, enormous sums are still realized by the treasury from this culture. In 1900 it was estimated the profits would be \$4,094,698. Sugar was formerly the second most remunerative item, but in 1890 the nation withdrew forever from this industry. Since that date the authorities treat only with the manufacturers and leave them to buy from the local dealers; the yield in 1897 was 6116 tons.³

During the past hundred years Java has had a wonderful development. Owing to the more liberal measures adopted toward the inhabitants, to the smaller number of articles monopolized by the metropolis, to the freedom of navigation and foreign commerce, renewed prosperity has lately been

¹ "The culture system still exists to-day only in part, and in that which they have substituted in its place the Dutch have shown themselves to be not merely revolutionary, but evolutionary." — (tr.) ANTON, 128.

² Ireland cites Henry Scott Boys, "Some Notes on Java and its Administration by the Dutch," as indicative of recent conditions, "Tropical Colonization," 211 et seq.; cf. also Leroy-Beaulieu, 280 et seq., 284.

³ Cf. article entitled, "Java" in "Annual Cyclopædia" for several recent years; "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 849 et seq.; Payne, 354 et seq.

reserved to this island and the other Dutch territories of the Orient. Holland seems to be destined to reap the rewards of its enlightened methods. While the trade managed by the Crown is steadily decreasing, that transacted by private individuals is constantly augmenting.¹ A healthy condition is approaching, when business will be more regular and permanent than ever. From the politico-economic standpoint the benefit of the Eastern possessions to the realm has not recently been so great. Java was once an inexhaustible granary of wealth. The sale of colonial products for the state account not only paid the current expenses of administration, but always yielded a large additional sum. In the earlier days of the present era this surplus varied from \$8,000,000 to \$33,000,000 per annum.² It was the period of immense gains to Holland, but of stagnation in the essential growth of the colonies; for these returns were possible only under a régime in which the practical needs of the latter were neglected. Therefore after reforms were instituted the national income from these sources began to decline.³ The dependencies have thenceforward been the favored regions. Ports have been improved, docks built, rivers deepened, roads constructed, public buildings erected, cities sanitarized, and various other engineering works undertaken to the advantage of their people. Vast outlays have necessarily been entailed.⁴ Unfortunately, in conjunction with all these disbursements, the Dutch have had a protracted rebellion on hand. Ever since 1873 the chiefs of Acheen, ruling over the northern extremity of Sumatra, have resisted their authority. As Payne, some years ago, said, the conclusion of this war will be "a remarkable historical event";⁵ and still, at

¹ "The opening of Java to private capital was in a double sense feasible once that the land of the natives was rendered available for cultivation by Europeans; and as soon as the land which was neither in the possession nor in the use of the natives, the so-called 'waste ground,' the uncultivated land, was placed at the disposal of private European colonization." — (tr.) ANTON, 135.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 292.

³ *Ibid.* 293 et seq.

⁴ Cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" for recent years, article "Java."

⁵ Payne, 357; "Annual Cyclopædia" (1899), 535.

this writing, these troubles are scarcely ended. Consequently, the colonial budget and indebtedness each show a corresponding increase. In 1899 the revenue was \$53,568,716.62 and the expenditures \$58,310,431.05.¹ During the ten years preceding 1871 the average annual profit to the mother country was \$10,000,000; since 1878 there has been a yearly deficit.²

The situation of the Dutch in the Indies, during these two intervals, immediately suggests the question, Which is the true doctrine: to secure financial success at the sacrifice of colonial welfare and private interests or to promote by every feasible means the progress of the colony and its inhabitants, even at the expense of the metropolis? There is not any doubt of the correct answer; for under the latter policy the indirect benefits readily compensate the losses sustained. The English have always found it the genuine system; and the recent experience of the Dutch, although costly by reason of their procrastination in its adoption, confirms the fact. After they shall have achieved the public works commenced by them, — which should have been sooner undertaken, but must now, because of their postponement, be the more quickly accomplished, — their dominions will undoubtedly become self-supporting. This condition forms the happy medium of prosperity for the dependency and satisfaction for the nation; it is the normal status. The history of Java in this century forcibly recalls that of Cuba, but affords this striking contrast: the Dutch began their reforms of their own free will and not too late to save their sovereignty. Under their present rule and future prospects Java and the other possessions of the East will probably long remain attached to Holland.

Inspired by the triumphs of their fellow-citizens in the Orient, some Dutch merchants early organized an association for the invasion of the Occident.³ The creation of the West India Company dated from 1617, although its concessions

¹ "Annual Cyclopædia" (1899), 534 et seq.; "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 847.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 293 et seq.

³ Heeren, 113 (par. 6); Motley, "United Netherlands," IV, 276 et seq., 339; Bancroft, I, 493; Leroy-Beaulieu, 83; McCullagh, II, 326 et seq.

were not finally obtained until June 3, 1621; the States-General then voted it the exclusive right for twenty-four years to the commerce of the west coast of Africa, of the entire seaboard—both east and west—of America, of the islands of the Pacific, and of the undiscovered or uncertain lands in the Southern oceans.¹ Exemption from import duties on merchandise entering Holland was likewise accorded for the period of eight years. The original capital stock of the society was 3,000,000 florins, increased after the grant of its privileges to 7,200,000 florins; its principal objects were twofold: to inflict injury—especially by the contraband trade—upon the colonies of Spain and Portugal, and to establish for itself plantations. For the execution of the first purpose it soon launched a mighty fleet of warships and other craft. In 1636 it owned 800 vessels valued at 45,000,000 florins; and since its inauguration had captured 545 Spanish and Portuguese galleons, while the sale of confiscated cargoes had brought 90,845,000 florins.² Locating its settlements on several of the Antilles, and more particularly in Curaçao,³ it succeeded in building up an immense smuggling traffic with the mainland.⁴ Not content with these transactions, it occupied, as elsewhere related, numerous Portuguese stations in Africa, as well as a considerable portion of Brazil.⁵ When Portugal, in 1640, regained its independence from Spain, Holland, as a proof of friendship, caused the legal abandonment of the greater part of the latter region, from

¹ Southey, "Chronological History of the West Indies," I, 232. "The Dutch were the first of the three peoples to treat West Africa as purely subsidiary to America and the West Indies." — LUCAS, III, 63.

² For a brief history of this company, cf. Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 79 et seq.

³ The date of the first Dutch occupation of Curaçao was 1634, Southey, I, 271, 274. For the early history of this island and its neighbors which belonged to Holland, cf. Raynal, VI, 372 et seq.

⁴ Heeren, 298; Payne, 71, Leroy-Beaulieu, 83. Cf. especially, Van Meesteren, "Emigratie naar Suriname" (Haarlem, 1883). "The regions of the New World were entirely Spanish, and with that power the Dutch were at war. Reprisal, not trade, was therefore the primary object in the formation of the new company. It was the inauguration of privateering." — YEATS, 219.

⁵ McCullagh, II, 328; Heeren, 113 (par. 6 note); Leroy-Beaulieu, 83; for the Dutch in Brazil, Payne, 58 et seq.

which, in reality, the colonists had by their prowess already driven the intruders.¹

While the chief energies of this corporation were bent on securing a foothold in South America, some few emigrants under its auspices had, in 1623, unostentatiously taken up their residence at the mouth of the Hudson² and there founded New Amsterdam. Manhattan Island was, in 1626, purchased of the natives by the governor-general, Peter Minuit, for the sum of twenty-four dollars; Dutch settlers also fixed themselves at Fort Orange—now Albany—and at other points along the river.³ Thus, unconsciously, this people performed their most enduring work in the New World. Neglected by the Company, which was so intently devoted to piracy and to the destruction of Spanish trade, New Amsterdam, under its rule, stagnated in tranquil repose for thirty-eight years, giving little promise of its brilliant future as New York.⁴ All the Dutch domains in this vicinity were, in 1664,⁵ seized by England; and, although once subsequently recaptured by their former proprietors, their history is thenceforth comprised in the narrative of British colonization.⁶

The defeat in its Brazilian enterprises by the Portuguese and the conquest of the New Netherlands⁷ by the English left the West India Company deprived of its most valuable territo-

¹ Raynal, VI, 372; *supra*, pp. 217, 218.

² As is well known, Henry Hudson had already, in the autumn of 1609, while in the employ of the Dutch East India Company, reached these waters, Bancroft, I, 481 et seq. Subsequently, in 1614, a company was incorporated under whose jurisdiction the region of the New Netherlands was placed; the fort at Albany was built (1614-1615) and trade was begun; other explorations in the vicinity were made by the Dutch, but the charter of the first company expired on December 31, 1617; then events in Europe delayed action in America until the creation of the Dutch West India Company on June 3, 1621; cf. Bancroft, I, 490 et seq.; Fiske, "The Dutch and Quaker Colonies in America."

³ Bancroft, I, 495.

⁴ This stagnation was attributable to the practice of a commercial monopoly on the part of the Dutch West India Company, Rosscher and Jannasch, 270; Leroy-Beaulieu, 84; Bancroft, I, Ch. XIII and XIV.

⁵ For the Peace of Breda (1664), cf. Hume, "History of England," VI, 55.

⁶ For the history of the New Netherlands under the rule of Holland, cf. Fiske, "The Dutch and Quaker Colonies in America" (New York, 1899); also Bancroft, I, 518 et seq.

⁷ Otherwise known as Nova Belgia.

ries: one by one the other acquisitions were likewise lost. The dividends, which during times of prosperity had annually varied from twenty to fifty per cent, had now entirely disappeared. Under these circumstances, the corporation soon became bankrupt; and finally, after many futile attempts at fusion with the East India Company, the States-General, in 1674, formally dissolved it.¹ To its lack of common sense in administration, to its wastefulness in war, to its sin of piracy, and to its failure in genuine colonial effort was added the crime of the slave trade. This society was, indeed, one of the earliest important dealers in human flesh. The establishment of agricultural colonies and the development of legitimate business were small considerations in its career. Its brief duration and the swiftness of the retribution which overtook it seem to have been fully justified.

Nevertheless, upon the ruins of the defunct institution another was to rise. The States-General, in 1674, licensed the new organization with a capital of 6,000,000 florins; its membership consisted of many stockholders and creditors of the old association.² In spite of the reforms made in the methods of management, it did not, however, have any remarkable success; although active until 1790 it never flourished, and its possessions were few. It not only participated in the slave traffic, but even let out this privilege to private individuals and other corporations; further objects of concern were gold, ivory, leather, and gum. When, in 1790, the end came, still a third Company was at once chartered. Its existence was very ephemeral, for in the course of events commerce between America, Africa, and Holland was soon to be declared free.³

Of the realms which once belonged to the first West India Company, only a few islands still remain under the sovereignty of Holland.⁴ Curaçao is the principal; its dependencies are

¹ More especially for the policy and cause of the fall of the West India Company, cf. McCullagh, II, 347 et seq.; R. and J. 270.

² Heeren, 288; Southey, II, 106-107.

³ Payne, 58, 62, 72; Heeren, 113 (par. 6 note), 298; for the abolition of the slave trade by the Dutch (1814), cf. Southey, "West Indies," III, 528-529.

⁴ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 854.

Bonaire, Aruba, St. Eustache, Saba, and part of St. Martin. The total area is approximately 403 square miles, and the population, on December 31, 1897, was 50,500. In 1899 the budget showed \$253,662 revenue, and \$268,938 expenditures. The imports in 1897 amounted to \$1,077,240.25; statistics for the exports are not available. The administration is confided to a governor appointed by the Crown, assisted by an advisory board of four members and a colonial council of eight, all selected by the home authorities.¹ Curaçao was originally settled by the Spaniards in 1527, and was owned by the Dutch from 1634 until 1798, when a British fleet took it; subsequently restored to Holland, the English again seized it, in 1806; at the close of hostilities, in 1814, it was returned to the Netherlands, which have since then continuously held it. The annals of the island during the nineteenth century have been without special incident.²

One other mercantile society founded in the Netherlands deserves attention. The Company of Surinam was created for the purpose of maintaining an establishment on the northeast coast of South America in the district afterward known as Dutch Guiana.³ Its colony was the only Dutch enterprise the origin of which is attributable to religious motives. This community was inaugurated, in 1634, by some French Protestants, self-exiled on account of their belief.⁴ Within a year it fell into the hands of the English, during whose occupation the population was greatly increased by Jewish refugees from Spain and Portugal. In 1667 it was captured by Dutch adventurers, and eventually came under the jurisdiction of the

¹ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 839 et seq.

² Cf. article "Curaçao" in "Encyclopædia Britannica"; also "Annual Cyclopædia" for recent years.

³ For some account of Guiana in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, cf. Raynal, VI, 387 et seq.; more especially Van Meesteren, "Emigratie naar Suriname" (Haarlem, 1883).

⁴ Leroy-Beaulieu, 84; Raynal says, "The first occupants were the English in 1634," VI, 391. According to Heeren, "Surinam was first founded in 1649 by Portuguese," "European States and Colonies," 164; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge says it owed its origin to the French in 1660, "Dutch Commerce," II, 34; cf. also Southey, I, 258.

first West India Company.¹ Just before the failure of this association it deeded two-thirds of the region to the city of Amsterdam, which forthwith instituted for its control the so-called "Company of Surinam."² Three times since then the Dutch have lost and recovered this territory.³

A very unhealthy climate and an invading sea rendered colonization exceedingly difficult. In spite of these obstacles the Dutch not only conquered the ocean, as in Holland, by dikes, but, by their wisely directed tillage of the soil, also redeemed from fever vast tracts.⁴ The condition of the inhabitants was always most deplorable. Owing to the fact that the immediate supervision of agriculture was intrusted to agents, and by reason of the absence of small landlords,⁵ human servitude here prevailed in its worst form and aspect. After the slaves had been in a state of rebellion during sixty-two years (1715 to 1777), waging open warfare on their masters, the government was finally obliged to lend the troops necessary to restore order and maintain its authority.⁶ Slavery was not abolished until 1863; and at one time the corporation is said to have owned 70,000 negroes.⁷ In 1776 its liabilities are calculated to have been 80,000,000 florins. The Company of Surinam, unlike the other trading associations, did not enjoy an exclusive monopoly. All citizens might participate in this traffic; but the organization had immense grants of land for cultivation, and the right of imposing certain taxes on vessels engaged in commerce with its possessions.⁸ Overburdened with debts and a prey to mismanagement, it perished, with its fellows, about the epoch of the French Revolution.⁹

¹ Heeren, 164; Van d. Bogaerde-d.-t.-Brugge, II, 22.

² Raynal, VI, 392 et seq.; Heeren, 298.

³ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 853.

⁴ Raynal, VI, 397-402; Payne, 86.

⁵ According to Lord Brougham, only eighty landed proprietors resided in Dutch Gulana, "Colonial Policy of the European Powers," I, 385.

⁶ Raynal, VI, 396-396. For general conditions in the colony at that time, *ibid.* 402-406.

⁷ Payne, 366.

⁸ Heeren, 298; Leroy-Beaulieu, 85.

⁹ For the early history of the Dutch establishments of Berbice and Essequibo, cf. Raynal, VI, 406-414.

During the nineteenth century Surinam has had an uneventful history. The emancipation of the blacks and the steady, although slight, current of Dutch immigration to the colony are the two chief items of interest; there has also been a tendency toward the development of a proprietor class, and generally a loss of economic prosperity.¹ The administration is in the hands of a governor, a privy council, and a legislative body known as the Colonial States, composed of thirteen members, nine of whom are elective. The principal crops are sugar and cocoa; in 1897 the output of the former was about 11,624 tons; of the latter 3424 tons; the extraction of gold amounted to 903,124 grammes. The imports in 1897 are reported to have been \$2,128,358.45, the exports \$2,107,151.75. In 1899 the local revenue was \$863,948, and the expenditure \$945,102, the difference being covered by an official subsidy.²

Holland, notwithstanding its misfortunes and disasters, as well as in spite of its own decline in European politics, still retains many of its valuable and extensive Oriental dominions; alone among the decadent states of modern days it has been able to continue its control over a multitude of distant races. The Netherlands themselves on December 31, 1897, contained 5,074,632 individuals, and had an area of 12,648 square miles. The number of inhabitants of the colonies is estimated to be 35,115,711, and their total area is 782,862 square miles. At the present time, in extent, these possessions rank fourth, and in their population third, among those of all European powers. Of the civilized nations only England and France have more populous dependencies, while they and Germany alone respectively rule over territories larger in superficie. Even before the recent war between the United States and Spain, Holland had far outdistanced its former enemy in the magnificent proportions of its colonial realm. The next table gives the details of this vast empire.³

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 299.

² "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 852 et seq.

³ All statistics are drawn from the "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 845 et seq.; cf. also "Annual Cyclopædia" for recent years.

**DUTCH COLONIES, PROTECTORATES, AND DEPENDENCIES, SHOW-
ING DIVISIONS, AREA, AND POPULATION:—**

	AREA	POPULATION AT THE END OF 1897
East Indies:		
Java and Madura	50,554	26,125,053
Island of Sumatra:		
Sumatra, West Coast	31,649	1,353,315 (a)
Sumatra, East Coast	35,312	335,432 (b)
Benkulen	9,399	158,767 (b)
Lampungs	11,284	137,501 (a)
Palembang	53,497	692,317 (a)
Atjeh	20,471	531,705 (b)
Riau-Lingga Archipelago	16,301	107,861 (b)
Banca	4,446	93,600 (a)
Billiton	1,863	41,558 (a)
Borneo, West Coast	55,825	370,775 (b)
Borneo, South and East Districts	156,912	809,803 (c)
Island of Celebes:		
Celebes	49,390	1,448,722 (c)
Menado	22,080	549,138 (c)
Molucca Islands	43,864	399,208 (c)
Timor Archipelago	17,698	119,239 (d)
Ball and Lombok	4,065	1,044,757 (c)
New Guinea to 141° East Longitude	151,789	200,000(c)(e)
Total in the Orient	738,399	35,000,000 (b)
America:		
Dutch Guiana	46,060	65,168
Curaçao	403	50,543
Total in America	46,463	115,711
Grand Total Dutch Colonial Possessions,	782,862	35,115,711 (f)

(a) Tolerably accurate.

(b) Approximately.

(c) Mere conjecture.

(d) Without the non-Christianized natives.

(e) New Guinea belongs to the residency of Ternate, Molucca Islands.

(f) Approximate total, the population of several unexplored countries is not included.

In Java and Madura the natives have more than doubled within fifty years, while the Chinese are exceedingly numerous; but the Europeans remain comparatively few, not exceed-

ing perhaps 50,000 souls. Efforts have been made to induce German emigrants to turn their course in that direction, with, however, little success. The most important cities of the Eastern colonies are Batavia, the capital, with 115,567 inhabitants; Soerakarta, 140,589; Soerabaya, 142,980; Palembang in Sumatra, 53,738; and Banjarmasin in Borneo, 45,028. In 1897 the total imports into Java and the other islands amounted to \$73,045,630.30, of which the share of the government was only \$2,079,202.29. Their exports in the same year were \$84,586,539.75, of which the portion of the state was \$7,758,961.34.¹

While the territories of the Dutch in the Orient are gradually increasing, it is nevertheless in their former African establishments that the national spirit has been most prominently exhibited. In the Transvaal (South African Republic), in the late Orange Free State, and at the Cape, Dutch settlers have by their industry been accomplishing the greatest results. Unfortunately for the influence of the metropolis, these districts, which have for many years been menaced with the loss of their racial characteristics by the proximity of English dependencies, are now about to be absorbed into the body politic of the British colonial system.

In view of the overwhelming preponderance of Great Britain it is remarkable how Holland has not merely preserved, but extended its possessions; without them it would be an insignificant, feeble member in the family of Europe; with them its power is much more substantial and far-reaching than many of the larger empires. The Dutch, with a small army of a few thousand men, govern thirty-five million people; their ships ply in every sea, their merchants frequent every market, and their products are required in every household. By their exercise of prudence, judgment, and enlightenment during the past few years they have admirably moulded their policy to meet the conditions prevailing in the countries over which they rule; by their moderation they have been able to maintain

¹ The statistics given in the text are drawn from the "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 843 et seq.

their sovereignty, while by their sagacity they have in many respects improved their position. After two centuries of monopoly as injurious to their real interests as it was contrary to justice, they have abandoned it; at last the errors of their former methods are manifest. Private capital and personal energy are now allowed full play. The Dutch for once appreciate the opportunities open to their enterprise. Not a single company, but rather the entire nation, to-day regards the colonies as a part of its wealth. The young men consider public employment in these regions an honor, not purely temporary, but ultimately leading to more coveted rewards. National patriotism is aroused; something more than the cupidity of financial gain inspires modern sentiment toward the dependencies. Even at a sacrifice of profits, abuses have been corrected and reforms introduced. The natives are not any longer being simply taught to till the soil, but are gradually being more and more brought under the protection of a genuine civilization. Education is being developed, and even religion is receiving some individual attention. A spirit of philanthropy is supplementing exclusively mercantile aims.

In reality the destiny of Holland has for nearly three centuries been in the Orient. Thence the Dutch have drawn their life-blood and their vitality. Yet for how long a time was this domain misgoverned! Commerce as an end was not entirely reprehensible; but in its restricted form it was vicious. Truly the unity of purpose displayed was phenomenal and estimable. Dark spots exist in these annals, stains left by war, massacre, slavery, cruelty, oppression, and misconduct, — all actuated by the sole love of lucre; but still, when thought is turned upon the better details, — upon the good faith, the religious tolerance, the justice, honesty, perseverance, assiduity, patience, foresight, skill, and wisdom with which Holland has through the ages directed the fortunes of the millions of Oriental races which Providence confided to its care, — the results attained cannot fail to evoke admiration. When further consideration is given to the immense benefits conferred upon its own inhabitants and the

neighboring peoples of Europe, by the advancement of commerce, trade, and industry, through the channels of colonial intercourse, the indomitable will of this nation must be praised. When its story is compared with the records of those who had preceded it in this field of labor, the fact must be admitted that another step in the way of progress has been taken. Without the work of the Dutch the development of colonization would have been infinitely retarded, and one of the most potent factors in the diffusion of civilization in the East would have been absent.

CHAPTER X

FRENCH COLONIZATION IN NORTH AMERICA

THE narrative of earlier French colonization is essentially a recital of adventure; it is this element, indeed, which chiefly prevented enduring success; many other reasons may be cited partially to explain the numerous misfortunes experienced.¹ The government was invariably vast in plans, but feeble in execution. The forces allotted for tasks were nearly always immeasurably inadequate for their achievement. By brilliancy of action, unity of purpose, and the moderation of their rule, the French succeeded in bringing immense and widely scattered regions under their nominal authority; but, for the most part, throughout their great empire of the West and the East the fabric of their power was weak; when collision came with a more sturdy and better-equipped rival its frailty was at once manifest. Had the French not unreasonably stretched the frontiers of their territories, and had they been content to possess more densely settled, but smaller, domains, they would have undoubtedly stood against the shock of British blows.²

France never lacked bold champions of a colonial policy. Richelieu, Colbert, and Coligny were equally ardent in their desire to extend her supremacy beyond the seas. Nor are her explorers less noted: Cartier, Champlain, Marquette, and De La Salle are names forever memorable. In spite, however, of the earnest endeavors of such persistent pro-

¹ French failure may be attributed to lack of individual tenacity, Roscher and Jannasch, 72.

² Who can fail to perceive the faults of French administration and policy after reading Parkman's brilliant series on "France and England in North America"?

moters, the succession of events in national history combined with the inherent characteristics of the people to render the effective inauguration of such a system almost as difficult as its maintenance was of brief duration.¹

Although the French participated prior to 1400 in voyages along the African coast and to the Canary Islands, still they failed, because of their Italian wars and their internal religious dissensions, to reap their share of the advantages in the original discoveries made one hundred years later. Similar causes, throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries conduced to hinder their healthy development abroad. The strength of the nation was well-nigh constantly required at home for defensive and offensive purposes, so that not any superfluous energy remained to be expended in the foundation and protection of distant settlements.² It is a noteworthy fact that the French almost invariably were obliged to yield, whenever their colonies were attacked. In addition to this constitutional disability, the authorities never ceased to believe that such possessions were legitimate prey, whence vast wealth might be extorted; many prime ministers regarded them as the natural sources of the moneys needed by France to wage her European conflicts. The method of administration by trading associations, with all its ills, being adopted, was carried to excess.³ Monopoly was the evil genius of the race; devotion to this phantom precipitated misfortunes only the more frequent and the more poignant. The Crown oppressed the companies, and these latter persecuted the colonists. When the state and the corporations agreed, the dependencies were ruined; when they quarrelled, as sometimes happened, their wards succumbed to the enemy. Little wonder, under such conditions, that the establishments of France were weak in their organization, deficient in endurance, swiftly exhausted in their resources, and, finally, irrevocably

¹ Heeren, 158 (par. 2).

² Raynal, VIII, 3 et seq.

³ In 1769 Morellet mentions fifty-five trading companies in Europe which had become bankrupt, Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 598.

captured by foreign rivals. Nevertheless, however deplorable in its results, the consideration of the history of French colonization is important, for it offers many valuable illustrations of the disasters which follow in the wake of misguided efforts.

Westward was the direction in which any considerable number of French mariners first steered their course after the discovery of America. Of the earlier voyages very little is known, although there are records which describe expeditions, in 1364, undertaken by sailors of Dieppe to the Canary Islands, and, somewhat later, by the united navigators of Dieppe and Rouen along the shores of Africa as far as the Gold Coast.¹ Several small trading posts were then located in these regions, but they were lost as soon as the Portuguese arrived; at the best they were feeble, broadly dispersed, and ephemeral. Upon their abandonment, in 1410, this vicinity remained unvisited by French sailors until the time of the adventurer Cousin, who in 1488 reached Guinea and Senegal.² Soon after 1500 the hardy fishermen of the northern provinces began to scatter in every sea. Some cruised to the south of Africa, rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and, passing into the slightly known oceans beyond, appeared off India, and even Australia; others, turning the prows of their vessels northwestwardly, cast anchor over the fishing grounds of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.³ But all those disconnected and unorganized enterprises were without direct effect; although they served a useful purpose in developing a seafaring population of intrepid

¹ Concerning these early settlements on the coast of Africa, cf. *post*, p. 412. Lucas claims that the Portuguese were the first.

² Cousin, in the opinion of some French enthusiasts, was the real discoverer of America. During the voyage mentioned in the text it is alleged that he was driven by storms to an unknown shore far to the westward: Pinzon, who afterward sailed with Columbus, was with him, and it is said influenced the great navigator to make his voyage in search of the New World, Parkman, "Pioneers of France," 87 et seq. (especially the notes for authorities).

³ The fishermen of the ports of Brittany are known to have reached the shores of Newfoundland as early as 1504. The name Cape Breton is found in one form or another upon very early maps, Winsor, IV, 4; Guizot, "History of France," V, 112; Parkman, "Pioneers," 188-193; Bancroft, "United States History," I, 14.

character and unflinching courage, France did not by them increase her domains.

The reign of Francis I (1515-1547) is distinguished as the first epoch in which the government took an interest in foreign explorations.¹ Commissioned by royal decree, Verrazano, a Florentine in the employ of France, crossed the Atlantic (1523-1524), and skirted the American coast from North Carolina to Newfoundland; after his return to France, as Parkman says, "he wrote from Dieppe to the king the earliest description known to exist of the shores of the United States."² Ten years later Jacques Cartier, a sailor from St. Malo, bent upon finding a northwest passage to India, ran into the St. Lawrence (1534), and on a second voyage, in 1535,³ examined the banks of this river up to the site of Montreal.⁴ The report made by him of the extreme fertility of the soil and of the friendly disposition of the natives, with whom his relations had been most harmonious, strengthened the resolution of the Crown, not merely to appropriate this territory as an addition to the national realms, but also to people it with Frenchmen and to develop its immeasurable resources. New France was the name given to this vast region. In spite of the attraction of the cod fisheries, the profits to be drawn from the fur traffic, and the prevailing conviction that the St. Lawrence was the highway to India, migration to Canada nevertheless illy responded to the high hopes fostered by the state.

¹ "Francis I of France manifested but slight reverence for Pope Alexander VI and his bulls. According to Bernal Diaz, he sent word to his great rival, Charles V, asking him by what right he and the king of Portugal undertook to monopolize the earth; had our first father, Adam, made them his sole heirs? If so, it would be no more than proper for them to produce a copy of the will, and meanwhile he should feel at liberty to seize upon all he could get."—Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 492 et seq.; same quotation in part, Raynal, VIII, 14.

² All information about Verrazano, even in respect to this voyage, is doubtful, Parkman, "Pioneers of France," 193-198, 227; Leroy-Beaulieu, 141 et seq.; cf. Winsor, IV, 6-9; for sources, *ibid.* 17-28; this voyage of discovery was the first made by Frenchmen at public expense, Hildreth, I, 42, 43; Pigeonneau, II, 145.

³ Winsor, IV, 53.

⁴ For the subsequent expedition of 1536, Winsor, IV, 54, 55.

Finally, in 1541, Cartier, in conjunction with Roberval, led about two hundred settlers to the valley of the St. Lawrence, and subsequently some few other individuals wandered thither; but they were more properly adventurers, hunters, or traders, rather than colonists.¹

The first organized effort at colonization in America originating in France and bidding fair to gain success, was the scheme proposed by Admiral Coligny. A desperate fighter, a stern Calvinist, and a logical thinker, he was one of the earliest to realize the futility of the Huguenot cause. Through his high favor at court he secured permission to mature a plan for the general removal of French Protestants to the distant shores of America. Imbued with the belief that he was thus relieving his country of a desperate strife at the same time as he was procuring a haven of refuge for his fellow-churchmen, Coligny pursued his designs with ardent fervor.² In 1556 he sent a colony to Brazil, but its leader, Villegagnon, turned traitor and urged upon his followers conversion to Catholicism.³ This settlement was in any event only short-lived; for in 1560 the Portuguese drove out the French. In 1562 a similar establishment, christened Fort Charles and often mentioned as Port Royal, was inaugurated near the mouth of the Broad River within the territory of the Carolinas; two years afterward its half-starved inhabitants went back to France. The most unfortunate undertaking was, however, on the soil of Florida; founded one year later than that farther north, this outpost of Fort Caroline soon came to a lamentable end. The Spaniards, having heard of the audacity of the French in claiming a share of the New World, captured the place and massacred almost every individual as "heretics to the church."⁴ A French expedition subsequently took

¹ Raynal, VIII, 14, 15; Guizot, V, 115; Parkman, "Pioneers," 200-227; Bancroft, I, 15 et seq.; Payne, 80; Cantu, VIII, 226; for the expedition of 1541, cf. Winsor, IV, 56 et seq.

² Guizot, V, 113; Parkman, "Pioneers," 23.

³ *Ibid.* 23 et seq.; for Villegagnon at Rio Janeiro, Rambaud, "Civillisation Française," I, 468.

⁴ For short account of this dastardly massacre, cf. Fiske, II, 511 et seq.

revenge, exterminating every Spaniard;¹ but the colony was never renewed.² Upon the death of Henry II, in 1559, Coligny, having fallen into discredit and being obliged openly to resort to arms against the government, saw his long-cherished dreams vainly vanish. His attempts had utterly failed.³ With the exception of these fruitless endeavors, the French did not participate in the colonial movement of the sixteenth century.⁴ Involved in the fiery torments of domestic religious warfare, neither the Crown nor the people had inclination or ability to seek riches or to extend their power beyond the seas. All the thoughts of king and nation were directed to the disentanglement of their civil difficulties and to the assuagement of their internal quarrels.

With the accession of Henry IV to the throne and the restoration of peace at home, the spirit of adventure and foreign conquest revived.⁵ The number of fishing smacks from St. Malo and other northern ports which made their way to Canada began to increase, and in 1598 the Marquis de la Roche was appointed lieutenant-general over this region;⁶ still, the emigrants continued to be mostly hunters,

The colony of Fort Charles was a distinct establishment from that of Fort Caroline, which was of later origin and was situated farther to the south; the two are frequently confounded, as, for example, by Guizot, V, 113, whose statements are in many particulars erroneous. Jean Ribaut of Dieppe was the leader of the first colonists at Fort Charles, but he returned to France for reinforcements. Before he again started for America his followers abandoned their settlement, and after many privations arrived home; subsequently Laudonnière led another colony to the New World, and established Fort Caroline. A little later Jean Ribaut brought out more men to the nascent settlement; his fleet had barely arrived when the Spaniards under Menendez appeared and attacked. By a peculiar series of circumstances this latter succeeded in separating the French; they were captured a few at a time, and nearly all executed. Cf. Parkman, "Pioneers," 33-150; Bancroft, I, 50 et seq.; Raynal, VIII, 5-14.

¹ Dominique de Gourges on his own initiative and at his own expense avenged his countrymen; cf. Fiske, "Discovery of America," II, 520 et seq.; Guizot, V, 114; Bancroft, I, 58 et seq.; Parkman, "Pioneers," 150-179.

² For the French in Florida, Hildreth, I, 71-72.

³ Nevertheless he has the honor of having clearly perceived the future which opened for the French across the Atlantic, Rambaud, I, 465.

⁴ Cantu, VIII, 222; Payne, 81.

⁵ Parkman, "Pioneers," 235 et seq.

⁶ "He could levy troops, declare war and peace, make laws, punish or par-

traders, and released convicts, while the results were insignificant until the opening of the next century. It is a noteworthy coincidence that "The Company of Canada and Acadia" was chartered in 1599, just one year after the publication of the Edict of Nantes. Thenceforward France speedily advanced, not only in the evolution of a policy, but even more markedly in the acquisition of a colonial empire. Prior to 1600 the French, already widely scattered over vast extents of territory and legally in control of immense domains, had not been able to strengthen their position in distant lands. Now, whether it be that the circumstances were more conducive to the process of development, or under the impulse of rivalry and consequent fear that without more care all would be lost, — whichever be the primary cause, — the fact is that the government commenced to put into execution practical plans for the elaboration and maintenance of a colonial system. How wise the methods employed is another question.

Influenced by the general disposition of the age so favorable to the corporate form of administration, the Crown created by patent various companies, to which the concession of the entire trade in their respective spheres of activity was granted.¹ During the seventeenth century some thirty such commercial associations were instituted; and France thus became the home of a network of monopolies. The king had constructive rights over limitless dominions in the West, as likewise in the Orient; the realms of which his representatives had taken possession in America exceeded those claimed at that epoch by England, while in the Eastern seas the islands reserved to him by his sailors were far more numerous than those over which Dutch sovereignty was exercised. On the other hand, the nation was weak; for the sake of the state it seemed impossible to arouse interest in

don at will, build cities, forts, and castles, and grant out lands in fiefs, seignories, counties, viscounties, and baronies; thus was effete and cumbrous feudalism to make a lodgment in the New World." — PARKMAN, "Pioneers," 231 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 222; Bancroft, I, 18.

¹ Heeren, 158 (par. 4).

colonization, while at the same time both English and Dutch competition was so rapidly increasing as to render some official action imperative if the dependencies were to be saved. In this predicament France had recourse to her citizens. By letting out absolute and exclusive privileges to duly constituted societies it was hoped, not merely to secure the proper defence of the colonies, but to extract from them the greatest amount of revenue for the treasury. This last selfish motive was undoubtedly quite as potent a factor as any; for the establishment to be regarded prosperous was necessarily expected to produce a considerable surplus income. In the chosen mode of rule it was also thought that the state could not possibly lose, since private capital alone was invested, and the government annually collected a certain fixed tax on the profits as its remuneration.

If professions of faith were valuable, the trading companies organized in France would have amassed untold wealth. The aims of these corporations as chartered in the days of Richelieu were magnificent. In lengthy and beautifully turned phrases, for example, the Company of the "Nacelle de Saint Pierre Fleur de Lysée" "proposed to establish in France a great trade in all articles of merchandise which enter into commerce, to introduce the fisheries, shipbuilding, etc., to render valuable many lands and places now without profit, to mine certain properties, to erect forges, to cast and to found gold, silver, and iron," besides "undertaking distant voyages, peopling and establishing new colonies in various places, especially in Canada and New France, as well as trading and trafficking in all countries not enemies of the Crown." The Company of Morbihan, likewise a marvel of that time, was not less pompous in the statement of its objects. Both of these societies were equally misconducted and similarly unfortunate in their careers.¹

Under the system adopted, the policy of France was theoretically quite as mercantile as that of the Netherlands; but

¹Leroy-Beaulieu, 146, who quotes Cailliet, "Administration de Richelieu," 335 et seq.; cf. also Lavisse and Rambaud, V, 368; Winsor, IV, 127.

practically the results were far less successful — at least from the financial point of view. Several facts contributed to this different outcome. In the first instance the French were not a thoroughly commercial people. Trade was held in disdain by the higher ranks of society; hence the nobles and the rich declining to coöperate in such schemes, left the formation and direction of the companies entirely to the merchants. Again, the Frenchman loved, as he still does, his fireside too much to absent himself far or long from it. The emigrants were consequently, for the most part, of the lowest classes, who, not having abodes at home, were ready to catch at any passing opportunity to better their situation; but when they reached their new places of habitation the old disposition of vagabondage showed itself in their preference for a fishing, hunting, wandering life, rather than the establishment of a fixed residence. The serious, plodding, never tiring characteristics of the Dutch were seldom manifested by the French colonists. Finally, they carried their religion wherever they went, and, with due consideration to the work accomplished by them in Christianizing the savages, this circumstance prevented the fusion into their midst of Protestant settlers, and often engendered hatred with their Dutch and English neighbors which, in the end, precipitated the overthrow of French power. The introduction of an ecclesiastical hierarchy into newly opened lands was not favorable to their domestic development. The privileges granted to the church and the priesthood constituted a kind of secondary monopoly, which sapped away the vigor of the recently founded communities. How this institution affected business and society in Canada will be presently more particularly perceived.¹ With these hindrances and errors in administration, small wonder that the French colonies failed to prosper under corporate management; ill luck in their undertakings naturally reacted on the associations, so that few of them, so brilliantly inaugurated with most stupendous names

¹For full account of the church in Canada, cf. Parkman, "The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century," to which the author is greatly indebted for many of the statements in the text.

and multifarious purposes, endured longer than the period usually allotted to the life of man.

After the creation of the Canadian Company, in 1599, little was done in the regions of Canada until the voyage of Samuel Champlain.¹ This hardy explorer, who in 1598 had sailed in command of a Spanish ship to the West Indies, first visited the St. Lawrence as early as 1603, again returned two years later, and for the third time in 1608, locating upon this last occasion the city of Quebec,² whereby he merits the title, "Father of Canada." Unfortunately, not only did he have to struggle with natural obstacles, climate, discontent, and misdirected effort, but likewise he encountered in the great Sully indefatigable opposition to his enterprise.³ Montreal was subsequently established by M. Paul de Maisonneuve, in 1642, as a Jesuit mission.⁴ In the new settlements, special attention being directed to the tillage of the soil, strenuous endeavors were made to induce French farmers to emigrate thither.⁵ To every important personage who would conduct his retainers with him, ample lands were given; these he might distribute as he saw fit, the only condition being that every tenant must serve in the militia, in time of need, for

¹ The organizer of the first Canadian expedition in which Champlain took part was originally Aymar de Chastes. The latter died before its arrival in America, and was succeeded by Pierre du Guast, Sieur de Monts, Guizot, V, 115 et seq.; his statement in reference to the participation of the missionaries in the foundation of Quebec is slightly overdrawn. The first Franciscan Fathers arrived in 1615, and the Jesuits in 1624, Parkman, "Pioneers," 425; soon thereafter, the latter says ("Pioneers," 451), "Quebec was become a mission;" cf. also Fiske, II, 528 et seq.; Bancroft, I, 19 et seq. Port Royal, subsequently known as Annapolis (Nova Scotia), founded by the French in 1604, must not be confounded with the other Port Royal of the Huguenots on the coast of the Carolinas, *supra*, p. 314, note 4. The Jesuits arrived here in 1610, Parkman, "Pioneers," 276 et seq.; Winsor, IV, 104.

² Parkman, "Pioneers," 237 et seq., 329, 331; Bancroft, I, 20; for Champlain's difficulties in founding Quebec, Winsor, IV, 114-116.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 143 et seq. "Sully, as he himself tells us, opposed the plan on the ground that the colonization of this northern wilderness would never repay the outlay."—PARKMAN, "Pioneers," 243.

⁴ Guizot, V, 117; Parkman, "The Jesuits," 261.

⁵ These endeavors, however, do not seem to have brought forth results; cf. Parkman, "Old Régime in Canada," 346. During the first twenty-five years its whole population did not probably at any time exceed one hundred persons; it was only a respectable trading post, Winsor, IV, 116.

the public defence against the aborigines. Trading, fishing, and milling were rights alone reserved to the landed proprietors. A feudal nobility came into existence, which was supported by its revenues and enjoyed a certain authority over its vassals.¹ These lords lived mostly by the sword and gun, only taking sufficient interest in their estates to collect their rents of the peasants. The mediæval system thus introduced was modelled on that of old France; it was an attempt to set up the usages of continental Europe in the New World.²

The method employed by the French for the extension of their supremacy in America was half military, half religious.³ They generally made friends with some one of the hostile Indian tribes, and then, on the pretence of affording them more effectual aid, secured permission to erect strongholds at every strategic point. In Canada they allied themselves with the Hurons as against the more fierce and warlike Iroquois. Stretching out from Quebec, they ultimately fixed their garrisons as far southward as Florida, and to the west along the banks of the Ohio and the Mississippi; while in the north the chain of their forts reached to Hudson's Bay; and wherever soldiers went, priests followed.⁴

The inefficiency of France as a colonial power was quickly to be proven. War broke out with England in 1627; within two years a couple of Scotchmen, by name Alexander and Kirk,

¹ *Supra*, p. 365, note 6. Merivale attributes the failure of the French in Canada to the fact of the monopoly of an exclusive company rather more than to the "vicious system of granting the land to non-resident proprietors to be held by seigniorial tenure," "Colonization and Colonies," 58 et seq.; Payne, 81 et seq.

² Cf. Parkman, "Old Régime," Ch. XVIII; "Canadian Feudalism," 219-313. "The seigniorial systems of Europe have never prospered in America, and the early experiments in founding colonies by the mere exportation of men to this soil were failures, even when the men were of English blood. The efforts to colonize the seaboard region of North Carolina without giving the fee of the land to the people, and without care in the selection of the colonists, resulted in a failure even more complete than that of the Canadian colonies."—Winsor, IV, xxii; cf. McCrady, "History of South Carolina, 1670-1719" (New York, 1877); Fiske, "Old Virginia and Her Neighbors," II, Ch. XV, 270-308.

³ Fiske, II, 529; Parkman says, "Quebec wore an aspect half military, half monastic."—"The Jesuits," 158.

⁴ Raynal, VIII, 74-80; Fiske, II, 531; Parkman, "Pioneers," 388 et seq.

in the British service, had seized Canada and divided it between them.¹ By chance the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, in 1632, restored this dependency to its former rulers.²

Meanwhile Champlain and other enlightened spirits had prevailed upon the Crown to correct the more flagrant faults of the existing régime. These men perceived the difficulty of creating and retaining a colonial domain; observed how few Frenchmen, even among the sailors of Brittany and Normandy, were willing to expatriate themselves; realized the hindrances arising from the severity of the Canadian climate; and appreciated the disadvantage of the French colonies, with an established church, as compared with the English possessions, where dissidents and free-thinkers were welcome. Records show that the English voluntarily went to New England and the Southern plantations by thousands, while the French were only with persuasion attracted to Canada by hundreds. Finally, in 1627, under the inspiration of Champlain, a new charter of much more liberal and practical terms was issued to the Company of New France.³ A perpetual monopoly, it is true, was conceded, but subject to the reservation of certain privileges to the colonists already residing in the country. Exports to France were likewise to be admitted free of customs duties. The corporation, on its part, agreed to transfer in fifteen years at least four thousand people to America, to take care of them for a period, and to provide them with lands for farming purposes. Catholicism also was to be fostered and the conversion of the Indians was to proceed.⁴

¹ On the surrender of Quebec in 1629, almost all the colonists were transported to France by way of England. Champlain was kept prisoner of war for several weeks in the attempt to make him pay ransom, Winsor, IV, 129.

² Leonard, "Recueil de Traités de Paix" (Paris, 1692); for the occupation, cf. "Sir William Alexander and American Colonization" (Prince Society ed.), 66-72; generally, Payne, 82; Bancroft, I, 219 et seq.; Parkman, "Old Régime," 5 et seq.; "Pioneers," 444 et seq.

³ Guizot, V, 116; Parkman, "Pioneers," 429 et seq.

⁴ Acte pour l'Établissement de la Compagnie des cent Associés in *Mercurie Français*, XIV, II, 232; Parkman, "Pioneers," 429 et seq.; "Jesuits," 155 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 146 et seq.; Raynal, VIII, 82; no Huguenot was allowed to enter the company. In the spring of 1628 four armed vessels were despatched

Again, in 1664, another effort to revive colonial prosperity occurred. On May 24 of that year Louis XIV, by the counsel and advice of his great prime minister, Colbert, signed the patent of the Company of the West; to its custody the interests of the colonies of France in the western hemisphere and those on the west coast of Africa were confided. As according to the edict "the glory of God was the chief object in view, the Company was required to supply its possessions with a sufficient number of priests and diligently to exclude all teachers of false doctrine. It was empowered to build forts and war-ships, cast cannon, wage war and make peace, establish courts, appoint judges, and otherwise to act as sovereign within its own domains. A monopoly of trade was granted it for forty years."¹

Although Canada evinced a certain constant degree of progress, still development was extremely slow. Three main obstacles to substantial improvement existed: the continuance of the feudal system of estates, the importance of the ecclesiastical authority, and the absence of genuine political liberty were the drawbacks to the growth of French power in the New World.² In a community, whether old or new, where the soil is held in large parcels, the cultivation of it is inevitably handicapped; in a colony this condition is fatal, for free land

to convoy eighteen transports to Quebec, Winsor, IV, 127; for the company of one hundred associates, cf. McMullen, I, 22, 56. The question of the conversion of the Indians is treated fully in the "Jesuit Relations," published by the Barrows Bros.

¹ Parkman, "Old Régime," 224, 258 et seq.; this queer combination for "the glory of God" did not prosper, for the company ceased to exist in 1674. Canada was not, however, relieved of the oppression of monopoly, for the king had scarcely resumed control when he granted out the fur trade and its duties — the most important branch of Canadian activity — to a new private organization, *ibid.* 352, 356. One after another of these associations succeeded each other with frightful rapidity and equally baneful effects, *ibid.* 357 et seq.

² *Ibid.* "Pioneers," 431. "The rigor of the climate repelled the emigrant, nor were the attractions which Father Le Jeune held forth — 'piety, freedom, and independence' — of a nature to entice him across the sea; when it is remembered that this freedom consisted in subjection to the arbitrary will of a priest and a soldier, and in the liability, should he forget to go to mass, of being made fast to a post with a collar and chain like a dog." — "Jesuits," 157; Leroy-Beaulieu, 148 et seq.

in small lots to every settler is a necessity and forms an effective incentive to immigration. In Canada the start was wrong. The class of proprietors was created first; the peasantry, it was thought, would spring up of its own accord.¹ The hope was futile; for where agriculture is artificially impeded, and burdened with numerous obligations, as under the then prevailing policy, thither farmers will not go.² In the earlier era the situation of the rural population was little better than in France, so far as concerned husbandry. Is it to be wondered that advancement was slight?³

Like under the Spaniards in South America, the priesthood exercised vast influence over the affairs of Canada. With the aim of converting, and at the same time protecting, the aborigines, strenuous endeavors were made to keep them separate from the whites, the fear of contamination and unfair treatment being alleged as a reason for this strict supervision. Such methods here, as everywhere else, proved inefficient and oppressive. The Indians, finding themselves forbidden to trade with the French, sought secret and illegal means of bartering with their English and Dutch neighbors; hence originated smuggling, protracted animosities, and serious losses to French commerce. Deceit and bad faith were also born. Beyond this feature, however, the exaction of tenths was more prejudicial to the nascent colony; for the country people could ill spare this tax imposed on their feeble resources. But, above all, the most pernicious result of the activity of the church was the remarkable ascendancy it secured over many of the more wealthy and prominent colonists. In the days of Champlain, —soon after the restoration of this region to France, in 1632, —it became customary to present or bequeath to it in perpetuity valuable estates and funds; extensive properties were thus tied up in mainmorte and

¹ It was due to the combination of the colonial and the mercantile interests that the profits of the colony were swallowed up by the merchant class, Winsor, IV, 106.

² Heeren, 160 (par. 8).

³ Raynal, VIII, 80-86; Parkman, "Old Régime," 279 note, 287 note, 424, 300 et seq.

considerable sums of money accumulated. The church, likewise, soon changed from a voluntary recipient into an exacting master. As it grew stronger its demands enlarged, until, within a comparatively brief period, it was as flourishing as at home. For the religious dissident it is evident Canada never had any charms. Even for the conscientious, resolute, self-reliant Catholic who had quit France for the sake of latitude in the interpretation of his doctrines, without their total abandonment, the colony became equally distasteful; therefore, although few of these heroes of the faith left their newly adopted land, still they could not hold forth the inducements of freedom to attract their fellow-believers.¹

The moment is now opportune, before discussing the lack of political liberty, to describe the administrative system. In France, the Minister of Marine was the chief of the colonial service. The immediate representatives of the Crown in Canada were the governor-general and the intendant. The former—usually of noble birth and belonging to the profession of arms—was clothed with both civil and military functions. The latter managed the finances, was the head of the department of justice as well as that of public works, and was directly accountable for all the details of government; because of his multifarious duties and heavy responsibilities he was by far the most influential personage in the colony. A general council invested with both executive and judicial powers also existed; this body was composed of the governor-general, the bishop, the intendant, and several other appointed members.² For administrative purposes Canada was

¹ For the progress of France in North America prior to 1658, cf. Bancroft, II, 137-148; also Parkman, "The Jesuits in North America in the Seventeenth Century."

² The original name of this board was the "Supreme Council," but the king, in 1703, modified it to the "Superior Council." Originally it consisted of five appointed members; after 1675 of seven, and subsequently to 1703 of twelve persons besides the governor, intendant, and bishop. At first the governor and the bishop made the appointments, but afterward the method varied. The governor, however, always had some influence on the selection, even when made by the Crown or the Company. Members were in the beginning appointed for one year, later for life, and in time the position became practically, if not in fact, hereditary, Parkman, "Old Régime," 317 et seq.

further subdivided into three districts, with their capitals at Quebec, Montreal, and Three Rivers. In each of these cities there resided a local governor, with limited prerogatives, a royal judge, an attorney-general, and a clerk of the court.¹

In the general council the clergy obtained the control, a circumstance which led to interminable conflicts between the ecclesiastical and civil officials. Upon one occasion even the recall of an unyielding governor-general was effected by this priest-ridden board. In matters of administration or policy the colonists were never consulted and seldom considered. Not content to rule with an iron hand over the Europeans and their descendants, the attempt was made despotically to regulate the affairs of the savages, sometimes with what disastrous results are well known. As a fact, in spite of the multiplicity and severity of the laws, scarcely any other colony shows such anarchy and so many disputes arising among the duly constituted authorities. The bishop, the governor-general, the intendant, and the council, continuously in disagreement, were perpetually envious of one another. Every public officer was also more interested in his own individual gain than in the universal welfare. Consequently, expenditures were inordinately large, economy was unpractised and unheeded, finances were in a deplorable condition.² The Company or Crown—as it happened—at home, oftentimes robbed by the speculation of its own agents, was constantly seeking means to recoup its losses by devising new schemes of oppression over the masses of the population. Little, if any, freedom and few political rights were vouchsafed the settler; in every aspect of his life he was at the mercy of a master beyond the Atlantic, or that of the latter's avaricious and fanatical substitutes in New France.³

¹ For a good description of the Canadian administration, cf. Parkman, "Old Régime in Canada," 314 et seq.; and Ch. XIX, entitled "The Rulers of Canada."

² Raynal, VIII, 263-264; Parkman, "Old Régime," 349 et seq., 429 et seq.

³ More particularly for some absurd edicts as specimens of early Canadian justice, cf. Parkman, "Old Régime," 327 et seq.

So long as the privileged corporation survived, and wherever it was omnipotent, — as, for example, in the fur traffic,¹ — all trade was reserved to it. Under the French system, unlike in the possessions of Spain and Portugal, foreigners might reside in the dependencies; otherwise the monopoly was quite unrestricted.² French vessels alone might carry goods to and from Canada. The Company, having absolute supervision over the imports and exports, could dictate just the quantity of every article sent to French America, and of merchandise shipped from it; thus the distribution of supplies was entirely in its hands. European commodities placed on the Canadian market were, therefore, notwithstanding they might be of inferior quality, quoted at extravagant figures; while, on the contrary, when raw products were bought for exportation, merely nominal prices were paid, insignificant as compared with the real value of the goods for European sale. By this falsely conceived method of netting speedy and fabulous profits, any possibility of promoting industry and securing durable progress in prosperity and wealth was banished. Even the Indians, who were in those times permitted to deal with the colonists, — as sagacious in business as they had been in war, — preferred to carry the booty of their huntsman's skill over the frontier to the neighboring English and Dutch establishments, where their efforts were more generously rewarded. Everything taken into account, Canada, while under this rule, suffered quite as much as Spanish America from illicit transactions.³

When the Crown reëntered on the privileges which had been granted to the West India Company, the situation was not materially improved. As Parkman graphically describes it: "In 1674 the charter . . . was revoked and trade was declared open to all subjects of the king; yet commerce was still condemned to wear the ball and chain. New restrictions were imposed, meant for good, but resulting in evil. Merchants

¹ For the fur trade in the seventeenth century in Canada, Hildreth, I, 89-93.

² Heeren, 158.

³ Parkman, "Old Régime," 225 et seq., 258 et seq.; Raynal, VIII, 253-260; Leroy-Beaulieu, 151 et seq.

not resident in the colony were forbidden all trade, directly or indirectly, with the Indians. They were also forbidden to sell any goods at retail except in August, September, and October, to trade anywhere in Canada above Quebec, and to sell clothing or domestic articles already made. This last restriction was designed to develop colonial industry. No person, resident or not, could trade with the English colonies, or go thither without a special passport, and a rigid examination by the military authorities. Foreign trade of any kind was strictly prohibited. In 1719, after a new company had engrossed the beaver trade, its agents were empowered to enter all houses in Canada, whether ecclesiastical or secular, and search them for foreign goods, which, when found, were publicly burned. In the next year the royal council ordered that vessels engaged in foreign trade should be captured by force of arms, like pirates, and confiscated, along with their cargoes; while anybody having an article of foreign manufacture in his possession was subjected to a heavy fine.

"Attempts were made to fix the exact amount of profit which merchants from France should be allowed to make in the colony. One of the first acts of the superior council was to order them to bring their invoices immediately before that body, which thereupon affixed prices to each article. The merchant who sold and the purchaser who bought above this tariff were alike condemned to heavy penalties; and so, too, was the merchant who chose to keep his goods rather than sell them at the price ordained. Resident merchants, on the other hand, were favored to the utmost. They could sell at what price they saw fit; and, according to La Hontan, they made great profit by the sale of laces, ribbons, watches, jewels, and similar superfluities to the poor, but extravagant, colonists."¹

The pernicious effect of the combination of all these malignant evils and disorders in the body politic and economic is best evidenced by the slow growth in population;² in 1666

¹ Parkman, "Old Régime," 339-341.

² Raynal, VIII, 240; for other details of this period, cf. Parkman, "Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV."

- ✓ Canada had only 3418 white inhabitants;¹ in 1683, 10,682; in 1721, another eventful date in its history, hardly 25,000; again, at the last-mentioned time the total value of its exports was scarcely more than \$300,000, while that of the imports was barely \$1,000,000. Compare these figures with those for most of the British North American colonies and note the enormous difference.

Another characteristic feature of French life in foreign climes — more the innate inclination of the people than a fault in colonial organization — was the disposition for adventure. As the ultimate beneficiaries of the results achieved by the many broad-minded, courageously acting, and daring men, both noble and untitled, who so thoroughly and unflinchingly explored the districts which were then the most remote regions of the known world, and thus opened up vast stretches of wilderness, it ill becomes Americans to complain. In fact, not a word of criticism upon the heroic performance of their self-inspired mission should be uttered; rather, they deserve high praise for the mighty intuitive inspiration which moved them to penetrate untrodden forests, to pass unfordable rivers, and to traverse far-reaching, uncultivated plains.² In general, for humanity, they were pointing out where to secure inestimable blessings; but nevertheless, in particular for France and for the French colony, Canada, this dispersion of forces was an irremediable weakness. Talon, Courcelles, and Frontenac³ were intent on the dissemination of the colonists over the largest possible area; the ten thousand farmers of 1683 were scattered throughout a realm in size nearly equal to

¹ The population of Canada in 1666 was 3418; in 1668, 5870, Parkman, "Old Régime," 268 note.

² For the importance of French explorations, especially those of De La Salle in the opening up of the interior, cf. Fiske, II, 531 et seq.; Guizot, V, 118; Raynal, VIII, 158-166; Leroy-Beaulieu, 153; Merivale, 59 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Economie Politique," II, 139 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 228-230; Bancroft, II, Ch. X, entitled "France in the Valley of the Mississippi," 149-174; Parkman, "La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West" and "Half a Century of Conflict," II, 1 et seq.

³ Cf. Parkman, "Count Frontenac." During his administration slavery was legalized in Canada, McMullen, I, 95; Winsor, IV, Ch. VII, 317 et seq.; sources, 356 et seq.

Europe. De La Salle, Saint Simon, Joliet, Marquette,¹ Hennepin, Charlevoix, Accau, and La Verendrye were, conscious or unconscious, instruments of the prevailing French aspiration, as typified by the renowned Colbert, who wished to be able to obtain at least the nominal control of the entire domain between the Alleghanies and the Rockies, extending from Hudson's Bay to the Gulf of Mexico. The French of 1680-1700, actuated by the same longing for territorial conquest which, a century later, took more serious form in the expeditions of Napoleon, sought by every means to anticipate the claims which England was preparing to substantiate; but in its endeavors the state overreached itself.² The confessed objects of these explorations and widely posted garrisons were, on the one side, to limit English colonization to the narrow strip of land between the Atlantic and the Alleghanies, and, on the other, to prevent any further progress of the Spaniards north of Mexico and to the east of California. France desired to preëempt the fertile Mississippi Valley for herself.³

The available resources proved, however, insufficient. The plan was worthy of a mightier effort; and had the French as a nation supported the projects of their leaders with a more hearty response to their appeals, success might have crowned these undertakings. But, in spite of the entreaties of its directing spirits, the populace remained silent, inactive, and indisposed to cross the seas. Emigration would have saved the situation; a few explorers and soldiers, though ardent

¹ Winsor, V, 201 et seq.; for the exploration of the Mississippi, cf. Winsor, "Mississippi Basin."

² "But the attempts . . . to establish communication between these countries by a chain of forts in the rear of the British colonies kindled a jealousy which was afterward to break out into a great war." — HEEBEN, 203 (par. 13); Bancroft, II, Ch. XI, 175-191; Payne, 83 et seq., 87, 106.

³ "Jean Talon, intendant of Canada, was full of projects for the good of the colony. . . . He meant to occupy the interior of the continent, control the rivers, which were its only highways, and hold it for France against every other nation. On the coast England was to be hemmed within a narrow strip of seaboard, while, to the south, Talon aimed at securing a port on the Gulf of Mexico to keep the Spaniards in check and dispute with them the possession of vast regions which they claimed as their own." — PARKMAN, "Discovery of the Great West," 39; such a policy, begun about 1670, was constantly pursued.

and faithful, could not accomplish that work of permanent settlement which the masses alone might have guaranteed. Perhaps the government was primarily to blame for this decided indifference by its want of foresight in the maintenance of many long-standing abuses; but now ready to redress some of these faults, a new policy was about to be adopted. Still, the people paid little heed.¹

The greatest man of this period — the latter half of the seventeenth century — was Colbert, the celebrated prime minister of France. He may well be regarded as only second to Prince Henry of Portugal in his influence on the record of colonial history. Born in 1619, he died in 1683, slightly before the achievement of the highest aims of his country; but he it was who inspired enthusiasm for distant enterprises. Not another statesman of his time can be compared to him in perspicacity, clear-mindedness, common sense, and ability, as well as in initiative and design. Colbert attempted to place his fatherland where he considered that it should rank among its rivals; unfortunately, he not only overestimated the strength and facilities at the command of himself and his successors, but likewise, by reason of his very energy, championed methods irretrievably marred by the doctrines of monopoly and absolutism. Had his wishes been fulfilled, France would have been the colonial power of to-day; failure followed, and in the catastrophe not merely the colonies were lost, but even the national independence was temporarily deprived of all its attributes. Of Colbert's theories, occasion to speak more fully will subsequently be given in connection with the possessions in the Orient.²

¹ "Everywhere in the western regions of the American continent the footsteps of the French, either travellers or missionaries, preceded the boldest adventurers. It is the glory and the misfortune of France always to lead the van in the march of civilization without having the wit to profit by the discoveries and the sagacious boldness of her children. On the unknown roads which she has opened to the human mind and to human enterprise, she has often left the fruits to be gathered by nations less inventive and less able than she, but more persevering and less perturbed by a confusion of desires and an incessant renewal of hopes." — GUIZOT, V, 118 et seq.

² For the influence which Colbert exercised on French industry, commerce,

In the early part of the eighteenth century a most remarkable calamity occurred. An adroit Scotchman, a gambler and refugee, the notorious John Law, convinced the French cabinet of the feasibility of his scheme to raise funds to pay off the national debt. Under the patronage of the Duke of Orleans, the regent of the young king, he established at Paris, in 1716, a bank in his own name; on September 6, 1717, the famous Mississippi Company was chartered. He was also appointed comptroller-general of France.¹ His institution absorbed most of the existing trading corporations, and began to issue bills, the credit of which was based on the future profits to be drawn from the colonies. The capital of the reorganized companies was augmented and enormously inflated; an interval of intense financial speculation ensued. The bank's stock rose in quotation as much as fortyfold, that of the united societies nearly in equal proportion; the prices of property and goods likewise advanced; but within five years the crash came; thousands of all classes were ruined, the government was bankrupt, and the Crown almost overturned. Law fled, a poverty-stricken, disdained, and hated adventurer, even less esteemed than when, ten years previously, he had entered France. Some time afterward he died at Venice in the utmost distress.²

As stupendous as was this disaster, the result proved, at least in one respect, beneficial; for New France, the effect was magical. From 25,000 people at that date, the population of Canada increased to 82,000 in 1759;³ but the reforms had been instituted too late for the nation to derive any satisfac-

and maritime power, Guizot, IV, 306; Parkman, "Old Régime," 222 et seq.; also the volume entitled, "The Economic Policy of Colbert," by A. J. Sargent, London, 1899.

¹ In 1718 the bank received the name, "Royal Bank," and in 1720 Law became comptroller-general. His first mistake was in consolidating the bank and the company of the Indies. For a short account, cf. Rambaud, II, 535-537; also Winsor, "Mississippi Basin," Ch. V.

² Cantu, VIII, 230; Guizot, V, 12-19; Bancroft, II, 227-231; Parkman, "Half Century of Conflict," I, 304; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 254 et seq.; Raynal, II, 396-418; VIII, 166-176. For Law, cf. Winsor, V, 32 et seq.; Gayarré, I, 191-232; *supra*, note 1.

³ 91,000, according to Raynal, VIII, 240.

tion from them. The British, who had once conquered this region,¹ and had unsuccessfully made another attempt in 1689, when Admiral Phipps was defeated in his operations before Quebec,² once more at war with France, by the brilliant aid and assistance of our forefathers, — among whom was Washington, — finally, after a seven years' struggle, forever broke French power in North America. In 1763 France yielded Canada to England and Louisiana to Spain.³ The policy inaugurated under Louis XIV had utterly failed. The chronicles of Canada thenceforth belong to British colonial history.

Of Louisiana, as a French dependency, not much is to be narrated. De La Salle reached the mouth of the Mississippi in 1680, and about 1700 the Canadian, Iberville, made the first settlement in that vicinity.⁴ Louisiana became, in 1716, the principal field of operations for the speculator John Law and his Mississippi Company.⁵ In 1718 New Orleans was founded.⁶ When the greatest fraud of the age collapsed, the Crown, recovering control of this trade, opened it in 1721 to the whole world. This territory, ceded by France in 1764⁷ to Spain, was in 1800 restored by the latter country to its former allegiance, and three years afterward purchased by the United States from Napoleon for the sum of \$15,000,000.⁸

Concerning the other former French dominions in North America, little more need be especially said than has elsewhere been casually noted. Their annals are, for the most part,

¹ *Supra*, p. 370, et seq.

² Cf. Parkman, "Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV," 262; also Raynal, VIII, 93 et seq.

³ For description of Canada at that time, cf. Raynal, VIII, 240-304.

⁴ For this early history, cf. Gayarré, I, 1-115.

⁵ For the charter of the Mississippi Company, Gayarré, I, 202 et seq., 262; *supra*, p. 381.

⁶ Early history of Louisiana, Raynal, VIII, 194-239; for founding of New Orleans by Bienville, brother of Iberville, cf. Gayarré, I, 235.

⁷ On the date when the preliminaries of peace at the close of the seven years' war were signed (September, 1762), France secretly agreed to turn over Louisiana to Spain, Parkman, "Montcalm and Wolfe," II, 406; Bancroft, III, 75; Heeren, 297.

⁸ Bancroft, II, 224 et seq.; Parkman, "Half Century of Conflict," 289 et seq.; for Napoleon and the Louisiana purchase, *American Historical Review*, April, 1899, 447 et seq.; article by Sloane.

involved in the story of Canada, although several of these districts were lost to France at an early date. In 1713 the English, by the Treaty of Utrecht, secured the cession of Acadia¹ or Nova Scotia.² Newfoundland and the Hudson's Bay establishments were transferred by this same instrument.³ Throughout the Mississippi Valley and along the northeastern coasts, where the fishing industry has always been so valuable, the conflicts between French and English rival claimants and occupants were fierce and unending. Notwithstanding the terms of the convention signed at Aix-la-Chapelle,⁴ in 1748, the colonists of the two nations, whenever they met, had joined battle with the moral consent and secret support of their respective governments. Open war was again renewed in 1755. The heroic combat between Montcalm and Wolfe, terminating in the death of both, the capture of Quebec, and the fall of Montreal, formed the American prelude to the Peace of 1763, which decided all these differences in favor of the English. The French flag disappeared from the North American continent, and save for the brief interval when Napoleon had temporary possession of Louisiana, and again when Maximilian invaded Mexico, has never here been subsequently raised. England and France had fought intermittently, but nearly uninterruptedly, for one hundred and thirty years.⁵ The issue to the latter was

¹ Acadia had been ceded to France by the Peace of Breda (1667), Heeren, 160 (par. 8); cf. generally Winsor, V, 135 et seq.; sources, 149 et seq.

² Subsequently, in 1755, the French settlers were, on account of their disloyalty to England, expelled from the region of Acadia, an event which is so vividly commemorated by Longfellow in "Evangeline," Parkman, "Montcalm and Wolfe," 265 et seq.; Bancroft, II, 426-434; Guizot, V, 123; also Raynal, VI, 242; VIII, 431-444.

³ Raynal, VIII, 131-138; Heeren, 203 (par. 13); Guizot, V, 119.

⁴ The provision of this treaty which most provoked the New England colonists was the restoration of Louisburg to France. This fortress, as well as Cape Breton, had been captured by their prowess in 1745, and they were highly exasperated to see them again fall into the hands of the French, in exchange for what seemed to the Americans paltry concessions on the coast of the East Indies; cf. Bancroft, II, 305-310.

⁵ For this period in brief, cf. Guizot, V, 119 et seq.; Parkman, "Montcalm and Wolfe"; Green, IV, 183-185; Payne, 115; Bancroft, II, 419 et seq., 482-533. It is a notable fact that at the time of the last conflict between England and France on the American Continent, Canada and Louisiana contained a total of 80,000 inhabitants, while the English settlements contained 1,200,000.

fatal in the arena of European politics not less than in the domain of colonization; in the protracted struggle her strength had been sapped to the roots. England was victorious, and France was a shell; but before further considering the ultimate effects of the contest in America, the experiences of French enterprise, during this first period, in other localities must be traced.

The French-Canadian troops, according to all authorities, were vastly outnumbered by the Anglo-Americans. Cf. also "The Fall of Quebec," article by C. T. Brady, in *McClure's Magazine*, July, 1900.

CHAPTER XI

EARLY FRENCH COLONIZATION IN GUIANA AND THE ANTILLES

ONE other French colony on the American mainland merits attention, unfortunately by reason of its disastrous record rather than because of any success. It may now seem strange that, about 1600, the Dutch, the English, and the French were all showing intense anxiety to assure their title to that part of South America afterward known as Guiana. A foothold on this coast was nevertheless then important, as affording a splendid base of operations for lawful or unlawful traffic with the neighboring Spanish and Portuguese dependencies, not to speak of the mines of precious metals presumed there to exist. The principal object of the second-rate mercantile states, it must not be forgotten, was to injure to the highest degree the commerce of Spain; hence their desire to occupy such an admirable point of vantage. The French, who first visited these shores in 1604,¹ established the earliest permanent settlement.²

Richelieu chartered a special organization for the trade of the Amazon and the Orinoco,³ and everything promised a brilliant future; but this district soon proved unsuitable for administration by a company which cannot and will not, at the beginning of its career, lay out large sums for improvements, no matter how essential these latter may be; for its chief aim is immediate revenue. Guiana was a marshy, unhealthy region. Many costly public works, to overcome natural obstacles and the malignant disposition of nature, were requisite before

¹ La Revardière, a Breton ship-owner, first brought news of the boundless riches of this locality, Norman, 192. He named the country "France Equatoriale," Rambaud, "French Colonization," 723.

² Raynal, VII, 27.

³ Norman, 192-193,

lasting prosperity could be attained; without regard to these conditions, colonization was impossible. Before white men could inhabit the country, it must necessarily be drained by canals; the construction of roads and bridges was likewise expensive, but nevertheless indispensable. The corporation unconsciously or wilfully overlooked and neglected these preliminaries; the colonists were condemned to prolonged sickness and premature death. The people themselves, by their form of government the subjects of a monopoly, were incapable of accomplishing any amelioration on their own account. In that age also, the French, accustomed to a paternal rule at home, were as individuals peculiarly devoid of initiative. They presented a striking contrast to their neighbors of the Low Countries; and not anywhere else better than in Guiana can the results of these different national characteristics be seen. They lacked the instinct of thrift, perseverance, and coöperation,¹ in all which the Dutch excelled. Another error of judgment was the land system. Vast undefined tracts were deeded to rich proprietors, who seldom had the energy to bring them under tillage, and yet forbade others to occupy them. At the best, these extensive grants were valued more for their wealth in fine woods, mines, plants, roots, and game, than for their agricultural resources. Here again, as in the North, the spirit of adventure, rather less in degree, was dominant. The Crown likewise seemed not to realize the immense profits which might be drawn from Guiana, by virtue of its favorable situation. On the one hand, the company abandoned the great waterway of the Orinoco to the Dutch, while subsequently Louis XIV ceded his rights over the Amazon and the Rio Negro to Portugal.²

In 1626, and again in 1643, some Rouen traders, undertaking to found several outposts in this vicinity, had failed, most of the immigrants being massacred by the natives.³ Not long afterward, a Parisian society made another attempt without much

¹ The Jews and the Huguenots had been driven out, Norman, 193.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 171 et seq.

³ La Revardière and his Gascon followers attempted a settlement here in

more success; of eight hundred persons who left France, only about three hundred managed to locate in Cayenne, an island within sight of the mainland. Notwithstanding the propitious conditions existing for the cultivation of coffee and certain kinds of spices, the community did not flourish. With the neighboring rivalry of the Dutch and the English, not to mention that of the Spaniards and the Portuguese, the French could not compete. Difficulty was experienced even in maintaining their station; Cayenne, the foremost town of the locality, had only five thousand inhabitants when Paramaribo, the Dutch city, had twenty thousand, and Demerara, the English establishment, twenty-five thousand.¹ In 1667 the British began to cast covetous glances on French Guiana, and finally, a century later, in 1763, — the same year as the conquest of Canada, — effected its capture. Nevertheless, when peace was signed between the two belligerents, France secured the return of this territory as a soothing salve for the surrender of her Northern possessions.²

The Duke de Choiseul was then the leading statesman of France. Stung by remorse at the national losses in North America,³ and determined to give an example of French enterprise in Guiana, he offered such flattering attractions to the peasants of Alsace and Lorraine, as to induce fifteen thousand of them to participate in the inauguration of a colony called

1604; Rouennaise in 1626, and again in company with Poucet de Bretigny in 1643; in 1652 the twelve Seigneurs, who were to have under their orders a hierarchy of enfeoffed seigneurs and tenants, made another effort; and finally the Parisians in 1664, Rambaud, 723; cf. also Lucas, II, 270-271.

¹ For rivalry between the European powers in this region, cf. Lucas, II, 276-278.

² For brief early history of Guiana, cf. Raynal, VII, 28-33. In 1664 Colbert had included this region in the grant made to the West India Company, which at first was under the direction of the king, but ten years later fell under the immediate control of the great prime minister. This period was one of high prosperity. The cultivation of the cane, cotton, and indigo was introduced, and the interior of the country explored. In 1716 Guiana especially excelled in coffee, and in 1730 cocoa was planted, Rambaud, 724.

³ Nor did De Choiseul forget his own personal interests. The king ceded to him the entire district between Kourou and Maroni, with which he enfeoffed the members of his family. The brother of Turgot, minister of Louis XVI, directed the enterprise, Rambaud, 724; De Lanessan, 697 et seq. For the modification of the boundary line, cf. De Lanessan, 685-694.

Kourou; but unfortunately De Choiseul manifested gross lack of foresight. He failed to appreciate that men alone were not requisite. Not any preparations were made for the reception of the colonists, nor for their occupation and support after arrival. The organization under chiefs and assistants was admirable; the arrangement was most military, but the purposes to be achieved and the means to execute them were forgotten. Fifteen thousand people, including farmers, musicians, soldiers, scholars, and even rich men, were transported to Cayenne. The inhabitants of this latter city not being, however, forewarned of the approach of this multitude, the results are readily anticipated, but still not in all their horror. Hunger, pestilence, and death immediately attacked the tumultuous throng. Twelve thousand human beings perished, not to consider the six millions of dollars wasted in vain.¹ French Guiana at once fell into such disrepute that to this day its good name has never been revived.

Baron de Besner formulated in 1777 a scheme to colonize the country with Indians and negroes, but his plans did not materialize.² Soon after that date, the government undertook the execution of a few of the more important public works which should have been constructed a century before. Under Louis XVI a colonial assembly was voted,³ and there were visible prospects of better times for the community, when the sudden upheaval in France left the colonies in a deplorable state of anxiety and uncertainty. The Convention, by its unexpected overthrow of many long-established, although vicious, institutions, occasioned the cessation, if not the ruin, of commerce. The disorders in Guiana caused by the abrupt liberation of the slaves,⁴ who formed by far the majority of

¹ Raynal, VII, 33-41; Heeren, 297 (par. 44 note); Merivale, 64; Leroy-Beaulieu, 175; Payne, 119.

² Payne, 120.

³ Law of March 28, 1792, "Archives Parlementaires," XL, 575-578. The first colonial assembly was inaugurated at Cayenne by Governor Malouet; for his administration (1776-1778), cf. Rambaud, 725; Norman, 194.

⁴ For the abolition of slavery in all the French colonies, cf. "Histoire parlementaire de la Revolution Française," XXXI, 266, 267. In 1802 Victor Hugues was ordered by the First Consul to reestablish slavery. The final emancipation occurred in 1848, Rambaud, 726; *post*, I, 425.

the population, and by the transportation of political exiles thither,¹ were fatal to prosperity and temporarily led to anarchy in its most acute phase. The united British and Portuguese forces eventually seized this district in 1809, the English remaining its masters until 1814, in which year it was restored to France.²

Among the dependencies in the West, the Antilles have always been the most flourishing; in those islands alone the French distinguished themselves during the early period. A combination of natural surroundings and fortunate circumstances joined to render these regions most propitious to their endeavor, industry, and power. There the colonists found a healthy climate, bright skies, a moderate temperature, modified by ocean breezes, an easy opportunity for adventure on sea and by land, and fields capable of producing many fold, with the slight care of oversight, but not requiring any great or constant personal toil. Life on the plantations was vastly different from farming or cattle raising. Coffee, cotton, and sugar planting were better adapted to the French disposition than wheat growing and sheep breeding. In the one much leisure was to be enjoyed; for the other unremitting labor was essential. In the Antilles, therefore, the people realized their ideal abode.³

The first settlement of the French in the West Indies — due to an accident — threatened international complications. In 1625, a privateer, Monsieur D'Enambuc, sailed from Dieppe, on a brig with four guns and a crew of fifty men, in quest of his destiny, but chiefly bent on the capture of rich Spanish galleons off the South American coast. Whether unluckily or otherwise, as the event proved, he met his superior in some hostile ship; and, being obliged to flee in a disabled condition, ran his little craft upon the nearest strand, which turned out to be the island of St. Christopher; about the same time, Thomas Warner, who had landed upon the opposite side, was taking

¹ Among them Billaud-Varenne, Collot-d'Herbois, and Pichegru.

² Payne, 143, 198.

³ Heeren, 116 (par. 13), 158 (par. 2), 202 (par. 12); Leroy-Beaulieu, 155.

possession in the name of the British king.¹ A few months later, D'Enambuc made his way back to France; his report of the fertility and beauty of the locality induced Richelieu to grant him and others, in 1626, a charter over St. Christopher and Barbados.² The Crown retained for itself a tenth part of the crops during twenty years, and on the other hand conceded the free entry of tobacco into France. It was furthermore decreed that all persons emigrating thither should be held under contract to their masters for a term of three years.³

By mutual consent, as it were, St. Christopher became the chief object of French solicitude, while Barbados was almost entirely abandoned to England. The company, devoted to the cultivation of tobacco, cotton, pimento, and arnotto, did not at once prosper; like all others, in its avarice for quick profits it exacted the production nearly exclusively of articles of export, not giving any heed to the growth of garden truck. Neither sufficient capital nor labor was at its command, but nevertheless it determined to make the most of its resources. Upon one occasion the inhabitants were, by the opportune arrival of a Dutch vessel, barely saved from starvation for want of vegetables. So highly appreciated was this aid, and so quickly the opportunity embraced, that the trade of the island was soon in the hands of the sailors of Holland. The French corporation, finding itself suddenly disenfranchised, appealed to the government, whereupon a proclamation was published forbidding business with foreigners under heavy penalties.⁴ In 1630 the Spaniards drove both the English and the French

¹ D'Enambuc and Warner are sometimes said to have reached St. Christopher on the same day, Raynal, V, 258; again, Warner is credited with having visited the island as early as 1623, Southey, I, 253, 255.

² For St. Christopher and D'Enambuc, cf. Rambaud, "Histoire de la Civilisation Française," I, 465; Pigeonneau, II, 435-436; Southey, "West Indies," I, 258-262; *et varii*.

³ Raynal, VII, 6, 7; Southey, I, 259; Leroy-Beaulien, 155 et seq.; Payne, 66 et seq. The charter of 1626 included from latitude 11° to 18° north; subsequently, as stated below in the text, in 1642, the grant was extended so as to include all the territory between 10° and 30°, Lucas, II, 45.

⁴ Forbonnais, "Recherches et Considérations sur les Finances de la France," I, 231, 325; Southey, 268, 272, 273, 275; Raynal, VII, 8; Leroy-Beaulien, 156 et seq. For a paragraph of this edict, cf. Norman, 134.

out of St. Christopher; but, after a brief absence, the former residents returned, with the exception of a few who went to live in the Windward group.¹ A few years later² the company was reorganized with sole privileges over all the islands between 10° and 30° north latitude.³ The appointment of the governor-general was reserved to the Crown. The absolute control of commerce was accorded for twenty years to the association, which on its part agreed to defend these possessions against Dutch ships; it further contracted to transport four thousand individuals thither within the same period, to strive to convert the Indians to Catholicism, and to support the church. In spite of these regulations and certain political rights guaranteed to the colonists, these communities, save for the glory of conquest, did not then flourish. Agriculture and trade continued in a most deplorable state.⁴

Guadeloupe, Martinique, Grenada, and others of the Antilles were overrun (1649-1660) and settled by sturdy adventurers, among whom may be mentioned Duparquet, Olive, and Du Plessis.⁵ The spirit of daring was fully satisfied in these expeditions. Whatever distinction may be derived from the wholesale massacre of savages — however barbarous they may

¹ At this time many of the French migrated to Antigua; six hundred were captured and condemned by the Spaniards to work in the mines. Within three months, however, D'Enambuc returned and reestablished the colony. The most important result of the Spanish attack was to furnish Cromwell with an excuse for making war on Spain, Pigeonneau, II, 437. "The expulsion of the French and English from St. Christopher gave rise to the buccaneers and pirates after 1630." — HEEREN, 159 (par. 6 note); cf. also Payne, 66.

² Lucas says this date was 1642; cf. *supra*, p. 390, note 3; according to others it is 1635; Southey, I, 275, 276, 294.

³ The company was reorganized under the name of "The Company of the Islands of America." Besides other privileges, it was authorized to import slaves, Lavisse and Rambaud, V, 369.

⁴ Leroy-Beaulieu, 157 et seq.

⁵ Raynal, VII, 9, 10. Olive and Du Plessis were lieutenants of D'Enambuc. Besides St. Christopher and Guadeloupe the French held St. Domingo, Grenada, The Grenadines, St. Vincent, Martinique, Tobago, St. Bartholomew, Marie Galante, St. Lucie, St. Martin, and St. Croix, Rambaud, 679; De Lanesan, 730; Southey, "West Indies," I, 272 et seq.; the company had sold out its rights and privileges in many of the islands to private individuals, Southey, I, 321, 329; Cantu, VIII, 400 et seq.; the Order of Malta purchased several others in 1651, Cantu, VIII, 400.

be—was the share of these noblemen; the Caribs, a fierce cannibal race dwelling on many of the islands, were almost totally annihilated. Most of the French explorers in these regions had bought their claims of the original French Company, or held patents from the king, granting them the unrestricted title to all the lands which they might subdue and capture; hence there arose a species of private ownership.¹ Some of the more venturesome, without any charter or vestige of royal authority, located in St. Domingo, and set up a veritable pirate establishment;² but the English and the Dutch having similar harbors of refuge not far distant, and the common enemy being the Spaniard, it was not thought necessary to interfere. St. Domingo was preëminently the home of the French filibusters, and not even their own government dared for a long time intervene.³ Richelieu, by conferring so-called privileges, took the first step toward their control.⁴

Meanwhile the population of St. Christopher was increasing. In 1642 it was estimated that 7000 individuals, instead of 4000, had immigrated. Among the colonists was a large number of young scions of noble birth, so that nearly every important family in France was represented. The clergy also exerted a beneficial effect on these lusty settlements; in them the Jesuits performed their most memorable and praiseworthy tasks. Generally better educated than their neighbors, they assumed the greater part of the scientific and professional duties. Architects, surveyors, engineers, machine builders, even planters and speculators, were here seen in their ranks. Father Labat, the inventor of the sugar distilling apparatus,

¹ Heeren, 158 (par. 5).

² Raynal, V, 262; VII, 156-161; Heeren, 159 (par. 5 note).

³ For the St. Domingo filibusters, cf. Lavissee and Rambaud, VI, 961, 962. An extensive bibliography of this subject is given by them on page 963.

⁴ The buccaneers observed treaties and submitted to official control only when it suited their convenience and did not interfere with their trade, Lucas, II, 57, 58; Southey, II, 86-94. To their hardihood Adam Smith attributes the subsequent prosperity of the French Antilles. For some account of them, cf. Raynal, V, 275-319, also VII, 161-175; Leroy-Beaulieu, 158; Cantu, VIII, 401 et seq.

also gained renown, and left an imperishable name by the inauguration and construction of schools, churches, and forts, as well as by the development of the plantations. Father Lavalette is not to be forgotten as equally active in many lines of progress, although his subsequent financial failure involved the suppression of the order in these regions. To another grade of society the Antilles were likewise propitious. The middle citizen class, mostly employed in commerce and industry, here found the opportunity profitably to invest small savings, with the assurance that the returns would be more speedy and more substantial than in the mother country. The "articled whites" formed the lowest scale of this varied community. At all the northern ports of France the engagement of these working men and women for emigration constituted a regular business. Thousands of these hired artisans, mechanics, and laborers passed from France to the West Indies between 1626 and 1774. Suffering indescribable horrors en route, and severe toil on their arrival, they present the one indomitable element in French colonization; accustomed to hardship and self-sacrifice, they rendered prosperity ultimately certain, even if tardy. Most of those who went out under the three years' contract succeeded in their new abodes, while many of them achieved distinction.¹ As Adam Smith wisely remarks, the difference between the sugar plantations of England and those of France consists in this fact: in the English islands most of the funds were originally received from the parent state; in the French possessions they were the product of the accumulated profits, drawn from the soil and due to the labors of the settlers. Hence the British dependencies from the beginning made rapid strides, while the growth of the French establishments was much slower, but for that reason not the less durable. The latter, indeed, produced their own capital, while the former only paid dividends on that furnished to them.²

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 161 et seq. For the subject of "Articled Whites," cf. Rambaud, 680, 708; De Lanessan, 730; for their treatment, Southey, I, 286.

Adam Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 463-464.

Strangely enough, in these islands, where the clergy were so numerous and zealous, religious tolerance prevailed. Whether by carelessness, or by a too great multiplicity of occupations, the priests do not seem to have strongly protested.¹ The free, adventurous, and vagabond nature of the people contributed, also, to this condition. Already, in 1641, Tortuga was captured from the English and set apart as a locality where the profession of all beliefs should be permitted. Another important event at this time not only favored the relaxation of the severity of the church, but guaranteed the future welfare of these colonies. About 1644 the sugar-cane was introduced into the Antilles, being first cultivated in Martinique by a Jew who had migrated from Brazil.² Benjamin Da Costa was his name. Possibly, as a matter of gratitude, animosities of creed were overlooked. It is even true that, a few years later, at the suggestion of prime minister Colbert, absolute liberty of conscience was formally proclaimed. Foreigners were still, however, rigidly excluded from these possessions.³

Colbert, recognizing the value of the Antilles, elaborated a plan for their common government. In 1664 he bought out the individual proprietors,⁴ and, chartering a second company, placed the entire traffic in its hands;⁵ he created a coun-

¹ Colbert himself obtained royal permission for a settlement of the Calvinists in Martinique, Norman, 135.

² According to standard authorities sugar was introduced by the Dutch into the West Indies from Brazil about 1640, Lucas, "Historical Geography of the British Colonies," II, 64, 178; Johnston, 39-40, 101. It was cultivated in Martinique in 1654, De Lanessan, 730; cf. also Southey, I, 355. Peter Martyr says it was grown in St. Domingo while under Spanish rule as early as 1506; in 1530 he says there were twenty-eight sugar works in that island. The plant which he mentions was, however, an inferior article, and not the same as that subsequently introduced and which became the staple of commerce. *Supra*, p. 279, note 3.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 162 et seq.

⁴ Raynal, VII, 11; Heeren, 158 (par. 5).

⁵ This same company was granted control over all the French possessions from Canada to the mouth of the Amazon, and over the African coast from Cape Verde to the Cape of Good Hope, Heeren, 159 (par. 7 et seq.). For the West India Company, cf. Rambaud, 681; Southey, II, 49, 55 et seq. It was abolished in 1674, and the islands were reunited to the domain of the Crown. The prosperity of Martinique dates from that epoch; cf. *supra*, p. 372 et seq.

cil of commerce, which abolished taxes in the dependencies, reduced the duties on goods imported into France, gave lands to the poor, advanced money to the planters, and protected them against pirates. The cultivation of sugar attracted capitalists and thousands of immigrants. Ready markets were found; in every respect success was assured, save for the burdensome control of the privileged corporation, an institution which, in spite of all other salutary dispositions, still weighed down the colonists for many years. The prohibition to ships other than those owned by the organization to participate in this trade was the main point of contention; for, in fact, the society, while reserving to itself this exclusive right, was inadequate for public needs.¹ The energies of the inhabitants were thus restricted by its capacity until, finally, this limitation of exports precipitated serious trouble in several localities. At Martinique and Guadeloupe the people were uttering deep complaints, and at St. Domingo, the home of the ancient filibusters, rebellion broke out. Colbert opportunely intervened, and insisted that all French vessels be allowed to frequent these ports, subject to the payment of a certain license tax.² Peace was thus maintained. The Company was, however, after a very brief and precarious existence, dissolved in 1674, when the régime of the Crown was restored.³ Commerce was opened only to the French, but aliens might settle in the islands. The colonial administration, confided to the Minister of the Marine, was locally delegated to a governor and an intendant.⁴ Thenceforth the Antilles belonged to the nation which thus finally vouchsafed them uninterrupted prosperity.

While Colbert, sturdy in his convictions of the wants of the colonies, was striving, by incessant toil, to strengthen the policy of France, he unwittingly fell into some errors, due to the doctrines of his age. His predilection for companies was

¹ Heeren, 159 (par. 7 note); Cantu, VIII, 406 et seq.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 163.

³ Raynal, VII, 12, 13; Southey, II, 108-110.

⁴ Payne, 87.

one; his introduction of human bondage was another; in both instances he believed his views were correct. In the earlier days, white labor was mostly used in the French Antilles.¹ Prior to the inauguration of sugar raising, the crops were not such as to necessitate large capital or extensive plantations. Dazzled by the fabulous possibilities of wealth winning in the cultivation of the cane, the people urged, and the government conceded, almost everything which might conduce to this end. Colbert authorized slavery throughout these possessions.² The adoption of this system of servitude was accompanied by another material modification. The new industry not only required cheap labor, but it likewise exacted ample investments and vast tracts of land. Small proprietors began to disappear; their properties became more and more united in the hands of fewer and fewer individuals. The planters who were rich generally resided in the city and hired overseers to watch their interests; they seldom lived on their estates; at the best, they visited them rarely, and only during the season.³ On the other hand, the expropriated farmers and the white laborers out of work were driven into the towns. A radical change thus transpired in these beautiful isles. The fields were deserted, except by the condemned creatures imported from Africa, while the more populous centres swarmed with the unemployed; even when the adjust-

¹ From the very beginning the colonists of Martinique had imported slaves, until in 1738 the latter numbered 58,000; after that date indentured whites were not any longer sent from Europe, Rambaud, 706; De Lanessan, 730.

² Slaves had already been introduced into Guadeloupe by the Dutch as early as 1653, Norman, 165. Subsequently, in 1701, the French Guinea Company obtained by treaty the exclusive right to supply slaves for Spanish America under the so-called *asiento*; for text of this agreement, cf. Southey, II, 185 et seq. This privilege was transferred to the English in 1713, *supra*, p. 260, note 3; *post*, II, Ch. XVIII.

³ Absenteeism of the landed proprietors is the curse of plantation colonies; cf. Malouet, "Mémoire sur les Colonies," IV, 127; Merivale, 65. *Contra*: "The prime causes of the prosperity and indeed of the superiority which the French islands acquired over the British, consisted partly in the far greater commercial privileges extended to them; partly in the slave traffic with Spanish America; and partly also in the habits of the planters, who devoted their whole time to the plantations in order that they might return the sooner enriched to their native land." — HEBER, 202 (par. 12).

ment of relations came, the outlook for social and moral progress was dimmed. The situation of the slaves, as everywhere else, was also deplorable. In 1685 Louis XIV decreed the "Code Noir," under which some rights were granted to the blacks; the union of families was assured and cruelty was forbidden. Nevertheless, the record of harsh treatment is a frightful commentary on the futility of human laws. Louis XIV unfortunately acquiesced in numerous other enactments which offset and rendered inefficacious the benevolent provisions of his code. He and his successors, in their endeavors to separate the various classes of society from one another, eventually deprived the negroes of most of the privileges so pompously promised them.¹ The consequences of the institution of serfdom in the Antilles were most marked.²

Another act of Colbert was to legislate for the sugar trade so that France alone should participate in it; the planters were, of course, pleased with the exclusion of other nationalities from the French market, but when the reverse of the plan was presented, their own restriction to the demand of the parent state, — for they were prohibited to sell abroad, — the proposition was decidedly different. The Crown, moreover, in consideration of the concession of a sole monopoly at home, imposed upon this cultivation immense duties; the reexportation of stock brought into France was also interdicted. The production of the Antilles about 1680 was thirty-three and a third per cent more than the mother country could consume. By their own local competition and overpopulation, with a limited outlet, the industry of these communities was ruined. Within thirty years the price of sugar declined to one-third of the quotations at the time of prosperity, the islands were in some places depopulated, and the volume of sales had fallen to a nominal amount. The point had been reached where, in the hope of salvation, the

¹ For the text of the "Code Noir," in full, Southey, II, 129-133 (note); for that and subsequent acts, cf. Rambaud, II, 257-259. For the later "Black Code," of 1724, cf. Gayarré, I (Appendix).

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 163 et seq.; De Sismondi, "Econ. Pol." 140.

landed proprietors were ready to grasp at the most deceptive schemes. Such was the predicament just prior to the period of great speculation. In view of the hardships due to the absurd conditions enforced by the government, is it surprising that a financial upheaval ensued? It was then the famous John Law appeared upon the scene.¹

One event of grave importance in the political development of these colonies had already occurred. Before further describing the economic transformation, mention must be made of the agreement adopted by England and France for the peaceable settlement of their controversies in the West Indies. Under the doctrine that the first discoverer had the legal title, many of the latter were apt subjects of contention between the two powers; St. Christopher, for instance, was claimed by each. In the disordered chaos of uncertainty, the natives were also incited by one nation or the other to open rebellion or secret conspiracy against the rival race. Hence it was concluded that the most expeditious, prudent, and cheapest method of establishing authority was amicably to divide these possessions. Guadeloupe, Martinique, Grenada, and others were allotted and confirmed to France. Barbados, Montserrat, Antigua, and Nevis were declared forever British; St. Christopher was left open to both, and a little later² St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Dominica, when reclaimed from the aborigines, were acknowledged to be neutral.³ Notwithstanding this arrangement, neither people hesitated, in their subsequent wars, to attack the islands belonging to the other. Several changed hands from time to time; but for the most part their fortunes were favorable to England, even before the Napoleonic era, when France lost all.⁴

During the epoch of depression in the sugar industry occasioned by French legislation, a severe blow from without was struck national and colonial prosperity. The slave trade,

¹ Raynal, VII, 13-21; Leroy-Beaulieu, 165 et seq.

² By Treaty of January 19, 1723; for that of 1667, cf. Southey, II, 79-81.

³ Lucas, II, 49, 145. The first English attack on the French West Indies — which was unsuccessful — took place in 1666, Rambaud, 681, 708.

⁴ Raynal, V, 261-262; Payne, 75 et seq.

however inhumane, barbarous, and immoral, was undeniably a source of huge profit to the state which controlled it. For some years previously France had, under the terms of the so-called *assiento*, reserved to her Guinea Company the right of supplying negroes to the West Indies and to certain districts of South America. By the treaty of peace signed at Utrecht in 1713, England, compelling her enemy to relinquish this lucrative business, exacted of the Spaniards an engagement that slaves for their colonies should be purchased only of English companies. In connection with other troubles this disaster was most seriously felt.¹

Just at this juncture, when the crisis was at its height, in 1717, the noted Law was advancing his projects.² To his perpetual credit he solved the questions pertaining to the Antilles, not merely satisfactorily, but permanently and successfully. He reduced the duties on exports to France, abolished the tax on goods sent thence to these islands, authorized the resale of colonial produce to other countries upon payment of a three per cent impost, and suppressed the privileges of almost all the companies in these regions.³ To these beneficent reforms a long period of marvellous affluence was due; in spite of his unfortunate speculations, Law was certainly the saviour of the Antilles. Supplemental to the sugar-cane, coffee and cotton planting were introduced and further developed.⁴ The value of the annual output of sugar in St. Domingo alone, from 1711 to 1788, multiplied eighteen-fold, and at the last-mentioned date exceeded a total of \$35,000,000.⁵ The

¹ *Supra*, p. 396, note 2. The African Company had to supply 144,000 slaves in thirty years; during twenty years the average was about 15,000 annually, Lucas, II, 66.

² For short account of Law and the West India Company, cf. Malleon, 24, 25; Raynal, VII, 13-21; Leroy-Beaulieu, 165 et seq.; Heeren, 203 (par. 12 note); Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 254; *supra*, p. 381 et seq., 398, note 1.

³ Raynal, VII, 21-23; Heeren, 203 (par. 12 note); Cantu, VIII, 406 et seq.

⁴ Leroy-Beaulieu, 162-164.

⁵ For the prosperity of St. Domingo at that date, cf. Raynal, VII, 175-228. For the value of the exports from that island and the other French West Indies about the same time, *ibid.* 221-225. "St. Domingo alone afforded her [France] in the latter half of this [eighteenth] century such an immense re-

wealth of the planters augmented enormously; the importation of blacks necessary for the cultivation of such crops caused this population to increase in a wonderful manner; while more whites, for the tasks of overseeing, accounting, and shipping, were likewise required in very nearly similar proportion. The number of seamen and vessels engaged in commerce enlarged. In the mother country, also, the reaction was apparent. Marseilles, Nantes, and Bordeaux experienced a marked impulse attributable to the growth of this trade. The opulence of the colonies became the envy of Europe, while the modified policy of France was cited, as the ideal type, by colonial reformers, even in the realm of her rival, Great Britain.¹

In the matter of administration,² the later system organized by France for these dependencies was kind and practical. A governor, an intendant, and a high council of prominent planters exercised the local power. Regular salaries were paid these functionaries, and they were subject to strict inspection; any captain, sailor, or merchant returning home might complain of irregularities, and official corruption or misconduct was promptly and condignly punished.³ Over all the possessions there was placed in France the Council of Commerce, composed of twenty-four members, in which each leading city was represented, with supreme authority. In the colonies taxes were light, while land was gratuitously dis-

turn, that it surpassed the expectations of the mother country, whose foreign commerce became almost entirely connected with this island." — HEEREN, 297. How soon and how great was to be the fall! Cf. *post*, p. 402; also Payne, 136; Cantu, VIII, 407 et seq. Merivale fixes the annual production of sugar in St. Domingo in the eighteenth century at £8,000,000 sterling, "Colonies and Colonization," 65.

¹ Merivale, 62, who cites Burke, "European Settlements in America"; Leroy-Beaulieu, 167.

² Cf. Norman, 6-8.

³ Still, Merivale scores "the vices of the administration incidental to a government so corrupt as that of old France. Court favor was the only source which supplied . . . governors and other executive officers. A source even more tainted than that of Parliamentary interest among ourselves [the English]. Men without fortune or character, ruined in their own country, eagerly sought and obtained these appointments, which were commonly regarded as the last resource of a spendthrift. Much ignorance as well as much corruption prevailed in all the details of office." — "Colonization and Colonies," 63.

tributed to immigrants. For the first time in history the parent state imposed upon itself considerable burdens for the sake of colonial advancement. The French régime of the eighteenth century, as prevailing in the Antilles, was peculiarly progressive, and in strong contrast with the antiquated methods of other nations still elsewhere in force; nevertheless, it was far from perfection. Let credit, however, be given where it is merited. It is for the development and application of liberal economic doctrines that the French deserve the greatest approbation. In the details of legislation affecting the sugar industry, they were most enlightened and successful. To such action, more than to political freedom, the French West Indies owe their good fortune. Just prior to 1800 the government even sanctioned the entry of foreign vessels into their harbors. By virtue of the unique combination of favorable fiscal measures and the remarkable natural fertility of their soil, the Antilles attained a degree of prosperity previously unexampled and in that age unparalleled.¹

The most striking evidence of the importance of the French colonial domain at that epoch is the value of its trade with the mother country, which, M. Augustin Cochin says, amounted in 1787 to approximately \$120,000,000; while the total of British commerce did not then exceed \$90,000,000.²

The chaotic events due to the volcanic eruption of the French Revolution suddenly cast their dark and fatal shadow over all the colonies. The terrible effects in the case of Guiana have already been described; other regions suffered not less. At a stroke, the planters were deprived of their sole market—a condition which existed, in greater or less intensity, for twenty-five years. Upon the emancipation of the negroes, wherever the French flag still floated, confusion and massacres occurred.³ Fortunately for the inhabitants, several of these

¹ For the history of the French Antilles in detail prior to 1775, cf. Raynal, VII; also Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 454, 462; Merivale, 61 et seq., 64 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 168 et seq.; Thomas Southey, "Chronological History of the West Indies," III.

² Cited by Leroy-Beaulieu, 171.

³ Heeren, 353 (par. 5); Southey, III, 25-29 et seq.

places had either fallen into the hands of Great Britain or had become semi-independent, in which order was maintained only by the suppression of the liberty-giving decrees. The Consulate attempted to reëstablish slavery as well as the slave trade, but any legislation was then necessarily ephemeral, and difficult of execution.¹

From 1763 forward the English were diligently engaged in absorbing the French possessions of the West Indies;² Grenada, Tobago, and Dominica were first taken;³ almost immediately after the outbreak of the Revolution British fleets began to threaten the remaining islands, all of which at length succumbed.⁴ In St. Domingo the blacks organized a rebellion and, triumphing over both French and English troops sent to repress it, in 1799 won their freedom,⁵ which, however, they quickly stained by the dreadful atrocities committed.⁶ Guadeloupe was the last vestige of the entire earlier colonial empire of the West. In 1810 England captured it, and, with the nearly coincident seizure of Bourbon and Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, deprived France of every single dependency.⁷

¹ For the reëstablishment of slavery in 1802, cf. Rambaud, 685-686, 710, 726; for Bonaparte's decree of March 29, 1815, reabolishing it, cf. Southey, III, 586.

² Raynal, V, 324 et seq.

³ Heeren, 247, 297; Payne, 117, 119, 127, 143.

⁴ For a concise account of the numerous transfers which these islands underwent, cf. Rambaud, 681 et seq.

⁵ For the rebellion in St. Domingo, cf. *Revue des Questions Historiques*, XX (new series), autumn number, 1898, 399-470; also Southey, "West Indies," III.

⁶ For the wealth of St. Domingo just prior to the French Revolution, and the causes of its decadence in brief, cf. Merivale, 64 et seq.; Cantu, XII, 178 et seq.; Heeren, 354 et seq.; Payne, 136 et seq.; also Southey, III.

⁷ Payne, 143.

CHAPTER XII

EARLY FRENCH COLONIZATION IN INDIA AND AFRICA

WHILE the greatest distinction and the most extensive territories were earned by the French in the West, still, not a little energy was displayed by this people in the Orient. Reference has already been made to their first expeditions in the fourteenth century along the coasts of Africa; it has been stated how, subsequently, — sometimes with long intervals of inactivity, — they pushed their way gradually farther and farther southward. Binot Paulmier de Gonneville was the first of his nation to round the Cape of Good Hope.¹ This task he not merely achieved, in 1503, but his adventurous spirit led him eastward so far that he finally experienced shipwreck on the shores of Australia. Other French mariners likewise cruised along the African seaboard, explored the Southern Ocean, and visited many of the ports of India. Still, notwithstanding these evidences of early enterprise on the part of her sailors and merchants, France did not accomplish anything material in the inauguration of commercial relations with the Orient until a very late date. Prior to the beginning of the seventeenth century, not any serious effort was put forth to participate in the Eastern trade. In 1604 Henry IV chartered the original French East India Company, but it soon failed. In 1615 a second organization was founded; in 1633 it ceased to exist. In 1642 a third association was perfected; it shared the same fate.² This last-mentioned society had aimed to

¹ Rambaud, 3; Johnston, 122-123, 194-195; *supra*, p. 362.

² The first French East India Company was aided by subsidies from the royal treasury and vessels from the government dockyards, Norman, 75. In 1615 two vessels were despatched to the Indian Ocean; they touched at Madagascar, but did not reach India. The new Company in 1642 was granted the exclusive privilege of settling colonies in Madagascar and adjacent islands. The renewal of privileges was not requested, Malleson, 7-8.

settle Madagascar, but had been obliged, by the savagery of the natives and the insalubrious atmosphere, to discontinue its colony. The auguries for French dominion in the Orient were decidedly evil.¹

Colbert, undaunted by the inability of his predecessors successfully to grapple with the problem, and believing his nation might overcome every obstacle, resolved to make one more magnificent endeavor. In 1664 the great East India Company of France was born. The Dutch East India Company was taken as a model, which the new corporation was designed to surpass in the amount of capital, the number of privileges, the extent of territories, the percentage of profits, and the degree of power. Colbert² decided that the society should start with \$3,000,000 paid in. The duration of the charter was fixed at fifty years, but the perpetual grant of all discovered and conquered regions was deeded to it.³ The treasury engaged to make large advances, not only to the Company, but likewise to individual emigrants; other inducements, in the nature of concessions, were offered to the latter, while to the former exemption from various duties and taxes was decreed; ample naval protection was also promised its ships.⁴

Every possible support, subsidy, and agreement was tendered or pledged in order to float this mammoth, but inherently weak, organization. One characteristic, however, was constitutionally lacking, the force of vitality, which the state could not, unfortunately, provide at command; which, indeed, only the people might have assured. As in the case of most of their Western ventures, the French did not enthuse over the vast

¹ Raynal, II, 284-287; Cantu, VIII, 313 et seq.

² For Colbert's enterprise, cf. Norman, 76-78.

³ Raynal, II, 287-289; Heeren, 160 (par. 9); Leroy-Beaulieu, 177 et seq.; Cantu, VIII, 313.

⁴ Guizot, V, 306 et seq. "Colbert's efforts were not useless; at his death the maritime trade of France had developed itself and French merchants were effectually protected at sea by ships of war." — *Ibid.* 308. It was Louis XIV who first was able to refuse the salute to the English flag, always prior to that time required of all foreign vessels in the English Channel, *supra*, p. 310, note 4; cf. also Payne, 77; Malletson, 9-11.

plans so ardently cherished and brilliantly, although artificially, sketched by their government. The same record of exaggerated anticipations on the side of the Crown and silent indifference on the part of the masses is again manifest. In this instance they suffered also the disadvantage that they were striving to enter a field of action already largely occupied and well reconnoitred by two or three vigorous rivals. It has been told how the Portuguese and the Spaniards had long been important factors in the Orient, how Holland was just then stretching upward to the approaching zenith of its glory, and how England, preparing to contest Dutch supremacy, was ready to oppose any other claimant. Such was the situation in 1664, when France was meditating her stupendous scheme for Oriental trade and conquest, in which Colbert was determined his compatriots should have a share.

Madagascar was again singled out as marking the first stage in French progress. This beautiful, fertile land, where the natural products of the tropics abound, appeared propitious to any well-managed effort.¹ Strength, prudence, and skill in the treatment of the natives, together with the prompt execution of certain works of sanitation, were necessary. The conditions were not any worse than those which the Dutch had overcome a hundred times in the East; yet the French proved unequal to the task. The few colonists who, with strenuous labor and flourish of trumpets, were assembled and transported thither were within six years either carried off by the fever or massacred by the aborigines. The attempted settlement came to a humiliating end. Madagascar was soon thereafter restored to the Crown,² which then directed its energies to the farther East. In 1668 an employee of the Dutch Company, by name Caron,³ having engaged in the French ser-

¹ Among the inducements offered to immigrants, the company stated that the climate was very temperate, "two-thirds of the year was like spring"; that there was gold, silver, lead, cotton, and tobacco . . . ; that the settler need not labor, for he had only to make the negro work, Malleon, 11, 12; Johnston, 262-263.

² Raynal, II, 289-310; Cantu, VIII, 313 et seq.; Leroy-Beaulieu, 179; Payne, 77.

³ For an account of Francis Caron, who resigned from the service of the

vice, led some Frenchmen into Surat and, after expelling the Dutch, established a trading station at St. Thomas. Four years later, however, the earlier occupants returned, reinstated themselves by force of arms, and obliged the French to flee; these latter retired to Pondicherry, on the coast of Coromandel (1679), where ultimately their nation was to have its main centre of influence in the Orient.¹

In 1672 an expedition was organized to take possession of Ceylon; of all the undertakings of that period it was the most prudent and sensible. The location of this island is favorable for commerce, and at that epoch its occupation could have been comparatively easily maintained; but, like so many other projects, the endeavor was barren of fruits.²

Had it not been for an unanticipated occurrence the French might never have become interested in Siam. The Portuguese had traded there since 1511, when they had first explored its coast. The Dutch reached that region in 1604, and the English in 1613. Constantine Phaulcon, a Greek adventurer, whom the chance of fortune had elevated to the post of Siamese prime minister, being ambitious to usurp the throne itself, desired an alliance with Louis XIV. He sent an embassy therefore, in 1685, to France with the proposition that in consideration of the assistance to be rendered him in carrying his prospective revolution to a successful close, he would accord French subjects an exclusive monopoly of the trade with his country. Flattered by this expression of homage, coming from such a distant part of the earth, Louis XIV granted the prayer of Phaulcon, helped him to gain the crown, and start to install a company. Only a brief time passed before this enterprise came very nearly involving the Eastern affairs of France in absolute ruin. The people of Siam, displeased with their new ruler, revolted, and forthwith exiled both Phaulcon and the French agents. War broke out between

Dutch East India Company because he was not given a post of importance at Batavia, and for the Persian Mercara, cf. Malleon, 13-16; Norman, 77-78.

¹ Raynal, II, 339-342; Cantu, VIII, 314.

² Raynal, II, 340; Leroy-Beaulieu, 180. For the history of the Ceylon expedition of which Caron became the scapegoat, cf. Malleon, 15-16,

France on the one hand, and Holland, Germany, Spain, and England on the other. The Dutch almost exterminated the French colonies in the Orient, while the French privateers, authorized by law, capturing numerous returning English East Indiamen and throwing their cargoes on the home market, materially prejudiced the business of the regular companies.¹

By the Peace of Ryswick, Pondicherry, — the chief establishment on the Indian continent, — which had been lost to the Dutch, was, in 1693, restored to France.² This event marked the opening of the period within which the French attained their greatest power. During the same interval the struggle with England for the supremacy was to be waged. Pondicherry, when recovered, was at once strongly fortified and became the political and commercial capital of French empire in the East. It soon was noted for the fine cloths and other valuable Indian and Persian merchandise which came thence to Europe.³ Dumas, Labourdonnais, and Dupleix are the names renowned in the history of French India. Dumas extended the national prestige over the entire Carnatic,⁴ and, when the Dutch abandoned the island of Mauritius, annexed it to these domains; Labourdonnais and Dupleix continued the work of development. Under the guidance of the latter as intendant at Chandernagore the trade of the Company grew so rapidly and comprised such a vast area that he was ultimately promoted to be governor-general at Pondicherry. A quarrel then ensued between these two celebrated men, which in the end wrecked the prosperity of their common cause. After the conquest of Madras and the lamentable issue of that victory, Labourdonnais suddenly withdrew, and

¹ Raynal, II, 342-364; Cantu, VIII, 314. For French occupation of Pondicherry and its trade, cf. Malleson, "Administration of Martin," 16-22; Vignon, "L'Expansion Coloniale," 55-62. For French commerce in the Levant, Norman, 79; *post*, p. 408, note 3.

² Raynal, II, 365-369.

³ In 1706, 40,000 natives are said to have been dependent upon the trade of Pondicherry; consult authorities mentioned in note 1.

⁴ Dumas abandoned the principle of strict neutrality between the native princes, Malleson, 28-34.

Dupleix was left independent in the elaboration of his policy.¹ But the authorities at Paris, by reason of incapacity or because of jealousy, failing to support him, refused the military and naval assistance required at a critical moment; which, if furnished and employed in accordance with his views, would have overwhelmed the English in India and the neighboring waters, and might forever have assured France the preëminence.² The government was satisfied to rest on the defensive, to protect merely its own immediate possessions, while its rivals were acquiring numerous footholds at other undisputed points.³ The Crown did not believe that England could ever seriously menace French dominion in the Orient. What a fallacy!⁴

As early as 1748 Pondicherry had been besieged by a hostile fleet,⁵ but Dupleix had succeeded in thwarting the enemy, and the peace soon following had saved for a time that city. The governor-general then pursued the execution of his plans, placing on the local thrones potentates amicably disposed to France. But in this matter he was checkmated by the English, who had adopted a similar practice in their section.⁶ In India, as in America, at this epoch, the interests of England and France were clashing; on these far removed continents

¹ The quarrel between Labourdonnais and Dupleix, growing out of the capture of Madras by the former, resulted not only seriously for the immediate actors, but most disastrously for France; cf. *post*, p. 411, note 8. For this period, cf. Raynal, II, 420-472; also Green, "History of the English People," IV, 161, 163, 179 et seq.

² For some account of the policy of Dupleix, cf. Malleison, Ch. II.

³ One great reason for the inactivity of the French in India during the first quarter of the eighteenth century was the continuance of the East India Company, which had lost its vitality. In 1719 it was united with another similar association and became known as the India or Mississippi Company. This institution erected a bank and assumed the national debt; Law, the speculator, was the prime promoter of the enterprise. In 1720 the collapse ensued; cf. *supra*, p. 381 et seq.; this final episode and crash worked a wonderful influence upon French colonial history and incidentally upon that of England, who ultimately profited by it. Cf. Heeren, 196, 204. The French East India Company was again subsequently rejuvenated and continued to exist until 1769.

⁴ For an excellent brief account of this period of French colonial history, cf. Guizot, V, 100; Payne, 113 et seq.

⁵ The English fleet under Admiral Boscawen; Guizot, V, 100; Malleison, 64-69.

⁶ Malleison, 70-72.

the two nations were girding themselves for the combat to be so fatal to the one, so glorious to the other. The natives in each of these regions, abetted and succored, although not openly acknowledged, by their principals, were waging irregular warfare in behalf of both peoples long before these latter actually took up their own arms for the final contest. It is certainly remarkable that this famous struggle for supremacy extended to the opposite sides of the globe, and that in the two hemispheres the English were almost equally and coincidentally successful. By some dire fatality the French seem not to have anticipated the significance or even the possibility of the conflict until it burst upon them. As in the West, so in the East, their authority was exercised over a vast realm. Although in the administration of Indian affairs the aborigines were much more directly subordinate to the duly constituted officials than were those of America, still these domains of France were too extensive and too widely scattered to be effectively defended; four distinct districts were under her influence. Dupleix, by his skilful management of the chieftains, had been able to maintain national authority;¹ but, unfortunately for himself and his country, he was in his old age withdrawn because of alleged intrigues with the very princes whom he had so masterfully held in subjection.²

Lally,³ the next governor-general, had scarcely assumed the reins of power when the English attacked; both on land and by sea the French were finally defeated. In 1761, after a protracted famine, Pondicherry surrendered; Clive accomplished for the entire peninsula the task which he had begun in Bengal. The rule of France was broken.⁴ Her settlements were

¹ Heeren, 296 (par. 41).

² For this period, cf. Raynal, II, 420-472. For an excellent account of the career of Dupleix, his early successes and subsequent misfortunes, Malleson, Ch. VI-X. More briefly, Guizot, V, 97 et seq.

³ Until the arrival of Lally in April, 1758, first, Godellieu, styled "Commissary of the Company," ruled in Dupleix' stead until 1755, followed by De Leyret (1755-1758), Malleson, 158-168. For a comparison of the policies of Dupleix and Lally, *ibid.* 170-171.

⁴ Raynal, II, 472-482; Guizot, 106 et seq.; Payne, 118. Lally was subsequently tried in Paris for treachery, condemned, and executed on May 9, 1766.

thenceforth absolutely at the mercy of England. When Pondicherry was restored, in 1763, the conditions were that all French troops be recalled, and that the fortifications in India be dismantled and ungarrisoned. The French East India Company ceased to exist in 1769.¹ Pondicherry was again captured by the British in 1778, returned in 1783, retaken in 1793, once more in 1803, and eventually given back to France in 1815. That city, with a population of fifty thousand inhabitants, is still to-day the chief French community in India.²

In spite of British efforts, France long retained a firm grasp over Mauritius and Bourbon — or Réunion — both lying a short distance to the east of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean.³ Bourbon, discovered by the Portuguese in 1545, was occupied by the French in 1642.⁴ The earliest immigrants came from Madagascar, and subsequently, at the time of the massacre, even more refugees fled thence. Many convicts were also sent to the Isle of Bourbon, where frequently they intermarried with the natives. Numerous Protestants likewise went thither after the Edict of Nantes. A beautiful climate and a fertile soil were favorable to success. Coffee, which was introduced soon after 1700, became the principal product, while cloves, nutmegs, pepper, cinnamon, and breadfruit formed important cultures. The course of affairs ran, for the most part, calmly. Great wealth was accumulated by many of the colonists, but otherwise little real progress was made. In the troublous times of India, during the second half of

The fate of the principal governors-general of French India is suggestive. Was not the Crown of France ungrateful?

¹ Heeren, 296, 289. For an account of the decadence of this organization and its causes, as well as a brief statement of Law's schemes and their effects, cf. Raynal, II, 365-510.

² Rambaud, 442 et seq. For the other early French possessions in India, De Lanessan, 593 et seq.

³ Heeren, 296 (par. 42), 362.

⁴ Salomon Goubert (1638) and De Proms (1642), agents of the French Company of the Indies at Madagascar, had both taken possession of Bourbon, Rambaud, 353; Johnston, 262; Lucas, I, 146, note 2. The first colonists had gone out from France in 1665, and in 1683 a governor had been appointed by the king, Rambaud, 354. The date (1720) given by Heeren for the French occupation of this island is certainly too late; cf. "European States and Colonies," 204.

the eighteenth century, the people remained faithful, and, although vigorously assailed by the English on several occasions, Bourbon was one of the last strongholds of France to fall.¹ On September 21, 1809, a British fleet finally took it; but in 1815 it was restored.²

Mauritius, first visited by the Portuguese in 1505, was settled by the Dutch in 1598; the latter were, however, driven out in 1712 by a plague of rats.³ Three years afterward the French, disembarking on its shores, baptized it the Isle of France.⁴ Labourdonnais became governor-general about 1735,⁵ called thither people from Bourbon, as well as some blacks from Madagascar, fortified it, and in fact made it temporarily the centre of French influence in those regions.⁶ He succeeded in obtaining for himself the title of nabob, subjugated the native princes, and in 1746 led a victorious expedition against the English capital of India, Madras.⁷ This triumph, however, proved disastrous; for Labourdonnais, unluckily incurring the enmity of Dupleix, — then almost at the height of his power, — not only found himself suddenly supplanted in the governorship of the Isle of France, but upon his return home was also accused of treachery, and passed two years in the Bastille.⁸ After his administration the island which he had ruled enjoyed a record of tranquil prosperity similar to that of its neighbor, Bourbon.⁹ Of all the possessions of the earlier French colonial domain it was the last to be lost.¹⁰ On

¹ Cantu, VIII, 315.

² Payne, 143.

³ Rambaud, 35.

⁴ Heeren says the Isle of France was occupied by the French as early as 1690.

⁵ Malleeson, 46; Rambaud, 354.

⁶ For the successful administration of Labourdonnais, cf. Lucas, I, 147-148. He established sugar works as well as cotton and indigo manufactures.

⁷ Malleeson, 51-52; Bancroft, II, 302. Three years later this city was, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, restored to England. Carlyle gives the details of Labourdonnais' campaign against Madras with complete dates, "Frederick the Great," VII, 160 and notes.

⁸ For brief details of the capture of Madras and the subsequent quarrel between Dupleix and Labourdonnais, cf. Heeren, 288 (par. 27). More extensively stated by Guizot, V, 98 et seq.; Raynal, II, 424-435. This personal enmity contributed not a little to the downfall of French power in India.

⁹ Cantu, VIII, 315.

¹⁰ For present French feeling in Bourbon and Mauritius, cf. Rambaud, 355-356.

December 2, 1810, it yielded to force of arms; and of the extensive realms beyond the seas over which the flag of France had so proudly floated not a single vestige remained. Every French colony was in the hands of a foreign conqueror.¹

Of the territories owned by France in Africa little has been said; nor is any detailed account of her experiences in Senegal and Gorée necessary. A few words will therefore suffice. After the voyages of the undaunted mariners of Dieppe, in the fourteenth century, the French for a long time neglected these coasts.² In 1634 the Company of Senegal was chartered by Richelieu, and the town of St. Louis was soon thereafter located. Subsequently, in 1664, under Colbert, a new organization of the same name was licensed,³ to be followed by five other similar associations.⁴ In 1678 Gorée was ceded by England to France.⁵ Legitimate business never flourished. The slave traffic was the main source of revenue; in 1702, indeed, the French became party with Spain to the so-called *assiento*, or treaty, by which they contracted, in consideration of certain privileges, annually to furnish the Spanish-American colonies with forty-eight hundred negroes; but in 1713, as previously stated,⁶ England obliged France to surrender this profitable arrangement.⁷ In 1758 the English seized these African establishments, returned them in 1763, took them once more in 1779, restored them in 1783, recaptured them in 1804-1809, finally to give them back in 1815. Prior to the nineteenth century the activity of the French in Africa was

¹ Payne, 143.

² The French claim the honor of rediscovering, in 1364, the Gold Coast and building a fort at Elmira (1413), Rambaud, 15. Lucas, however, claims that the Portuguese were the pioneers on the west coast, "Historical Geography of English Colonies," III, 15; cf. Johnston, 122-123; *supra*, pp. 206 and notes, 223, 403.

³ The company had the sole right to trade in America between Canada and the Amazon, as well as in Africa between Cape Blanco and the Cape of Good Hope, Lucas, III, 100-101; it failed in 1673-1674.

⁴ Heeren, 160.

⁵ Gorée was the earliest Dutch possession in West Africa, but subsequently fell into the hands of the English and afterward into those of France.

⁶ *Supra*, p. 396, note 2.

⁷ For the slave trade in Senegal and the Soudan, cf. Rambaud, 255-260; Lucas, III, Ch. III, especially pp. 83-85.

practically limited to the trade in blacks. Their other enterprises on that continent were far more in the field of adventure and discovery than in lawful transactions. The chief credit due to them is for the intrepidity and daring exhibited in their explorations so early undertaken among the native tribes, to the knowledge of whose natural and material situation, customs, manners, religions, and mode of life they so substantially contributed.¹

The reasons why France was not able to retain her colonial power are so self-evident in reviewing the annals of history as not to require exemplification. In brief, the love of territorial conquest was everywhere the destruction of French rule. The aims of the representatives of French sovereignty were the exclusive control of the best regions of North America and the expulsion of England and Holland utterly and entirely from India and the Indian Ocean. Although in the western hemisphere France had at first an equal chance of success, under the conditions existing, when her labors were begun in the Orient, the hope to consummate the Herculean task there proposed was as preposterous as it was unessential. Had the nation been willing to hold a few places, seriously to colonize and strongly to fortify them, the nucleus would have been formed for future healthy and vigorous development; but such a modest and prudent, although more enduring, policy did not satisfy the visions of glorious achievement dreamed by France and her governors. However celebrated French maritime and military prowess was during the first decades of the eighteenth century, it was nevertheless incapable of defending from hostile attack all the vast possessions quite as widely scattered in the Orient as in America. The attenuated distribution of navy and army in distant quarters of the world, thus imposed, in connection with the necessity of constant vigilance at home, swiftly enfeebled national resources. The more extensive the colonies acquired, the more pressing the danger became. The brilliant designs of Colbert elaborated in the later half of the seventeenth century had been nullified by the events of the subse-

¹ For the early wars in West Africa, cf. Lucas, III, 104-110.

quent hundred years. In 1763 the greater part of the colonial domain of France was lost, and, in a still more decided degree, her authority; while involved, for the sake of its defence, in bitter hostilities with her leading rival for these honors, France herself was almost ruined. There is not any doubt that the sacrifice of her immense establishments beyond the seas exercised a potent effect upon domestic affairs, which culminated in the Revolution; while it is certain that the antagonism evoked by these disputes with England rendered that country the more eager, when the opportunity presented itself, to humble her old competitor beyond any possibility of revival and discord.¹

The one patent lesson to be drawn from the experience of France in this earlier period is, that a colonial system cannot be artificially created by the state; it must be a spontaneous manifestation of popular desire. Mere territorial aggrandizement does not imply strength. In peopling and cultivating remote lands the prime element is the participation of the masses; adventurous lives, glorious deeds, large capital, nominal control, and titular sovereignty over millions of savages or untutored aborigines are not the essential mainstays. Rapid conquests do not imply enduring power. Slower, more plodding, but more prudent and more assiduous, methods are required to insure success. The parent country must find its wealth and its sinews in the sturdy character of the thousands of hardy pioneers who, going forth to fix their homes in the newly opened regions, should draw their principal resources from the soil. The colonists must precede, the statesmen and the generals follow. The foundation must be well and deeply laid before the superstructure is erected.

France failed because of her endeavor to create complicated

¹Ramband gives four reasons for the inferiority of the French to the English in colonization: (1) the preponderance of the religious factor in all French enterprises; (2) the introduction of the feudal institutions into the New World; (3) the transfer into the colonies of the same system of administration as that at home; (4) want of inducements to the peasants to emigrate, "*La France Coloniale*," 253 et seq.; cf. generally, also, the works mentioned in bibliography.

mechanisms — the so-called companies — in which it was anticipated her citizens would find profitable employment, and under which they were expected to enlist; but they did not respond. The plans were well prepared, the brain was there; the forces of direction and execution existed; but the material upon which they were to work was lacking; explorers, mariners, captains, governors, administrators, and advocates of colonization — promoters were not wanting; nor were the fields of action deficient, for the government provided them in their immensity, in both America and India. The people of France, however, could not, or at least did not, second the schemes of their leaders. The circumstances of the ages and, above all, their own natural disposition restrained them from any general sympathy in the projects so ostentatiously and magnificently evolved for them. Therefore, although the territories of France grew in number and extent, they were possessions rather than colonies. Without the coöperation of its subjects the Crown found its colonial empire burdensome, a bubble of fortune, a phantom, a dream of glory, as unreal as it was unstable, which, when it vanished, left scarcely any traces of its former apparent splendor, but rather, indeed, precipitated the nation into a nightmare of despair.

CHAPTER XIII

GENERAL GROWTH OF FRENCH COLONIZATION IN LATER TIMES

By far the greater proportion of French acquisitions are of modern date; for the colonial history of France is sharply divided into two epochs, the one from the end of the sixteenth to the close of the eighteenth century, which has already been reviewed, the other from 1830 to the present. The balance sheet at the day of reckoning for the earlier period showed only insignificant returns, and even these were engulfed in the chasm opened by the Revolution. Of all the leading powers France suffered the most complete loss of national possessions. After the seizure of Mauritius by the English, in December, 1810, not a single outpost remained unconquered by the enemy. As in former ages the French people were in their foreign enterprises the most unlucky, so in the nineteenth century their success has not been more than mediocre; but very recently they have shown an ardor, energy, and resolution which promise better fortune for the future.

When Louis XVIII resumed the reins of government, he, by the grace of England, obtained the restoration of the colonies actually occupied just prior to the Revolution, except Tobago, St. Lucia, and Mauritius. The territories thus returned embraced the settlements in India, those on the west coast of Africa, and French Guiana in South America, as well as the Antilles (with some exceptions) and the island of Réunion. But all these places, constituting only a small portion of the French domain previous to 1763, were in a deplorable economic, commercial, industrial, and agricultural condition.

Although France did not immediately manifest any renewed activity in acquiring other dependencies, still the tendency of

the colonial movement since 1815 has been toward the ascendant, with an exceedingly variable, but constantly augmenting, degree of progress. For the sake of comparison, it may be well to consider a few statistical details. The colonies recovered in 1815 included approximately:—

LOCALITY	SQUARE MILES	INHABITANTS
Asia	197	179,000
Africa	1,034	95,000 ¹
America	16,000	225,000
Total	17,231	499,000

The first effort made by France to augment her colonial domain dates from 1830; in that year the reawakening began. The conquest of Algeria was then commenced, an undertaking which was not officially concluded until 1857. In the interval between 1830 and 1860, besides making this acquisition, France also occupied in Africa the Nossi-Bé district (1841), Mayotte (1843), and the Ivory Coast (1843); in America an extension of influence in Guiana was effected, and in Oceanica the Marquesas Islands (1841), as well as New Caledonia (1854), were appropriated. In 1860, then, the possessions of France were:—

LOCALITY	SQUARE MILES	INHABITANTS
Asia	197	221,507
Africa	185,650 ²	2,800,000 ³
America	48,011	300,000
Oceanica	8,000	50,000
Total	241,858	3,371,507

¹ Not including Senegal, where both the area and population under French suzerainty were very undetermined.

² Not including Senegal, for which there are not any absolute figures at that time.

³ The population directly under French rule was about 250,000.

Between 1860 and 1880 France added to her colonial empire in Africa by the increase of her prestige in the locality of Senegal (chiefly in 1865), and by the annexation of Obok and the Somali Coast (1864); and in Asia by the seizure of Cochin-China (1861) and of Cambodia (1862). In 1880 or thereabouts, as nearly as figures are available, the French realms comprised:—

LOCALITY	SQUARE MILES	INHABITANTS
Asia	69,147	3,333,500
Africa	624,624	3,702,482
America	48,011	391,084
Oceanica	8,585	93,831
Total	750,347	7,520,897

The growth of the power of France between 1880 and 1890 was immense; in Asia large portions of Tonquin and Annam were brought under her sway; in Africa her authority was extended over Tunis, partially over the island of Madagascar, and, in a considerable degree, over the Sahara Desert and Algerian-Sahara region, besides other districts on the West coast; while in Oceanica several unimportant islands were occupied. In the year 1890 statistics showed French colonies, protectorates, and dependencies as follows:—

LOCALITY	SQUARE MILES	INHABITANTS
Asia	201,000	18,000,000
Africa	2,128,814 ¹	16,800,000
America	48,043	372,805
Oceanica	9,135	72,300
Total	2,386,992	35,245,105

Since 1890 the chief addition which France has made to her list of possessions is Madagascar, which has been finally

¹ Without Madagascar.

incorporated in the colonial system. In Africa, likewise, some new acquisitions have been won, but the aggrandizement of the past decade has been principally achieved by the steady advancement of boundary lines where a foothold had already been gained. Both in Africa and Asia this gradual development has been pursued. The dependencies under the French flag now include:—

LOCALITY	SQUARE MILES	INHABITANTS
Asia	363,027	22,679,100
Africa	3,320,488	33,257,010
America	48,011	383,750
Oceanica	9,220	82,000
Total	3,740,746	56,401,860

These figures thoroughly indicate the area and population of the regions at present subject to French rule. The next table shows, in tabulated form, the situation at different epochs of the nineteenth century:—

MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH COLONIAL POWER

LOCALITY	AREA IN SQUARE MILES				
	1815-30	1860	1880	1890	1899
Asia . . .	197	197	69,147	201,000	363,027
Africa . .	1,034	185,650	624,624	2,128,814	3,320,488
America . .	16,000	48,011	48,011	48,043	48,011
Oceanica .		8,000	8,566	9,135	9,220
Total . .	17,231	241,858	750,347	2,386,992	3,740,746

POPULATION

Asia . . .	179,000	221,507	3,333,500	18,000,000	22,679,100
Africa . .	95,000	2,800,000	3,702,482	16,800,000	33,257,010
America . .	225,000	300,000	391,084	372,805	383,750
Oceanica .		50,000	98,831	72,300	82,000
Total . .	499,000	3,371,507	7,520,897	35,245,105	56,401,860

It is seen at a glance that the greatest increase in the colonial empire of France has occurred within the past twenty years; since 1880 the extent of her foreign establishments has multiplied fourfold and their population more than eightfold. These facts are significant. France now ranks second among the nations of the world in this sphere of activity; it is indeed a wonderful achievement to have attained this distinction and to have constituted such a wide domain of influence within seventy years, especially when the exhausted state of this people in 1815, together with the subsequent foreign wars and internal revolutions of the past century, are taken into consideration. It is well worth the labor to investigate how these results have been accomplished. With this end in view the thread of the narrative must be resumed. But, before entering upon the detailed history of the French colonies in recent times, it now seems convenient to cite the latest available statistics which indicate their respective conditions. The following tables¹ give the particulars of date of occupation, as well as present area, population, and trade:—

COLONY	YEAR OF ACQUISITION	AREA Sq. Miles	POPULATION
Asia :			
India	1679	197	279,100
Annam	1884	88,780	5,000,000
Cambodia	1862	40,530	1,500,000
Cochin-China	1861	23,160	2,400,000
Tonquin (with Laos)	1884-93	210,370	13,500,000
Total of Asia		363,027	22,679,100

¹ These tables are adapted from the "Statesman's Year Book" for 1900.

COLONY	YEAR OF ACQUISITION	AREA Sq. Miles	POPULATION
Africa :			
Algeria	1830	184,474	4,430,000
Algerian Sahara		123,500	50,000
Tunis	1881	50,840	1,500,000
Sahara Region		1,684,000	2,500,000
Senegal	1637	120,000	2,000,000
Soudan	1880	300,000	2,500,000
Ivory Coast, ¹ etc.	1843	100,000	2,500,000
Dahomey	1893	50,000	1,000,000
Congo and Gabun	1884	425,000	12,000,000
French Guinea	1843	48,000	1,000,000
Obok and Somali Coast	1864	5,000	22,000
Réunion	1649	970	173,200
Comoro Isles	1886	620	53,000
Mayotte	1843	140	11,640
Nossi-Bé	1841	130	9,500
Sainte Marie	1643	64	7,670
Madagascar	1896	227,750	3,500,000
Total of Africa		3,320,488	33,257,010
America :			
Guiana	1626	46,850	22,710
Guadeloupe and Dependencies	1634	688	167,100
Martinique	1635	380	187,690
St. Pierre and Miquelon	1635	93	6,250
Total of America		48,011	383,750
Oceanica :			
New Caledonia and Dependencies,	1854	7,700	53,000
Other French Establishments	1841-81	1,520	29,000
Total of Oceanica		9,220	82,000
Grand total		3,740,756	56,401,860

¹ France also claims as a sphere of influence under the Franco-German agreement of February, 1896, the region of Bagirmi, with an area approximating 65,650 square miles and a population of 1,000,000.

IMPORT TRADE OF PRINCIPAL FRENCH COLONIES

COLONY	YEAR	IMPORTS FROM FRANCE	IMPORTS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES	TOTAL IMPORTS
Algeria ¹	1898	\$ 45,107,080	\$ 12,904,861	\$ 58,011,941
Tunis ¹	1898	7,759,547	4,789,389	12,548,936
Senegal	1898	1,700,000	1,900,000	3,600,000
French Soudan . .	1898	864,000 ²	1,296,000 ²	2,160,000
French Congo . .	1898	254,873	713,974	968,847
French Guinea . .	1898	290,680	1,513,295	1,803,975
Dahomey and Dependencies . . .	1898	390,700	1,608,200	1,998,900
Ivory Coast . . .	1898	160,000 ²	800,000 ²	960,000
Madagascar (including Nossi-Bé and Diego Suarez) . .	1898	3,406,000	922,200	4,328,200
Réunion	1898	2,419,215	1,533,839	3,953,054
Mayotte and Comoro Isles	1898	45,389 ³	33,073 ³	78,462 ³
French India . . .	1898	720,000	55,542	775,542
Indo-China . . .	1898	8,883,157	11,605,712	20,488,869
St. Pierre and Miquelon . . .	1897	586,620 ²	604,380 ²	1,191,000
Martinique	1898	2,628,560	2,245,200	4,873,760
Guadeloupe . . .	1898	1,774,889	1,945,155	3,720,044
French Guiana . .	1897	1,266,800 ²	600,000 ²	1,866,800
New Caledonia . .	1898	1,005,385	945,176	1,950,561
French Oceanica . .	1898	140,620 ⁴	446,140	586,760
Approximate annual total		\$ 79,403,515	\$ 46,462,136	\$ 125,865,651

NOTE. — The figures in this and the next table are obtained by dividing the amounts in francs by five, which is sufficiently exact for the present purpose. Of the total imports 63 per cent came from France.

¹ Algeria and Tunis are not officially reckoned as "colonies."

² Approximately.

³ For ten months only.

⁴ From France and French colonies.

EXPORT TRADE OF PRINCIPAL FRENCH COLONIES

COLONY	YEAR	EXPORTS TO FRANCE	EXPORTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES	TOTAL EXPORTS
Algeria ¹	1898	\$44,890,259	\$3,529,741	\$48,420,000
Tunis ¹	1898	6,560,194	3,882,736	10,442,930
Senegal	1898	3,868,000	1,732,000	5,600,000
French Soudan	1898	600,000 ²	140,000 ²	740,000
French Congo	1898	297,577	843,110	1,140,687
French Guinea	1898	84,145	1,475,850	1,559,995
Dahomey and Dependencies	1898	435,580	1,072,160	1,507,740
Ivory Coast	1898	500,000 ²	500,000 ²	1,000,000
Madagascar (including Nossi-Bé and Diego Suarez)	1898	373,400	618,600	992,000
Réunion	1898	3,733,900 ⁴	71,671	3,805,571
Mayotte and Comoro Isles	1898	149,067 ²³	20,000 ²³	169,067 ²³
French India	1898	560,000	2,407,347	2,967,347
Indo-China	1898	5,839,757	19,270,906	25,110,663
St. Pierre and Miquelon	1897	3,552,667	1,776,333	5,329,000
Martinique	1898	4,077,446	391,516	4,468,962
Guadeloupe	1898	3,317,904	215,187	3,533,091
French Guiana	1897	1,332,000	100,000	1,432,000
New Caledonia	1898	699,553	647,791	1,347,344
French Oceanica	1898	20,235	498,760	518,995
Approximate annual total		\$80,891,684	\$39,193,708	\$120,085,392

NOTE. — Of the total exports 67 per cent were to France.

¹ See other notes on preceding page.

CHAPTER XIV

LATER FRENCH COLONIZATION IN THE OLDER DEPENDENCIES

THE former realms of France, recovered after the restoration of Louis XVIII, — to mention them more in detail than heretofore, — were: in America, Guiana, the islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and the latter's dependencies, as well as the two small isles of St. Pierre and Miquelon; in Africa, Senegal, Gorée, the islands of Bourbon and Ste. Marie de Madagascar; and in Asia (India), Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanaon, Chandernagore, and Mahé, together with their adjacent districts.

Throughout the turbulent Napoleonic epoch, all the colonies in America, as elsewhere, whosoever happened to be in possession, suffered most grievously. The attempt to free the slaves by parliamentary decree, in some places enforced and in others without effect, the loss of markets, the capture of their own territories, and the consequent transformation of their political institutions by foreign powers, precipitated ruin and despair.¹ Even after the reinauguration of French rule a considerable period was required to enable the dependencies partially to regain their bygone prosperity and to adjust themselves to the newly existing conditions. The situation in the Antilles and Guiana was pitiable. Two problems were, by the necessities of the times, urgent. Measures for the rehabilitation of industry and commerce and for the liberation of the negroes were in these regions preëminently the subjects of the day. Unfortunately, the French were unequal to the task, and neither one nor the other of the questions was solved until 1845. (These communities there-

¹ *Supra*, p. 401 et seq. and notes.

fore languished.) Upon reëntry into them the Crown revived the laws in force prior to 1789, which for the next thirty years formed the basis of colonial legislation. Some progress was made by the negotiation of reciprocity treaties, by the reform of the monetary system, and by regulations protecting real estate titles. In 1825 the mother country took upon herself the expenses incidental to the defence of the colonies against external enemies, and obliged them, on the other hand, to provide for the support of their own domestic administration.¹

Between 1830 and 1840 numerous statutes were passed by the home authorities for the purpose of ameliorating and improving the surroundings of the slaves, with a view to their ultimate, but slow, manumission. Efforts were redoubled to elevate their social and educational position; but the colonists vigorously opposed such enactments, and even their magistrates refused or neglected to apply the laws. In spite of these protests the cabinet, seconded by the best sentiment of the nation, proceeded to adopt final measures. By their obstinacy the planters unwittingly renounced the benefit of the intermediary steps taken for their own advantage, as well as goaded the parent state into more severe provisions. At first even in France the prevailing disposition was to devise some method by which the gradual enfranchisement of the blacks could be accomplished within ten to twenty-five years. Many such propositions were discussed. Hardly any one had anticipated immediate and abrupt action, but the unexpected occurred; the Revolution of 1848 hastened the issue. One of the most important proclamations of the provisional government was its emancipation decree.² An endeavor was made to modify its results by certain limitations relative to the care and future employment of the negroes; some economic and land projects were also voted as supplementary acts necessary to maintain the social equilibrium. Eventu-

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 220 et seq.; for a very brief account of the French West Indies, cf. Payne, 364 et seq.

² For the abolition of slavery in the French colonies, cf. Tourmagne, 346-365.

ally, about one year after the abolition of slavery, the planters were in part reimbursed for their losses to the amount of a hundred dollars per head for each freed person. The effects of these laws were varied, but not the less grievous, in the different colonies.¹

In Martinique the distress connected with this reform being only transient, prosperity was in time regained. In Guadeloupe and Guiana the blow was almost mortal. The sugar interest was naturally the most menaced. In 1850 the output of the cane-producing regions was only fifty per cent of the average quantity in earlier years. The exigencies of the situation nevertheless occasioned material improvements in the methods and implements employed in planting and manufacture, so that before another decade had passed the total of sugar exported was far in excess of what it had ever been. Such was the general outcome—beneficial in its entirety. Of the Antilles, Martinique flourished, as likewise, in the East, Réunion; but Guiana never recovered.²

The principal solicitude of the colonists after the freedom of the slaves was the requisite supply of labor. Not more than a quarter of the freedmen remained with their old masters, or even would engage on the plantations. The deficiency had to be filled elsewhere. With this end in view, immigration was fostered. The government sought relief for the colonists by attracting laborers from East India, China, and Africa.³ Special companies were organized for this purpose, made contracts in advance with these individuals, transported them, and then, upon their arrival, assigned their allotted time to private parties. The results of this practice were not fortunate; morally and socially many evils were introduced. When the planters found it possible to replace their former serfs they seemed pleased to do it. Not only were the latter unprotected, but they were exposed to direct competition. Although failure to screen the feeble, simple-

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 222 et seq.

² *Ibid.* 226 et seq.

³ For immigration of laborers into the French colonies, cf. De Lanessan, 786; especially for that of the coolies into Guiana, Norman, 196.

mindless creatures was a crime, the whites regarded their mistreatment merely as a sort of revenge. Many negroes were turned away from their old homes to wander in the woods and loaf in the cities, under which conditions not a few of them fell into a state approaching barbarism. A well-grounded hatred sprang up between the blacks and the immigrants; feuds, riots, and uprisings were of frequent occurrence.

The colonies again soon saw themselves suffering from an excess of laborers. An exaggerated immigration had taken place; but, more than all, the capacity of the newcomers was limited. Twenty imported Africans, Indians, or Chinamen did not accomplish one man's work; wages were low, so that a large number more or less did not seemingly matter, but in fact their pay was dear. The residence of these aliens was for the most part temporary. The agreement made with them included their return to their native land at the conclusion of their period of service. Transportation was expensive, and the proportion of them who died en route was considerable; then those leaving after the prescribed interval usually carried back to their distant homes almost the entire sum of their earnings, for in frugality and economy these foreigners excelled. Their departure thus left the colonies so much the poorer. The ignorance of these contract employees and their want of skill precluded any serious advancement in the science of cultivation; but in the branch of manufacture numerous modifications were made; in the division of labor progress was the greatest. Sugar growing and the processes of refining it became more and more distinct industries.¹

The most momentous transformation, only secondary in importance to the emancipation of the slaves, was the gradual dissolution of the so-called "Colonial Compact,"² which finally became extinct in 1861; by it the earlier systems of colonization are distinguished, and its absence indeed is, in a negative sense, the characteristic of the newer policy. How, by legis-

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 228 et seq.

² For a discussion of the "Colonial Compact," cf. Rambaud, "*Civilisation Française*," II, 254-255.

lation, France reserved to herself the sugar raised in the plantations, how within Canada in olden days her people had the exclusive right of sale of French wares, and how the colonists could ship their products only to the parent state, are facts already recited. In some degree this same rule applied to all colonial traffic. France alone had the privilege to buy from her dependencies and to sell to them.¹ Time and circumstances caused the first breach in this doctrine. As far back as 1763, after the loss of Canada, the theory was unavoidably relaxed; thenceforward, for a few articles of absolute need, the Antilles were allowed to continue to trade with this region—although a British possession—and with the other English settlements on American soil.²

In 1784 and 1826 a larger possibility for intercourse with foreign peoples was given by permission to purchase certain prime necessities elsewhere than in France. Thus little by little the colonial compact was being broken. In the one industry, however, which formed the essential wealth of the Antilles, the metropolis was loath to make concessions. The old restrictions would undoubtedly have been longer maintained in their vigor had not the peculiar circumstances of the nineteenth century's economic progress intervening thwarted every hope of prosperity—not less for France than for her colonies—without a decided change in attitude. Since 1828 the sugar problem has been the most persistently unsolvable question in French politics; as long ago as 1791 the same subject was attracting attention. The legislative branch of the government, beginning in that year to busy itself with the matter, has scarcely ever failed in activity concerning it. The West Indies, and indeed all tropical regions, not only French but British and others, have seen their fate depend on the action taken in respect to sugar by their European sovereign states; for nearly a century this topic has been as pressing to them as it has recently become to Europe itself.

¹ For a discussion of the harm worked by the restrictive colonial policy, cf. Norman, 236 et seq.; Smith, "Wealth of Nations," 465 et seq.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 234.

Under the influence of enormous import duties the cultivation of the beet was introduced by Napoleon into France. It was the opening of trouble.¹ The home production of sugar nevertheless remained unimportant until 1830, when it assumed prodigious proportions. Although this competition was paralyzing to the colonial staple, the ensuing struggle was not without its benefits. The reaction was felt in the Antilles; the planters awoke from their inertia, and prepared, by the adoption of modern appliances and methods, to place themselves on a more favorable basis for trade.

The French authorities devised various schemes to assure an equal market for both cane and beet products, always with varying success, now to the advantage of the one, then to that of the other. In the dilemma of impartiality legislation was thrown into chaos; its revision was almost as frequent as the seasons. The effort to retain the colonial monopoly and to protect the French farmers was heroic, but uncertainty was the curse. In the long run the colonies suffered; to what extent may be imagined, when it is stated that at one period, in 1860, not a single French vessel was in the ports of Guadeloupe. It should also be recalled that France had not merely promoted a domestic manufacture to their ruin, but had likewise, since 1850, admitted on the same terms, as their exports, the sugar of Cuba and Java. Finally, in 1861, the appeals to the government became too importunate to be resisted. Want of prosperity in the dependencies involved a drain on the national strength. Following the example of other countries, absolute freedom under any flag and with any people was decreed to all commerce. The colonial compact ceased to exist. Coupled with this emancipation of trade was the grant of the privilege to the respective communities to vote their own customs laws; but at the same time the obligation of self-defence was imposed upon them. The French establishments thus attained nearly complete liberty.²

The principal effect of these modified conditions was a ten-

¹ Merivale, 67; McCulloch, "Commercial Dictionary," 1195.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 235 et seq.

dency to multiply the number and kinds of products. Under the old system the fascination of sugar growing was irresistible; under the new policy coffee, cocoa, cotton, and indigo were equally, or still more profitable. Kitchen gardening even made progress, and the colonists saw finally removed the contingency of a scarcity of vegetables, such as they had often experienced in the past. From the economic standpoint the change was decidedly beneficial. Small landowners commenced to be more numerous. The Antilles began to be prosperous, not so much by reason of their output of one article, but rather because of the variety of their crops. A more general distribution of wealth accompanied the higher development of agriculture. Opportunity of trade with other countries speedily revived the languishing state of these islands; but, in spite of this marked improvement, the share of France in their commerce lessened.

Geographical location, the natural laws of supply and demand, as well as facilities of transportation, inevitably aided the intercourse of the French colonies with other nations more than with the metropolis. Notwithstanding the prevailing satisfaction, the planters felt severe distress, being for some years unable to obtain a price sufficient to cover their costs. These two circumstances—the loss of French trade and the decline of the sugar industry—induced, in 1884, a practical return to ancient doctrines. At the suggestion of Mr. Felix Faure—then Under-Secretary of the Colonies, afterward President of the French Republic—the local councils adopted a discriminating tariff in favor of French manufacturers, and France on the other hand voted an import bounty on colonial commodities.¹ Since this legislation little has occurred affecting the situation of the Antilles.²

Guadeloupe and Martinique each are represented in the French Parliament by one senator and two deputies. Guadeloupe itself, with an area of 583 square miles, has now a

¹ "Annual Cyclopædia" (1884), 804, 805.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 240; for later details, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" for recent years.

population of 170,000 people, and the dependent islands, with 105 square miles, count 24,000 inhabitants. The exports in 1898 amounted to \$3,533,090, of which \$3,317,904 was to France; the imports were valued at \$3,720,044, of which sum \$1,774,889 was in French goods. The local budget in 1899 was for \$1,339,852. Martinique, with an area of 381 square miles, has a total of 190,000 persons; its trade in 1898 was, exports \$4,468,962, of which \$4,077,446 was to France; imports \$4,873,760, of which \$2,628,560 was from France. The budget in 1899 reached \$1,309,160. Both these islands are still chiefly devoted to sugar growing.¹

Guiana, in this century the most unfortunate of all French colonies, claims, in some respects, special attention. Soon after the restoration of Louis XVIII a second attempt at forced colonization was made. Madam Jahomey, a nun, endeavored, in the colony of Mana, to demonstrate that the experience of De Choiseul, in Kourou, was not necessarily final. Great subsidies and much private charity united in the hope of assuring the success of her enterprise, but in vain, for after five years it was abandoned to its fate of decay.²

The continuance of a cumbersome and absurd land system, the abolition of slavery, and the deportation of criminals thither have combined to plunge French Guiana into despair and transform it almost into a desert. Fine forests for lumbering and beautiful meadows for pasturage abound, but, for want of proper official consideration, advantage has not yet been taken of them.³ The reputation of this whole district, climatically, morally, socially, and politically, was long ago lost and has never been regained. Local self-government scarcely exists.⁴ In the general administration of the colony the home authorities were, until 1879, absolute; they alone had the exclusive right to decree the amount and scale of tariff duties, as well as to collect and expend the public rev-

¹ For further statistics, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 577 et seq.

² Rambaud, 726; Norman, 196; Leroy-Beaulieu, 221.

³ Guiana is the least productive of the French colonies.

⁴ Rambaud, 727-730, 740, 741.

enue. Most of the governors of later times, chosen from the military or naval service, have had very brief terms of office; only two years, indeed, has been the average period of their sojourn. Stability has thus been entirely wanting, as every arriving chief magistrate has manifested a desire to revise or modify the scheme of taxation. Of recent years a colonial council has been inaugurated, and a township organization has been adopted.¹

Since 1853 Guiana has been the most celebrated as a penal station. In February of that year the privilege of deportation was offered to all convicts sentenced to hard labor; in 1854 their transportation to Guiana was rendered compulsory.² At first scarcely anything was done to ameliorate the condition of the malefactors, or to protect the society in whose midst they were placed. Although the law said that they should be kept apart from the other residents, as a matter of fact they enjoyed, in most cases, complete liberty. The effect on the community may be easily imagined. After 1860 efforts were made, not only more fully to seclude the criminals, but at the same time to elevate their moral and social surroundings. A certain portion of this region was then set apart for their occupation, while serious measures were undertaken to make them industrious, to give them homes, and to educate them. Finally, in 1864, French philanthropists protested against the inhumanity of sending even felons to these marshy, pestilential places, where death was sure to follow soon after their arrival. Guiana has thenceforth been reserved for negro and Arab miscreants — now numbering forty-five hundred — from other colonies, and the whites have been shipped to the more healthy island of New Caledonia.³

The latest event in the history of Guiana was the arbitration

¹ Leroy-Beaulieu, 519 et seq.

² For a discussion of the French system of penal deportation, cf. De Lanesan, 857-874. Prior to 1864 Guiana was the only penal colony of France; by the law of 1863 New Caledonia likewise became such an establishment.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 524 et seq.; Payne, 365. The policy was slightly changed by the law of 1884; cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1884), 343. For New Caledonia, cf. *post*, p. 456.

of the boundary line between the Dutch and the French possessions; the umpire, the Emperor of Russia, decided in favor of the former. There is still an open dispute with Brazil as to the demarcation of its frontier.¹ Industry and trade are at a very low ebb. Gold mining, pursued on a limited scale, is the only remunerative labor; the quantity exported in 1899 was 81,715 ounces. The area is 46,850 square miles; the population does not exceed 30,000, of whom the free whites number not more than 1000. In 1898 the local budget was for \$605,550; the home government spent \$1,379,812 additional, of which \$1,090,110 was for the penal settlement. The imports in 1897 amounted to \$1,866,800; the exports to \$1,432,000; one deputy is sent to the French Parliament.²

Of St. Pierre and Miquelon, those little islands of the North, the sole remnants of the earlier realms of France in North America, mere mention may be made.³ Their area is 93 square miles, and they are peopled by 6350 individuals. The value of the catch of cod, their single avocation, reaches \$2,500,000 to \$3,000,000 in value per annum. In 1899 their local budget was for \$100,000; the expenditures of France \$56,500; the imports in 1897 were \$1,191,000; the exports \$5,329,000.⁴

The island of Réunion, — formerly known as the Isle of Bourbon, — lying in the Indian Ocean, has, by reason of the affinity of its cultures and inhabitants, experienced during the century crises very similar to those occurring in the Antilles. The abolition of slavery naturally disturbed the sugar business; but, more fortunate than other colonies producing this staple, Réunion, by its situation, was soon able to replace the negroes by emigrants from India.⁵ The planters, also show-

¹ For the boundary question between French Guiana and Brazil, cf. Rambaud, 734-736.

² Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 577 et seq.

³ They are nevertheless of immense importance to the French, De Lanessan, 667, 678; especially for the fisheries, cf. Rambaud, 766-771.

⁴ Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 578, also "Annual Cyclopædia" (1899).

⁵ By the convention of 1860 England agreed to allow as many East India-

ing a most laudable disposition for progress, made large purchases of new and improved implements. Radical reforms in cultivation soon revived the industry, and the island was within a few years more productive than ever. Under such favorable influences even the price of land materially advanced. In Réunion, nevertheless, like in the West Indies, the influx of the coolies from India and China, coming under contract only for temporary residence, had evil social and moral effects. In this foreign element crimes were frequent, while many corrupt practices were thus introduced into the character of the colonists. The old slaves were woefully neglected. The ultimate excess in the numbers of the working class also caused a reaction. Development in the methods of agriculture and manufacture ceased. Labor became cheaper than machinery, with the attending distress to individual laborers.¹ Réunion, however, maintained the lead among French sugar-growing colonies. In all the fluctuations of this article, and in the varied legislation of the century relative to it, this island has been deeply concerned. The gradual increase in the quantity of the beet output has been the most serious menace to its prosperity. In 1861, upon the rupture of the colonial compact, Réunion suffered the vicissitudes elsewhere prevailing. The consequences were vital. While the trade with other nations indicated only a slight loss, that with France at once declined to the extent of fifty per cent. Since the adoption of the differential tariff there has been some improvement in the transactions with the parent state.² Réunion has an area of 970 square miles and a population now approximating 173,000 people. The imports in 1898 amounted to \$3,953,053, and the exports to \$3,805,571. With the desire to foster the commerce of this colony, the government has lately expended considerable sums in harbor and railway construction.³ Three other small islands in the men as were necessary to emigrate to Réunion, Rambaud, 359, 360; *supra*, p. 426 and note 3.

¹ For agriculture in Réunion, cf. De Lanessan, 353.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 233, 234, 246.

³ Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 568.

Indian Ocean belong to France: Mayotte, 140 square miles, 11,640 inhabitants; Nossi-Bé, 130 square miles, 9500 individuals; and Ste. Marie, 64 square miles, 7670 people; as well as the Comoro group, 620 square miles, 53,000 inhabitants.¹ Madagascar, to which further consideration will subsequently be given, is the most recent French acquisition.

The difference between French and English colonization is aptly illustrated by the respective situations of Réunion and Mauritius, the latter, during this century, an English possession. While in Réunion prosperity has always been doubtful and progress inappreciable, on the neighboring island, under British rule, where the natural conditions are nearly the same, commerce and trade have quadrupled within the past hundred years.

The questions of the day in the Antilles, Réunion, and the other islands, are practically identical. Their welfare depends upon the degree of success attained by the plantation system. Sugar is the great staple. Unless its future can be assured and some constancy be given to the demand, all must necessarily languish. The main problem of the adjustment of social and political relations between races of different color is extremely serious. The solution the most conducive to internal tranquillity has been the voluntary withdrawal of the white population from any participation in civil affairs; but is this attitude to be perpetual? And will it inure to eventual stability? Is it possible for white men to live and advancement to be achieved in localities where the blacks predominate in number, but are deficient in education? Such are the pressing topics of policy and fact in these colonies.

The only other remaining vestige of the earlier colonial empire of France consists of her few surviving establishments in India, — Pondicherry, Yanaon, Karikal, Mahé, and Chandernagore, — with their immediate suburbs, embracing 197 square miles of territory and 287,000 inhabitants, of whom

¹ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900); also for further statistical tables, *supra*, Ch. XIII.

about 1000 are Europeans.¹ The imports in 1898 amounted to \$775,542, and the exports to \$2,967,347. The former are mostly French products, while about one-sixth of the latter are shipped to France. The local budget in 1899 approximated \$231,840.² Prior to 1870 the administrative régime of these dependencies was very defective and gave occasion to well-grounded complaints on the part of their people. Representative government in domestic matters was entirely lacking; but since that date general and local councils have been instituted. Public works, which were once absolutely neglected, are now receiving due attention. One senator and one deputy constitute the representation of India in the French Parliament.³

¹ For concise statements about these possessions of France, cf. Rambaud, 441-480.

² For further statistics see tables in Ch. XIII; "Statesman's Year Book," and "Annual Cyclopædia" (1899), 294, 861.

³ Leroy-Beaulieu, 553, to whom the author takes this opportunity to acknowledge his indebtedness for many details stated in the present chapter. "In regard to their forms of government," Alleyne Ireland says, "the French tropical colonies may be divided into two classes—those in which government is carried out to some extent by the passage of laws, and those in which all matters are settled by the simple decree of the governor. To the first class belong Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Réunion; to the second class all the other French tropical colonies. In the first class of colonies the principal subjects to which the passage of laws is applicable, are the exercise of political rights, the regulation of contract matters relating to wills, legacies, and successions, the institution of juries, criminal procedure, recruiting for naval and military forces, the method of electing mayors, municipal deputies, and councillors, and the organization of the local councils general. In regard to all other matters of importance all the French tropical colonies are on the same basis of legislation, that is, government by decrees issued by the governor or the minister of the colonies. The governor of a French colony has very wide powers. . . . In his administrative capacity, he has absolute authority to regulate nearly all the internal affairs of his colony, and he is above the law. . . . The governor is to some extent guided by the advice of two bodies, the privy council, which is a nominated body consisting of official and unofficial members, and the general council, which is made up of councillors elected by the votes of all male persons over twenty-five years of age who have resided for more than one year in the colony."—"Tropical Colonization," 70-72. This statement practically applies to all French colonies except Algeria and Tunis. The former is considered a part of France, the latter is under the direction of the department of foreign affairs.

CHAPTER XV

EXTENSION OF FRENCH COLONIZATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

AMONG the present territories of France on the African continent, Senegal is, strictly speaking, the oldest. Although Frenchmen took formal possession of these regions in 1637, they have only in very recent years endeavored to extend their sphere of influence.¹ At the end of the eighteenth century the commercial relations with France were already quite important, but the chief traffic of the whole district was then the slave trade. Under the Restoration strenuous efforts were made to found here, as in Guiana, an agricultural settlement; for similar reasons failure ensued. Want of foresight, the unpreparedness of the soil, and the insalubrity of the climate effectually prevented permanent results. After the first unsuccessful attempt, Senegal was again disregarded until 1887-1888.² In 1860 the total population of this colony proper was 115,000; in 1876, 195,190; in 1887, 135,000; and at this time, including the entire domain directly under French protection, it is about 1,180,000 people. Of this number not more than 2000 individuals are Europeans. St. Louis, the principal town, has 20,000 residents.

The uppermost thought in the colonial policy of the French in Africa has been directed to the extension of their activity in Senegal, the Congo, and adjoining localities, until, on the north, their occupation should reach to the frontiers of Algeria, while on the west it should comprise all the Upper Niger.³

¹ For a discussion of the early French policy, cf. Lucas, III, 102.

² "Annual Cyclopædia" (1887), 305.

³ *Ibid.* (1890), 335, 336; for statistics, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 569 et seq.

Under the impulse of British competition they have put forth their best energies.¹ Thus inspired, they have built up a vast realm in the heart of Africa, with countless millions of inhabitants over which they at least claim to have the right to exercise sovereign power. Unfortunately, climatic conditions are a decided hindrance to the accomplishment of any real, genuine colonization. White men will always be few in these unhealthy latitudes, where the natives still slumber in barbarism, varying only in degree. Education and justice are the two potent instruments by means of which France is striving to lift up the aborigines out of intellectual darkness, and to strengthen her own authority. The task is long and arduous. Perhaps after its reasonable measure of achievement and the inauguration of sanitary improvements, colonists may be drawn thither to gather the inexhaustible riches which there abound.²

As the situation now is, besides Algeria and Tunis, France administers in Africa the regions of Senegal, with an area of 80,000 square miles and a population estimated at 1,180,000; the western Soudan (area 120,000 square miles, with a population of 2,000,000); the French Soudan (area 300,000 square miles, population 2,500,000);³ French Guinea (area 48,000 square miles, population 1,000,000); the French Congo (area 425,000 square miles, population 12,000,000 to 15,000,000); the Sahara region (area 2,000,000 square miles, population 2,500,000); the Ivory Coast (area 100,000 square miles, population 2,500,000); Dahomey (area 50,000 square miles, population 1,000,000); Bagirmi (area 65,650 square miles, popula-

¹ Under date of March 30, 1892, Lord Salisbury wrote to the British ambassador at Paris: "The colonial policy of Great Britain and France in West Africa has been widely different. France from her basis on the Senegal coast has pursued steadily the aim of establishing herself on the Upper Niger and its affluents. This object she attained by a large and constant expenditure and by a succession of military expeditions. . . . Great Britain, on the other hand, has adopted the policy of advance by commercial enterprise."—"Parliamentary Papers," Ch. 6701, 92.

² Leroy-Beaulieu, 533 et seq.; for French progress in Africa, cf. Lucas, III, 149 et seq.; Johnston, 143-145.

³ For the recent plan for the government of the Soudan, cf. summary in the *Nation* of January 25, 1900.

tion 1,000,000); Obok and the Somali coast (area 5000 square miles, population 22,000).¹ The trade of Senegal and its dependencies annually amounts, for imports, to about \$3,600,000, and for exports \$5,600,000; in the former instance France controls about one-half, and in the latter two-thirds, of the total. The local budget for 1899 was nearly \$875,000; the expenditure of France in 1900, \$1,137,241.²

Concerning the French Congo there is little special to write. This district, along the coasts of which French adventurers sailed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, was not finally and authoritatively taken under the guardianship of France until 1884. Since then its utility as a colonial station has materially increased; according to the most recent available statistics, its annual commerce approximates \$2,107,534 in value, of which \$966,847 is for imports and \$1,140,687 for exports. Of the former about one-fourth, of the latter slightly more than one-third, is in the hands of the metropolis.³

Of the other West African dominions the Ivory Coast was acquired in 1842;⁴ its trade is yearly, imports \$960,000, exports only a trifle more; in the former the share of France is one-sixth, in the latter one-half. The western Soudan was annexed in 1880;⁵ Dahomey was subjected to French rule in 1893;⁶ its imports are stated annually to be worth \$2,000,000, and its exports \$1,500,000; in the former France controls about one-fifth, in the latter a little less than one-third. Of French Guinea the imports are \$1,800,000, the exports \$1,500,000; they are for the greater part with countries other than France.

¹ For brief account and statistical data of each of these regions, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 569 et seq.; at the best, however, all estimates of population are mere approximations. In this connection it should also be observed that, with the exception of Tunis, there is not a French possession which is self-supporting, Johnston, 145; "Annual Cyclopaedia" (1899), 295 et seq.

² Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 570.

³ *Ibid.* More particularly for the French Congo, Johnston, 219; Rambaud, 316 et seq.

⁴ Rambaud, 286 et seq.

⁵ For French progress in the Soudan, cf. Rambaud, 208 et seq.; for the Fashoda affair, cf. "Annual Register" (1893), 33, 159-171.

⁶ For details concerning Dahomey, cf. Lucas, III, 150; Rambaud, 298-306.

Bagirmi was occupied first in 1895; Obok¹ and the Somali coast have been held since 1864.²

These territories in their characteristic features have a general resemblance. All are in the tropics, burdened with a more or less unhealthy climate, inhabited by rude races in a savage or barbarous state, enjoying great natural resources and vast possibilities of wealth, when only the existing obstacles shall have been overcome so that white men may, with reasonable safety, reside in them. Public works are still to be constructed and immense sums expended by the government or by authorized organizations, before these districts can be considered habitable. They are now merely strategic outposts; the commerce transacted is accomplished under the protection of armed forces; while constant warfare and frequent uprisings are factors with which France must still contend for long years.³ In many respects the actual situation in Western Africa recalls the attitude of the French in America during the seventeenth century. The influence of wild, uncivilized regions has always exerted a potent sway over this people. The spirit of exploration, adventure, and military prowess has already won immense realms for the French flag; but, as vividly portrayed by history, the prudence, assiduity, perseverance, and judgment have usually been lacking to maintain the position so brilliantly gained.⁴ The problem to be solved is whether the French of to-day, by the application of advanced methods to trade and colonial policy, will be more fortunate than their forefathers in the achievement of permanent and enduring success in the treatment and defence of their foreign possessions. For the sake of the nation which is so grandly making this second supreme effort to colonize and civilize such extensive domains, it is to be hoped that the fates may evince a more kindly disposition in the future than

¹ For Obok, cf. De Lanessan, 312-319; Norman, 256 et seq.

² For statistics, cf. generally "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 569-572.

³ For some account of the wealth of these French territories and a description of their military form of government, cf. De Lanessan, 322, 326, 329, 330; Rambaud, 260, 268, 279.

⁴ *Supra*, Ch. X.

in the past. If the evident plans of the French are consummated, they will, in time, own the northwestern quarter of Africa.¹

This diversion on the western coast immediately suggests Madagascar, which, as a field for French enterprise, is not so very different from the localities just described. Postponing, then, for a few moments any mention of the most important colony of France, — Algeria, — attention is now to be briefly directed to that recently acquired island. Madagascar has the unique distinction of being reckoned among the first colonial stations of France, and yet being only of late years conquered. It is at once recollected how Richelieu, in 1648, authorized the establishment of a settlement, and how, in 1686, Madagascar was formally annexed to the Crown.² Want of perseverance and instability of character caused the French of those early days to abandon the fatal struggle with climate and savages. The greater charms of East India so enchanted them that they went thither to found their ephemeral empire. After the beautiful, but theoretical, projects of Colbert had ended in ruin, the island was seemingly forever deserted as a worthless and inhospitable land. Nor, strangely, did the English approach it with any serious designs until 1810, when a part of its shores fell into their hands. Although eight years subsequently, in consideration of the abolition of the slave traffic by King Radama,³ the British withdrew their claims of sovereignty, still, since then, until very recent times, not only the English, but even Americans, have had a larger share than the French in this trade. France, nevertheless, always pretended to the titular rights of a patron state without ever making any vigorous effort to enforce them. French diplomatists, for several generations, viewed the island as an objective point of national policy,

¹ Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, 546 et seq.; for the problems confronting France in the Soudan, cf. Rambaud, 281-283.

² *Supra*, pp. 404, 405.

³ For some account of this ruler, cf. Rambaud, 378; subsequently, in 1829, an expedition was made against Queen Ranavalona; cf. Johnston, 268; Rambaud, 380.

whenever the proper opportunity should occur, or in the event that any other people should try to seize it. In 1846 Louis Philippe, thinking the hour had come, was preparing for an offensive campaign, when some unexpected turn in domestic affairs deterred him.¹

Thenceforward, until 1883, France took little, if any, action in Madagascar further than ever stoutly maintaining the equity of her historical prerogatives. At this last-named date, to redress some wrongs done to French settlers and a friendly tribe called the Sakalavas, the cabinet sent a naval force against the Hovas, who constituted the ruling race. After two years' hostilities, peace was restored at the close of 1885 on a compromise basis. The Hovas paid France \$2,000,000 as an indemnity, surrendered the northern part of the island, known as Diego Suarez, for a French colony, and agreed to receive at their own court at Antananarivo a French resident as adviser of the nation.² In spite of this arrangement, the friction with the Hovas tended to increase; in all trade matters Englishmen and Americans were openly or surreptitiously favored. If Frenchmen secured privileges, the prevailing prejudice was such that they could not find the necessary workmen. One of the *causes célèbres* growing out of these strained relations was the concession by the Malagasy government of 225 square miles of land and one-half the rubber traffic to the former United States consul, John L. Waller.³ Then boundary disputes between the French and the Hovas relative to the district granted in 1885 broke out. Finally, in September, 1894, a special commissioner was despatched from Paris to Antananarivo with a proposition involving complete submission and the acceptance of an absolute protectorate. These

¹ As a protest against the expulsion of foreign traders the English and French had in 1845 made a joint bombardment of Tamatave and an unsuccessful attack by land, Johnston, 269; Rambaud, 380; for a brief history of Madagascar, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1883), 506, 507.

² For this war and the events preceding it, cf. Johnston, 269-275; Rambaud, 384-397; Leroy-Beaulieu, 450 et seq.; Ricard, "L'Expansion Coloniale," 99-159; also "L'Année Historique"; "Annual Cyclopædia" (1883), 507; (1884), 458-461; for the treaty of peace, *ibid.* (1885), 565; (1886), 516-518; (1897), 452.

³ "Annual Cyclopædia" (1894), 449, 450.

terms being rejected by the Hovas, France declared war in the following November. Her troops arrived in Madagascar in April and, after an unbroken series of victories, entered the capital on September 30, 1895. Thus terminated the thirty-second campaign which the French had fought in that island since 1645, the year of their first occupation. The treaty promptly signed after the capture of Antananarivo provided a strict protectorate, the exile of the prime minister, who was also the husband of the queen, and deprived the Hova authorities of all powers, both general and local, recognizing in every respect French supremacy.¹ In August, 1896, the formal annexation of the territory to France was proclaimed; in February, 1897, the queen was deposed and soon thereafter deported to the island of Réunion.² After a protracted strife of two hundred and fifty years the French now seem firmly fixed in Madagascar.

The area of the island is 228,500 square miles; the population is between 3,500,000 and 5,000,000. Prior to the last war the entire number of whites did not exceed 500. In 1898 the imports were approximately valued at \$4,328,200, and the exports at \$992,000,* the share of France in the former being more than three-fourths, in the latter about one-third. In 1900 France is expending about \$5,000,000 for administrative purposes, while in 1899 the revenue amounted to \$2,227,200, including \$360,000 as a subvention from the home government. To judge from analogy, the French will in due course raise Madagascar to the rank of their most important and prosperous establishments, thus bringing to fruition one of their most ardent and longest cherished dreams.⁴

It is now time to consider that colony wherein France has achieved her greatest success in policy and administration, and

¹ For the final conquest of Madagascar, cf. Johnston, 276-277; "Annual Cyclopædia" (1895), 432-434.

² "Annual Cyclopædia" (1896), 442, 443; (1897), 494; (1898), 414.

³ Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 562-566.

⁴ For the value of Madagascar to France, cf. Ricaud, 160 et seq.; De Lanesan, 136-149.

in which her fondest hopes are centred. Algeria is unqualifiedly an acquisition by conquest. Not the less it marks the opening of the epoch of modern French colonization, inasmuch as its territory was the first field of national endeavor — after the restoration of the Bourbons — for an extension of the colonial realm.¹

The period of Turkish preponderance in the regions of Algeria runs back to the days of the famous Aroudj or Barbarossa.² In the fifteenth century, this adventurer, coming from the island of Mitylene, set up the standard of the crescent at Algiers, which thenceforth became the headquarters of piracy and corsair ships. In 1659 the Turkish pasha was, after a revolution, bereft of power, and in 1710 the representative of the Sultan was formally banished; from the latter date the Dey of Algiers exercised absolute control not only in fact but in name. Little by little the Algerines, by their reckless daring and their disregard of the accepted laws of warfare, built up such a reign of terror in Northern Africa and on the Mediterranean as to have become a menace to the legitimate trade of civilized nations; to these unprincipled marauders all peoples were yielding tribute. Even Charles V having failed to subdue them, Spain was ultimately forced to surrender most of its strongholds on their coast.³ France, about 1635, began to undertake disciplinary measures; the first efforts made under Louis XIII were without results, but Louis XIV, at intervals during twenty-five years, sent against Algiers several expeditions which caused the city great damage. After the Treaty of 1689 was signed comparative peace between the two countries prevailed until

¹ Paul Leroy-Beaulieu has written a special work entitled "*L'Algérie et la Tunisie*." In his "*Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes*," he devotes 135 pages to the problems connected with Algerian administration. The study of all details concerning French colonies on the north coast of Africa should be of peculiar value to those interested in the development and government of tropical dependencies.

² For some account of this pirate, cf. Rambaud, 49; Réclus, II, 21-22; Roy, "*Histoire de l'Algérie*," 103-111.

³ For the Spanish expeditions against Algiers, cf. Prescott, "*Charles Fifth*," I, 411; II, 229-241; Roy, 109-135.

1830. In 1694 the Algerines deeded certain portions of their shore-line to France and granted other concessions.¹

The series of events leading to the final occupation of Algeria commenced in 1793. At that time the French government, in need of grain for the support of its army, was obliged to turn to the Algerines for relief. By permission of the Dey, two prominent Jewish merchants opened an account with France. The transactions, covering a considerable term, were manifestly large and were subject to an arrangement for credit; in the end there was a material difference as to the amount due. For twenty years or more attempts were made to reach a settlement. Finally, in 1819, an agreement was concluded by which France promised to give \$1,400,000 in full of all indebtedness, it being provided that the right was reserved to offset any claims outstanding against Algiers. Remittances were to be forwarded, beginning from 1820, in twelve annual instalments.² Everything seemed amicably closed, when some citizens of Marseilles presented a counter demand for \$500,000. The French authorities, paying the balance of \$900,000 to the Algerines, held the sum said to be owing their own parties in escrow, pending judicial decision.³

The Dey of Algiers naturally resented this proceeding as a wilful avoidance of the signed compromise. In April, 1827, at an official reception of the diplomatic corps, he and the French consul-general became involved in an altercation, when hot words were passed, and, finally, he slapped the latter in the face. There is little doubt but that the French had for years been looking toward Algeria as a fine locality for the extension of their domains. In the matter of the negotiations concerning the adjustment of the debt, they certainly had not been without fault. This gross outrage to their representative now afforded a plausible excuse for action. Friendly relations being at once suspended, a fleet was soon blockading Algiers. For three years the situation so continued.⁴

¹ For the early relations between Algiers and France, Roy, 139-152.

² *Ibid.* 153-162.

³ *Ibid.* 162-163.

⁴ Rambaud, 50 et seq.; Réclus, II, 25; E. Hamel, "Histoire de la Restauration," II, 672, 695-698, 704-706; Roy, 163-203.

The Dey was obstinate, declared war on the French, and defied them to injure him; they, vexed by the delay, resolved to act resolutely. On June 14, 1830, a well-organized army disembarked at Sidi Ferruch on the African coast; on July 5 Algiers capitulated; the Dey was taken prisoner, and soon afterward exiled. This triumph, however, was not conclusive nor comprehensive. The other governors in the different provinces, as well as the chiefs of the various tribes, ambitious to succeed the fallen potentate, refused to yield submission. France found herself drawn into protracted hostilities to assert and obtain the recognition of her sovereignty. Campaign followed campaign, expedition after expedition, during a period of twenty-seven years, until all the pretenders had been vanquished; ¹ before 1857 Algeria was not effectually pacified. ² Subsequently, in 1871 and again in 1881, serious insurrections occurred. ³

The extent of territory over which France at last imposed her authority measures about 620 miles in length from east to west, along the Mediterranean, and stretches some 250 miles or more inland. The area of Algeria is 184,474 square miles, while the Algerian Sahara to the southward, which undoubtedly also in due course will be brought entirely under control, includes 125,000 square miles. The population of Algeria itself is at present 4,430,000, and of the Sahara 50,000 people. Of the total 318,000 are French. ⁴ The subject races comprise the Kabyles, inhabiting the mountains of the coast regions; the Arabs, the earlier conquerors of the country; the Moors, meaning the Arabs residing in cities, the Turks, and the Jews. Over this heterogeneous mass the French have finally established their supremacy. The Kabyles were the last to be subdued. Prior to 1857 they had never abjured their independence; and since that date they have constantly been a menace to peace and tranquillity. ⁵ Of the details of the mili-

¹ For Abd-el-Kader, cf. Rambaud, 52-54; Flathé, 342 et seq. (Oncken, IV, 2); Guizot, "History of France," VIII, 357-359.

² For this period of warfare, Roy, 234-348.

³ Rambaud, 55-56.

⁴ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 556 et seq.

⁵ For some account of the Kabyles, cf. De Lanessan, 19 et seq.; Rambaud, 71.

tary operations, of the numerous conflicts and stout sieges forming the record of the conquest of Algeria, it is not the purpose here to speak. Suffice it to know that the French were seeking some opportunity for the rehabilitation of their bygone colonial grandeur. Domestic conditions required a field for the display of military prowess, exterior events favored it, and the government availed itself of the propitious conjunction of circumstances.¹

Algeria not only became French by force of arms, but even yet is being more and more modernized and civilized by the absorption of ideas, education, and customs common to the paramount state. Through the gradual, slow-working, but not the less effective, process of fusion, this colony is being strongly welded into the body politic and social of France. It is in this phase of the transformation of the inhabitants from pirates and freebooters into a law-abiding community, that the most interest is felt. How has the task been accomplished? At the time of its occupation the country presented several peculiarities in respect to the possibility of colonization. The method of its acquisition, as well as the existence of a people enjoying a form of civilization, an organized mode of life, a highly developed religion, a system of agriculture, and a theory of landed property, were facts considered as constituting obstacles to the admission of a foreign class assuming to itself the absolute mastery and dictating its decrees.² The French have overcome all these hindrances by a long series of persistent, unremitting efforts.

In the earlier years of the invasion, until 1860, the military power was supreme.³ This rule was marked by incredible severity toward the natives, and by unprecedented cruelty in the warfare waged against the unsubjugated tribes; from 1860 to 1871 was a period of transition, during which

¹ For a French view of the conquest of Algeria contemporaneous in date with this first occupation, cf. De Sismondi, "Pol. Econ." II, 141 et seq.

² For some account of Algeria and its people at the time of the conquest, Roy, 204-233.

³ For a criticism of the early military policy of the French, cf. De Lanessan, 28 et seq.

civil government was introduced in many pacified districts while the latter date signalizes an entire change of régime on the part of France.¹ Upon that occasion a regular administration was inaugurated throughout Algeria, and the military jurisdiction was subsequently limited to the Sahara regions. The policy since then has been little by little to incorporate this whole territory, so far as feasible, into the republic. The French do not any longer regard it as a colony, but rather as an integral portion of the nation.² Algeria is now divided into three departments, each one of which is represented in the French Parliament at Paris by one senator and two deputies; for executive purposes a governor-general lives at Algiers.³

As in other similar French enterprises, immigration was at first placed under official direction; not only were the qualifications exacted of colonists, such as materially to restrict their number, but the procedure adopted was chiefly aimed against voluntary settlers. In 1855 the European residents in Algeria are said not to have exceeded 150,000; thenceforth they increased more rapidly, for in 1865 they were estimated at 235,000. After the Franco-German conflict many Alsations removed thither,⁴ and now the white population of this dependency does not fall far short of 600,000. The Spanish compose the second most important factor. As sanitation progresses throughout the country the proportion of foreigners is destined to augment. In former years the excessive rate of mortality was a serious drawback to extended colonization; but as the new arrivals are becoming better acclimated, and public works are being constructed, this danger is inevitably minimized. For success a large European contingent is not absolutely essential. The French have always evinced the ability to fuse aboriginal races into their midst; in this instance it is the same story. If the Kabyles and

¹ Rambaud, 84-87; De Lanessan, 43-44.

² "Annual Cyclopædia" (1891), 313; (1893), 328.

³ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 556.

⁴ De Lanessan, 43-46; Johnston, 49.

Arabs can be brought, as already in a certain degree accomplished, into a peaceful, tranquil state, taught the customs and habits of life in civilized communities, and instructed in the necessity and reward of systematic labor, then a very small body of whites will suffice for the tasks of organization, supervision, and management. Such are the ultimate conditions which France wishes to see prevail. The happy mean of commercial and economic prosperity will be attained by the skillful amalgamation of the European and indigenous elements.¹

One of the greatest difficulties to be solved by the French government, after its occupation of Algeria, was the land question. The only parcels of the soil strictly at its disposal were the confiscated estates of the exiled Dey. All other property, belonging to the tribes, was more or less under cultivation. Still, on the other hand, individual ownership did not exist; hence acquisition by purchase was well-nigh impossible. An explanation of the solution of this problem would be tedious and impracticable; a method at once equitable to the natives and advantageous to the French has nevertheless been found.² The significance of the result is evidenced by the statement that the colonists engaged in agricultural pursuits count more than 200,000, not to mention the 3,400,000 Algerians likewise employed.

The speedy development of Algeria may be judged from the following figures: In the year after the conquest the total value of foreign commerce was \$1,600,000; in 1850, \$2,600,000; in 1860, \$31,400,000; in 1870, \$60,000,000; in 1880, \$78,400,000; in 1890, \$99,000,000; and in 1898, \$117,600,000 in round numbers. The principal products are grain, wine, fruit, and vegetables; cattle raising is also a leading industry. As may be presumed, most of the transactions are with France. More than three-fourths of the import and eleven-twelfths of the export trade (\$58,011,941 and \$48,420,000 respectively) is

¹ Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, "L'Algerie et la Tunisie."

² For details, cf. De Lanessan, 50; Leroy-Beaulieu, 357-386; the French legislation in this particular is modelled after the Torrens Act of Australia, cf. *post*, II, Ch. XXI.

with the parent state. Algeria has cost the metropolis enormous sums; from 1830 to 1890 the disbursements for this colony were \$1,000,000,000, while at present it still receives about \$15,000,000 per annum. The budget for 1900 shows approximately revenue \$11,000,000; expenditures, \$14,400,000. Since 1860 the larger share of the disbursements has been for the erection and extension of public improvements. Highways, railroads, and telegraphs have been built, harbors deepened, lighthouses constructed, and cities sanitarized. The length of railways in Algeria exceeds 2000 miles, and there are more than 5000 miles of telegraph lines. In the matter of intellectual advancement, France has been equally attentive. A thorough course of graded instruction has been elaborated. About 1000 primary schools exist, and the entire educational system is crowned by a Franco-Arab college at Algiers. The judiciary is also well organized, and the policy of local self-government is fostered.¹

Generally speaking, the native races within Algeria proper are now completely pacified. Regular and lucrative employment has worked its inevitable effect on the former nomadic tribes. The control of 3,275,000 fierce, proud, strong-minded, courageous people has not been an easy task, but France accepted unflinchingly the labor, and may now justly claim, after a period of seventy years, to have accomplished her purpose. Many have been the moments of irresolution, vacillation, and despair; still, in the end, the triumph due to perseverance, energy, wisdom, and self-sacrifice has been won. This colony may now be cited as a model dependency; an establishment which, indeed, merits its incorporation into the national domain; for, in spite of the prosperity which it has already attained, it is yet only on the threshold of its career. To France of the future its importance and value, both in an economic and political aspect, are incalculable.

Tunis, which forms to the eastward the natural prolongation of Algeria, has an area of 51,000 square miles, and a

¹ For further statistical data, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 556-560.

population approximating 1,700,000 inhabitants. Its territory includes the site of ancient Carthage, which subsequently became the granary of Rome. The history of the region, as one of the Barbary States, is, prior to this century, not dissimilar to that of Algiers; but in more recent times, under the pressure of the European powers, the Bey endeavored to introduce reforms in the government, as well as in the conduct of his subjects.¹ After the conquest of Algeria, French influence was predominant, although the opportunity for creating a closer relationship, more tangible in its nature, did not for many years arise.² Finally, in 1881, France, ostensibly with the sole intent of securing an indebtedness, forced the Bey to acknowledge her protectorate.³ This change practically signaled the transformation of Tunis into a French colony. The administration is, in fact, in the hands of a cabinet composed — with a single exception — of French representatives, who act under the direction of a bureau of Tunisian affairs at Paris.⁴ The aim steadily held in view is the eventual annexation of Tunis on a plan resembling that applied to Algeria.⁵

The country, by reason of its former unity, and because of its vast agricultural resources, bids fair to be much less expensive and more valuable than its neighbor. It was in the first instance peaceably acquired. Until the present not any advances have been made on its account, while, on the other hand, considerable profits have been realized from its commerce. From the period just preceding the inauguration of French rule to the year 1896 the annual trade increased three-fold. The total of all transactions — mostly with France — was in 1898 nearly \$23,000,000, of which a little more

¹ Among other things he renounced piracy and Christian slavery, cf. Rambaud, 435.

² For the gradual growth of French influence in Tunis, cf. Norman, 276.

³ Rambaud, 140; Norman, 284; for the treaty in full, "Annual Cyclopædia" (1881), 309; (1883), 358-359; (1896), 297.

⁴ "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 573 et seq.

⁵ For a comparatively brief account of affairs and conditions in Tunis, cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, 467-518.

than \$12,500,000 were for imports, and nearly \$10,500,000 for exports.¹

In Tunis France found a docile, patient people, many of them well educated and ready to accept whatever benefits the protectorate could bestow upon them.² Under these conditions the modification of the system of government, the construction of public works, and the reorganization of the judiciary, the finances, and public instruction, have not been very difficult. Compared with the record in Algeria, progress has been much more rapid. In fifteen years (1881-1896) almost as great results in moral and civic development had been achieved as during fifty years in the adjoining possession. The future of this region is manifest. In the course of time, incorporation with France, under the style of one or more departments, is unavoidable, when there will be for Tunis a common equality of rights, privileges, and obligations with Algeria, and for France another inalienable stronghold to round out her realms in North Africa.

Before abandoning the consideration of modern French colonization to the southward of the Mediterranean, let it finally be remarked how many lessons may be drawn from these experiences. Algeria presents an unique example of colonial effort. Tunis promises to offer enlightenment upon the method of foreign administration under the form of a protectorate. The details in both cases deserve the attention of those concerned in semi-tropical climes. Were it not for want of space, a thorough study of their varied economic, social, and political aspects might here be practically made; to the full appreciation of the obstacles encountered and the task accomplished, such an investigation is highly essential. In this general outline, however, it is only possible to encourage those interested in the subject to its further and more scientific examination.³

¹ For statistics, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 573 et seq.

² For a description of the inhabitants, cf. Rambaud, 159-162.

³ For French form of government in tropical colonies, cf. Ireland, "Tropical Colonization," 71 et seq.; partially quoted, *supra*, p. 436, note 3.

Napoleon III was always chagrined at the insignificance of French power in the Orient. Inspired by the desire to acquire for France dominions sufficient to indemnify those lost in India during the previous century, he was constantly on the watch for a favorable chance to execute his designs. In 1858 the occasion arose. The Christians had been established in Cochin-China since the seventeenth century, but, after the accession of the Emperor Tu Duc to the throne of Annam, had, because of his personal spite, been subjected to extreme cruelty. Persecution had become habitual, and many massacres had occurred. France and Spain united in 1858 in sending an expedition to the defence of these tortured and terrified believers. Some little success was gained, but, the war with China intervening, the decisive blow to Tu Duc was not given until 1861.¹ At the close of these hostilities France retained several provinces under the name of Cochin-China. In 1863 this territory was extended by the occupation of Cambodia;² in 1883-1885 by the subjugation, after a hard struggle, of Annam;³ in 1884-1893 by the seizure of Tonquin and Laos; and, at length, in 1896 by the annexation of a portion of Siam.⁴ In all probability French influence in this locality is destined to still greater growth. As conditions now are, Cochin-China has an area of 23,160 square miles, with a population of 2,323,499 people; Cambodia, 40,530 square miles, with 1,500,000 inhabitants; Annam, 88,780 square miles, with 2,000,000 to 6,000,000 individuals; and Tonquin (including Laos — a part of Siam), 210,370 square miles, with 13,500,000 residents. The entire area under French control is 363,027

¹ Rambaud, 482-483.

² For the protectorate over Cambodia, cf. Rambaud, 484; De Lanessan, 93-112.

³ The treaty signed at Hué, August 25, 1883, established a French protectorate over Annam and Tonquin, Rambaud, 497; De Lanessan, 112-135; for a brief historical review and an account of the French expedition of 1883, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1883), 763-770. Chinese opposition, however, developed and the campaigns of 1884-1885 followed before the French were in unmolested possession. The final treaty was dated June 9, 1885; cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1884), 137-143; (1885), 24-31, 171-173.

⁴ For the war of 1893, cf. "Annual Cyclopædia" (1893), 687-690; for the convention of 1896, *ibid.* (1896), 702-703.

square miles, containing 22,679,100 human beings. The total commerce of these dependencies amounted in 1898 to approximately \$45,600,000, of which \$25,100,000 were for exports and \$20,500,000 for imports. Of the former the share of France was more than one-quarter, and of the latter less than one-half. The British and the Germans are the leaders in the import trade, while the export business and domestic transactions are largely handled by the Chinese.¹

These colonies, essentially acquisitions by conquest, are properly commercial outposts. Their characteristic feature is the absence of French settlers; for example, in Cochin-China, with its 2,000,000 inhabitants, there are scarcely 3000 Frenchmen; and the most of them are official functionaries or soldiers. As in the olden days, France finds it well-nigh impossible, notwithstanding every effort, to induce her children to emigrate. In Cambodia, Annam, and Tonquin the form of rule is a protectorate; they, together with the colony of Cochin-China, were in 1887 united, under the designation of Indo-China, into a customs union, with a governor-general, residing at Saigon, as the chief delegate of French power.² Each of these possessions is also represented in the French Parliament. The prime object of the administration is to promote mercantile relations with France. As evident from the figures already cited, these attempts have thus far failed.

The French government, by its assiduity in opening these regions to foreign intercourse, is performing a Herculean task. In time the rewards of this labor will probably be reaped; but even if it happen that the direct returns escape France, the nation will, for its energy, still merit the thanks of mankind. Railroads, transport lines, and industries of all kinds are being rapidly introduced and developed. The fertility of the country is extraordinary. Rice, Indian corn, tobacco, vegetables, and tropical fruits are staple products; cotton, tea, coffee, and sugar are also cultivated; mines of coal, antimony,

¹ For statistics, cf. "Statesman's Year Book (1900), 553-556.

² For the history of the Indo-Chinese union of 1887, cf. Rambaud, 561; "Annual Cyclopædia" (1888), 351.

and precious metals abound.¹ The prospect therefore for material progress is most flattering. The two great problems which France must solve are the maintenance of tranquillity among the native populations, and the necessary immigration of her citizens in sufficient numbers properly to promote and manage the vast resources which these districts contain. As in Algeria, likewise here, the administration has formulated plans of immense magnitude for the construction of works of public utility, as well as for the organization of the local judiciary, instruction, and finance. Every element of success exists; the framework is there in detail, only the principal actors are lacking. It remains with the French people to decide whether they will accept the magnificent present prepared for them. In the event of their apathy, the authorities must determine by experience whether they can advantageously sustain these enterprises without the active coöperation of the masses; or if this mighty fabric, like so many others erected in the past, must ultimately crumble. Much will naturally depend upon international politics. If France continues at peace with the world, she may be able to hold in check the wonderfully varied races of her widely dispersed realms; if, perchance, by an untoward contingency she should engage in some European war, she might once again be despoiled of all these territories. Situated in every part of the globe, and as sparsely inhabited as they in fact are by individuals of French blood or descent, scarcely the most formidable army and navy could in any outbreak of general hostilities retain them against foes within as well as without. Again, lengthy consideration might be given to the methods, means, aims, and results attained by the Republic in the different branches of colonial policy and system as applied to Indo-China; but mere reference can here be made to the many particulars of theory and practice elaborately described in the numerous works relating to French colonization.²

¹ For some account of the industries, minerals, and commerce of these regions, cf. Rambaud, 583-588.

² For brief account of the French establishments in Indo-China, cf. Leroy-

The other dependencies of France are scattered throughout the seas. The colonies in Oceanica embrace the Marquesas Islands, occupied in 1841; New Caledonia and its appendages, settled in 1854; Tahiti and Moorea (1880); Tubuai and Ravai-vai (1881); Tuamotu and Gambier Islands (1881); the Wallis Archipelago (1887); and some few others of even less consequence. The main purpose in the acquisition of rights in most instances has been to secure suitable naval bases and coaling stations; only New Caledonia and Tahiti have any significance. The total area of French Oceanica is 9220 square miles, with a population of 82,000 souls. New Caledonia has 7700 square miles and 57,000 people. Tahiti and Moorea together measure 650 square miles, and count 12,755 inhabitants. All the others comprise 1060 square miles, and have only 15,580 residents. The commerce of New Caledonia annually amounts to a trifle more than \$3,000,000, of which three-fifths are imports and two-fifths exports; France participates to the extent of one-half. The trade of the remainder of French Oceanica yearly reaches only \$1,100,000 in value, almost equally divided between imports and exports, and in which France has a share of not quite \$160,000.¹

New Caledonia is chiefly noted as the principal penal settlement of France after the partial abandonment of Guiana; but prior to 1870 the number of criminals here exiled was limited; in that year they included 2302 individuals. In 1871 it turned out that the group was selected as the point of transportation for the communists, of whom nearly 4000 were condemned to deportation thither. This event gave a strong impulse to immigration; the whites have since then constantly increased, and now exceed 20,000, nearly all of whom are French or of French descent. These islands still serve as the place of punishment for certain classes of miscreants.² The climate is salubrious and pleasant; the soil, while not

Beaulieu, 556-568; more at length, Norman, "People and Politics," 71-124; and especially De Lanessan, "French Colonization in Indo-China."

¹ For statistics, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 579-581.

² The offenders are divided into three classes, officially known as "transportés," "relégués," "déportés," Rambaud, 614.

highly fertile, is productive; the mines are especially rich,¹ and the opportunities for trade are favorable. The question of the day and of the future is the management of the convicts alongside of the free inhabitants; it is the one problem upon the solution of which depends the prosperity of these regions, as well as the happiness of several thousand unfortunate human beings.²

Thus the story of French colonization closes. What judgment can be given? Indeed, the verdict on modern French enterprises is not yet written. French rule over foreign lands may well be said to be for the most part in the transitory stage. In America the record is complete. Little, if anything, can be done by France to revive her prestige on this hemisphere. In Africa good progress has been achieved, while in Asia scarcely the beginnings have been made. The importance of French possessions of every kind at the present moment may be judged from the circumstance that Great Britain alone is superior in the extent and population of her dependencies. The superficie of all French territories outside of Europe, as stated, measures 3,740,756 square miles more or less, and their inhabitants in the aggregate approximate 56,401,860. The annual trade of the colonies, exclusive of Algeria and Tunis, reaches \$116,527,000 in round figures; \$55,305,000 being for their imports and \$61,222,000 for their exports; of the entire amount the share of France is \$55,978,000, of which her imports are valued at \$29,441,000 and her exports at \$26,537,000. Including Algeria and Tunis the total volume adds up \$245,951,000 (\$160,295,000 for France), of which exports \$120,085,392 (\$80,891,684 to France); imports \$125,865,651 (\$79,403,515 from France). It is worthy of note that the larger proportion of French colonial transactions, strictly speaking (without those of Algeria

¹ Rambaud, 620; for results accomplished in New Caledonia, cf. De Lanessan, 659-665.

² For some account of French Oceanica and New Caledonia, cf. briefly Leroy-Beaulieu, 568-583; Payne, 367 et seq.; and other works already cited; for statistical data, cf. "Statesman's Year Book" and "Annual Cyclopædia" for recent years.

and Tunis), is under the control of competitors—a palpable proof of the fact that capital, when properly managed and wisely directed, is now a more potent element in newly opened districts than the mighty armies of the ancient world.¹ Money is playing a great rôle in the development of vast realms and in their retention under a permanent, peace-abiding administration. In 1900 France estimated the expenditures for the colonies, aside from those for Algeria, at the sum of \$19,000,000, and expected to receive \$940,000 from them.²

To have effected these results since 1830, in view of the few dilapidated fragments of the former colonial domain, then recently recovered, is certainly a work of which the French people may be proud. While these achievements are not yet by any means final, the foundation is well laid for the subsequent erection of the superstructure. The remarkable method and tact of France during this era are peculiarly exemplified by the representation in the national Parliament granted to the majority of the colonies. It is a prophetic sign; it demonstrates that the prevailing policy aims at the federation of the weaker members of the body politic around the predominant state, rather than the utter subjugation of vast territories and numerous races to the autocratic dictatorship of some distant and unsympathetic power.³

Whatever be the opinion of the details of French rule, it must be conceded that the doctrines of to-day constitute a decided improvement over the theories of the old system. North Africa, Madagascar, and Indo-China are now the principal centres of French influence. With the exercise of due skill, prudence, perseverance, and intelligence these regions should, by their progress, become typical reproductions of France. Time alone will determine; let it not be forgotten that even thus in the middle of the eighteenth century,

¹ The statement should nevertheless be made that the percentage of the total trade of all the possessions controlled by France is gradually increasing.

² Cf. "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 550 and "Annual Cyclopædia" (1899), 294.

³ *Supra*, p. 436, note 3; Ireland, "Tropical Colonization," 73 et seq.

France had in North America and East India visions of absolute empire. How they faded! What catastrophe within fifty short years fell upon the nation and its possessions! It must be with deep regret that French statesmen of this age reflect upon the disasters of the past. May it be with the wisdom gained from the experience of their forefathers that they weigh the difficulties of the present and approach the perplexities of the future. Liberty and exemption from paternalism are the crying needs of French colonization. Let France have the courage to remodel the administration of her colonies, to liberate them from red tape officialism, and to give them their local independence. With these essential reforms, drawing in their wake so many minor ameliorations, permanent prosperity will be assured.

NOTE. — In April, 1898, China leased to France for ninety-nine years the Bay of Kwang-Chau-Wan, on the Lien-Chau peninsula, opposite the island of Hainan; in November, 1899, two islands at the entrance of the bay were included in this arrangement. All are under the jurisdiction of the governor-general of Indo-China. — "Statesman's Year Book" (1900), 458.

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